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
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Edition Used:

The Politics of Aristotle, trans. into English with introduction, marginal analysis, essays, notes and indices by B. Jowett. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1885. 2 vols. Vol. 2.

Author: [Aristotle](#)

Translator: [Benjamin Jowett](#)

About This Title:

Volume 2 of Benjamin Jowett's translation of one of Aristotle's most influential writings. This volume contains Jowett's detailed notes to each Book.

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


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NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK I.

ἡπειδὴ παῖσαν πόλιν κ.τ.λ.

The order of the first paragraph is disturbed by the repetition of the statement that every community aims at some good. The meaning will be clearer if drawn out in a technical form:

Every community aims at some good:
Every city is a community; and therefore
Every city aims at some good.

Upon which rests a second syllogism with added determinants:

Whereas all communities aim at some good,
the highest aim at the highest good:
The city is the highest community; and therefore
The city aims at the highest good.

Compare the opening of the Nicom. Ethics, i. 1. § 1,—

παῖσα τέχνη καὶ παῖσα μέθοδος ἡμοίως δὲ πραξίς καὶ προαίρεσις ἡγαθόν τι τινὲς
ἡγίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλωρὲς ἡπερήναντο τῆγαθὸν ὅτι πάντ' ἡγίεται.

Similarly the Metaphysics begin with a general proposition, πάντες ἡνθρωποι τον
εἰδέναι ἡρέγονται ἡύσει; and the Posterior Analytics, παῖσα διδασκαλία καὶ παῖσα
μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἡκ προῦπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.

The connexion of what follows in § 2, if there be any, is not easy to trace: 'But a community is a complex organisation;' Or, 'But we must not suppose the different forms of communities to be the same;' Or, the agreement described in the first sentence may be contrasted with the difference of opinion in the second;— 'We are all agreed about the end of the state, but we are not equally agreed about the definition of the ruler.'

ἡσοι μὲν ὀνῶν ὀγονται πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν καὶ ὀκονομικὴν καὶ δεσποτικὴν
εἶῶναι τῶν αἰτῶν κ.τ.λ.

The starting-point of Aristotle's enquiry here, as in many other passages, is a criticism of Plato. See Politicus, 259 C, ἡανερῶν ἡς ἡπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ' ἡστὶ τανῶτα· ταύτην δὲ εἶτε βασιλικὴν εἶτε πολιτικὴν εἶτε ὀκονομικὴν τις ἡνομάζει, μηδὲν αἰτῶν διαἡερώμεθα.

This criticism is further worked out in ii. c. 1-5; cp. especially, c. 2. §§ 2-8, where Aristotle shows that the state is composed of dissimilar elements. An opposite view is maintained, or appears to be maintained by Socrates in Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 12, where he says, ὁ τῶν ὀδίων ἡπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν; and § 7, where the good ὁκονόμος is said to be the good στρατηγός. This is a paradoxical way of insisting on the interdependence or identity of different callings; Aristotle rather dwells upon their diversity.

ὁρῶν ἢ μὲν ἡλίγων. Sc. ῥχων ἢ, or ῥχ?

A general notion gathered from the words πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν κ.τ.λ.

καὶ πολιτικὴν δὲ κ.τ.λ.,

sc. τὴν ῥχοντα λέγουσι.

τῆς ἡπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης,

sc. πολιτικῆς, to be supplied either from the previous part of the sentence, or from the word πολιτικὴν which follows:—‘According to the principles of the science which deals with this subject.’ Cp. i. 8. § 7, θάλατταν τοιαύτην, where τοιαύτην is to be explained from ἡλιείας which precedes: and in the same chapter, § 9, τοιαύτη κτησις, where τοιαύτη (meaning ‘in the sense of a bare livelihood’) is gathered from ἀτόντος and μὲν δι’ ἡλλαγῆς in the previous section; and ii. 4. § 4, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ῥχομένους πρὸς τὴν πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὲν νεωτερίζειν; where τοιούτους, meaning ‘disunited,’ is a notion supplied from the preceding words,—ἕττον γὰρ ἔσται ἡλία κοινῶν ἢ τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν: and ii. 6. § 22, ἢ μὲν ὄν ὁκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, where the idea of an ‘imperfect’ state, like that contained in Plato’s Laws, has to be gathered from the whole preceding passage.

κατὰ τὴν ἡγημένην μέθοδον.

i. e. the method of analysis which resolves the compound into the simple. Cp. c. 8. § 1, ἢως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὴν ἡγημένον τρόπον, ἢπερ καὶ ἢ δὲ ἢος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἢν.

ἡγημένην, ‘which we have followed,’ not merely in the Ethics, as Schneider and others; for the same expression occurs N. E. ii. 7. § 9 (κατὰ τὴν ἡγημένον τρόπον), and therefore can hardly refer to them, but ‘generally’ or ‘in this discussion.’ The μέθοδος, like the λόγος in Plato, goes before and we follow. Cp. De Gen. Anim. 3. 758 a. 28, and note on c. 13. § 6.

ἢπερ γὰρ ἢν τοῖς ἡλλοις τὴν σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἢσυνθέτων ἢνάγκη διαίρειν (ταντα γὰρ ἢλάχιστα μόρια τον παντός), ὄτω καὶ πόλιν ἢξ ὄν σύγκειται σκοπονντες ἢνόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μαλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἢλλήλων καὶ εἰ τι τεχνικὴν ἢνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἢκαστον τῶν ἢθέντων.

τούτων may either refer 1)* to ἧ ὠρῶν σύγκειται, i. e. the elements of the state which he is going to distinguish in this book; or 2) to the different kinds of rule mentioned in the preceding paragraph (Bernays, Susemihl): in the latter case it is paraphrased by περὶ ἡκαστον τῶν ἡθέντων, in the next clause. (For the vague antecedent to τούτων cp. supra c. 2. §§ 2, 12, etc., etc.) Aristotle treats of ‘the kinds of rule’ in Book iii. cc. 7, 8, and in the fourth and sixth books.

καί, according to the first explanation = ‘as about the state so about the elements of the state,’ according to the second, = ‘about kinds of government as well as about other things.’ ὅσπερ ἔν τοῖς ἄλλοις . . . καὶ περὶ τούτων is repeated or resumed in ὅσπερ ἔν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἔν τούτοις at the beginning of the next paragraph, c. 2. § 1.

The argument is to the effect that if we analyse forms of government into their parts, or into their kinds, we shall see that they differ in something besides number—e. g. in the nature of the authority exercised in them, or in the character of their magistracies, or in the classification of their citizens. (Cp. iv. 4. § 7 ff.) That states consist not only of their elements, but have in them something analogous to the principle of life in the human frame, is a truth strongly felt by Plato (Rep. v. 462 D), less strongly by Aristotle (infra c. 2. § 13).

εἰ δὴ τις ἧ ἄρχη τῶν πράγματα ὑόμμενα βλέψειεν, ὅσπερ ἔν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἔν τούτοις κάλλιστ’ ἔν ὁτῶ θεωρήσειεν.

Aristotle does not mean that politics are to be studied in the light of history; but rather that the complex structure of the state is to be separated into the simple elements out of which it appears to be created. Yet the two points of view are not always distinguished by him; and his method of procedure is often historical (e. g. in Book v) as well as analytical.

καὶ ἔν . . . ἡτοῖς ἡσικῶν τῶ ἡίεσθαι, ὁτῶν ἀτῶ, τοιοντῶν καταλιπεῖν ἡτερον.

Aristotle, like Plato (Symp. 186), attributed sex to plants, male and female being combined in the same plant. The analogy of plants and animals is drawn out; De Gen. Anim. i. c. 23.

τανῶτα ποιεῖν,

sc. τῶ προορώμμενα ἡπῶ τονῶ ἡρχοντος, another instance of the vague antecedent (c. 1. § 2 and c. 2. § 12).

τῶν Δελτικῶν μάχαιραν.

Evidently an instrument that could serve other purposes than that of a knife. Compare the ἡβελισκολύχνιον mentioned in iv. 15. § 8. The Delphian knife is described by Hesychius as λαμβάνουσα ἡμπροσθεν μέρος σιδηρονῶν, ‘having an iron part added to it in front.’ The name is in some way connected with the sacrifice at Delphi, and is said in the appendix to the Proverbiorum Centuria, 1. 94 (p. 393 Schneidewin) to have passed into a proverb directed against the meanness of the Delphians in taking a part of the sacrifices and in charging for the use of the sacrificial knife. (See Goettling,

Commentatio de Machaera Delphica, Jena, 1856.) We may agree with Schlosser in thinking that the matter is unimportant.

τὸ ὕσει ῥχον οἰκ ῥχουσιν, . . . γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία ἀποτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου.

‘Among barbarians women are slaves. The reason is that all barbarians are equally slaves: there is no ruling principle among them such as gives the true relation of husband and wife, of master and slave; they are all upon a level.’ Cp. *infra*, cc. 12, 13.

‘ο[Editor: illegible character]κον μὲν πρότιστα γυναῖκά τε βονῶν τὸ ῥοτηῖρα.’

Compare Wallace’s *Russia* (p. 90. ed. 8). ‘The natural labour unit (i. e. the Russian peasant family of the old type) comprises a man, a woman, and a horse.’

εἰς παῖσαν ἡμέραν.

‘For wants which recur every day,’ and therefore can never be left unsatisfied.

ῥμοκάπνους.

‘Sitting in the smoke of one fire’ is read by MSS. of the better class, P⁴, L^s, corr. M^b, William de Moerbek; ῥμοκάπους by the rest (Susemihl). The meaning of the latter word ‘fed at the same manger’ is better suited to the context.

ἡ δὲ οἰκ πλειόνων οἰκῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἡνεκεν μὲν ἡμετέρου κόμης.

There was a time when the κόμη or village community had an important place in Greek life. Cp. *iii*. 9. § 14, where it is joined with γένος (πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ ἀτάρκους), and Thucydides, *i*. 5: *ib.* 10 (κατὰ κόμης δὲ τῆς παλαιῆς τῆς ἡλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, sc. τῆς Σπάρτης). Such communities lasted into historical times in Ætolia, Acarnania, Arcadia, and even in Laconia. During the life of Aristotle himself the villages of Arcadia had been united by Epaminondas in the city of Megalopolis (cp. note on *ii*. 2. § 3).

πρώτη. To be taken with the words which follow: ‘When they began no longer to regard only the necessities of life.’

μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ ὕσιν οἰκεν ἡ κόμη ῥποικία οἰκίας εἶναι· οἰς καλονῶσι τινες ῥμογάλακτας, παῖδάς τε καὶ παῖδων παῖδας.

‘The tie of relationship is still acknowledged in the village, which in its most natural form is only a larger family or a colony of the family.’ (There should be a comma in the Greek after ῥμογάλακτας; the words παῖδάς τε κ.τ.λ. though construed with καλονῶσιν, being really an explanation of ῥποικία.) The form of the village community is most natural, not when composed of individuals combined by chance, say, for the purposes of plunder or self-defence, but when the family becoming enlarged leaves its original seat and finds a new home. The expression ῥποικία οἰκίας is not strictly accurate, for the village might grow up on the same spot.

Cp. Cicero de Officiis, i. 17, 'Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis: deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae. Sequuntur fratrum conjunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque; qui cum una domo jam capi non possunt, in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui. Quae propagatio et soboles origo est rerum publicarum.'

ῥμογάλακτες, a rare term for γεννηται or ῥράτερες.

δι? κα? τ? πρωτον βασιλεύοντο α? πόλεις, κα? νν?ν ?τι τ? ῥθνη? κ βασιλευομένων γ?ρ συνηλθον. πα?σα γ?ρ ο?κία βασιλεύεται π? τον? πρεσβυτάτου, ῥστε κα? α? ῥποικίαι δι? τ?ν συγγένειαν. κα? τον?τ' ῥστ?ν ῥ λέγει ῥμηρος,

‘θεμιστεύει δ? ῥκαστος
παίδων ῥδ' ῥλόχων.’

σποράδες γάρ· κα? ο?τω τ? ῥρχα?ον ῥκουν. κα? το?ς θεο?ς δ? δι? τον?το πάντες ῥασ? βασιλεύεσθαι, ῥτι κα? α?το? ο? μ?ν ῥτι κα? νν?ν, ο? δ? τ? ῥρχα?ον βασιλεύοντο· ῥσπερ δ? κα? τ? ε?δη ῥαυτο?ς ῥομοιον?σιν ο? ῥνθρωποι, ο?τω κα? το?ς βίους τω?ν θεω?ν.

The argument is as follows: The rise of the village from the family explains also the existence of monarchy in ancient Hellas. For in the family the eldest rules. This rule of the eldest in the family is continued into the village, and from that passes into the state. In support of his opinion Aristotle quotes what Homer says of the Cyclopes (a passage also quoted by Plato, Laws 680, in a similar connexion), and he further illustrates it by men's ideas about the Gods, to whom they attribute a regal or patriarchal form of government, such as their own had been in primitive times.

τ? ῥθνη here as in ii. 5. § 2 (see note in loco), a general term for barbarians.

κ βασιλευομένων γ?ρ συνηλθον.

Aristotle is here speaking of one kind of monarchy, which may be called the patriarchal. In iii. 14. § 12, he attributes the rise of monarchy to the benefits conferred on the inhabitants of a country in peace or war by distinguished individuals, whereas in this passage he assigns to it a patriarchal origin. Both accounts have probably a certain degree of truth in them. And doubtless in history either form of monarchy may have taken the place of the other; a series of undistinguished kings may have been interrupted by the hero or legislator, and the hero or legislator may have transmitted his power to his posterity. Cp. also iv. 13. § 12.

δι? τ?ν συγγένειαν.

Either 'the relation of the members of the κώμη (γένος) to one another,' or 'to the original ο?κία.'

‘θεμιστεύει δ? ῥκαστος παίδων ῥδ' ῥλόχων.’

Odyssey ix. 114; again alluded to in Nicom. Ethics x. 9. § 13, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστευόντων παίδων ἢ δ' ἡλόχου.

ὅσπερ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδη αὐτοῦ ἴσομοιον εἶναι οὐκ ἄνθρωποι οὕτω καὶ τοῦ βίου τῶν θεῶν.

This is especially true of the Greeks, who limited the divine by the human; in other mythologies the idea of a superior being who could not be conceived, led to extravagance and grotesqueness. And even among the Greeks, the light of fancy was always breaking in, though not in such a manner as to impair the harmony of the poetical vision.

τέλειος πόλις.

Opposed to πρώτη (§ 5).

γινόμενη μὲν ὄντων τὸν ζῆν νεκεν, ὄντων δὲ τὸν ἐν ζῆν.

‘The state is created for the maintenance of life, but when once established has a higher aim.’

ὄντων partly derives its meaning from γινόμενη, ‘having a true being’ opposed to ‘coming into being’ (cp. οὐσία and γένεσις).

ἢ δὲ ἄριστος τέλος [Editor: illegible character]στίν.

By Aristotle the end of a thing is said to be its nature; the best and alone self-sufficing development of it. From this transcendental point of view the state is prior to the individual, the whole to the part (§ 12). But he is not always consistent in his use of language; for while in this passage he speaks of the state as the end or final cause of the οὐκία, in Nic. Ethics viii. 12. § 7 he also speaks of the οὐκία as prior to the state and more necessary (πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον οὐκία πόλεως). Cp. Categories c. 12, 14 a 26.

εἴπερ καὶ αὐτὰ πρῶται κοινωνία.

‘If the original elements of the state exist by nature, the state must exist by nature.’ But is the argument sound? are not two senses of the word nature here confused?

τῶν ἄσει ἢ πόλις.

i.e. because it is the end, the fulfilment, the self-sufficing, the good: yet there is another sense of the word ἄσις, which is not applicable to the state.

ἄσει τοιοντοῦ καὶ πολέμου ἠπιθυμητής, ἢτε περὶ ζυξ ἢ ἢ ἢ περὶ περτοῦ.

Lit. ‘For the alien, who is by nature such as I have described, is also a lover of war.’

The margin of one MS. supported by the old Latin Version (which gives ‘sicut in volatilibus’) reads πετεινοῦς. πετοῦς is the reading of one late MS., πεττοῦς apparently of all the rest. In support of the last a very difficult epigram of Agathias (Pal. Anthology, ix. 482) is adduced in which the term ζυξ occurs in the description of a game played with dice and similar to our backgammon; the game is not however called πεττοί, nor does the description answer to the game of πεττοί. The word ζυξ, when applied to a game, may mean either ‘exposed’ or ‘blocked,’ and so incapable of combination or action. With ἄν πετεινοῦς, ζυξ might be interpreted of birds of prey which fly alone, the solitary opposed to the gregarious: cp. παντῶς γελαίου ζῶου in the next sentence.

But neither ἄν πεττοῦς nor ἄν πετεινοῦς can be precisely explained. The variations of reading (omission of ζυξ ἄν, alteration into ἄνευ ζυγον? τυγχάνων) shew that the copyists were in a difficulty. We can only infer that whether applied to birds or to the pieces of a game, the word ζυξ is here used as a figure representing the solitude of a savage who has no city or dwelling-place.

διότι.

Either 1) *‘why,’ or 2) ‘that.’ In either case the reason is supplied from what follows (§ 11):—‘Man has the faculty of speech, and speech was given him that he might express pleasure and pain, good and evil, the ideas which lie at the basis of the state.’

ἢ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ? οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

τούτων, sc. ‘of these perceptions,’ or rather ‘of those who have these perceptions.’ For the vague antecedent see note on § 2.

καὶ πρότερον δὲ τηρῆ? ἕσει κ.τ.λ.

In idea the state is prior to the family, as the whole is prior to the part, for the true or perfect family cannot exist until human nature is developed in the state: but in time, and in history, the family and the village are prior to the state. The state is ἕσει πρότερον, but the family χρόνῳ πρότερον. See above, note on § 8, and Categ. c. 12, 14 a, 26.

διαθαρῆσα γὰρ ἕσται τοιαύτη.

Referring either 1) to ἕμωνύμως:—‘When the powers of the hand are destroyed (διαθαρῆσα) it will only be such in an equivocal sense;’ or 2) *to ἕπερ λιθίνη ‘it will be like a stone hand.’ Cp. Sir J. F. Stephen’s *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, p. 128, ‘A man would no more be a man if he was alone in the world, than a hand would be a hand without the rest of the body.’

ἢ τι μὲν οὐδὲν ἢ πόλις καὶ ἕσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ καστος, δηλον· εἴ γὰρ μὲν ἀτάρκης καστος χωρισθείς, ἕμοίως τοῦς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ἕλον.

This is a resumption of the words; καὶ πρότερον δὲ τηρῆ? ἕσει κ.τ.λ. in § 12. ‘That the state exists by nature and is prior to the individual is proved by the consideration

that the individual is not self-sufficing; he is therefore a part, like every other part, relative to the whole and so implying it.’

ἴστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

Compare the old scholastic aphorism derived from Aristotle that ‘the man who lives wholly detached from others must be either an angel or a devil;’ quoted by Burke, ‘Thoughts on the causes of the present discontent,’ vol. i. p. 340, edit. 1826.

ἴσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ῥμῆ.

‘True, the political instinct is implanted in all men by nature: yet he who brought them together in a state was the greatest of benefactors’: or 2) with a less marked opposition: ‘The political instinct is natural; and he who first brought men together [and so developed it] was the greatest of benefactors.’

Here as elsewhere Aristotle presupposes a given material, upon which, according to the traditional Greek notion, the legislator works. Society is born and grows, but it is also made.

ἢ δ’ ἄνθρωπος ἢ πλά ἢ χων ἴεται ῥονήσει καὶ ῥετή, οἷος ἢ πῦ τῶναντία ἴστι χρησθῆναι μάλιστα.

1) *ἢ πλά ἢ χων = ἢ πλισμένος, the words ῥονήσει καὶ ῥετή being datives of the instrument. It seems strange at first sight to speak of ῥόνησις and ῥετή as capable of a wrong direction. We might rather have expected Aristotle to have distinguished ῥόνησις from what in Nic. Eth. vi. 12. § 9, is called δεινότης, (an intellectual capacity which may receive a good direction and become ῥόνησις; but may also when receiving a bad direction become πανουργία) and ῥετή, from what in the same passage of the Ethics is spoken of as mere ῥσικῶ ῥετῶ (Nic. Eth. vi. 13. §§ 1 and 2) or in the Magna Moralia i. c. 35, 1197 b. 39, as ῥμαί τινες ῥνευ λόγου πρῶς τῶ ῥνδρεῶα καὶ τῶ δίκαια κ.τ.λ., which may become injurious unless directed by reason (ῥνευ νονῶ βλαβεραῶ ῥαίνονται οὐκ ἴσαι, Nic. Eth. vi. 13, § 1). But the transfer of certain words from a good to a neutral sense or from a technical to a general one is common in Aristotle; and in the fluctuating state of philosophical language may be expected to occur. We must not suppose that he always employed words in the same senses; or that he had a scientific vocabulary fixed by use and ready on all occasions.

2) Bernays and others translate ‘Man is by nature equipped with arms or instruments for wisdom and virtue;’ i. e. Man has a natural capacity which may be developed into ῥόνησις and ῥετή, or may degenerate into their opposites. This gives an excellent meaning and agrees in the use of words as well as in thought with the passage in the Ethics referred to above. But the construction of the dative in the sense of ‘for’ after ἢ πλά ἢ χων is impossible. Or if 3) the datives are taken with ἴεται, a construction which is quite possible, the words ἢ πλά ἢ χων become pointless. In this uncertainty of the construction the general meaning is clear; viz., that ‘man has intelligence and an aptitude for virtue, gifts which are in the highest degree capable of abuse.’

ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ τὴν ἐπιστήμην μάλιστα. There is an inaccuracy in these words; for it is not virtue and knowledge which can be turned to the worst uses (cp. Rhet. i. 1355 b. 4) but the finer nature which is alone capable of virtue. Cp. Goethe's Faust, Prologue in Heaven, where Mephistopheles says, 'Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein nur thierischer als jedes Thier zu sein;' and Nic. Eth. vii. 6. § 7, ἡλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας ὑπερτώτερον δέ. Compare also Plato Repub. vi. 495 A, B, where it is said that the best, i.e. the greatest natures, if they are ill educated, become the worst:—καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οὐ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἔργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίνονται καὶ τοὺς διώτας καὶ οὐ τὰγαθά, οὐ τὰ ταῦτα τύχῳσι ὑέντες· σμικρὰ δὲ ὑσίσ οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὐτε διώτην οὐτε πόλιν δραστῶν.

ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἢ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἢ δὲ δίκη τὸν δίκαιον κρίσις.

'But the virtue of justice unites men in states (i.e. is the quality opposed to the lawlessness which makes men lower than the beasts), and executive justice is the ordering of political society and the decision of what is just.'

In this passage δίκη is the 'administration of justice': δικαιοσύνη, 'the virtue of justice': τὸ δίκαιον, 'the principle of justice to be applied in each case.'

οἰκίας δὲ μέρη, ἕξ ὧν ἀνθρώποις οἰκία συνίσταται· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος καὶ δούλων καὶ ἄλευθέρων.

ἀνθρώποις = 'in turn.' 'As the state is made up of households, so the household in turn is made up of lesser parts; and a complete household includes both slaves and freemen.' Of these elements of the household Aristotle now proceeds to speak.

τὰντα δ' ἐστὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμικὴ (ἐνὸνυμον γὰρ ἢ γυναικῆς καὶ ἀνδρῶς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητικὴ.

Not finding common words which express his idea, Aristotle gives new senses to γαμικὴ and τεκνοποιητικὴ. In ordinary Greek they would have meant 'of or referring to marriage,' and 'to the procreation of children': here he extends their meaning to the whole marital or parental relation. It was natural in the beginning of philosophy to make new words, or to give new meanings to old ones; cp. Plato, Theæt. 182 A, where he calls ποιότης an ἡλλόκοτον ἵνομα, and Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 9, where the relation of husband and wife is termed by a periphrasis τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον, or τὸ πρὸς γυναῖκα δίκαιον: cp. also c. 12. § 1 infra, where πατρικὴ is used for what is here called τεκνοποιητικὴ. That Aristotle found many words wanting in his philosophical vocabulary, we gather from Nic. Eth. ii. 7. §§ 2, 3, 8, 11, De Interp. c. 2 and 3, and infra iii. 1. § 7, where similar remarks are made upon ἡναισθησία, upon the anonymous mean of ἡλιουμία and ἡλιουμία, upon ἡοβία the excess of courage, and upon ἡνομα ἡόριστον, ἡημα ἡόριστον, ἡόριστος ἡρχή.

ἡστῶσαν δ' ἀρῶται τρεῖς ἡς ἐπομεν.

‘Let us assume the relationships, by whatever names they are called, to be three, those which I have mentioned.’ Cp. περὶ τριῶν § 1 above. The passage would read more smoothly if αὐτὰ were inserted before τρεῖς: ‘let there be those three.’

τοῖς δὲ παρὰ ὑμῖν τὸ δεσπάζειν.

Many traces of this sophistic or humanistic feeling occur in Greek Poetry, especially in Euripides: some of the most striking are collected by Oncken, *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles*, vol. ii. pp. 34-36:—

Eurip. Ion, 854-856,—

Ἦν γὰρ τι τοῖς δούλοισιν ἀσχύνῃν ἔρει
τοῖνομα· τὸ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἑλευθέρων
οἷδεὲς κακίων δονῆλος, ἴστις ἴσθλῆς ἴῃ.

ib. Helena, 726 ff.,—

κακῆς γὰρ ἴστις μὲν σέβει τὸ δεσποτῶν
κατὰ ξυγγέγηθε κατὰ ξυνωδίνει κακοῖς.
ἴγω μὲν ἐῆν, κετὰ πέφυχ’ ἴμων λάτρις,
Ἦν τοῖσι γενναίοισιν ἴριθμημένος
δούλοισι, τοῖνομ’ οἷκ ἴχων ἑλεύθερον
τῶν νονῶν δέ.

ib. Melanippe, fr. 515,—

δονῆλον γὰρ ἴσθλῆν τοῖνομ’ οἷ διαῖθερεῖ
πολλοὶ δ’ ἴμείνους ἐσὶ τῶν ἑλευθέρων.

Philem. apud Stobæum,—

κῆν δονῆλος ἴῃ τις, οἷθῶν ἴῃττον, δέσποτα,
ἴνθρωπος οἷῃτός ἴστιν, Ἦν ἴνθρωπος ἴῃ.

ib. fr. 39,—

κῆν δονῆλός ἴστι, σάρκα τῶν ἀτῶν ἴχει·
ἴύσει γὰρ οἷδεὲς δονῆλος ἴγενήθη ποτέ·
ἴ δ’ ἀνῃ Τύχη τῶ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο.

βίαιον γάρ.

Either 1) * = παρὰ ὑμῖν or simply 2) ‘brought about by violence;’ βία may be opposed either to ὑμῖν or νόμος or both.

ἴσπερ δὲ Ἦν ταῖς ἴρισμ[Editor: illegible character]ναῖς τέχναῖς ἴναγκαῖον Ἦν ἐῆ
ἴπάρχειν τῶ οἷκεῖα ἴργα, ἐῃ μέλλει ἴποτελεσθήσεσθαι τῶ ἴργον, οἷτω κατὰ τῶν
οἷκονομικῶν.

The first six words ὅσπερ . . . τέχνας are read as in Bekker supported by some MSS. There is also MS. authority for the omission of δέ; and for the omission of both δ? and ?ν.

Retaining Bekker's reading, we must either 1) *translate, as in the text, making the apodosis to ?πε? ον??ν begin with κα? ? κτητική; or 2) δ? after ὅσπερ may be regarded as marking the apodosis; or 3) the sentence may be an anacoluthon; as frequently after ?πε? in Aristotle (cp. Rhet. ii. 25, 1402 b. 26 ?πε? γ?ρ ? μ?ν κατηγοροῦν δι' ἐκότων ?ποδείκνυσιν κ.τ.λ.). If we omit δέ, the apodosis still begins with ὅσπερ.

τα??ς ?ρισμέναις τέχνας: The arts which have a definite sphere, such as the art of the pilot, or of the carpenter, contrasted with the ill defined arts of politics or household management, cp. c. 13, § 13 ? γ?ρ βάνασος τεχνίτης ??ωρισμένην τιν? ?χει δουλείαν.

Instead of Bekker's reading ο?τω κα? τω?ν ο?κονομικω?ν another reading ο?τω κα? τ?? ο?κονομικ?? has been proposed on the authority of the old translation (Moerbek) 'sic et yconomico.' But τω?ν ο?κονομικω?ν is more idiomatic and has the support of the greater number of MSS. Sc. ο?κε??α ?ργανα δε?? ?πάρχειν.

κα? ὅσπερ ?ργανον πρ? ?ργάνων.

Not 'instead of' but 'taking precedence of':—the slave is in idea prior to the tool which he uses. He is an instrument, but he is also a link between his master and the inferior instruments which he uses and sets in motion.

For the use of πρ? cp. the proverb quoted in c. 7. § 3 δον?λος πρ? δούλου, δεσπότης πρ? δεσπότης. So the hand is spoken of as ?ργανον πρ? ?ργάνων (De Part. Anim. iv. 10, 687 a. 21).

ε? γ?ρ ?δύνατο κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is as follows:—'There are not only lifeless but living instruments; for the lifeless instrument cannot execute its purpose without the living.'

τ? μ?ν ον??ν λεγόμενα ?ργανα ποιητικ? ?ργανά ?στι, τ? δ? κτη?μα πρακτικόν· ?π? μ?ν γ?ρ τη?ς κερκίδος ?τερόν τι γίνεται παρ? τ?ν χρη?σιν α?τη?ς, ?π? δ? τη?ς ?σθη?τος κα? τη?ς κλίνης ? χρη?σις μόνον.

It was said that a possession is an instrument for maintaining life, and there seems to be no reason why both κτήματα and ?ργανα should not be regarded as different aspects of wealth (cp. infra c. 8. § 15, ? δ? πλον?τος ?ργάνων πλη?θός ?στιν ο?κονομικω?ν κα? πολιτικω?ν, and Plato Politicus 287 D, who feels the difficulty of specialising the notion of an ?ργανον: 'there is plausibility in saying that everything in the world is the *instrument* of doing something'). But here the term instrument, used in a narrower sense, is opposed to a possession, and regarded as a mere instrument of production. A parallel distinction is drawn between production and action, and the slave is described as the instrument of action. But he is also spoken of as the 'instrument preceding instruments' (§ 2), words which rather indicate the minister of

production. Aristotle passes from one point of view to another without marking the transition.

He wants to discriminate the household slave from the artisan; but in the attempt to make this distinction becomes confused. The conception of the slave on which he chiefly insists is that he is relative to a master and receives from him a rule of life: c. 13. §§ 12-14. He therefore differs from the artisan.

τ? λεγόμενα, e.g. instruments such as the shuttle, etc.

? δ? βίος πρα?ξις, ο? ποίησίς ?στιν· δι? κα? ? δον?λος ?πηρέτης τω?ν πρ?ς τ?ν πρα?ξιν.

‘Life is action, and therefore the slave, i.e. the household slave, is the minister of action, because he ministers to his master’s life.’

τ? γ?ρ μόνιον ο? μόνον ?λλου ?στ? μόνιον, ?λλ? κα? ?λωσ ?λλου.

Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 8, τ? δ? κτη?μα κα? τ? τέκνον, ?ως ?ν ??? πηλίκον κα? μ? χωρισθη??, ?σπερ μέρος α?τον?.

?λωσ ?κείνου.

The master although relative to the slave has an existence of his own, but the slave’s individuality is lost in his master.

τ?? λόγ? θεωρη?σαι κα? ?κ τω?ν γινομένων καταμαθε??ν.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes between reasoning and facts, the analogy of nature supplying the theory, the observation of the differences which exist among mankind, the fact. Cp. infra vii. 1. § 6, and Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 1; ix. 8. § 2; x. 1. § 4, and Plato (Polit. 278 D), who speaks of the ‘long and difficult language of facts.’ The verbal antithesis of λόγος and ?ργον, which in Thucydides is often merely rhetorical, enters deeply into the philosophy of Aristotle. There is however no real opposition between them any more than between the *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasoning of modern philosophers, which are only different modes of proving or of conceiving the same fact.

ε?θ?ς ?κ γενετη?ς.

‘From their very birth,’ or, with a logical turn, ‘to go no further than the state of birth;’ cp. c. 13. § 6, κα? τον?το ε?θ?ς ??ήγηται περ? τ?ν ψυχήν and infra § 4, τ? δ? ζ??ον πρω?τον κ.τ.λ.

?που δ? τ? μ?ν ?ρχει, τ? δ? ?ρχεται, ?στι τι τούτων ?ργον.

‘As ruler and subject, they may be said to have a work or function—the one to command, the other to obey, apart from any other work or function.’

εἴτ' ἢ συνεχῶν εἴτ' ἢ διηρημένων.

For the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, cp. Categ. 6. 1, p. 4 b. 20, and Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 4. The human frame would be an instance of the first, musical harmony or a chorus or an army of the second. The πόλις may be said to partake of the nature of both in being one body and having many offices or members.

καὶ τὸν τοῦ ἢ τῆς ἰσότητος ἕνεκα ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἄψυχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἢ τοῖς μὲν μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἵνα τις ἴσῃ, ὁ δὲ ἢ ἰσότητος.

1) The connexion is as follows: 'This principle of a superior is found in living beings, but not confined to them. *It is derived from the universal nature, for it pervades all things, inanimate as well as animate' (so Bernays). It is remarkable that Aristotle recognises a common principle pervading alike organic and inorganic nature.

2) Or ἢ is partitive; see Bonitz, Index Arist. 225 b. 11 ff. 'Out of all the kingdom of nature this is found [especially] in living beings' (Stahr, Susemihl). But according to this interpretation, the addition of μάλιστα after ὑπάρχει, suggested by Susemihl, appears to be indispensable to the meaning.

ὁ δὲ ἢ ἰσότητος.

Either 1)* 'as in musical harmony there is a ruling principle determining the character of the harmony,' or 2) 'as harmony is a ruling principle governing the combinations of sounds.' The first accords best with the common meaning of the word ἰσότητος and with the use of the genitive.

ἕτερον ἰσότητος.

'Somewhat foreign to the present subject,' not in the sense of ἕτερον λόγοι.

τὸ δὲ ζῶν πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἢ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἢ ἰσότητος ἵνα ἴσῃ τὸ δὲ ἢ ἰσότητος.

i. e. 'the living creature, as soon as we begin to analyse it, is found to consist of soul and body.'

The opposition expressed by δὲ in τὸ δὲ ζῶν is as follows: 'not to speak of the whole of nature, but of the living creature only.'

For πρῶτον (which is to be taken with συνέστηκεν) meaning either 'to go no further,' or 'as the first result of analysis,' cp. πρῶτον ἢ ζῶν θεωρησάμεν infra § 6, and the similar use of εἴθ' supra § 2.

δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἢ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἴσῃ μακρόν τὸ ἵνα καὶ μὲν ἢ τοῖς διεθαρμένοις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 8 and Cicero Tusc. Disput. i. 14 'num dubitas quin specimen naturae capi deceat ex optima quaque natura?'

ἴσθι δ' ὄντων ἵσπερ λέγομεν.

A resumption of the words τὸ δὲ ζῴον πρῶτον above.

ἢ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ.

Psychology, like logic, is constantly made by Aristotle and Plato the basis or form of politics. The individual is the image of the state in the complexity of his life and organisation, and the relations of the parts of the state are expressed and even suggested by the divisions of the soul, and the relations of mind and body.

τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας ὁ τῶς.

Cp. supra c. 2. § 2 ἵσθον δὲ ἴσσει καὶ ἵσχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν. ἔσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἐρημένοις.

I.e. for the animals, for the body, for the female sex, for τὸ παθητικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, to which he has just referred as inferiors.

διὰ καὶ ἄλλου ἴσθιν.

‘Because he is by nature capable of belonging to another, he does belong to another.’

τὸ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῴα ὁ λόγου ἀσθανόμενα, ἄλλὰ παθήμασιν ἵσπερετῶν· καὶ ἵσ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν.

‘The difference between the slave and the animal is that the slave can apprehend reason but the animal cannot; the use of them is much the same.’

Aristotle is chiefly dwelling on the resemblance between the slave and the animal: but in nothing the difference, he has not duly subordinated it to the general tone of the passage. Hence an awkwardness in the connection.

βούλεται μὲν ὄντων ἵσύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἄλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὸ μὲν ἵσχυρὸν πρὸς τὴν ἵναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὸ δὲ ἵσθὸν καὶ ἵσχρηστα πρὸς τῆς τοιαύτας ἵργασίας, ἄλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (ὁστος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διῆρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν ἐρηνικὴν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὸναντίον, τὸς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἵσχειν ἄλευθέρων τὸς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς.

‘Nature would in fact like, if she could, to make a difference between the bodies of freemen and slaves . . . but her intention is not always fulfilled; for some men have the bodies and some the souls of freemen:’ that is to say, they are deficient in the other half. The bodies of freemen and the souls of freemen are found indifferently among freemen and slaves: or, referring τὸς μὲν to the freemen and τὸς δὲ to the slaves: ‘the one (the freemen) may have the bodies only of freemen, i. e. the souls of slaves, the others (the slaves) may have the souls of freemen.’

ἄλευθέρων must be taken both with σώματα and ψυχῆς.

βούλεται expresses, first of all, ‘intention’ or ‘design;’ secondly, ‘tendency.’ The personal language easily passes into the impersonal. Cp. for the use of βούλομαι Nic. Eth. v. 8. § 14, βούλεται μένειν μάλλον, sc. τὸ νόμισμα, and infra c. 12. § 2. For the general thought, cp. Theognis (line 535 Bergk), οὔποτε δουλείη κεῖται ἢ θεοῖα πέφυκεν | ἄλλ’ ἀεὶ σκολιή, κατὰ χεῖρα λούξῃ χειρὶ.

ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἰσομοίως ἴδιον δεῖν τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸν σώματος.

The connection is,—‘There is as great difference between souls as between bodies or even greater, but not in the same degree perceptible.’ For the ‘sight of the invisible’ cp. Plat. Phaedr. 250 D, ‘For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though not by that is wisdom seen,’ and the words preceding.

τί μὲν τοίνυν εἴς τινος οὐ μὲν ἡλεύθεροι, οὐ δὲ δούλοι, ἀνερόν·

οὐ μὲν and οὐ δὲ are not subdivisions of τινός, which is itself partitive, but there appears to be a pleonastic confusion of two constructions; 1) τινος μὲν ἡλεύθεροι τινος δὲ δούλοι: and 2) οὐ μὲν ἡλεύθεροι οὐ δὲ δούλοι. In other words the construction beginning with τινος has varied into οὐ μὲν—οὐ δέ.

ὅσπερ ἤτορα γράγονται παρανόμων.

‘But a convention by which captives taken in war are made slaves, is a violation of nature, and may be accused of illegality like the author of an unconstitutional measure.’ The more common view is expressed in Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. § 73, νόμος γὰρ ἢ παρὰ τὴν ἰσότητα ἴδιός ἐστιν, ἢ τὰν πολεμούντων πόλιν ἄλλῃ, τῶν ἰσότητων εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἰσότητων πόλιν καὶ τὰ χρήματα.

ἀτίον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἰσοβητικῆς, καὶ ἢ ποιεῖ τὸς λόγους παλλάττειν, τί τὸν τρόπον τινὸς ἴσως τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἴσως ἢ τὸ κράτος ἢ τὴν ἰσοβητικῆς ἰσότητος, ἴσως δοκεῖν μὲν ἴσως ἴσως εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἄλλ’ ἴσως περὶ τὸν δίκαιον μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἰσοβητικῆσιν. Διὲ γὰρ τὸν τοῦ τοῦ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦ δ’ ἀτὲ τὸν τοῦ δίκαιον, τὸ τὴν κρείττονα ἴσως, ἴσως διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὐτ’ ἴσως οὐθὺν ἴσως οὐτε πιθανὸν ἴσως λόγοι, ἴσως οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ’ ἴσως ἴσως καὶ δεσπόζειν.

ἢ ποιεῖ τὸς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Not ‘makes the reasons ambiguous’ (Liddell and Scott), but ‘makes the arguments pass from one side to the other,’ or, ‘makes them overlap’ or ‘invade each other’s territory,’ as in the Homeric phrase, ἰσοβητικῆσιν | περὶ γὰρ παλλάξαντες (Il. xiii. 358, 9), and in iv. 10. § 2,—τυραννίδος δ’ εἶδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἢ οὐτὸς περὶ βασιλείας ἴσως ἴσως, διὲ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν παλλάττειν πῶς ἀτὸν καὶ περὶ τὴν βασιλείαν. vi. 1. § 3,—τὰν γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιεῖ τὸς πολιτείας παλλάττειν, ἴσως ἴσως τε ἴσως ἴσως εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. See also infra c. 9. § 15. Virtue and power are opposed: but from one point of view the arguments cross over or pass into one another, because there is an element of virtue in power and of power in virtue. Cp. Plat. Rep. i. 352 ff.

Δι? γ?ρ τον?το, κ.τ.λ. The translation given in the text nearly agrees with that of Bernays: the phrase τούτων τῶν λόγων in § 4 refers, not to the το?ς λόγους of § 3, but to the two positions which immediately precede; the first, that justice is benevolence; the second, that justice is the rule of a superior. These two positions, according to Aristotle, have a common ground, which explains why such a difference of opinion can exist (§ 3). This common ground is the connexion between ?ρετ? and βία; the point in dispute being whether the principle of justice is benevolence or power (§§ 3, 4). If these two propositions are simply kept apart and not allowed to combine, there will follow the silly and unmeaning result that the superior in virtue is not entitled to rule: ‘but there is no force or plausibility in this’ [and therefore they cannot be kept apart, but must be combined]. Aristotle is arguing from his own strong conviction, which is repeated again and again in the Politics, that the superior in virtue has a right to rule. He continues: ‘There are others who maintain that what is legal is just; but they contradict themselves, for what is allowed by law may be in a higher sense illegal. Captives taken in war are by law usually enslaved, yet the war may be unjust, and the persons may be ‘nature’s freemen,’ and unworthy to be made slaves. But all these views are untenable; and so Aristotle shews negatively that his own view (expressed in c. 6. §§ 1 and 3) is right, namely, that there is a slavery which is natural and just, because based on the superior virtue of the master, and therefore combining power and right; and that there is a slavery which is unnatural and unjust, because based on mere violence; also that the argument from the right of the conqueror is invalid.

The chief difficulties in this complicated passage are the following:—

- (1) The opposition of justice to virtue, which is, perhaps, only to virtue in the lower sense of the word.
- (2) What is the meaning of δι? γ?ρ τον?το (§ 4)? See Eng. text.
- (3) Is ε?νοια *a*) a principle excluding slavery (Bernays), or *b*) justifying slavery, as existing for the protection of the inferior races (cp. 5. § 11, ο??ς κα? συμ?έρει τ? δουλεύειν, 6. § 10 and iii. 6. § 6)? The thesis that ‘justice is benevolence’ is held by Aristotle to be not inconsistent with slavery, that is, with the just rule of a superior.
- (4) Do the words διαστάντων χωρ?ς = *a*)* ‘being kept apart and not combined, placed in bare opposition,’ or *b*) ‘being set aside?’ Both uses of δίστασθαι are justified by examples; in support of the former we may quote Ar. de Caelo, ii. 13, 295 a. 30, ?τε τ? στοιχε??α (sc. of Empedocles) διειστήκει χωρ?ς ?π? τον? νείκους, and supra c. 5. §§ 2, 8; and this meaning agrees better with the context.
- (5) Do the words ?τεροι λόγοι refer *a*) to one of the two preceding propositions, or *b*) to a further alternative? It is doubtful whether they are Greek, if taken in the sense of ‘the latter,’ or ‘one of these two propositions.’ It is better to translate ‘the other view,’ which is explained by what follows, ?ς ο? δε?? κ.τ.λ., being the view which denies the natural right of the superior in virtue to rule, and which here as elsewhere, iii. 13. 25, is regarded by Aristotle as absurd. (See discussion of this passage in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. II.)

No philosopher is known to have asserted that δικαιοσύνη is ἐ?νοια. Aristotle in Nic. Eth. viii. 1. § 4, 9. §§ 1-3 notes some resemblances between δικαιοσύνη and ?λία: and we may cite as parallel the Christian maxim, 'Love is the fulfilling of the law.'

?λωσ δ' ?ντεχόμενοι τινες, ?ς ο?ονται, δικαίου τινός·

'There are some again who identify law and justice.' ?λωσ may be taken either 1) with τιθέασι, 'they maintain in general terms,' i.e. holding to some general notion of justice; or 2)* with ?ντεχόμενοι, 'holding absolutely to a kind of justice.'

?μα δ' ο? ?ασιν·

'But in the same breath they say the opposite,' i.e. they are compelled by facts, if they think for a moment, to contradict themselves. The language is slightly inaccurate; for it is not they who contradict themselves, but the facts which refute them.

τήν τε γ?ρ ?ρχ?ν ?νδέχεται μ? δικαίαν ε??ναι τω?ν πολέμων, κα? τ?ν ?νάξιον δουλεύειν ο?δαμω?ς ?ν ?αίη τις δον?λον ε??ναι.

Either one or two distinct grounds are alleged: 1)* the cause of war may be unjust, and then the slave ought not to be a slave; or 2) the cause of war may be unjust, and also the slave, being a Greek, ought not to be a slave.

διόπερ α?το?ς ο? βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ?λλ? το?ς βαρβάρους.

Cp. Xen. Hell. i. 6. § 14, κελυ?ντων τω?ν ξυμμάχων ?ποδόσθαι κα? το?ς Μηθυμναίους ο?κ ??η [? Καλλικρατίδας] ?αυτον? γε ?ρχοντος ο?δένα ?λλήνων ε?ς τ? ?κείνου δυνατ?ν ?νδραποδισθη?ναι, and Plat. Rep. v. 469 B, C, where Plato indignantly prohibits Hellenes from becoming the owners of other Hellenes taken in war.

?σπερ ? Θεοδέκτου ?λένη ?ησί.

Theodectes was a younger contemporary, and, according to Suidas, scholar of Aristotle. During the earlier portion of his life he had studied rhetoric under Isocrates, and is said by Dionysius to have been one of the most famous of rhetoricians. His works are often quoted by Aristotle, e.g. Rhet. ii. 23, 1399 a. 7, παράδειγμα ?κ τον? Σωκράτους τον? Θεοδέκτου, Ε?ς πο??ον ?ερ?ν ?σέβηκεν; τίνας θεω?ν ο? τετίμηκεν, ω??ν ? πόλις νομίζει; Nic. Eth. vii. 7. § 6, ο? γ?ρ ε? τις ?σχυρω?ν κα? ?περβαλλουσω?ν ?δονω?ν ?ττα?ται ? λυπω?ν, θαυμαστόν, ?λλ? κα? συγγνωμονικόν, ε? ?ντιτείνων, ?σπερ ? Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ?π? τον? ?χεως πεπληγμ?νος, and in several other passages. See Bonitz.

?ταν δ? τον?το λέγωσιν, ο?θεν? ?λλ' ? ?ρετ[Editor: illegible character] κα? κακί? διορίζουσι τ? δον?λον κα? ?λεύθερον.

'When they speak of Hellenes as everywhere free and noble, they lay down the principle that slave and free are distinguished by the criterion of bad and good.'

ἢ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τὸν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν πολλάκις ὁ μὲντοι δύναται.

Not 'nature sometimes intends this and sometimes not,' for she always intends it; nor 'nature always intends this, but often cannot accomplish it,' which does violence to the order of the words *πολλάκις ὁ μὲντοι*: but 'this nature often intends, when unable to accomplish it,' *πολλάκις* adhering to both clauses.

ἢ τί μὲν ὄντων ἔχει τινὲς λόγον ἢ μὴ ἰσβήτησις.

ἢ μὴ ἰσβήτησις, sc. the objection to slavery with which chapter 6 commenced, ἢ τί δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶναντία ἄσκοντες.

καὶ ὁκ ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν φύσει δονῶλοι ὁ δ' ἡλεύθεροι.

'And that men are not by nature, the one class [all] slaves and the other [all] freemen, is evident,' repeating ἢ τί. Aristotle had maintained at the end of chapter 5, ἢ τί μὲν τοῖσιν ἐστὶ φύσει τινὲς ὁ μὲν ἡλεύθεροι, ὁ δὲ δονῶλοι, ἡανερὸν: here he affirms the opposite of his former statement; but he does not explain in what way the two statements are to be reconciled with one another. 'Nature has divided mankind into slaves and freemen, but she has not consistently carried out the division; and there are slaves and freemen who were not the creation of nature.'

The words ἐστὶ καὶ are inserted before ὁκ ἐστὶν by Bekker, (ed. 2); 'if there are some who are by nature slaves and some who are by nature freemen, there are some who are not.' The change has no authority, and is not required by the sense.

ἢν τις διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἂν συμῆρει τὸ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τὸ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν.

'Such a distinction has been made in some cases, and in these it is expedient that one should serve another rule'; ὡς ἂν is substituted for ὁς, that it may be in regimen with τὸ μὲν.

ἢστε καὶ δεσπόζειν.

'And consequently the master over his slaves,' i.e. if they and he are fitted, the one to serve, the other to command.

διὲ καὶ συμῆρον ἢ τί τι καὶ ἡλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς ἡλλήλους.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 11. § 7, ἢ τί μὲν ὄντων δονῶλος ὁκ ἔστὶ ἡλία πρὸς ἀτόν, ἢ τί δὲ ἡνθρωπος. The qualification contained in the last three words shows the contradiction of Aristotle's position.

ἡανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἡκ τούτων.

Aristotle returns to the thesis with which he commenced; 'From these considerations, too, i.e. from the natural and permanent difference of freemen and slaves, our old

doctrine (i. 1. § 2) that the rule of a master differs from that of a king or statesman, the art of governing a family from the art of governing freemen,' is clearly proven.

ἴσθι γὰρ ἴτερα ἴτέρων κ.τ.λ.

'Slaves have various duties, higher and lower, and therefore the science which treats of them will have many branches; and there is a corresponding science of using slaves, which is the science of the master; yet neither is implied in the terms master or slave; who are so called not because they have science, but because they are of a certain character.' Yet the two propositions are not inconsistent: Plato would have said that the master must have science, and not have denied that he must be of a certain character.

δονῆλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

Aristotle clearly uses the word πρὸ in the sense of precedence as supra c. 4. § 2, ἴργανον πρὸ ἴργάνων. Such a hierarchy among servants as well as masters is not unknown in modern society.

But compare iv. 6. § 6, where he says that the rich having to take care of their property have no leisure for politics.

ἴ δὲ κτητικὴ ἴτερα ἴμῶτέρων τούτων, ὁἴον ἴ δικαία, πολεμικὴ τις ὁἴσα ἴ θηρευτικὴ.

The passage is obscurely expressed. The writer means to say that the art of acquiring slaves is not to be identified either with the art of the slave or of the master: it is a kind of war (vii. 14. § 21) or hunting. The words ὁἴον ἴ δικαία imply that Aristotle is not disposed to justify every mode of acquiring slaves from inferior races: (compare below c. 8. § 12, ἴ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος ἀἴτης [sc. τῆς κτητικῆς], ἴ δὲ ἴ χρησθαι πρὸς τε τῆ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἴνθρώπων ἴσοι πεἴυκότες ἴρχεσθαι μῆ θέλουσιν, ἴ ἴύσει δίκαιον τὸνἴτον ἴντα τῶν πόλεμον). The awkward manner of their introduction leads to the suspicion that they are a gloss, suggested by the passage just cited. The sense of ὁἴον is explanatory and so corrective; not, as Bernays, 'for example, the art of justly acquiring slaves approximates to the art of war or hunting;' for this would apply equally to every mode of acquiring slaves, and the meaning given to τις is feeble; but 'I mean to say,' or 'I am speaking of the just mode of acquiring slaves which is a kind of war or of hunting.' (See Bonitz, *Index Arist.*, s.v. ὁἴον.)

ἴλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κἴσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τῶν ἴηγημένον τρόπον, ἴείπερ καὶ ἴ δονῆλος τῆς κἴσεως μέρος τι ἴν.

'We have been speaking (ἴν) of the possession of slaves which is a part of property, and according to our usual method of resolving the whole into its parts, we will now proceed to consider generally the other parts of property.' For ἴηγημένον cp. note on c. 1. § 3.

ἴότερον ἴ χρηματιστικὴ ἴ ἀἴτῃ τῆἴ ὁἴκονομικῆἴ ἴστίν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle proceeds to show that the art of money-making is not the same with the management of the family; it is only subordinate to it. But subordinate in what way? Bearing in mind his own distinction of instrumental and material, he argues that it provides material to the household, but is not the same with household management.

ἴστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. = ‘the question arises’ or ‘we are led to ask first of all, whether tillage is a part of the management of a household; or rather whether we must not include all the various ways of providing food,’ which are then described at length.

The digression which follows is intended to contrast χρηματιστικὴ in all its branches with οἰκονομική, and to prepare for the distinction between the natural and unnatural modes of acquisition.

The sentence is irregular, the clause ἴστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. following as if ἴστι τον χρηματιστικὸν θεωρησαί without εἴ had preceded. The words ἴστι τον χρηματιστικὸν κ.τ.λ. are to be repeated with πότερον μέρος τι.

ἴλλῃ μὲν εἴδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς.

‘The question has been asked, Is the whole provision of food a part of money-making?—But then we should remember that there are several kinds of food.’

πρὸς τῆς ἀστώνας καὶ τῶν ἀρῆσιν τῶν τούτων.

τῆς ἀστώνας κ.τ.λ. ‘For their convenience and the obtaining’; the words may also be regarded as a hendiadys, ‘for the opportunity of obtaining.’

τούτων. Sc. καρπῶν, ζῴων, understood from ζῴογά, καρπογά.

According to the common notion the life of the hunter precedes that of the shepherd; Aristotle places the shepherd first, apparently because the least exertion is required of him. The remark arises out of the previous sentence, in which he divided the lives of men according to the facility with which they obtained food. Cp. Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks.

θάλατταν τοιαύτην.

Sc. συμῆρουσαν πρὸς ἴλιαν. Cp. note on c. 1. § 2.

ἀτόυτον.

Either 1)* ‘immediately obtained from the products of nature’ = ἴξ ἀτης της ἴσσεως, or 2) = ἀτουργόν, ‘by their own labour.’

τῶν ἴνδεέστατον βίον.

Bernays reads ἴνδεέστερον without MS. authority, but there is no need to make any change. The meaning is that they supplement the extreme poverty (ἴνδεέστατον) of one kind of life by another: the two together give them a comfortable subsistence.

In this sentence two clauses are compressed into one:—‘one kind of acquisition is according to nature, and this is a part of household management.’

κατ' ὕσιν is equivalent to ? κατ' ὕσιν ἔστι, and is best taken, not with οἰκονομικῆς (Bernays) but with κτητικῆς, as is shown by the use of the words infra § 15: ?τι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατ' ὕσιν τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, καὶ δι' ἣν ἀτίαν, δηλον.

? δεῖ ?τοι ?πάρχειν ? πορίζειν ἀτὲν ἴπως ?πάρχῃ, ὡς ἔστι θησαυρισμῶν χρημάτων πρὸς ζῶν ?ναγκαίῳ καὶ χρησίμων ἐς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ? οἰκίας.

? δεῖ is a confused expression referring grammatically to ἐξῆδος κτητικῆς or τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος, but in sense to the property with which this art of acquisition is concerned. It is needless to read with Bernays καθ' ? δεῖ, for the inexact antecedent is common in Aristotle.

ἀτὲν refers to κτητικῆς or possibly to ὕσιν: the nominative to ?πάρχῃ is either the same as to ?πάρχειν, i. e. ? = κτήματα understood from ἐξῆδος κτητικῆς, or θησαυρισμῶν χρημάτων ? ἔστι πρὸς ζῶν ?ναγκαίῳ, the genitive ὡς ἔστι being substituted by attraction for the nominative = ἴπως ?πάρχῃ χρήματα ὡς ἔστι θησαυρισμῶν. It must be admitted that the words ὡς ἔστι would be better away: they read awkwardly, and, if this were a sufficient reason for rejecting them, might be deemed spurious.

πλούτου δ' οἴθῃν τέρμα περὶ ἀσμένον ἴνδράσι κεῖται.

Solon, Fr. xii. 71 Bergk. The line is also found in Theognis 227 with a slight variation, ἴνθρώποισι for ἴνδράσι κεῖται.

κεῖται γὰρ ἴσπερ καὶ τὰς ἴλλαις τέχναις.

A slight inaccuracy; either 1) πλούτῃ understood = τῆς τέχνης τον? πλούτου: or 2) τὰς ἴλλαις τέχναις may be taken to mean the subjects of the other arts: or vaguely = ‘in the other arts’: or 3) τῆς κατ' ὕσιν κτητικῆς may be supplied from the beginning of the sentence.

οἴδῃν γὰρ ἴργανον ἴπειρον οἴδεμιας ἔστι τέχνης οἴτε πλήθει οἴτε μεγέθει, ? δῃ πλον?τος ἴργάνων πλῆθός ἔστιν οἴκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

Life, according to Aristotle, is subject, like the arts, to a limit, and requires only a certain number of implements.

Cp. the passage in the Republic (i. 349, 350) in which it is shewn from the analogy of the arts that the just and the wise do not aim at excess. Here as elsewhere ‘the good is of the nature of the finite,’ whereas evil is undefined. Cp. also Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 14, τῃ γὰρ κακῶν τον? ἴπείρου, ἔς οἴ Πυθαγόρειοι ἐκαζον, τῃ δῃ ἴγαθῶν τον? πεπερασμένον: and Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks, ‘the definition of wealth as signifying instruments is philosophically correct but departs too widely from the custom of language.’

δι' ἣν αἰτίαν.

Sc. because provision has to be made for the uses of life.

δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας.

'Owing to which,' or 'to the nature of which,' 'there appears to be no limit,' etc.

ἵσται δ' ἢ μὲν ἴσσει ἢ δ' οὐ ἴσσει.

So Plato divides κτητικὴ into θηρευτικὴ and ἑλλακτικὴ, Soph. 223 ff.

ἰκαστοῦ κτήματος διττὴ ἢ χρησῖς.

Cp. Adam Smith's 'Value in use' and 'Value in exchange'; Wealth of Nations, Book i. c. 4, though the order of the two ideas is inverted. For to Aristotle the value in use or teleological value is the truer and better, to Adam Smith as a political economist the value in exchange is prior in importance.

ἵσον γὰρ ἴκανῶν αἰτοῦσθαι.

Sc. τοῦσθαι ἰσθῶντες.

οὐ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αἰτωμένων κοινωνοὺν πάντων, οὐ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἰτέρων· ὧσθαι κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἰναγκαῖον ποιηθῆσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις.

Bernays inserts ἕτεροι before ἰτέρων, which he would translate 'different persons want different things;' and he assumes the idea of want to be implied in κεχωρισμένοι. But it is difficult to understand this explanation. A fair meaning may be elicited from the text, as it stands:— 1)* 'In families they shared in all things alike; when they were dispersed they had many things as before, but not all the same': or 2) καὶ ἰτέρων may be taken more simply: 'they shared in many things as before, and had many other things as well'; i. e. the enlargement of society gave rise to new wants. The word κοινωνοὺν = κοινῶν ἐπιχρον is not equally applicable to both clauses; in the second clause some other word like ἐπιχρον or ἰκτωῖντο is wanted.

For κεχωρισμένοι compare ii. 2. § 3, Διοίσει δὲ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ πόλις ἰθνοὺς ἴταν μὲν κατὰ κόμας ὧσθαι κεχωρισμένοι τὴν πληθῶσ, ἵλλ' οὐσθαι ἰρκάδες.

οὐ μὲν, sc. οὐ ἴν τῆσ πρῶτῆ κοινωνίῆ, 'mankind in the first stage of society'; οὐ δέ, sc. πλείονος τῆσ κοινωνίῆσ οὐσθῆσ further explained by κεχωρισμένοι, 'mankind after their dispersion.'

ὧσθαι in the words which follow is to be connected with τὰς μεταδόσεις.

καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἰθνωμένων.

κα? which is found in all the MSS., though omitted in William de Moerbeke, merely emphasizes the whole clause ‘As moreover some barbarian nations still do.’ There is no need to introduce *vuv* after κα? without MS. authority, as Bernays has done.

ε?ς ?ναπλήρωσιν τη?ς κατ? ?ύσιν α?ταρκείας.

Lit. ‘to fill up what was wanting of the self-sufficingness intended by nature;’ or ‘to fill up what nature demanded in order to make man self-sufficing,’ = ε?ς ?ναπλήρωσιν τη?ς κατ? ?ύσιν ?νδείας ?στε α?τάρκη ε??ναι.

κατ? λόγον. ‘In a natural way’; ‘as might be expected.’

ξενικωτέρας γινομένης τη?ς βοηθείας.

‘When the supply began to come more from foreign countries,’ etc.

?ξ ?νάγκης ? τον? νομίσματος ?πορίσθη χρη?σις.

‘Of necessity there arose a currency.’

Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 371 B, νόμισμα σύμβολον τη?ς ?λλαγη?ς ?νεκα. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 11, ο??ον δ’ ?πάλλαγμα τη?ς χρείας τ? νόμισμα γέγονε κατ? συνθήκην.

? τω?ν χρησίμων α?τ? ?ν ε??χε τ?ν χρείαν ε?μεταχείριστον.

‘Money belongs to the class of things which are in themselves useful and convenient for the purposes of life,’ although there may be circumstances under which it is a mere sham (λη?ρος); see § 11.

πορισθέντος ον??ν ?δη νομίσματος ?κ τη?ς ?ναγκαίας ?λλαγη?ς θάτερον ε??δος τη?ς χρηματιστικη?ς ?γένετο, τ? καπηλικόν, τ? μ?ν πρω?τον ?πλω?ς ?σως γινόμενον, ε??τα δι’ ?μπειρίας ?δη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν κα? πω?ς μεταβαλλόμενον πλε??στον ποιήσει κέρδος.

θάτερον ε??δος, i.e. ‘other’ than what Aristotle before called ?ν ε??δος κτητικη?ς (c. 8. § 13) which he had not yet distinguished from καπηλική. He admits that the simpler forms of exchange are necessary; but he also supposes that there are two uses to which the art of money-making may be applied, the one, the storing up of the necessaries of life, which he approves, the other, retail trade which he condemns. A prejudice against money, which is further developed in the condemnation of usury (c. 10. §§ 4, 5) underlies the whole tone of thought. We may note that καπηλική, though here applied to trade in general, carries with it the disparaging association of shopkeeping.

πόθεν κα? πω?ς μεταβαλλόμενον is dependent on δι’ ?μπειρίας.

For the story of Midas see Ovid, Met. xi. 90-145. It is obvious that Midas would have suffered equally if his touch had produced food or clothing or any other article of commerce. In his account of money Aristotle seems to be perplexed between its

usefulness and its uselessness, and between the good and bad consequences which flow from it.

τι γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρασ τῆς ἄλλαγῆς.

Money is the element, i.e. the instrument of exchange. It is also the limit or end of it. Exchange is not possible without money and seeks for nothing beyond it.

καὶ ἄπειρος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι πλοῦτος.

There is no limit to the art of making money any more than to medicine or other arts; for we want to have as much health and wealth as we can. But there *is* a limit if we regard wealth as only a means to an end, i.e. to the maintenance of a household. The passage is not very clearly expressed, owing partly to the double meaning of the word πέρασ, (1) 'limit' or 'measure,' as opposed to the infinite or indefinite ἄπειρον, and (2) 'end' as opposed to 'means.' Aristotle probably intends to say that the art of money making is unlimited, having no other end but wealth, which is also unlimited; whereas in the art of household management, the limit or end is fixed by natural needs.

There is another confusion in this chapter. Aristotle tries to make a difference in kind between the legitimate and illegitimate use of exchange, but the difference is really one of degree. Trade is not rendered illegitimate by the use of coin, which is natural and necessary. The source of the confusion is that he never regards exchange on the great scale as the saving of labour, but only as the means of creating superfluous wealth.

ὅσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἰατρικὸν τὸν ὑγιαίνειν ἐξ ἄπειρον ἔστι καὶ ἄκαστη τῶν τεχνῶν τὸν τέλος ἐξ ἄπειρον (ἔτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἄκατη νοβούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ ἐξ ἄπειρον (πέρασ γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τὸν τέλος πέρασ, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοῖοντος πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις.

'The art of money-making, like the other arts, is limited in the means, but unlimited in the end; as the physician seeks health without limit, so the money-maker seeks wealth without limit.' Yet the analogy is defective; for there is no accumulation of health in the same sense in which there may be an accumulation of wealth. The physician stands really on the same footing with the manager of the household; for both equally seek to fulfil to the utmost their respective functions, the one to order the household, the other to improve the health of the patient, and there is a limit to both. The opposition of means and ends is also questionable; for the end may be regarded as the sum of the means, and would not an unlimited end, if such a conception is allowable, imply unlimited means, or the unlimited use of limited?

τῆς δ' οὐκονομικῆς οὐκ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι πέρασ· οὐ γὰρ τὸν τοῦ τῆς οὐκονομικῆς ἔργον.

Lit. 'the art of household management which is not concerned with money-making has a limit; for this (sc. ὁ τοῖοντος, the unlimited making of money described above) is not its business.'

ἡπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ τὸν ἀπονηθῆσαν κατέρρα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.

‘For the two uses of money-making being concerned with the same thing, namely coin or wealth, they run into each other.’

ἡ χρηματιστικὴ governs both τῆς χρηματιστικῆς and τὸν ἀπονηθῆσαν. The emendation of Bernays κατέρρα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς is unnecessary.

τῆς γὰρ ἀπονηθῆσαν χρήσεως κτηματιστικῆς, ἄλλ’ οὐ κατὰ τὸν αἴτιον, ἄλλ’ τῆς μὲν ἕτερον τέλος, τῆς δ’ ἀφῆσεις.

χρήσεως κτηματιστικῆς. ‘For acquisition belongs to the same use of χρηματιστικῆς,’ i.e. in all acquisition chrematistic is used in the same way, though the ends differ, for the end in the one case is external, i.e. the supply of the household, in the other case, mere accumulation.

ἄλλ’ οὐ κατὰ τὸν αἴτιον ζῆλον ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τῆς πολυαύσεις τῆς σωματικῆς ζήτησιν, ἄλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὸν αἴτιον ἢ τῆς κτήσεως αἴτιον ἢ ἀρχαίαν κ.τ.λ.

Even good men desire pleasures, and therefore wealth, just because these (τὸν αἴτιον) depend on wealth. Cp. τὸν αἴτιον, § 15, referring to χρηματιστικῆς.

ἡνδρίας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἄλλ’ ἄρσος.

I. e. whereas the virtue of courage, the art of medicine or of military command have severally ends of their own, they are perverted to the unnatural end of money-making.

δηλον δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀπονηθῆσαν ἢ ἀρχαίαν, πότερον τὸν οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ἄλλ’ οὐ χρηματιστικῆς οὐ, ἄλλ’ δεῖ τὸν αἴτιον μὲν ἢ ἀρχαίαν κ.τ.λ.

τὸν ἀπονηθῆσαν see supra c. 8. §§ 1, 2.

τὸν αἴτιον, sc. τὸν χρήματα, understood from χρηματιστικῆς as infra § 3 τὸν αἴτιον ἢ ἀρχαίαν refers to τὸν χρήματα. ἄλλ’ δεῖ is the other alternative of the ἀπονηθῆσαν, implying the answer to the question: ‘whether the art of money-making is the business of the manager of the household and of the statesman or whether [this is not the case, but] the possession of wealth must be presupposed? [We reply, the latter.] For as the art of the statesman receives men from nature, even so must nature, that is to say land or sea or some other element, provide them with food.’

ἄλλ’ οὐ κατὰ τὸν ἀπονηθῆσαν οὐ ποιεῖν ἢ πολιτικῆς, ἄλλ’ λαβόντα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρηματίζεται ἀπονηθῆσαν, οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αἴτιον τῆς φύσεως δεῖ παραδόντων γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι.

The last words γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι are either 1)* in apposition with τῆς φύσεως, or 2) accusatives after παραδόντων. In the first case γῆν and θάλατταν are an explanation of τῆς φύσεως. In the second case τῆς φύσεως is a remote accusative, ‘nature gives land and sea for the supply of food.’ The latter way of taking the words is forced. Nature is here said to provide food, but no real distinction can be drawn

between the provision of food by nature and the acquisition or appropriation of it by the labour of man, cp. § 3.

ἢ κ δὲ τούτων, ἢς δεῖ, τὰντα διαθεῖναι προσήκει τῷ οἰκονόμῳ.

ἢ κ τούτων, ‘thereupon,’ i. e. ἢ κ τῶν λαβεῖν παρ’ ἕσσεως; τὰντα διαθεῖναι, ‘to order them,’ i. e. the things which nature gives [for the use of the household]; or ἢ κ τούτων = ‘from what is given by nature.’ τὰντα διαθεῖναι, ‘to set in order,’ i. e. to select and arrange the things necessary for the household.

καὶ γὰρ ἠπορήσειεν ἄν τις.

‘Were this otherwise’ (as in the translation) i. e. ‘if the duty of the manager of a household consisted in producing and not in using, then he would be equally concerned with money-making and with medicine. And so he is to a certain extent concerned with both, but unlike the physician or the maker of money only to a certain extent, whereas they pursue their vocations without limit.’

καὶ περὶ ἡγείας.

About health as well as about wealth.

μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ ἐρηται πρότερον, δεῖ ἕσει τὸντο ἠάρχειν.

τὸντο refers to some general idea, such as ‘the means of life,’ to be gathered from τὰ χρήματα in the preceding sentence.

παντὶ γάρ, ἢς οὐ γίνεται, τροπὴ τῶν λειπόμενων ἔστιν.

τῶν λειπόμενων = τῶν λειπόμενων ἄν κείνῃ ἢς οὐ γίνεται, the residuum or that from which the offspring parts, i. e. milk, white of egg, etc.: cp. De Hist. Anim. i. 5, 489 b. 8, ἢν . . . ἢς οὐ γίνεται τῶν γινόμενων ζῴων ἢ κ μορίου τῶν ῥχῆν, τῶ δ’ ἄλλο τροπὴ τῶν γινόμενων ἔστιν: and supra c. 8. § 10.

διὲ κατ’ ἕσιν ἔστῶν ἢ χρηματιστικῶν παῖσιν ἢ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων.

Fruits and animals are the gifts of nature and intended for the subsistence of man (cp. c. 8): hence (διό), with some equivocation, the trade in them is said to be natural.

ἢ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίσματος.

Cp. Arist. Nub. 1286, τὸντο δ’ ἔσθ’ ἢ τόκος τί θηρίον; Thesm. 845, ἢξία γονῶν ἐπὶ τόκου τεκονῶσα τοιοντόν τόκον.

Cp. also Shakspeare’s Merchant of Venice, Act i, Scene 3,—‘A breed of barren metal.’

It has been customary, since Bentham wrote, to denounce Usury Laws on the ground 1) that they are ineffectual, or worse, 2) that they are unjust both to lender and borrower, because they interfere with the natural rate of interest. But in primitive

states of society, as in India at the present day, they may have been more needed and more easy to enforce. In a simple agricultural population where the want of capital is greatly felt, and land is the only security, the usurer becomes a tyrant: hence the detestation of usury. The other and better side of usury, that is to say, the advantage of transferring money at the market rate from those who cannot use it to those who can, was not understood by Aristotle any more than the advantage of exchanging commodities. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 555 E; Laws v. 742.

τὴ τοιανῶτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἡλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἡμπερίαν ἡναγκαίαν.

1*) 'To speculate about such matters is a liberal pursuit; the practice of them is servile.' In modern language 'a gentleman may study political economy, but he must not keep a shop.' Cp. infra § 5, περὶ ἡκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν ἐρῆται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἡκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἡργασίαν, ἡορτικὴν δὲ τὴν ἡνδιατρίβειν: and iv. 15. § 4, ἡλλὰ τανῶτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἡρήσεις οἰθῶν ἡς ἐπερῶν· οἷ γὰρ πῶ κρίσις γέγονεν ἡμῆισθητωντων περὶ τον ἡνόματος· ἡχει δὲ τιν' ἡλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν: also iii. 8. § 1, τὸ δὲ περὶ ἡκάστην μέθοδον ἡιλοσοῶντι καὶ μὲ μόνον ἡποβλέποντι πρὸς τὴν πράττειν οἷκεῶν ἡστι τὸ μὲ παροραῶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν, ἡλλὰ δηλονῶν τὴν περὶ ἡκαστον ἡλήθειαν.

Or again 2) 'Speculation is free; but in practice we are limited by circumstances;' i.e. speculation on such matters may go to any extent or take any direction, but in practice we must restrict ourselves to the necessities of the case, e. g. the nature of the soil, climate, neighbourhood, etc. § 5 infra may be quoted in defence of either explanation, the words χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν ἡργασίαν supporting the second, ἡορτικὴν τὴν ἡνδιατρίβειν the first. ἡμπερίαν connects with ἡμπειρον which follows: 'experience of live-stock is one of the useful parts of money-making.'



SYNOPSIS OF THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF κτητική, in c. 11. §§ 1-4.

ναυκληρία, ἡορτηγία.

ναυκληρία = 'commerce by sea,' ἡορτηγία = 'commerce by land.' The word ναυκληρία may also be taken in the narrower sense of 'owning of ships'; and ἡορτηγία in the sense of 'carrying whether by sea or land.' But this explanation of the words does not afford so natural a division.

διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἡτερα ἡτέρων τὸ τὸ μὲν ἡσφαλέστερα ἐρῶναι, τὸ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἡπικαρπίαν.

It is not certain whether in this sentence Aristotle is speaking of trades in general without reference to the three previous divisions, or, of the divisions themselves, commerce by sea being the more profitable, commerce by land the more secure mode of trading. The opposition of τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ favours the more general application of the words.

οἷον ἄλοτομία τε καὶ παῖσα μεταλλευτική. ἀτὴ δὲ πολλὰ ἄδη περιείληθε γένη·
πολλὰ γὰρ ἐδη τῶν κτηνῶν μεταλλευομένων ἔστιν.

In these words Aristotle is illustrating ‘the third or mixed kind of chrematistic,’ which is concerned not only with fruits of the earth and animals, but with other products dug out of the earth and manufactured by man.

ἄδη, ‘mining again is not a simple art, but already—or, not to speak of other species—contains in itself many subdivisions.’

ἐστὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἔργασίων ἅντι ἁλίστου τῆς τύχης, βαναυσόταται δὲ ἅντι ἀγγείων σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δὲ ἅντι τῶν σώματος πλεονεξίαι χρήσεις, ἄγεννέσταται δὲ ἅντι ἁλίστου προσδεῖται ἄρετης. ἄπερ δὲ ἅντι νείοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is with the word καθόλου in § 5. Aristotle, although he declines to go into the particulars of these arts, gives some general characteristics of them.

In the sentence which follows, the clause ἄπερ δὲ ἅντι skips the intervening passage ἐστὶ δὲ . . . ἄρετης, and goes back to the previous subject. In another author we might suspect a gloss. But there are many such dislocations in Aristotle’s Politics; e. g. iii. 4. §§ 11-13. For the meaning cp. Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b. 31, ἄναγκαῖον τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐρημένων ἅστορικῶν ἐῖναι.

οἷον Χάρητι δὴ.

δὲ is to be taken with οἷον like ἄλως δὴ, οἷτω δὴ, καὶ δὲ with a slight emphasis, and sometimes with a word interposed, e. g. καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ, Nic. Eth. iv. 1. § 6.

Θάλεω τὸν Μιλησίον.

Thales is referred to in the Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 5 and by Plato in the Theaetetus (p. 174 A) as a type of the unpractical philosopher. ‘But even he could have made a fortune, if he had pleased.’

τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι ἅντι.

Cp. § 12. The device attributed to Thales is only an application of the general principle of creating a monopoly.

ἄπώλει μόνος, οἷ πολλὰν ποιήσας ἄπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ.

I. e. he bought up all the iron when it was very cheap, and having a monopoly sold it rather, but not very, dear.

ἄραμα Θάλεω.

ῥαμα, which is the reading of all the MSS., is used in the metaphorical sense of 'idea' here required, only in Pseudo-Demosthenes, 1460. 26, perhaps a sufficient authority for the meaning of a word.

* εῖρημα (Camerarius): θεώρημα (Coraes): δραῖμα (Prof. Campbell) may be suggested. Cp. Plat. Theaet. 150 A.

ῥπε? δ? τρία μέρη, κ.τ.λ.

The apodosis is lost; the suppressed thought that 'all three parts are concerned with man' is resumed in the next chapter.

κα? γ?ρ γυναικ?ς ῥρχειν κα? τέκνων.

Sc. τ?ν ῥνδρα. Supply for the construction either ῥ?ν μέρος ο?κονομικη?ς or εῖρηται α?τ?ν from the preceding words.

ῥξ ῥσου γ?ρ εῖ?ναι βούλεται τ?ν ῥύσιν κα? διαῖρειν μηθέν. ῥμως δέ, ῥταν τ? μ?ν ῥρχ? τ? δ' ῥρχηται, ζητεῖ? διαῖορ?ν εῖ?ναι κα? σχήμασι κα? λόγοις κα? τιμαῖ?ς, ῥσπερ κα? ῥμασις εῖ?πε τ?ν περ? τον? ποδανιπτηῖρος λόγον.

βούλεται sc. ῥ πολιτεία or ῥ πολιτικ? ῥρχή, understood from ῥν ταῖ?ς πολιτικαῖ?ς ῥρχαῖ?ς: 'where there is a πολιτεία, political equality is implied. All other differences, such as titles of honour, are temporary and official only.' The construction of ζητεῖ? may be similarly explained. Or both may be taken impersonally.

ῥμασις, who made his foot-pan into a god, as he had himself been made into a king, cp. Herod. ii. 172. The connexion is as follows: 'Among equals, where one rules and another is ruled, we make an artificial distinction of names and titles, but this is not the case in the relation of husband and wife, because the distinction between them exists already and is permanent.'

τ? δ' ῥρρεν ῥε? πρ?ς τ? θηῖλυ τον?τον ῥχει τ?ν τρόπον.

Resuming the words in § 1 γυναικ?ς μ?ν πολιτικω?ς, and adding the distinction that the relation between husband and wife, unlike that between ruler and subject in a πολιτεία, is permanent (ῥεί). This permanence of relation between husband and wife makes it rather an 'aristocratical' than a 'constitutional' rule, and in Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5 and Eud. Eth. vii. 9. § 4 it is so described.

κα? τω?ν ῥλλων τω?ν τοιούτων ῥξεων.

Supply ῥρετή τις before τω?ν ῥλλων—assisted by οῖδεμία in the following clause. Cp. infra § 13, σκυτοτόμος δ' οῖθείς, οῖδ? τω?ν ῥλλων τεχνιτω?ν. The words τω?ν τοιούτων are used inaccurately 'of such habits,' meaning the habits which have virtues like these.

ῥνάγκη μ?ν μετέχειν ῥμ?στέρους ῥρετη?ς, ταύτης δ' εῖ?ναι διαῖοράς, ῥσπερ κα? τω?ν ῥύσει ῥρχομένων.

‘Both require virtue, and of these virtues there will be different kinds since the natural subject differs [from the natural ruler]’; or, with Bernays, ‘corresponding to the difference in the subject classes,’ cp. *infra* clause 7. But why only in the subject?—a difficulty which seems to have been felt by those copyists or editors who, supported by Moerbeke, insert *ῥχόντων κα?* before *ῥχομένων*. Better: ‘There will be differences of virtue in the ruling and subject classes, similar to those which [we have already noted to exist] in the natural subject.’

κα? τον?το ε?θ?ς ??ήγηται περ? τ?ν ψυχῆν.

1) ‘*And this is immediately suggested by the soul’: or 2) ‘And this, without looking further, is the leading or guiding principle in the soul.’ There is a rule of superior and inferior, not only in states, but in the soul itself.

The verb *??ήγηται* in this passage is taken passively by Bonitz, ‘and this distinction was indicated in the soul.’ Cp. Theophrastus, *Hist. Plant.* i. 2. 3, *δη?λον ?τι καθάπερ ??ήγηται περ? τούτων λεκτέον*. But in most other examples of its use the word must be, or is better, construed actively, and it is safer to take it so in this passage. Cp. *supra* c. 5. §§ 2-6.

?στε ?ύσει τ? πλείω ῥχοντα κα? ῥχόμενα. ?λλον γ?ρ τρόπον τ? ?λεύθερον τον? δούλου ῥχει κα? τ? ῥρεν τον? θήλεος κα? ?ν?ρ παιδός· κα? πα?σιν ?νυπάρχει μ?ν τ? μόρια τη?ς ψυχῆς, ?λλ’ ?νυπάρχει δια?ερόντως. ? μ?ν γ?ρ δον?λος ?λως ο?κ ?χει τ? βουλευτικόν, τ? δ? θη?λυ ?χει μέν, ?λλ’ ?κυρον· ? δ? πα??ς ?χει μέν, ?λλ’ ?τελής. ?μοίως τοίνυν ?ναγκα??ον ?χειν κα? περ? τ?ς ?θικ?ς ?ρετάς.

By inserting *?πε?* before *?ύσει*, altering *τ? πλείω ῥχοντα* into *πλείω τ? ῥχοντα*, and omitting *?ναγκα??ον* before *?χειν* a few lines lower down, Bernays has ingeniously fused the whole train of thought with its many involutions, into a single consistent sentence. But in such a complex passage, an *anacoluthon* seems more probable, and Bernays’ alterations are considerable and unsupported by MS. authority. Cp. *Nic. Eth.* iii. 5. § 17, for a similar passage, which has also been arranged so as to form a continuous sentence; also c. 8. § 3; c. 12. § 1; iii. 9. § 6, and note. The words *?λλον γ?ρ τρόπον* go back to *ταύτης ε??ναι δια?οράς*.

?στε ?ανερ?ν ?τι ?στ?ν ?θικ? ?ρετ? τω?ν ε?ρημένων πάντων, κα? ο?χ ? α?τ? σω?ροσύνη κ.τ.λ.

‘Moral virtue is to be attributed to all these classes and [as they differ in character so] their virtues differ.’

καθόλου γ?ρ ο? λέγοντες κ.τ.λ.

In the *Meno* of Plato (p. 73), Socrates argues for the necessity of some general definition of virtue against Gorgias, who, being unable to apprehend such a general idea, confuses the whole of virtue with its parts. Either from an imperfect recollection of the passage or perhaps also from the party spirit which made him or his school professional adversaries of Plato (see note on ii. 4. § 2), Aristotle takes a view of his meaning which, when compared with the context, is seen to be untenable. For the

Platonic Socrates is maintaining what Aristotle is elsewhere quite ready to allow, — that there must be a common idea of virtue; this Gorgias the Sophist in the infancy of philosophy is unable to understand, and in reply can only enumerate separate virtues. The tendency in the Aristotelian writings to refer to Plato, the mention of Gorgias, and the opposition between the general idea of virtue and the particular virtues sufficiently prove that the passage in the Meno is intended.

κα? ? μ?ν δον?λος τω?ν ?ύσει σκυτοτόμος δ' ο?θείς.

Aristotle is contrasting the lot of the slave and of the artisan. The slave is in one respect better off than the artisan because he is directed by a master, whereas the artisan has no intelligence but his own by which to guide his life. He too is a slave without the advantages of slavery. Thus Socialist writers, like Lassalle and others, in recent times have contrasted unfavourably the lot of the modern operative with that of the mediæval serf. We may note in modern times the civilizing influence of domestic service on the homes and manners of the poor. Many a household servant in England has received an impress from a master or mistress, and in Aristotle's language, 'has derived a virtue from them.' Cp. iii. 5. § 4, τω?ν δ' ?ναγκαίων ο? μ?ν ?ν? λειτουργον?ντες τ? τοιαν?τα δον?λοι, ο? δ? κοινο? βάνασοι κα? θη?τες, where, in a similar spirit, Aristotle contrasts the duties of the artisan, which are rendered to the community, with the duties of the slave, which are rendered to the individual.

?λλ' ο? τ?ν διδασκαλικ?ν ?χοντα τω?ν ?ργων δεσποτικήν.

These strange words may be translated literally: 'But not in so far as he possesses an art of the master such as would direct the slave in his particular employment;' i. e. it is not as the teacher of a craft but as a master that he imparts virtue to his slave.

The slave is relative to the master. His virtues are all received from him, and cannot be imparted by any chance instructor. Nor does the master instruct him in any art. But the artisan stands in no relation to another; he has a separate art (§ 13) which he exercises independently. He is without any ennobling influence external to himself, whereas the slave is inspired by his master.

δι? λέγουσιν ο? καλω?ς ο? λόγου το?ς δούλους ?ποστερον?ντες κα? ?άσκοντες ?πιτάξει χρη?σθαι μόνον· νουθετητέον γ?ρ μα?λλον το?ς δούλους ? το?ς πα??δας.

These words may mean: either 1)* 'who do not allow us to converse with slaves,' or 2) 'who do not allow to slaves the gift of reason.' In either case there is a reference to Plato, Laws, vi. 777, 778.

περ? δ? ?νδρ?ς κα? γυναικ?ς κα? τέκνων κα? πατρός, τη?ς τε περ? ?καστον α?τω?ν ?ρετη?ς, κα? τη?ς πρ?ς σ?α?ς α?το?ς ?μιλίας, τί τ? καλω?ς κα? μ? καλω?ς ?στί, κα? πω?ς δε?? τ? μ?ν εν?? διώκειν τ? δ? κακω?ς ?εύγειν, ?ν το??ς περ? τ?ς πολιτείας ?ναγκα??ον ?πελθε??ν.

This is one of the many promises in the Politics which are unfulfilled. Cp. iv. 15. § 3, a passage which is sometimes quoted in this connexion. But the reference is only to the office of παιδονόμος and γυναικονόμος.

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BOOK II.

ἴτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτῶν ἕτερον μὴ δοκεῖ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων.

τὸ ζητεῖν is the nominative of μὴ δοκεῖ: πάντως is to be taken closely with μή, 'and that our object in seeking for a new state is not at all to make a display of ingenuity; but to supply defects in states which are known to us, both in those which are actually existing and also in theoretical states like that of Plato.' μὴ δοκεῖ and δοκῶμεν are dependent on εἶναι.

ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.

'To undertake' or 'take upon oneself,' a curious and idiomatic use of the word, found also in Plato and Thucydides. See Bonitz (Liddell and Scott), s. v.

ἢ μὴ γὰρ τόπος ἐστὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως, οὗ δὲ πολλοὶ κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως.

ἐστὶ τῆς is required by the sense and is supported by the old Latin Translation. All the Greek MSS. however read ἑσότης.

ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, either the title of the book (cp. iv. c. 4. § 11; c. 7. § 1), or 'in the state which is described by Plato.'

The comments of Aristotle on Plato's Republic and Laws, contained in this and the following chapters, can hardly be dealt with properly in single notes. They are full of inaccuracies and inconsistencies. But the nature of these comments, which throw great light on the character of ancient criticism in general, will be best appreciated when they are brought together and compared with one another in a comprehensive manner. I have therefore reserved much of what has to be said about them for an essay 'On the Criticisms of Plato in Aristotle.' Both in the essay and in the notes I have been much indebted to Susemihl.

δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἦσθε δεῖν νομοθετησθαι τὴν τρόπον τῶν Σωκράτους, οὗ αἰνεται συμβαῖνον ἕκ τῶν λόγων. ἴτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἦσθε τὴν πόλιν δεῖν ἵσθαι, ἢ μὴ εἴρηται νῦν, ἡδύνατον. πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν οὗδ' ἐν διώρισται.

δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, sc. unity.

'The argument of Socrates does not show that these enactments are to be approved for the reason which he gives [viz. as tending to unity]; and, regarded as a means to the end which he attributes to the state, unless some new explanation of them is offered, they are impossible.' Bernays places a comma after πρὸς, which he takes with ἴτι: cp. πρὸς τούτοις ἴτι (Meteorol. i. 8, 346 a. 10); πρὸς δὲ ἴτι (Herod. iii. 74). The construction is thus made simpler; but the adverbial use of πρὸς hardly ever occurs in

Aristotle. 'Moreover, the end, viz. unity, which he attributes to the state upon his own showing is impossible.'

The first of these propositions, τὴν μίαν ἢ τι μάλιστα εἶναι τὴν πόλιν is discussed in the remainder of this chapter,—the second at the commencement of chapter 3.

ἡ μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, 'as it is described in his book,' or 'as it is actually described.'
Cp. infra c. 5. § 23, νῦν γὰρ οὕτως διώρισται.

πῶς δὲ δεῖ διαλεῖν. Sc. τὸ τέλος, or generally 'what Plato means by unity.'

For the use of διαλεῖν in the sense of 'to interpret,' cp. Herod. vii. 16, εἴ δὲ ἴρα μή ἴσθι τὸν τοιοῦτον οὕτως διαίρω, ἢ ἄλλο τι τὸν θεὸν μετέχον, σὺ πάντων αὐτῶν συλλαβῶν εἴρηκας. διαλεῖν may also be taken in the more common sense of 'to distinguish,' i.e. how we are to distinguish or define unity and plurality (cp. iii. 13. § 6: εἴ δὲ τὴν ἰσότητά ἐν ἄλλοις πάντων οὗ τὴν ἰσότητά ἕχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διαλεῖν τὴν τῶν τρόπον;).

ὅτι γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἴση ἰσότητων.

The equality among citizens which is elsewhere (iii. 16. § 2; iv. 11. § 8; vii. 8. § 4) said to be the true and natural principle, is not inconsistent with a difference of character and of pursuits.

διοίσει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ πόλις ἰσότητων, ἴσων μὲν κατὰ κώμας ὡς κεχωρισμένοι τὴν πλῆθος, ἢ ἄλλ' οὕτως ἰσότητες.

The clause ἴσων μὲν κ.τ.λ. may be a description either 1)* of the ἰσότητων, 'when the inhabitants of a country are not yet distributed in villages'; or 2) of the πόλις, 'when they are no longer dispersed in villages.' According to 1), the Arcadians are placed below, according to 2), above the ordinary condition of village communities.

1) Taking the first rendering, we may compare Plato's Symposium, 193 A, νῦν δὲ διττὴ τὴν ἰσότητα διττὴν ἴσων ἴσων τὸν θεὸν καθάπερ ἰσότητες ἴσων Λακεδαιμονίων. But Arcadia was also the most backward state in Hellas, the type of primitive simplicity. Hence, without referring to the dispersion of the Mantineans by the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 6) it is possible that Aristotle is speaking, not of their actual, but of their primitive and traditional state. 2) On the other hand he may be using the Arcadians as an example, not of the ἰσότητων but of the πόλις, and contrasting their condition, when centralized in Megalopolis by Epaminondas, with the ruder life of earlier times. They would certainly have furnished the latest illustration of a συνοίκισις. We may paraphrase 'When they are not scattered in villages, but, like the Arcadians, have a central city.'

It may be argued on the other side that Aristotle would not have used the Arcadians who were the most backward of Hellenes, as the type of a civilized, but of a semi-barbarous, nation.

To Aristotle the *ἄθνος* is a lower stage than the *πόλις*. He had no idea of a nation in the higher sense; nor did he see how ill adapted the Greek *πόλις* was to the larger order of the world, which was springing up around him, or how completely it had outlived its objects.

ἢ ὡς δὲ δεῖ ἔν τε γενέσθαι, εἴδει διαφέρει.

The state like the nation is not a mere aggregate, but has an organic unity of higher and lower elements.

διόπερ τὸ ἄσον τὸ ἄντιπεπονητὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὅπερ ἔν τοῖς ἄθμοις ἐρηται πρότερον.

Euclid in his 6th Book uses *ἄντιπεπονηθέναι* to express the relation of reciprocal proportion. Probably the ethical significance of the term among the Pythagoreans was derived from its mathematical use. Cf. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 1, and Alex. Aphrod. on Met. i. 5, τῆς μὲν δικαιοσύνης ἄδιον ἄπολαμβάνοντες τὸ ἄντιπεπονητὸς τε καὶ ἄσον, etc. (Scholia in Arist. Ed. Berol. 539 b. 12.)

ὅπερ ἔν τοῖς ἄθμοις. Here, and in vii. 13. § 5, Aristotle quotes the Ethics in the Politics, as he quotes the Politics in the Rhetoric (i. 8, 1366 a. 21). But probably the references have been interpolated.

ὅπερ ἔν εἰ μετέβαλλον οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ οἱ ἄλλοι εἰ σκυτοτόμοι καὶ τέκτονες ἔσαν.

These words are a reflection on the proposed arrangement, not unlike the satirical remarks of Socrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2. § 9), and in the Republic ii. 374. But the connexion is imperfectly drawn out:—Aristotle, while making this reflection upon the inconvenience of the practice, admits in the next sentence that the alternation of rulers and subjects is in some cases the only arrangement possible. To Plato it seemed essential that the division between rulers and ruled should be permanent, like the division of labour in the arts, between one craftsman and another. Aristotle says, ‘yes, if possible,’ but this permanence is not always attainable, for where there is equality and freedom among the citizens, they must rule in turn (vii. c. 9; cp. also infra, c. 11. § 13).

ἔν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν . . . ἔξ ἄρχη.

‘However desirable it may be that the same should rule, yet, if they cannot, but justice requires that all, being by nature equal, should share in the government, then they must rule by turns.’

ἔν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἔν μέρει τοῖς ἄσοις ἐκεῖν ἄμοίως τοῖς ἔξ ἄρχη.

ἔν τούτοις, sc. among those who are naturally equal and have a right to share in the government.

μιμεῖσθαι, 'to imitate,' i.e. to come as near as we can to 'this principle of succession,' dependent on βέλτιον.

τοῦξ ῥηγῆς, sc. ἐκούσιν. Like 'the original rulers, who have yielded to them;' or, without supplying ἐκούσιν, nearly the same meaning may be obtained. Cp. Book iii. 6. § 9, a passage which helps to explain this, διὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ῥηγῆς, ἦταν ἢ κατ' ἰσότητά τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ' ἰμοιότητα, κατ' μέρος ἰξιοῦσιν ῥχεῖν, πρότερον μὲν, ἢ πέφυκεν, ἰξιοῦντες ἢ μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινὲς πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸν ἰγαθόν, ἵσπερ πρότερον αὐτῆς ῥχων ἰσκόπει τὸ κείνου συμφέρον.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ῥχόντων ἕτεροι ἕτερας ῥχουσιν ῥηγῆς.

1) The equalisation of rulers and ruled is attained in two ways: *a*) by succession; *b*) by the variety of offices which the same person may hold,—that is to say, instead of going out of office, he may pass from one office to another, from higher to lower and conversely; the alderman may become a common councillor or the common councillor an alderman. Or, 2) the words are a passing thought suggested by ἄλλοι γενόμενοι, confirmatory of the view that the State consists of dissimilars. 'There is a further variety; not only do they come into and go out of office, as if they were no longer the same persons, but they have different offices.'

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἴς ἰκαστος, τάχ' ἢ ἐη μαλλὸν ἰ βούλεται ποιεῖν ἰ Σωκράτης . . . ννὲν δ' οἴχ οἴτω ἰήσουσιν κ.τ.λ.

'When each man can speak of his own wife, his own son, or his own property, the clear conviction which he entertains may tend to produce unity, but this is not the meaning of those who would have all things in common; they mean "all," not "each."

τὸ γῆρ πάντες καὶ ἰμότερα καὶ περιττὸ καὶ ῥρτια διὲ τὸ διττὸν καὶ ἢν τοῦξ λόγους ῥριστικοῦς ποιεῖν συλλογισμοῦς: διὲ ἵστὲ τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ἰδὲ μὲν καλόν, ἢλλ' οἴ δυνατόν, ἰδὲ δ' οἴθῆν ἰμονοητικόν.

The absolute unity of 'all' in the sense of 'each' is not what Plato intended, and is in fact impracticable. The unity of all in the abstract, i.e. of the whole state, excluding individuals, does not tend to harmony. Such a unity is really inconceivable; a state without individuals is a μάταιον ἐξῆδος. (Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 10.) The term 'all,' like the term 'one,' is ambiguous, and has a different meaning when applied to the state and to the individuals of whom the state is composed.

πάντες καὶ ἰμότερα. The fallacy is that these words may mean 'all' or 'both,' either in a collective or individual sense.

περιττὸ καὶ ῥρτια. The fallacy consists in assuming that odd and even are the same because two odd numbers when added together are even: e. g. the odd numbers, 5 + 7 = 12, which is an even number; or that five is both odd and even, because it is composed of three which is an odd and two which is an even number. See Arist.

Sophist. Elench. c. 4. 162 a. 33. Cp. infra c. 5. § 27, ο? γ?ρ τω?ν α?τω?ν τ? ε?δαιμονε??ν ω??νπερ τ? ?ρτιον, κ.τ.λ.

κα? ?ν το??ς λόγους κ.τ.λ. ‘For the word πάντες is fallacious, *and indeed* the use of this and other analogous terms is a source of contentious syllogisms in arguments.’ καί, ‘not only in this instance, but in arguments generally.’

The fallacy referred to is that of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, cp. Soph. Elench. c. 20. 177 a. 33 ff.

? ?σον ?κάστ? ?πιβάλλει.

Either, ‘only so far as comes in the way of,’ or, ‘is the business of each,’ or, with a slight difference of meaning, ‘only so far as it touches or affects each.’ Cp. i. 13. § 8, δι? τ?ν μ?ν ?ρχοντα τελέαν ?χειν δε?? τ?ν ?θικ?ν ?ρετ?ν τω?ν δ’ ?λλων ?καστον ?σον ?πιβάλλει α?το??ς.

κα? ο??τοι ο?χ ?ς ?κάστου.

‘Every man will have a thousand sons, and these do not properly belong to him individually, but equally to all.’

?τι ο?τως ?καστος ?μ?ς λέγει τ?ν εν?? πράττοντα τω?ν πολιτω?ν ? κακω?ς, ?πόστος τυγχάνει τ?ν ?ριθμ?ν ?ν, ο??ον ?μ?ς ? τον? δε??νος, τον?τον τ?ν τρόπον λέγων καθ’ ?καστον τω?ν χιλίων.

ο?τως*, ‘on this principle’; ?μ?ς = ?μός ?στι. ‘Further, on this principle [of common parentage], each one says of the citizen who fares ill or well, “he is mine,” whatever fraction he himself may be of the whole number; I mean that (ο??ον) he will say, “he is mine,” or, “his,” and this will be his way of speaking about each of Plato’s thousand citizens.’ The words have a reference to Plat. Rep. v. 463 E, μάλιστα συμφωνήσουσιν ?νός τινος ? εν?? ? κακω?ς πράττοντος . . . ?τι τ? ?μ?ν εν?? πράττει ? τ? ?μ?ν κακω?ς. The citizen speaks as one in a thousand of all the rest: he gives a thousandth part of his affection to each and all of the thousand persons who are the objects of it. Or, to put the matter in another way: we may suppose the citizens to be conversing with each other: they say, ‘my son is doing well,’ or, ‘is not doing well,’ being each of them a thousandth part of the whole, and those of whom they speak being likewise each of them a thousandth part.

A different view of this passage has been taken in the Text. More stress is laid on the words τ?ν εν?? ? κακω?ς πράττοντα: the parent is supposed to appropriate the youth who is doing well, and to disown the one who is doing badly: ?μ?ς λέγει τ?ν εν?? ? κακω?ς πράττοντα = ?μ?ς λέγει τ?ν εν?? πράττοντα, ο?κ ?μ?ς λέγει τ?ν κακω?ς πράττοντα. It must be remembered that, according to Aristotle, the true children are liable to be discovered by their likeness to their parents.

τω?ν χιλίων, as if Plato had made his state to consist of a thousand citizens; cp. infra c. 6. § 5. This is only an inference from Rep. iv. 423 A, in which Plato says that the

ideal state, even if consisting of no more than a thousand soldiers, would be invincible.

ἢ μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν κ.τ.λ.

‘In Plato’s state they are all “mine”: in ordinary states there are many sorts of relationship, and the same person may be a father or a brother or a cousin of some one or other; there are likewise remoter degrees of affinity, and remoter still the tie of fellow wardsman or fellow tribesman. Even a distant cousinship is preferable to that shadow of a relationship which supersedes them all.’

ἢ δ’ ἄνεμιόν, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλην τινὲς συγγένειαν.

The variety of human relations as ordinarily conceived is contrasted with the monotony of Plato’s society in which the state and the family are identified.

κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἄνεμιὸν εἶναι ἢ τὴν τρόπον τῶν υἱόν.

A resumption of πότερον οἴτω κρεῖττον; ‘Is not the present practice better? for it is better to have a cousin of your own than to have a son after Plato’s fashion.’

ἄσιν τινες . . . τῶν τῆς γῆς περιόδου πραγματευομένων εἶναι τισὶ τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινῆς τῆς γυναῖκος, τῶν μὲντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαίρεσθαι κατὰ τῆς ἰσότητος.

Cp. Herod. iv. 180, τῶν ἄνω τῶν ἄνω τῶν ἄνω τῶν παιδίων, τούτου πατρὸς νομίζεται, who is speaking, however, not of Upper, but of Lower Libya.

ὡς οὐδὲν ἴσιν ὅτι γίνεσθαι πατρὸς καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοῦ μὲν πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ἴσιν, ὅπερ πατρὸς τοῦ ἴσιν.

‘Crimes of violence are worse in the republic of Plato because they are attended with impiety, and they are more likely to be committed because natural relationships are undiscoverable.’ Aristotle here mixes up Plato’s point of view and his own. He does not remark that Plato having abolished family relations is not really chargeable with the occurrence of offences which arise out of them. Perhaps he would have retorted that the natural relationship could not be thus abolished.

καὶ γενομένων, τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων ἄνδεσθαι τῆς νομιζόμενης γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν.

τῶν δὲ is opposed to τῶν μὲν, though not parallel with it = ‘but in the other case,’ as if τῶν μὲν without γνωριζόντων had preceded. Or a comma may be placed after τῶν μὲν, and γνωριζόντων may be separated from it. ‘And when offences take place, in the one case men having knowledge of them, the customary expiations may be made, in the other case they cannot.’

ἴσιν δὲ καὶ τῶν κοινῆς ποιήσαντα τοῦ υἱοῦ τῶν συνεῖναι μόνον ἴσιν τῶν ἴσιν, τῶν δὲ ἴσιν μὲν κωλύσασθαι, μηδὲ τῶν χρήσεις τῶν ἴσιν, ἴσιν πατρὸς πατρὸς υἱῶν

εἶναι πάντων ἑστῆν ἡπρεπέστατον καὶ ἡδελέεστος πρὸς ἡδελφόν· ἢ περὶ καὶ τῶν ἡρατῶν μόνον.

The instance quoted, πατρὶς πρὸς υἱόν, shews that the reference is to Rep. iii. 403, but Aristotle has been hasty or forgetful in his citation. Plato does not say that he will allow the practice of lovers to prevail between father and son, or brother and brother, but that the endearments of lovers shall be only such as might be practised without offence between members of the same family. τῶν ἡρατῶν evidently in the lover's sense of the word.

ἴσκει δὲ μάλλον κ.τ.λ.

‘If the legislator desire to keep the inferior classes in a state of weakness, and communism is a source, not of strength, but of weakness, then it is better adapted to them than to the guardians’— that is, according to Aristotle's view of communism, not Plato's. Cp. vii. 9. § 8; c. 10. § 13 where he argues that the legislator should destroy as far as possible any tie of race among the slave population. And the traditional policy of slave-holding countries has been to deprive the slave of education and of family rights.

τοιούτους.

Sc. ἕκτον ἡλικίης gathered from ἕκτον ἡλία.

καὶ δι' ἓν ἀτίαν ἢ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἴεται δεῖν τάττειν τὸ περὶ τῶν τέκνα.

Supply τοῦναντίον (from the preceding) τῆς ἀτίας δι' ἓν, viz. unity. Cp. supra c. 2. § 1, καὶ δι' ἓν ἀτίαν ἢ ἡσὶ δεῖν νενομοθετησθαι τὴν τρόπον τοντόν ἢ Σωκράτης οὗ αἵνεται συμβαῖνον ἢ κ τῶν λόγων.

δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ κῆκεῖνος εἶναι ἡσὶ τῆς ἡλίας ἡργον, καθάπερ ἓν τοῖς ἡρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἡσμεν λέγοντα τὴν ἡριστοῖάνην ἢ τῶν ἡρώντων δι' τὸ σῶδρα ἡλεῖν ἡπιθυμούντων συμῖναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἢ δύο ἡντων ἡμῶτέρους ἡνα. ἡντανῶθα ἡμῖν ἡνῶν ἡνάγκη ἡμῶτέρους ἡῶθάρθαι ἢ τῶν ἡνα· ἢ δὲ τῆς πόλει τὴν ἡλίαν ἡναγκαῖον ἡδαρηῶ γίνεσθαι δι' τὴν κοινωῖαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἡκιστα λέγειν τὴν ἡμῖν ἢ υῖν πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν.

Socrates wishes to have the city entirely one: now such a unity is either attained or not attained: if attained like that of the lovers in the Symposium (called here ἡρωτικοῖς λόγοις), p. 192, it would be suicidal. But it is not attained, for he only succeeds in creating a very loose tie between his citizens.

ἢ τῶν ἡρώντων, a rare construction after λέγειν. Cp. Plat. Men o 95 E, ἢ διδάκτον ἡσῆς τῆς ἡρετῆς λέγει.

ἢ τὴν ἡνα. ‘If they are to be absorbed in one another, both individualities cannot subsist, though one may.’

οὔτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οὐκείότητα τὴν πρὸς ἑλλήλους τὴν ἡπὶ τῶν ἰνομάτων
τούτων διαφροντίζειν ἕκιστα ἠναγκαζόν ἢ ἢν τῆς πολιτείας τῆς τοιαύτης, ἢ πατέρα
ἢ υἱὸν ἢ υἱὸν ἢ πατρός, ἢ ἢς ἠδελφοῦς ἑλλήλων.

ἠναγκαζόν ἢν is to be taken with συμβαίνει, ἕκιστα with διαφροντίζειν. The latter
word has two constructions, 1) with τινί for subject, and οὐκείότητα as object; 2) with
πατέρα, υἱόν for subjects, and the genitives υἱὸν, πατρὸς following, e. g. ἢ πατέρα
διαφροντίζειν ἢς υἱὸν.

τό τε ἰδιὸν καὶ τὸ ἠγαπητόν.

ἠγαπητόν, ‘that which is to be cherished or valued,’ like ἠγαπητῶς in Plat. (?)
Alcibiades I. 131 E, οὔτ’ ἠγένετο, ἢς ἠοικεν, ἠλκιβιάδ’ τῆς Κλεινίου ἠραστῶς οὔτ’
ἠσθιν ἠλλ’ ἢ ἠῆς μόνος, καὶ οὔτος ἠγαπητός, Σωκράτης ἢ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ
Φαιναρέτης; and Rhet. i. 7, 1365 b. 19, οὔκ ἠση ζῆμία, ἢν τις τὴν ἠτερόθραλλον
τῶν ἠλώσ’ καὶ τῶν δὴ ἠχοντα ἠγαπητὸν ἠγῶ ἠῆρηται: also Homer (Odyssey ii. 365)
μὸν ἠνος ἢν ἠγαπητός. Compare the English ‘dear.’ Or, more simply, ἠγαπητὸν may
also be taken as answering to ἠλείν: ‘men love an object which is naturally to be
loved.’

καὶ πάλιν οὔ παρ’ τοῦ ἠύλαξιν [εἰς] τοῦ ἠλλοῦς πολίτας.

Aristotle is referring to the case of the citizens who pass from one rank to another.
Those who are raised to the condition of the guardians and those who are degraded
from it have both lost the natural relationships of brothers and sisters, parents and
children. But the natural relations still exist although the names of them have
disappeared; and therefore they are now less likely to be respected. Here again
Aristotle is confusing his own point of view with that of Plato.

παρ’ τοῦ ἠύλαξιν must be explained as a confusion of rest and motion, lit. ‘those
who [having been transferred from the other citizens] are now among the guardians.’
The words εἰς τοῦ ἠλλοῦς πολίτας have been explained as a pleonasm = ‘in relation
to the other citizens’ (οὔ προσαγορεύουσιν ἠδελφοῦς, κ.τ.λ.), ‘they do not call them
brothers.’ But the use of εἰς in a different sense in two successive lines is
objectionable. It is possible that the words εἰς τοῦ ἠλλοῦς πολίτας are an error of the
copyist, who may have repeated the words of the previous line. The omission of εἰς
(which is wanting in Moerbeke and in two good MSS., M^s. P¹, but inserted as a
correction in one of them, and found in all the rest) is the best way of amending the
passage.

κῶν ἠῆ ἠκεῖνα χωρίς,

sc. τὸ περ’ τὸ τέκνα καὶ τῶς γυναικῶν.

πότερον . . . τάς τε κτήσεις κοινῶς εἰῆναι βέλτιον καὶ τῶς χρήσεις.

These words are a statement of the general question which is afterwards subdivided
into three cases, though the carelessness of the language might at first sight lead to the
inference that Aristotle is putting the third case only. Hence Bernays has been led,

unnecessarily, to alter the reading. The change made by him of τε into γε and of κα? into κατ? impairs the parallelism of κτήσεις and χρήσεις (τάς γε κτήσεις κοιν?ς ε??ναι βελτιον κατ? τ?ς χρήσεις). The three cases are: 1) the soil divided, produce common: 2) soil common, produce divided: 3) soil and produce alike common.

?περ ?νια ποιε?? τω?ν ?θνω?ν.

?θνη as in i. 2. § 6, a vague expression for βάρβαροι and generally opposed to πόλεις or ?λληνες: also any loosely organised people, ii. 2. § 3; applied to the more general divisions of Hellas, vii. 7. § 4. The cases of Sparta, infra § 7, and of Tarentum, vi. 5. § 10, are not in point, even if their practice could be regarded as communism.

?τέρων μ?ν ον??ν ?ντων τω?ν γεωργούντων ?λλος ?ν ε?η τρόπος κα? ??ων.

If the land were cultivated by serfs there would be no disputes among the cultivators, for having no property, they would have nothing to quarrel about.

τω?ν συναποδήμων κοινωνία· σχεδ?ν γ?ρ ο? πλε??στοι δια?ερόμενοι κ.τ.λ.

Either* ‘fellow-travellers’ or ‘fellow-settlers in a foreign city.’ Whether the κοινωνία were formed for the purposes of business or only of companionship is not determined. With the words σχεδ?ν γ?ρ κ.τ.λ. supply προσκρούουσι.

κα? ?πικοσμηθ?ν . . διενέγκαι.

A condensed expression put for ?ν δ? νν?ν τρόπον ?χει, δια?έρει, κα? ?πικοσμηθ?ν (‘when it has been improved’), ο? μικρ?ν ?ν διενέγκαι.

α? μ?ν γ?ρ ?πιμέλεια δι?ρημέναι τ? ?γκλήματα πρ?ς ?λλήλους ο? ποιήσουσιν.

Either 1), ‘for the division of labour will give rise to no complaints,’ i. e. will prevent complaints, ?πιμέλεια being taken as the nominative to ο? ποιήσουσιν: or 2) regarding (as the words πρ?ς ?λλήλους and the following clause μα?λλον δ’ ?πιδώσουσιν seem to indicate) α? μ?ν ?πιμέλεια as nom. absolute, or the construction of the sentence as changing, we may translate, ‘Every one having a distinct occupation, men will not complain of one another.’

δι’ ?ρετ?ν δέ.

‘But where there is virtue there will be in practice community of goods among friends.’

?πογεγραμμένον.

‘Sketched out or faintly indicated.’ For ?πογρά?ειν, cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 6, 743 b. 24, ο? γρα?ε??ς ?πογράψαντες τα??ς γραμμα??ς ο?τως ?ναλεί?ουσι το??ς χρώμασι τ? ζ??ον.

οἷον καὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμόνι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρωῦνται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ἢ ἐπεὶ τῶν
 ἰδίοις, ἢ τι δὲ ἴπποις καὶ κυσίν, κὲν δεηθῶσιν ἰσοδίων τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ τὴν
 χώραν.

χώρα as opposed to πόλις:—‘When on a journey in the country, they take the produce
 in the fields.’ The apodosis (i. e. some such words as χρωῦνται ἰσοδίοις) is omitted.
 Cp. Xen. Respub. Lac. 6, § 1, 3, 4, ἑναντία γε μὴν ἴγνων καὶ τάδε τοῖς πλείστοις. τὴν
 μὴν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἰκαστος καὶ παίδων καὶ οἰκετῶν καὶ
 χρημάτων ῥχουσιν· ἢ δὲ Λυκονῤργος, κατασκευάσαι βουλόμενος ἢ τὴν μὴδὲν
 βλάπτοντες ἴπολαυοιέν τι οὐ πολὺταὶ ἀλλήλων ἴγαθόν, ἴποίησε παίδων ἰκαστον
 ἴμοίως τῶν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλοτρίων ῥχειν. . . . ἴποίησε δὲ καὶ οἰκέταις, εἴ
 τις δεηθεῖν, χρηῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοτρίοις. Καὶ κυνῶν δὲ θηρευτικῶν συνηῖψε
 κοινωνίαν· ἴστε οὐ μὴν δεόμενοι παρακαλονῶσιν ἴπὲ θήραν, ἢ δὲ μὴ ἀτῤς σχολάζων
 ἴδέως ἴκέμπει. Καὶ ἴπποις δὲ ἴσαύτως χρωῦνται· ἢ γὰρ ἴσθενήσας ἴ δεηθεῖς
 ἴχήματος ἴ ταχύ ποι βουληθεῖς ἴἴκῆσθαι, τὴν που ἴδὲ ἴππον ἴντα, λαβῶν καὶ
 χρησάμενος καλῶς ἴποκαθίστησιν, κ.τ.λ. Also Plat. Laws, viii. 845 A, ἴτὴν δὲ ξένος
 ἴπιδημήσας ἴπώρας ἴπιθυμηῖ ἴαγεῖτὴν διαπορευόμενος τῤς ἴδούς, τῤς μὴν γενναίας
 ἴπτέσθω, ἴτὴν βούληται, με[Editor: illegible character] ἴνῤς ἴκολούθου χωρῤς τιμηῤς,
 ξένια δεχόμενος, τῤς δὲ ἴγροῖκου λεγομένης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴ νόμος εἴργετῶ μὲ
 κοινωνεῖτὴν ἴμῶν τοῤς ξένους.

ἴπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιονῤτοι.

‘Of such an unselfish character as to place their property at the service of others.’

τῤ δὲ ἴίλαυτον εῖτῤναι ψέγεται δικαίως, κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 8; Rhet. i. 11. § 26; Plato’s Laws, v. 731 E.

τῶν τοιούτων.

‘Not only money, but anything towards which there can be an excess of love.’ Cp.
 note on i. 1. § 2.

ἴναιρονῶσιν ἴργα . . σωῤροσύνης περῤ τῤς γυναῖῤκας.

Yet Plato in his Republic aimed really at an impossible strictness in the relation of the
 sexes, and is very far from allowing his guardians to indulge in sensuality.

Εἴπρόσωπος μὴν ονῤτὴν ἴ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ ἴίλάνθρωπος τὴν εῖτῤναι δόξειεν· ἢ
 γὰρ ἴκροώμενος ἴσμενος ἴποδέχεται, νομίζων ἴσεσθαι ἴίλιαν τινῤ θαυμαστῤν παῖσι
 πρῤς ἴπαντας, ἴλλως τε καὶ ἴταν κατηγορηῖ τις τῶν ννῤν ἴπαρχόντων τὴν ταῖς
 πολιτείας κακῶν ἢς γινομένων διῤ τῤ μὲ κοινῶν εῖτῤναι τῤν οἰσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε
 πρῤς ἴλλήλους περῤ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίῶν
 κολακείας.

The flow and regularity of this sentence remind us of the opening of Book vii, noticed
 by Bernays. Cp. for a similar regularity supra c. 1.

Mankind quickly become enamoured of socialistic theories, especially when they are interspersed with attacks on existing institutions. Cp. Plat. Rep. v. 464, 465; iv. 425.

ω??ν ο?δ?ν γίνεται δι? τ?ν ?κοινωνησίαν ?λλ? δι? τ?ν μοχθηρίαν.

A similar unwillingness to ascribe to institutions what is due to human nature may be remarked elsewhere: e.g. c. 7. § 8, ?τι δ' ε? τις κα? τ?ν μετρίαν τάξειεν ο?σίαν πα?σιν, ο?δ?ν ??ελος; μα?λλον γ?ρ δε?? τ?ς ?πιθυμίας ?μαλίζειν ? τ?ς ο?σίας κ.τ.λ.

The emphatic negative ω??ν ο?δ?ν γίνεται for ? ο? γίνεται is curious.

?λλ? θεωρον?μεν ?λίγους τους ?κ τω?ν κοινωνιω?ν δια?ερομένους πρ?ς πολλο?ς συμβάλλοντες το?ς κεκτημένους ?δί? τ?ς κτ?σεις.

To what Aristotle may be alluding is not very clear. He may have remarked that there were more quarrels among Pythagorean sects, as well as among friends who had become fellow-travellers, than among other men. A similar reflection has often been made on the religious communities of later times. Or he may be referring to disputes arising in 'guilds' or 'clubs,' or partnerships in business. δια?ερομένους is to be repeated with κεκτημένους. The meaning is that the owners of common property are comparatively few, and that therefore their quarrels, though relatively more frequent, do not so often come under our notice.

?λλ? δε?? πλη?θος ?ν, ?σπερ ε?ρηται πρότερον, δι? τ?ν παιδείαν κοιν?ν κα? μίαν ποιε??ν.

Aristotle takes up a position half way between the communism of Plato and the existing practice of states. He would have men lend or give to their neighbours more than they do, but he would not enforce by law a community of goods; he would unite them by education, but would not destroy family life.

?σπερ τ? περ? τ?ς κτήσεις ?ν Λακεδαίμονι κα? Κρήτ? το??ς συσσιτίοις ? νομοθέτης ?κοίνωσεν.

This remark more truly applies to Crete, where the common tables were provided at the public expense (c. 10. § 7), than to Sparta, where he who could not afford to contribute to his mess lost the rights of citizenship (c. 9. §§ 30-32). Still in both there was a common mode of life; and an element of communism was introduced by the legislator. Compare also the remarkable description of the effect of Lacedaemonian training (iv. 9. §§ 6-9) in producing the same simple habits of life both among rich and poor; and Xen. De Rep. Laced. 6. §§ 1, 3, 4.

πάντα γ?ρ σχεδ?ν ε?ρηται μέν, ?λλ? τ? μ?ν ο? συνη?κται, το??ς δ' ο? χρω?νται γινώσκοντες.

ο? συνη?κται, lit. 'they have not been put together,' implying that no comparison has been made of them, nor inference drawn from them. In other cases the inference has been drawn, but not applied to a practical use. As in Pol. vii. 10. § 7, and Metaph. xi. 8, 1074 b. 8 (ω??ν ε? τις χωρίσας α?τ? λάβοι μόνον τ? πρω?τον, ?τι θεο?ς ?οντο τ?ς

πρώτας οἰσίας εἶναι, θείως ἢ ἐρηθῆσθαι νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνης πολλάκις ἐρημμένης ἐξ ἧς δυνατὸν ἦκαστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν ἠθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τῆς δόξας ἠκείνων οἴον λείψανα περισεσῶσθαι μέχρι τῶν νῦν), and several other passages, Aristotle supposes the inventions of arts and laws to have been made many times over. Compare Plat. Laws iii. 677 A foll.

μάλιστα δ' ἢ γένοιτο ἠανερὸν, ἐξ τῆς τοῦ ἔργου ἔδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην.

'In the actual process of creation.'

Cp. Plat. Tim. 19 B, προσέειπε δὲ δὴ τινὶ μοι τοιῶδε τὸ πάθος, οἴον ἐξ τῆς ζῆλα καλὰ που θεασάμενος, ἐπεὶ ἦν γράνητος ἐργασμένα ἐπεὶ καὶ ζῶντα ἠληθινῶς, ἠσυχίαν δὲ ἔγοντα, ἐξ ἠπιθυμίας ἠἴκοιτο θεάσασθαι κινούμενά τε αὐτὰ καὶ τι τῶν τοῦ σώμασι δοκούντων προσήκειν κατὰ τὴν ἠγωνίαν ἠθλονῶντα. ταῦτ' ἢ καὶ ἠγὰ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἢ διήλθομεν.

μὲν μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων.

αὐτὰ refers to some general subject gathered from τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. The neuter is supported by τὸ μὲν and τὸ δέ, which follow.

ἠπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῶν ἠπιχειροῦσιν.

1)* 'Which already,' i.e. as a matter of fact, without having recourse to Plato's ideal, the Lacedaemonians are actually carrying out; or 2), 'which at this very time the Lacedaemonians are trying to carry out [as though they had fallen into desuetude]' (Schneider). For the use of νῦν compare ii. 8. 6.

ἠπιχειροῦσιν according to 1), (as often in Plato. See Ast's Lexicon) is used pleonastically = 'do carry out.' So τῶν ἠπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν (v. 7. § 13) = τῶν νεωτερισάντων. And Plato's Phaedrus, 265 E, μὲν ἠπιχειρεῶν καταγνῶναι μέρος μηδέν.

ποιεῶν γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἠύλακας οἴον ἠρουρούς, τοῦ δὲ γεωργοῦ καὶ τοῦ τεχνίτας καὶ τοῦ ἠλλοῦς πολίτας.

1)* The emphasis is on τοῦ μὲν and τοῦ δέ. 'He makes one class to consist of the guardians, who are a sort of garrison, and he makes husbandmen, [or, 'to these he opposes the husbandmen'] and the artisans and the rest of the citizens.' 2) Bernays translates, 'For he makes the guardians a sort of garrison and the husbandmen and the artisans and the others, citizens [held in check by the garrison],' making a pause at τοῦ ἠλλοῦς. Cp. Rep. iv. 419. But the opposition between ἠρουροῦς and πολίτας is harsh. For the ἠρουροῦς or ἠύλακες had a special right to the name citizens, whereas the husbandmen, as is implied in §§ 23, 28, are hardly to be reckoned in the State at all. Cp. c. 6. §§ 2, 3. Yet it may be argued on the other hand, that Aristotle has only an imperfect recollection of Plato; that he 'snatches' at the word ἠρουρονῶντας, and puts into the mouth of Socrates an objection which really proceeds from Adeimantus, though afterwards paradoxically admitted by Socrates himself. Nor is it possible to set

any limits to the misinterpretations of Plato passing under the name of Aristotle. The first way of taking the passage is confirmed by c. 8. § 2 infra: ἡποίει γὰρ ἕν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἕν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτον δὲ τὴν προπολεμονῶν καὶ τὴν ἡπλᾶ ἕχον.

ἢλλο γὰρ ἐστὶ ἡναγκαῖα τᾶνθ' ἡμοίως ἐστὲ μή, νῦν γὰρ οὐδὲν διώρισταί.

Here, again, the antecedent to τᾶνθ' is to be gathered generally from the context, = 'whether these communistic institutions are equally necessary for the inferior and for the superior classes,' &c. Cp. note on i. 2. § 2.

νῦν γὰρ.

'As far, at least, as his book shows.' Cp. supra c. 2. § 1.

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡχομένων.

Sc. οὐδὲν διώρισταί from the previous sentence. 'And as to matters connected with these, what is to be their government, what their education, what their laws, nothing has been determined.' A repetition of § 18. The emendation ἡχομένων (Congreve) is unnecessary and out of place; for Aristotle has already disposed of the subject class in § 22, and at § 24 he returns to speak of the members of the state generally.

κῶν ἐστὶ κοινὰ ἢ κτήσεις καὶ ἢ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες.

Sc. τίς οὐκονομήσει; or more generally, 'What then?' Two cases are supposed: 1) what if wives are common and possessions private; and 2) what if possessions and wives are both common.

ἡτοπον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἡκ τῶν θηρίων ποιῆσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ἡτι δεῖ τὴν ἡτὴν ἡπιτηδεύειν τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦ ἡνδράσιν οὐκ οὐκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

The language is not exact; ποιῆσθαι τὴν παραβολήν = to argue from the comparison of the animals. οὐκ: sc. τοῦ θηρίου.

'The rulers must always be the same; for they cannot change the metal or quality which is infused into their souls by nature.' But then Plato supposes the whole ruling class to be guardians, divided only as young and old into warriors and counsellors (as in the state described in vii. 9. § 5); and he provides for exceptional merit by the transfer from one class to another. The actual governing class are men advanced in years (Rep. vii. 536 ff.), and Aristotle himself acknowledges (vii. 14. § 5) that the division of functions between young and old is natural, and that the young wait their turn and do not rebel against such an arrangement.

ἡτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐδαμονίαν ἡαιρούμενος τῶν ἡυλάκων, ἡλην ἡησὶν δεῖν ἐδαίμονα ποιῆν τὴν πόλιν τὴν νομοθέτην. ἡδύνατον δὲ ἐδαμονεῖν ἡλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἡ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἡ τινῶν ἡχόντων τὴν ἐδαμονίαν.

This passage, like many others in the Politics, involves a misconception of Plato's meaning. The literalism of Aristotle prevents him from seeing that Plato does not

really take away the happiness of individuals in affirming that the happiness of the state must be considered first. He takes it away that he may afterwards restore a larger measure of it. He is only insisting that the doctrine of the priority of the whole to the part, which Aristotle holds in common with him (cp. Pol. i. 2. § 13), should be carried out in practice. Compare also Rep. iv. 420 B, C, and Politics vii. 9. § 7, (τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐδαιμονεῖν ἄναγκαῖον ἵπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας, ἐδαιμόνα δὲ πόλιν οἷον ἐξ μέρους τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλ' ἐξ πάντας τῶν πολιτῶν) where Aristotle appears to coincide with Plato in the doctrine which he here repudiates.

ὡς ἂν περὶ τῶν ἰσίων, κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle means to say that the even number may exist in the whole though not always in the parts (cp. note on c. 3. § 3 supra); but happiness must always exist in both.

Socrates is here spoken of by implication (ἡλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐρηκεν, § 4) as if he were the chief speaker in the Laws, though he is not introduced at all. The Laws are quoted as Plato's in c. 7. § 4.

καὶ γὰρ ἂν τῆς πολιτείας περὶ ἡλίγων πάντων διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης.

The list which follows is a very inadequate summary of the subjects contained in the Republic. Probably the metaphysical and imaginative portions of the work appeared to Aristotle ποιητικὰ μεταφυσικὰ (Met. c. 9. 991 a. 22) and alien from politics.

τὸ δὲ ἐξ τῶν προπολεμῶν μέρος· τρίτον δ' οἷον τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως.

‘And a third class taken from the warriors,’ (τῶν προπολεμούντων).

περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, πότερον οὐδεμίαν ἢ μετέχουσί τινος ἡμετέρας . . . ο[Editor: illegible character]δὲν διώρικεν.

Yet Plato has expressly foretold, emphasizing his words by the declaration of an oracle, ‘that when a man of brass or iron guards the State it will then be destroyed’ (Rep. iii. 415, and supra c. 5. § 26), by which he clearly means that the third and fourth classes are to be excluded from office. Nor would he have thought for a moment of a shoemaker, or agricultural labourer, exercising political rights. On the other hand, it is true to say that Plato has nowhere defined the position of the lower classes: he has thus evaded the question of slavery to which Aristotle was keenly alive. He acknowledges the difficulty of this question in the Laws v. 776 ff.

τοῦτο ἔξωθεν λόγοις.

I. e. with digressions, such as the attack upon the poets (Books ii and iii), the theory of knowledge (v, vi, vii), the doctrine of immortality (x). To Aristotle these appear irrelevant, though naturally entering into Plato's conception of the state, which includes philosophy and religion as well as politics.

τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ἄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐρήκεν.

This statement is far from accurate. The truth is that in the Laws of Plato a nearly equal space is given to the constitution and to legislation; the latter half of the fifth book, the sixth, seventh, eighth, and a portion of the twelfth book being devoted to the constitution; the ninth, tenth, eleventh and the remainder of the twelfth to legislation.

καὶ ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιῶν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρὸν περιάλει πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἄλλαν πολιτείαν.

For a similar use of the word κοινοτέραν cp. c. 6. § 16, εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν, κ.τ.λ.

ἄλλαν πολιτείαν, sc. the Republic. The idea of good, the rule of philosophers, the second education in dialectic, the doctrine of another life, are the chief speculative elements, as the community of property, and of women and children, are the chief social or practical elements, of the Republic which vanish in the Laws (Laws v. 739). The spirit of the Republic is more ideal and poetical, of the Laws more ethical and religious. Plato may be said to 'bring round the Laws to the Republic' in the assimilation of male and female education, in the *syssitia* for women, in the assertion of the priority of the soul to the body and of her fellowship with the gods; in the final revelation of the unity of knowledge to which he introduces his guardians at the end of the work (Laws xii. 965 ff.).

τὴν μὲν χιλίων.

Cp. note on c. 3. § 5, supra.

τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι περιττόν κ.τ.λ.

This and the noble passage in the Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 1 (προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ ἴλους ἄνδρας ἐσαγαγεῖν τὴν ἐξουσίαν. Δόξειε δὲ ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν πρὸς σωτηρίαν γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἄναιρεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἰλοσόφους ἄντας· μὴ οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἄντιον ἴλοισιν ἴσιον προτιμαῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν) are a sufficient confutation of the idle calumnies spread abroad in later times respecting the quarrels of Plato and Aristotle, which only reflect the *odium philosophicum* of their respective schools. Cp. note, i. 13. § 10.

χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσοῦτοις Βαβυλωνίας κ.τ.λ.

A strange remark: Aristotle himself mentions, apparently without surprise, that according to the ancient tradition the Spartan citizens had once numbered ten thousand, and he has himself testified that the country could support thirty thousand hoplites and fifteen hundred cavalry (c. 9. §§ 16, 17). Nor were the 5000 or rather 5040 citizens to be maintained in idleness, for each of them had to cultivate his lot.

δεῖν μὲν οὐκ ἔστι ποτιθέσθαι κατὰ ἐξουσίαν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἰδύνατον.

Even the best state, according to Aristotle, is limited by the number of citizens who can readily act together and by other conditions. These conditions he accuses Plato of having disregarded. Cp. vii. 4. § 2, and 4. § 11.

Plato would not have admitted the impracticability of his ideal state. It might be hard to realise, but was not impossible, Rep. v. 471-474. In the Laws he resigns his ideal, though with reluctance, and acknowledging the conditions of actual life, he allows that there must be a second-best and even a third-best sample of states; Laws v. 739.

ἤτι δὲ καλωῶς ἔχει προσθεῖναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τόπους, εἴ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν.

Compare vii. 6. § 7, εἴ γὰρ ἔγεμονικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ζήσεται βίον κ.τ.λ. [sc. ἡ πόλις]. The two passages mutually confirm each other and the comparison of them shows that neither here, with Muretus, nor in vii. 6. § 7, with Bekker (2nd edition), do we need to substitute πολεμικὴν for πολιτικὴν which in both passages is used to express International Relations. The addition of μὴ μονωτικὴν or μὴ μονώτερον in some MSS. after πολιτικὴν appears to be a gloss, probably suggested by vii. 2. § 16.

The same criticism—that a state must have a foreign as well as a domestic policy, is made once more on Phaleas in c. 7. § 14. Nations and cities can no more get rid of other nations and cities than man (except by going into the wilderness) can tear himself from the society of his fellows. Cp. Mazzini's forcible saying, 'Non-interference is political suicide.'

εἴ δέ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ὑποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὴν ἴδιον μήτε τὴν κοινὴν τῆς πόλεως . . . ἔπελθονσιν.

'But if a person does not accept the life of action either for individuals or for states, still the country must be protected against her enemies.' In modern language, 'however much we may dislike war and the use of arms, there are cases in which the resistance to an enemy becomes a duty.'

ἔπελθονσιν, i.e. 'lest they renew the attempt.'

καὶ τὸ πλεονεξία δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ἕρῃ δέη, μήποτε βέλτιον ἕτέρως διορίσαι τὴν σαφῶς μαλλόν.

Literally, 'Would it not be better to define the amount of property differently by defining it more clearly?'

ὅπερ ἔν εἴ τις εἴη πεν ὅστε ζῆν ἐν τῷ· τὸν γὰρ ὅστι καθόλου μαλλόν.

It is doubtful whether these words are to be taken 1) as an illustration of the want of clearness in Plato's definition, or 2) as a correction of it; e.g. 1) 'this is only saying, "enough to enable a man to live well." ' But this explanation seems to require that the following words τὸν γὰρ ὅστι καθόλου μαλλόν should be translated 'this however is too general' (Bernays), giving a sense to μαλλόν (= μαλλόν ἢ δεῖ) which is doubtful unless suggested by the context, as in Rep. iii. 410 E, Phaedo 63 D. 2)* 'By

the confused expression “Enough to live upon with temperance,” he means only “enough to live upon well or virtuously; for this is the more general idea.” ’

ῥξεις ἀρεταί.

The MSS. give ῥρεταί, corrected by Bekker from a marginal note in a copy of the Aldine edition into ἀρεταί. But the words ῥξεις ἀρεταί are unmeaning. It is possible that ῥξεις may be the true reading and ῥρεταί the gloss or vice versâ. See note on text.

ἔειπὲν τὴν τεκνοποιίαν.

Another inaccurate criticism. For Plato expressly provides that the overplus of population should be sent to colonies (Laws v. 740).

δεῖ δὲ τὸν τ’ οἷα ῥμοίως ῥκριβῶς ῥχειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν.

‘But this matter ought not to be regulated with the same strictness then and now,’ i.e. it ought to be regulated with greater strictness in the imaginary state of the Laws than in existing states.

παράζυγας.

‘For whom there is no place at the banquet of life.’—Malthus.

τὸν τὸ δὲ τιθέναι τὴν πληθὸς ῥποβλέποντα περὶ τὰς τύχας, ῥν συμβαίνει τελευταῖν τινὰς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ῥλλων ῥτεκνίαν.

τῶν ῥλλων, ‘the sterility of others,’ i.e. of others than those who have children, implied in the word γεννηθέντων,—‘the death of some of the children and the sterility of some of the married couples.’

Φείδων μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ῥ Κορίνθιος, ῥν νομοθέτης τῶν ῥρχαιοτάτων, τοῖς οἴκοις ῥσους ῥήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὴν πληθὸς τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ εἴ τὴν πρῶτον τοῖς κλήρου ῥνίσους εἴησαν πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος.

ῥσους and ῥνίσους are here used in slightly different senses, ῥσους referring to the numbers of the families, ῥνίσους to the size of the lot. ‘He thought that the number of the families should be the same, even although the original size of the lot was different.’ That is to say he accepted the existing distribution of property among families, however disproportioned, and did not allow it to be afterwards altered.

Of Pheidon the Corinthian nothing is known; he has been identified with Pheidon the tyrant of Argos on the ground that Corinth lay in the Argive dominions (Müller, Dorians i. 7. § 15). But no evidence is adduced of this assertion. The word Κορίνθιος may have been a slip: (cp. for a similar or worse error, *infra* c. 11. §§ 2, 15; v. 12. §§ 12, 14); but such a slip would be remarkable in a writer who has elsewhere called Pheidon tyrant of Argos, v. 10. § 6.

περὶ μὲν τούτων . . . λεκτέον ῥστερον.

There is no adequate fulfilment of this promise to resume the question hereafter. But cp. vii. 5. § 1; 10. § 11; 16. § 15.

ἤσθ' ἄρα δεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle is finding fault with Plato's vagueness:—'He says nothing but that the governors and governed should be made of a different wool.'

τὴν παῖσαν οἴσιν ἴησι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πενταπλασίας.

Cp. Laws, v. 744 E, where the proprietor is allowed to acquire (κταῖσθαι) four times the value of his original inheritance. If we add in the original inheritance which was not acquired, the limit of property will be fivefold. There is no reason for supposing any mistake in this statement (Susemihl) or in c. 7. § 4.

καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖν σκοπεῖν, μή ποτ' οἱ συμῆρ' πρὸς οἰκονομίαν.

One of the homesteads is to be in the city, another on the border (v. 745 E), the first to be the dwelling of the elders, the second of the son of the house (vi. 776 A). A plan similar to the one which he condemns is adopted by Aristotle in vii. 10. § 11: cp. note on text, in which the inconsistency of the two passages is pointed out.

ἄκ' ἄρα τῶν ἡλιευόντων ἴσθιν.

The normal idea of a πολιτεία is that it consists of the free citizens who carry arms and are its natural defenders. Cp. iii. 7. §§ 3, 4, ἴταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμῆρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ἵνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτῶν, πολιτεία συμβαίνει δ' ἐλόγως· ἵνα μὲν ἄρα διαῖρειν κατ' ἵρετὸν ἡ ἴλιγους ἵνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἴδη χαλεπὸν ἵκριβῶσθαι πρὸς παῖσαν ἵρετὴν, ἴλλ' ἡ μάλιστ' ἵπολεμικὴν ἵατὴ ἄρα ἵν πλῆθει γίγνεται· δίοπερ κατ' ἵαύτην τὸν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμονὸν, κατ' ἵμετέχουσιν ἵατῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὸ ἵπλα, and see also Ib. c. 17. § 4; iv. 13. § 7; and Nic. Eth. viii. 10. 6.

τὴν ἄρα πρώτην πολιτείαν.

The same as the ἵτέρα πολιτεία (§ 4), i. e. the Republic of Plato.

Here the Spartan is spoken of as a mixed constitution; in iv. c. 9. § 7, as a combination of aristocracy and democracy. So uncritical writers of the last century extol the English constitution as comprehending the elements of every other. It was thought by other nations as well as by ourselves to be an ideal which Europe should copy. But so far from being the fulfilment of a perfect design, it was really the growth of accident; the merit lay not in any wisdom of our ancestors, but in the willingness of the people to conform to circumstances which was so wanting among the Spartans...; With the criticisms of Aristotle on the Lacedaemonian constitution it is interesting to compare the very similar criticism of Plato in the Laws, iv. 712 D, E, κατ' ἡμὸν ξυνοῶν γε, ὡς ξένε, τὸν ἵν Λακεδαίμονι πολιτείαν οἱκ' ἵχω σοι ἵράζειν οἱτως, ἵντινα προσαγορεύειν ἵατὸν δεῖ· κατ' ἄρα τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσεικέναι· τὸ ἄρα τῶν

ἄλλοι θάυμαστον ἔστι τυραννικὸν ἢ ἀτιμὸν γέγονε· καὶ τις ἥντιότι μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατουμένων μάλιστα ἰοικέναι. τὸ δ' ἀντὶ μὲν φάναι ἰσοκρατίαν ἀτὶν ἐφάναι παντάπασιν ἰσοπον. καὶ μὲν δὲ βασιλεία γε διὰ βίου τὸ ἄριστον ἢ ἀτιμὸν καὶ ἰσοκρατία πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἰσθῶπων καὶ ἴσῳ ἀτῶν λεγομένη. ἢ δὲ οὐτῶν ἕξαινης ἢ ἰρωτηθεὶς ἰντως, ἢ περ ἐφάνον, οὐκ ἔχω διωρισάμενος ἐπεφάν τίς τούτων ἴσῳ τῶν πολιτειῶν. Cp. Cic. de Rep. ii. 23.

ἢ δὲ τοῦ νόμοις ἐρηται τούτοις ἔστι δέον συγκεφάνσαι τὸν ἰρίστην πολιτείαν ἔστι δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος.

This is not really said, though in Laws (iv. 710 ff.) Plato sketches an imaginary tyrant who is to mould the state to virtue.

ἔρειν ἰρχοντας.

ἔρειν = 'to vote for,' used here as in Plato and Demosthenes with the accusative of the person.

ἀφρονῶνται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἰπάναγκες, ἢλλ' ἔστι τονὸν πρώτου τιμήματος, ἐφάντα πάλιν ἔσους ἔστι τονὸν δευτέρου, ἐφάντ' ἔστι τῶν τρίτων. πλὴν οὐ παφάν ἰπάναγκες ἔφάν τοῦ ἔστι τῶν τρίτων ἔ τετάρτων, ἔστι δὲ τονὸν τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις ἰπάναγκες τοῦ πρώτοις καὶ τοῦ δευτέροις.

The general meaning is that the higher the qualification of the elected, the lower may be the qualification of the electors, or, vice versâ, the lower the qualification of the elected, the higher must be the qualification of the electors; they should balance one another.

There remain, however, some difficulties in reconciling the text of the Politics with the statements of Plato.

What Plato says in the Laws (756) may be shortly stated as follows: 'For those who are to be elected out of the 1st and 2nd classes, all are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties if they abstain from voting: for those who are to be elected out of the 3rd class, only the three first classes are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties; for those who are to be elected out of the 4th class only the two first classes.

The text of the Politics as given by Bekker (which is that of all the MSS.) does not agree with the corresponding passage of Plato and in one place at least is corrupt.

1) The words ἔστι τονὸν τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων can hardly be right if we are to get any sense out of the passage at all. Either τονὸν τετάρτου or τῶν τετάρτων must be omitted. Probably we should omit the latter, for τονὸν τετάρτου agrees best with τονὸν πρώτου τιμήματος and τονὸν δευτέρου antea, and τῶν τετάρτων may have crept into the text from the preceding τετάρτων. Either alternative is simpler than reading τετάρτων (for τετάρτων) as in 2nd Ald. edition.

But 2) if we are to make the passage agree with Plato, we should further omit τρίτων before τετάρτων. Cp. Laws, 756 D, where nothing is said about the third class.

Finally, we must allow that Aristotle may not have remembered or may have misunderstood the words of Plato. Such a supposition cannot be thought far-fetched, when we consider the numerous passages in which he has done unintentional injustice to his master, Pol. i. 13. § 10; ii. 4. § 2; ii. 5. § 27; ii. 6. § 5, etc. The words ο? πα?σιν ?πάναγκες, sc. α?ρε??σθαι, do not imply that some of the class were compelled to vote. They are used as they are in Anal. Pr. ii. 15, 63, b 26 for the particular negative proposition, which is called by Aristotle indifferently τ? ο? παντ? and τ? ο? τινί, from which of course we can logically infer nothing as to the particular affirmative.

?ς μ?ν ον??ν ο?κ ?κ δημοκρατίας κα? μοναρχίας δε?? συνιστάναι τ?ν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, ?κ τούτων ?ανερ?ν κα? τω?ν ?στερον ?ηθησομένων, ?ταν ?πιβάλλ? περ? τη?ς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ? σκέψις.

?κ τούτων. Whether the inference be true or false, it is difficult to elicit from the words which have preceded the grounds for maintaining that a polity should not be made up of democracy and monarchy. Strictly speaking they are only a more detailed statement of this proposition, not an argument in support of it.

In the passage which follows (?ταν ?πιβάλλ?), Aristotle is looking forward to the discussion of what he calls πολιτεία, or 'constitutional government,' which like the constitution of the Laws, falls short of the ideal state, but is in advance of most existing forms.

τοιαύτης, 'a state similar to that in the Laws.'

τω?ν ?στερον ?ηθησομένων.

Mixed constitutions are treated of in iv. cc. 7-9, but the promise seems hardly to be fulfilled in that place.

?χει δ? κα? περ? τ?ν α?ρεσιν τω?ν ?ρχόντων τ? ?ξ α?ρετω?ν α?ρετο?ς ?πικίνδυνον· ε? γάρ τινες συστη?ναι θέλουσι κα? μέτριοι τ? πληθος, ?ε? κατ? τ?ν τούτων α?ρεθήσονται βούλησιν.

Cp. Mill's Representative Government, chap. ix (Should there be two stages of election?), 'The comparatively small number of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a member of parliament would reside, could not but afford additional facilities to intrigue.' The double election of representatives is thought to be a safeguard against democracy ; it is really a source of danger and suspicion, and weakens the national interest in politics. It seems often to supersede itself. Thus the election of the President of the United States by Electoral Colleges has passed into a mere form of universal suffrage. The only case in which such elections succeed is where the electors have other important functions (like the American State Legislatures, to which the election of the Senate is entrusted), and therefore cannot be appointed under a pledge to vote for an individual.

For the indefinite use of ?πικίνδυνον cp. Thuc. i. 137, ?πειδ? ?ν τ?? ?σ?αλε?? μ?ν ?μοί, ?κείν? δ? ?ν ?πικινδύν? πάλιν ? ?ποκομίδ? ?γένετο.

α? μ?ν ?διωτω?ν α? δ? ?ιλοσό?ων κα? πολιτικω?ν.

?διώτης is opposed both to philosophers and statesmen, as in Plato to δημιουργ?ς (Laws 921 B) and to ποιητ?ς (Phaedr. 258 D), and in Thucydides (ii. 48) to ?ατρός. ‘?διω?ται’ such as Phaleas and Hippodamus; ‘philosophers’ such as Pittacus or perhaps Pythagoras; ‘statesmen’ such as Solon or Lycurgus (cp. infra, c. 12. § 1).

δι? Φαλέας ? Χαλκηδόνιος τον?τ’ ε?σήνεγκε πρω?τος.

A sentence apparently inconsequential but really a condensation of two propositions. ‘Therefore Phaleas the Chalcedonian introduced this, sc. the regulation of property, he being the first to do it.’

Nothing is known of Phaleas from other sources. The manner in which Aristotle speaks of him in this passage (§ 2 ?ησ? γάρ, § 8 ε?ποι ?ν ? Φαλέας, ο?εται γ?ρ) would lead us to the inference that he was not a legislator but the writer of a book; and this inference is further confirmed by c. 12. § 1, in which Aristotle (?) places first, and in a class by themselves, the private individuals who had treated of laws, apparently meaning Phaleas and Hippodamus. Whether Phaleas was earlier than Hippodamus is uncertain. It is true that Hippodamus is described as the first of those not statesmen who treated of ‘the best state,’ c. 8. § 1. But the stress may be laid on the words περ? τη?ς πολιτείας τη?ς ?ρίστης, ‘Hippodamus was the first, not of political writers, but the first who treated of the perfect state’ which would be consistent with the claim of Phaleas to be an earlier writer on the subject of politics in general.

We cannot argue with Grote (Pt. II. c. 6, vol. ii. p. 523) that because Phaleas was the first who wrote or speculated about the equal division of land, therefore the legislation of Lycurgus or the ancient Dorian institutions may not have anticipated him in fact.

κατοικιζομέναις, sc. τα??ς πόλεσι or πολιτείαις, an emphatic present, ‘when in process of settlement.’

τ?? τ?ς προ??κας το?ς μ?ν πλουσίους διδόναι μ?ν λαμβάνειν δ? μή κ.τ.λ.

Cp. the Babylonian ‘marriage-market’ in Hdt. i. 196.

?ργον γ?ρ μ? νεωτεροποιω?ς ε??ναι το?ς τοιούτους.

With this passage compare v. 12. § 17 where Aristotle criticizes rather captiously the remark of Plato ‘that loss of fortune is a source of revolutions,’ to which he replies that ‘it is only dangerous when it affects the leaders of the state.’

ο??ον κα? Σόλων ?νομοθέτησεν κ.τ.λ.

Mr. Grote (iii. pt. ii. chap. 11, p. 179) thinks that these words refer only to the annulment of mortgages. But they clearly imply that Solon restricted or attempted to restrict the amount of land which might be held by individuals. Although there is no other evidence of this fact, the silence of antiquity cannot be taken as decisive against

the statement of Aristotle, and is certainly no reason for explaining away the plain meaning of his words, whether he was correctly informed or not.

ἴτι δὲ τοῖς παλαιοῖς κλήρους διασώζειν.

Dependent on νόμοι ἐπί, gathered from the preceding sentence. The preservation of the lot tended to maintain the equality of property; hence the transition from the one subject to the other.

ὁ γὰρ ἴτι συνέβαινε πρὸ τῶν ἰρισμένων τιμημάτων ἐς τὸς ῥαγὲς βαδίζειν.

The meaning is as follows:—Originally the Leucadian citizens had a lot which was their qualification for office. They were afterwards allowed to sell this lot, and still retained the right of holding office, when they had lost their qualification.

ἄλλο τὴν τε παιδείαν ἴτις ἴσται δεῖν λέγειν, καὶ τὴν μίαν ἐπὶ καὶ τὴν ἀτὴν οὐδὲν ἴελος.

So in modern times reflections are often made on the evils of education unless based on moral and religious principles. Yet it was a noble thought of an early thinker like Phaleas that there should be equal education for all.

καὶ τὴν μίαν κ.τ.λ. ‘Moreover there is no point in saying that it is one and the same, for it may be bad.’

τοῖς ἀντίον δὲ πρὸς ἴκατερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν κτήσεις ἴνισον, ὁ δὲ χαρίεντες πρὸς τῶν τιμῶν, ἴνισαι.

The opposition here intended is between the inequality of property by which the many are offended, and the equality of honour which offends the higher classes.

πρὸς ἴκατερον, sc. τὴν κτήσεις καὶ τὴν τιμᾶς.

ὁ τῶν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἄλλο καὶ ἴν ἴπιθυμοῖεν, ἴνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἴνευ λυπῶν ἴδοναῖς. Τί ὄν ἴν ἴκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων;

The words καὶ ἴν ἴπιθυμοῖεν, though rather weak, are found in all MSS. and are therefore probably genuine. They are omitted however by Bernays, and have been variously corrected, καὶ ἴνευ ἴπιθυμῶν (Bojesen), sc. ἴδικήσουσιν, an ingenious conjecture; ἴν μὲν ἴπιθυμῶσιν (Schneider), too great a departure from the MSS.; ἴνεπιθύμητοι (also Bojesen), too rare a word.

The general meaning is plain: ‘And therefore, i.e. not only to still pain, but also to gain pleasure, they will desire pleasures to which no pains are annexed.’ The three motives are, 1) necessity, 2) desire of things not necessary, 3) desire of painless pleasures.

ὁ κ ἴν ἴπιζητοῖεν ἐ μὲν παρ ἴφιλοσοφίας ἴκος.

‘They will look for a cure from philosophy and go no further.’

οἷον τυραννον?σιν ο?χ ?να μ? ?γω?σιν. Δι? κα? α? τιμα? μεγάλαι.

Cp. the Story of Jason, who said πεινη?ν ?τε μ? τυραννο??, iii. 4. § 9 and note. So Daniel Manin (quoted by Stahr) used to say of himself that ‘he knew nothing except how to govern.’ ‘And as is the greatness of the crime, so is the honour given to the tyrannicide.’

δε?? δ? κα? πρ?ς το?ς γειτνιω?ντας κ.τ.λ.

A favourite idea of Aristotle. Cp. supra c. 6. § 7.

?λλ’ ο?τως ?ς ?ν κα? μ? ?χόντων τοσαύτην ο?σίαν.

= ?λλ’ ο?τως ποιε??ν ?ς ?ν ποιο??εν κα? μ? ?χόντων τοσαύτην ο?σίαν, the more general word ποιε??ν being understood from πολεμε??ν.

‘That your enemies should act as they would do if you had not so great an amount of property,’ i.e. that your wealth should be no temptation. Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 422, where he argues that trained warriors will be always too much for wealthy citizens.

Eubulus, by birth a Bithynian, was the tyrant of Atarneus in Mysia, and was succeeded by Hermias his slave, whose niece or adopted daughter Aristotle is said to have married; Eubulus revolted from Persia, and was besieged by Autophradates, the Satrap of Lydia. See Strabo, xiii. 610, Suidas s. v. ?ριστοτέλης.

διωβελία.

The diobelia was the ordinary payment of two obols for attendance on the assembly and the courts, and also for theatrical entertainments. These payments seem in the later days of Athens, and even during the Peloponnesian war, to have amounted to three obols, and some of them to have been as high as a drachma. They were also made much more frequently than in ‘the good old times.’ Cp. Schol. in Aristoph. Vesp. 684, where it is said on the authority of Aristotle in [the] Politics that the sum given was originally three obols, but afterwards varied at different times: also cp. Lucian Dem. Encom. 36; Prooem. Dem. 1459, 27, a remarkable place; and other passages quoted by Boeckh, ‘Public Economy,’ Eng. Tr. vol. i. ed. 1, pp. 296 ff.

τω?ν ον??ν τοιούτων ?ρχή κ.τ.λ.

If ?ρχ? be retained, τω?ν τοιούτων refers to some idea of reform vaguely implied in the previous sentences. ?κη conj. Scaliger, ?ρκε?? Coraes.

?λλ’ ε?περ δε?? δημοσίους ε??ναι, το?ς τ? κοιν? ?ργαζομένους δε?? καθάπερ ?ν ?πιδάμν? τε, κα? ?ς Διό?αντός ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν ?θήνησι, τον?τον ?χειν τ?ν τρόπον.

Bernays places a comma after ε?περ, and omits the second δε??, placing a κα? before καθάπερ. ‘But if this is so (i. e. if artisans are to be public slaves), those who are to be

engaged in public works should be slaves.’ Nearly the same meaning may be got from the text, *if we place a comma after εἶναι and remove the comma after ῥαζομένους: ‘But if artisans are to be public slaves, those who are engaged in public works should form this class.’

τοντον ῥχειν τῶν τρόπον, sc. δημοσίους εἶναι. This Diophantus, or ‘some one else of the same name, about whom nothing is known, was Archon at Athens in the year 395.

Stobaeus has preserved some fragments of a work περὶ πολιτείας, which bear the name of ‘Hippodamus the Pythagorean’ (Florileg. xliii. pp. 248-251, xcvi. p. 534, Mullach. Fragm. Philos. Graec. vol. ii. p. 11). But there can be little doubt that they are, as Schneider says, the pious fraud of some later writer. The portions cited by Stobaeus will be enough to show the character of such performances. These fragments disagree in several points with the statements of Aristotle; such as the threefold division of the citizens into councillors, auxiliaries, and artisans (cp. the Republic of Plato), and the subdivision of each class into three other classes; the three principles of honesty, justice, utility, and the three instruments by which civil society is knit together, reason, habit, law. Of all this and of a good deal else, there is no trace in Aristotle, although the triplets are also found in Stobaeus. Considerable differences are not however inconsistent with the genuineness of the fragments. A more suspicious circumstance is the character of the philosophical distinctions, such as the opposition of καλόν, δίκαιον, and συμφέρον, which could hardly have existed before the time of Socrates, and a certain later tone of thought.

Hippodamus Περὶ Πολιτείας.

‘In my opinion the whole state is divided into three parts: one the “Good”—that is, those who govern the commonwealth by mind; another, those who rule by force; a third part, those who supply and furnish necessaries. The first class I call councillors; the second, “allies” or warriors; the third, artisans. To the two former classes belong those who lead a freeman’s life: to the latter those who work for their living. The councillors are the best, the artisans the worst, the warriors are in a mean. The councillors must rule, the artisans must be ruled, while the warriors must rule and be ruled in turn. For the councillors settle beforehand what is to be done: the warriors rule over the artisans, because they fight for the state, but in so far as they must be guided, they have to submit to rule.

‘Each of these parts again has three divisions: of the councillors there are 1) the supreme council; 2) the magistrates; 3) the common councillors. The first has the presidency, and deliberates about all matters before they are carried to the assembly. The second comprises all those who are or have been magistrates. The third, the common councillors, are the mass of senators who receive the measures which the upper council have prepared, and vote upon and determine matters which come before them for decision. In a word, the upper council refers matters to the common council, and the common council, through the general, to the assembly. In like manner there are three divisions of the warrior or military class: the officers, the fighters in the front ranks, and lastly the common herd of soldiers, who are the larger number. The

officers are the class which furnishes generals and colonels and captains and the front rank of soldiers, and generally all those who have authority. The soldiers of the front rank are the whole class of the bravest, most spirited, and most courageous men; the common herd of soldiers are the remaining multitude. Again, of the class who work for their living, some are husbandmen and tillers of the ground; others mechanics, who supply tools and instruments for the needs of life; others traders and merchants, who export superfluous productions to foreign countries, and import necessaries into their own. The framework of the political community then is composed of such and so many parts; we will therefore proceed to speak of the harmony and unison of them.

‘Now every political community exactly resembles a stringed instrument, in that it needs arrangement and harmony and touch and frequent practice. Of the character and number of the elements which form the arrangement of the state I have already spoken. The state is harmonized by these three things — reason (λόγος), moral habit, law, and by these three man is educated and becomes better. Reason gives instruction and implants impulses towards virtue. The law partly deters men from crime by the restraint of fear, partly attracts and invites them by rewards and gifts. Habits and pursuits form and mould the soul, and produce a character by constant action. All these three must have regard to the honourable and the expedient and the just; and each of the three must aim at them all if possible, or, if this is not possible, at one or two. So will reason and habit and law all be honourable and just and expedient; but the honourable must always be first esteemed; secondly, the just; thirdly, the expedient. And generally our aim should be to render the city by these qualities as far as possible harmonious, and deliver it from the love of quarrelling and strife, and make it at unity with itself. This will come to pass if the passions of the youthful soul are trained by endurance in pleasures and pains and conformed to moderation;—if the amount of wealth is small, and the revenue derived from the cultivation of the soil; — if the virtuous fill the offices in which virtue is needed, the skilful those in which skill is needed, the rich those in which lavish expenditure and profusion are needed; and to all these, when they have filled in due manner their proper offices, due honour be assigned. Now the causes of virtue are three: fear, desire, shame. The law creates fear, moral habits, shame (for those who have been trained in right habits are ashamed to do wrong); reason implants desire. For it is a motive power, at once giving the reason and attracting the soul, especially when it is combined with exhortation. Wherefore also we must prepare for the souls of the young guilds and common meals, and places of living and meeting together, military as well as civil, and the elders must be harmonized with them, since the young want prudence and training, the old, cheerfulness and quiet enjoyment.’

Aristotle’s account of the character and attainments of Hippodamus may be compared with the passage in the Lesser Hippias of Plato(?) (368 A foll.), in which Hippias is described as acquainted with every conceivable art and science. The personal description of Hippodamus also bears an odd resemblance to the statement of Diogenes Laertius about Aristotle himself—τραυλῆς τῶν ὠνῶν . . . ἄλλῃ καὶ ἰσχυροσκελῆς . . . ἄνθρωπος, καὶ μικρόμματος, ἰσθητὶ τε πιστὴμῷ χρώμενος καὶ δακτυλίοις καὶ κουραῖς (v. 1. § 2 init.).

The quantity of the name Hippod[Editor: illegible character]mus, though unimportant, is a somewhat difficult question. In Aristophanes (Knights 327) the *a* is long, yet if the name be a compound of δη?μος, it is hard to give any meaning to it. It has been thought that Aristophanes has altered the quantity for the sake of the joke.

Mention occurs of the ?πποδάμειος ?γορ? at the Piraeus in Andoc. de Myst. § 45, p. 7, Xen. Hell. ii. 4. § 11, and Dem.(?) adv. Timoth. § 22, p. 1190. A tradition is preserved by Strabo (xiv. 653, ?ς ?ασίν), that the architect of the Piraeus was the architect of the magnificent city of Rhodes. The scholiast on Knights 327 who supposes the Hippodamus of Aristophanes to be the person here mentioned, supposes him also to have designed the Piraeus at the time of the Persian War (κατ? τ? Μηδικά); but he had probably no special means of information and only ‘combined’ the two facts that Hippodamus was the architect of the Piraeus and that Themistocles was the original author of the proposal to improve the harbour. Hippodamus is also called ‘the Thurian’ in Hesychius. The city of Thurii was founded in 445 b.c. and Rhodes was built in 406 b.c. If therefore Hippodamus was a Thurian and also the builder of Rhodes he must have designed not the original works of the Piraeus, but the improvements made at a later date, such as was the middle wall in the age of Pericles, b.c. 444. This latter date is more in accordance with the half Sophist, half Pythagorean character which is attributed to Hippodamus. It is also more in accordance with the words of Aristotle in vii. 11. § 6, ? δ? τω?ν ?δίων ο?κήσεων διάθεσις ?δίων μ?ν νομίζεται . . . ?ν ε?τομος ??? κα? κατ? τ?ν νεώτερον κα? τ?ν ?πποδάμειον τρόπον, where it is implied that the Hippodamean plan of arranging cities in straight streets was comparatively recent. Cp. for the whole subject C. F. Hermann de Hippodamo Milesio.

κα? κόσμ? πολυτελε??, ?τι δ? ?σθη?τος ε?τελον?ς κ.τ.λ.

There is no reason for suspecting corruption. The eccentricity of Hippodamus consisted in combining expensiveness and simplicity: ?σθη?τος is dependent on some such word as χρήσει to be supplied from κόσμ?.

δι?ρει δ’ ε?ς τρία μέρη τ?ν χώραν, τ?ν μ?ν ?εράν, τ?ν δ? δημοσίαν, τ?ν δ’ ?δίαν.

The division of the land proposed in the Seventh Book (c. 10. § 11) is nearly similar to that of Hippodamus.

δικαστήριον ?ν τ? κύριον.

Plato in the Laws also establishes an appeal, vi. 767 C. ‘The final judgment shall rest with that court, which has been established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of the neighbours or of the tribes.’

τ?ς δ? κρίσεις ?ν το??ς δικαστηρίοις κ.τ.λ.

See *infra* note on §§ 14, 15. Though the principle of Hippodamus is condemned by Aristotle as unsuited to the Athenian popular courts of law, it prevailed in the more advanced jurisprudence of the Romans in which the judges were allowed to give a sentence of *n. l.* or *non liquet*, whence the Scotch verdict of ‘not proven.’ The ideas of

Hippodamus certainly show great legislative ingenuity in an age when such a quality was extremely rare.

ἤσ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον· ἤσ'τι δὲ καὶ ἔνθα ἔστι νόμος
νῦν καὶ ἔνθα ἔστι τῶν πόλεων.

Aristotle intends to say that Hippodamus proposed this law as a novelty of which he claimed the credit, whereas it already existed at Athens and elsewhere. The meaning is clear, though the form of the sentence is not perfectly logical: ‘*But this law actually exists in Athens at the present day,’ and this is considered as sufficient proof that it existed at the time of Hippodamus. Or 2) without any opposition but with less point: ‘And this law now exists at Athens.’ Cp. Thuc. ii. 46.

τοῦ δ' ἀρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ῥηρῶν.

I. e. ‘They were to watch over the public interests and over the interests of persons who had no legal status.’

Aristotle, after his rather onesided manner of attacking an opponent, raises several ἐπιμαρτυρίαι respecting the three classes of Hippodamus. ‘How can the two inferior classes, who have no arms, maintain their independence? For many offices they are obviously unfitted: and if they have no share in the state how can they be loyal citizens? Granting that the artisans have a *raison d'être*, what place in the state can be claimed by the husbandmen and why should they have land of their own? If the soldiers cultivate their own lands, there will be no distinction between them and the husbandmen; this, however, is not the intention of the legislator: if there are separate cultivators of the public lands, then there are not three, but four classes. The husbandmen are practically slaves who will be at the mercy of the warriors; and if so, why should they elect the magistrates? They will have no attachment to the state and must be kept down by force.’

To these ἐπιμαρτυρίαι he finds no answer. He adds one or two more: ‘How can the husbandmen produce enough for themselves and the warriors? And why, if they can, should there be any distinction between their lots and those of the soldiers?’

γεωργήσῃ δύο οὐκίας.

Either οὐκία is here used like οὐρεῖα in the sense of ‘property’ or ‘inheritance’; or γεωργήσῃ must be taken to mean ‘maintains by agriculture.’ (Cp. for a similar use of οὐκία Dem. de Falsâ Leg. καρπουμένη τῶν χωρῶν οὐκίας; and for another singular use of γεωργέω, i. 8. § 6, ἵνα γεωργίαν ζῶσαν γεωργονύκτες.) If neither of these explanations is deemed satisfactory, we must suppose a corruption of the text, which may be corrected by reading εἰς δύο οὐκίας (Bernays), or δύσιν οὐκίας. The old Latin translation ‘ministrabit’ has suggested the emendation ἐπιμαρτυρήσῃ. This is no better, or rather worse, Greek than γεωργήσῃ in the sense given above.

τοῦτο δ' ἔνθα μὲν τῶν διαίτων καὶ πλείοσιν ὑδέχεται.

‘This is an arbitration is possible, even although the judges are many.’

ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἑκοσι μναῖς, ἢ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μναῖς, ἢ ἢ μὲν πλεόν, ἢ δ' ἡλασσον, ἡλλος δὲ πέντε, ἢ δὲ τέτταρας.

ἢ μὲν γὰρ clearly refers to the litigant, sc. ἢ εἰλεσθαι οἴεται. But in what follows, the words ἢ μὲν πλ[Editor: illegible character]ον ἢ δὲ ἡλασσον may refer either 1) to the difference between the judges and the litigant or 2*) to the differences of the judges among themselves. In the first case ἢ ἢ μὲν πλεόν ἢ δὲ ἡλασσον is a generalised statement of the words which have preceded, ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἑκοσι μναῖς, ἢ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μναῖς. But in the second case the words are restricted to ἢ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μναῖς, ἡλλος δὲ πέντε, ἢ δὲ τέτταρας. Anyhow there is a colloquial irregularity, the words ἡλλος δὲ πέντε κ.τ.λ. having crept in out of place, as an illustration of the general principle ἢ μὲν πλεόν κ.τ.λ. already stated.

εἰδῶθαλμον ἢ κονῶσαι μόνον.

A confusion of language: cp. εἰ πρόσωπος (c. 5. § 11).

ἢ χει γὰρ συκοῶαντίας.

That Hippodamus was speaking of political discoveries and not of inventions in the arts, is clear from the context. Hippodamus' error was derived from the analogy of the arts, § 18. We can easily understand the danger of rewarding discoveries such as were made in the conspiracy of the Hermae at Athens or in the days of the Popish Plot in England. Aristotle admits that there have been and will be changes in government, but he advocates caution and insists that law should be based on custom.

αἰ τῆχνοι παῶσαι καἰ αἰ δυνάμεις.

Every art and science is also a power to make or become; hence the word δύναμις being the more general term is constantly associated with both τέχνη and ἢ πιστήμη.

ζητονῶσι δ' ἢ λως οἰ τῶ πάτριον ἢ λλῶ τῶγαθῶν πάντες.

This statement goes beyond the truth. For the traditions of families or clans are very slow in giving way, as e.g. in the constitution of Lycurgus or Solon, to a sense of the common good. It is rarely and for a brief space that nations wake up to the feeling of their own nationality, or are touched by the enthusiasm of humanity.

ἢ μοίους εἰῶναι καἰ τοῶς τυχόντας καἰ τοῶς ἢ νοήτους, ἢ σπερ καἰ λέγεται κατῶ τῶν γηγενῶν.

ἢ μοίους has been altered by Bernays into ἢ λίγους but without reason. It may be taken 1) as = ἢ μοίους τοῶς γηγενέσι, or, 2)* ἢ μοίους may be joined with καἰ τοῶς τυχόντες = 'no better than simple or common persons.' Cp. Hdt. vii. 50, γνώμῶσι ἢ χρέοντο ἢ μοίῶσι καἰ σύ. Plat. Theaet. 154 A, ἢ λλῶ ἢ νθρώπῶ ἢ ῶρῶ ἢ μοιον καἰ σοῶ αἰνεται ἢ τιονῶν.

ἢ σπερ γὰρ καἰ περῶ τῶς ἢ λλας τέχνας, καἰ τῶν πολιτικῶν τάξιν ἢ δύνατον ἢ κριβῶς πάντα γραῶηῶναι.

1)* If we take πάντα as subject, τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν may be the remote object of γραῖναι, or the words may be governed by περὶ of which the force is continued from περὶ τῆς ἄλλας τέχνας. Or 2) τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν may be the subject of γραῖναι, in which case πάντα is to be taken adverbially.

οὐ γὰρ τοσοντον ἐλήσεται κινήσας, ἴσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ῥηουσιν πειθεῖν ἴσισθεις.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα, ἵτι χείροσι νόμοις κινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἴσιν καλωῖς ῥηουσιν κύροις.

κινήσας, sc. ὁ πολίτης gathered from the previous sentence.

ἢ γὰρ νόμος ἴσιν οὐδεμίαν ῥηει πρὸς τὴν πείθεσθαι πλὴν παρὰ τὴν ἴθους, τοντο δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πληθους, ἴστε τὴν ἴδιως μεταβάλλειν καὶ τῶν παρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἴτερους νόμους καινοῖς ἴσθην ποιεῖν ἴστὶ τὴν τοντὸν νόμου δύναμιν . . ῥηει μεγάλην διαῖοράν.

Cp. Plat. Laws i. 634 D, εἰς τῶν καλλίστων ἴν εἴη νόμων μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν νέων μηδένα ἴαν, ποῖα καλωῖς αἴτων ἢ μὴ καλωῖς ῥηει and Arist. Met. ii. 3, 995 a. 3, ἴλικην δὲ ἴσιν ῥηει τὴν σύνηθες οὐ νόμοι δηλονῖσιν, ἴν οἴς τὴν μυθώδη καὶ παιδαριώδη μεῖζον ἴσχει τοντὸν γινώσκειν περὶ αἴτων διὰ τὴν ἴθους.

ῥηει μεγάλην διαῖοράν, lit. 'makes a great difference.'

In this chapter Aristotle tacitly assumes or perhaps acquiesces in the popular belief that Lycurgus is the author of all Spartan institutions. He was supposed to be the founder of the Spartan constitution, as Solon of the Athenian, or as King Alfred of the ancient English laws. The Ephoralty is apparently attributed to him; yet elsewhere (v. 11. § 2, 3) Theopompus, a later king of Sparta, is said to have introduced this new power into the state.

εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ἴόθεσιν καὶ τὴν τρόπον ἴπεναντίως τηῖς προκειμένης αἴτοῖς πολιτείας.

εἴ τι, sc. νενομοθέτηται: καὶ τὴν τρόπον following πρὸς τὴν ἴόθεσιν. προκειμένης αἴτοῖς, i.e. 1)* 'which is proposed to the citizens,' πολίταις understood from πολιτεῖαν supra; or 2) 'which legislators set before themselves' referring to νομοθέται implied in νενομοθέτηται: cp. ὁ ἴόθεσις τοντὸν νομοθέτου at the end of this chapter (§ 33).

τὴν τῶν ἴναγκαίων σχολήν.

'Leisure or relief from the necessary cares of life.' The construction is singular and rare in prose, yet not really different from ἴν τινι σχολῇ κακοντὸν of Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1286. So Plat. Rep. ii. 370 C ἴταν εἰς ἴν, σχολῇ τῶν ἴλλων ἴγων, πράττῃ.

ἢ τε γὰρ Θεταλων πενεστεία πολλάκις ἴπέθετο τοῖς Θεταλοῖς, ἴμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οὐ Εἴλωτες ἴσπερ γὰρ ἴεδρεύοντες τοῖς ἴτυχήμασι διατελονῖσιν.

Cp. Laws vi. 776 C, D: ‘I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae.’ Yet in this passage of Aristotle the Penestae are spoken of as constantly revolting from their masters.

περὶ δὲ τοῖς Κρηταῖς οὐδὲν πῶ τοιοντόν συμβέβηκεν· ἀτίον δ’ ἴσως τῶ τῶς γειτνιώσας πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμούσας ἑλληλαῖς, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἰσταμένοις δι’ τῶ μὲ συμῆρειν καὶ ἀταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους· τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οὐ γειτνιῶντες ἕχθροὶ πάντες ἴσαν, ἴργεῖοι καὶ Μεσσηνιοὶ καὶ ἴρκάδες.

The argument is that in Crete, where all the states had their Perioeci or subject class, no attempt was ever made to raise a servile insurrection when they went to war, because such a measure would have been contrary to the interests of both parties. The Cretans were the inhabitants of an island and there were no out-siders to encourage revolt among the slaves (cp. c. 10. § 15, ἡλλ’ καθάπερ εἴρηται σώζεται δι’ τῶν τόπον). Probably also a sort of international custom prevailed among them, arising from their common necessity, of not raising the slaves in their wars with one another. The Argives and the other Peloponnesian states, when at war, were always receiving the insurgent Helots. But the Argive subject population, like the Cretan, were not equally ready to rise, and indeed were at times admitted to the governing body (cp. v. 3. § 7, καὶ ἴν ἴργει τῶν ἴν τῶ ἴβδόμῃ ἴπολομένων ἴπῃ Κλεομένουσ τονῃ Λάκωνος ἴναγκάσθησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς). We may also remark that in c. 5. § 19 supra, Aristotle incidentally observes that the Cretan slaves were comparatively well treated, although forbidden gymnastics and the use of arms.

The word ‘perioeci’ appears to have been used in Crete to denote generally an inferior class, who were not, as at Sparta, distinguished from Helots or slaves. This is confirmed by c. 10. § 5, γεωργονῖσι τε γῆρ τοῖς μῆν (sc. Λακεδαιμονίοις) Εἴλωτες, τοῖς δὲ Κρηταῖσιν οὐ περιοίκοι. But compare also Sosicrates [b.c. 200-128] preserved in Athenaeus (vi. c. 84. fin., p. 263), τῶν μῆν κοινῶν δουλείαν οὐ Κρηταῖτεσ καλονῖσι μνοῖαν, τῶν δὲ ἴδιαν ἴαμιώτασ, τοῖς δὲ περιοίκουσ ἴπηκόουσ. The use of the term μνοῖα in Sosicrates is confirmed by the celebrated Scolium of Hybrias the Cretan (Bergk 27), τούτῃ (sc. τῶ ἴξίῃει) δεσπότασ μνωῖασ κέκλημαι. Cp. also Athen. vi. 267, where the term μνῆτισ is said by Hermon to be applied to ‘well-born’ serfs: εἴγενεῖσ οὐκέτα.

καὶ ἀταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους. ‘Since they too have perioeci.’

With these criticisms we may compare Aristotle’s proposal (vii. 9. § 8 and 10. §§ 13, 14) in the description of his own state, that the husbandmen should be either slaves or foreign perioeci.

ἴσπερ γῆρ οὐκίασ μέρος ἴνῃρ καὶ γυνή.

The singular μέρος is used by attraction with the singular ἴνήρ.

For the general subject, cp. Laws vi. 780 E ff.: ‘For in your country, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness—I mean the female sex — has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter, but in proportion as woman’s nature is inferior to that of men in capacity of virtue, in that proportion is she more important than the two halves put together.

Cp. also Rhet. i. 5, 1361 a. 10, ἴσοις γὰρ τὴν κατὰ γυναῖκα ἀνὰ ἅπαντα ἴσπερ Λακεδαιμονίοις, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὴν ἴμισυ οὐκ ἐδαίμονον ἴσι: and supra i. 13. § 16; also Eur. Andr. 595,

οὐδ’ ἴν, ἐβούλοίτο τις,
σώρων γένοιτο Σπαρτιατίδων κόρη.

ἴπ τῆς ἴρχῆς ἀτῶν.

Translated in the text, as by interpreters generally*, ‘in the days of their greatness,’ i. e. in the fourth century b. c. after the taking of Athens when Sparta had the hegemony of Hellas. But is not the passage rather to be explained ‘many things in their government were ordered by women’? (Schlosser). For why should women be more powerful in the days of their greatness than in their degeneracy? To which it may be replied that the very greatness of the empire made the evil more conspicuous. According to the latter of the two explanations ἴρχῆς corresponds to ἴρχειν in what follows.

This use of the genitive is not uncommon: cp. ἴπ στρατῆς Arist. Wasps 557; τῶς ἴπ τῶν πραγμάτων, sc. ἴντας, Dem. 309. 10.

For the conduct of the Spartan women in the invasion of Epaminondas: compare Xenophon, himself the eulogist of Sparta, Hell. vi. 5. § 28, τῶν δὲ ἴκ τῆς πόλεως ἀμὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τὴν καπνὸν ἴρωσαι ἴνεύχοντο, ἴτε οὐδέποτε ἴδονσαι πολέμιους, and Plutarch, Ages. 31, who has preserved a similar tradition, οὐχ ἴττον δὲ τούτων ἴλύπουν τὴν ἴγησίλαον οὐ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν θόρυβοι καὶ κραυγαὶ καὶ διαδρομαὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων δυσανασχετούντων τὴν γινόμενα, καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ δυναμένων ἴσυχάζειν, ἴλλ’ ἴπαντάπασιν ἴκρόνων οὐσῶν πρὸς τε τὴν κραυγὴν καὶ τὴν πνῆρ τῶν πολέμιων.

χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἴσαν, ἴσπερ ἴν ἴτέραις πόλεσιν, θόρυβον δὲ παρεἴχον πλείω τῶν πολέμιων.

Either 1)* ‘For, unlike the women in other cities, they were utterly useless’; or 2) ‘For, like the women of other cities, they were utterly useless; and they caused more confusion than the enemy.’

The employment of the men on military service, which rendered it more easy for Lycurgus to bring them under his institutions, is supposed to have caused the disorder of the women which made it more difficult to control them. Yet we may fairly doubt whether this notion is anything more than a speculation of Aristotle or some of his predecessors (ἄσφ μὲν), striving to account for a seemingly contradictory phenomenon. For there could have been no trustworthy tradition of the time before Lycurgus. It is observable that Aristotle, if his words are construed strictly, supposes Lycurgus to have lived after the time of the Messenian and Argive wars. Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, vol. i., p. 143 note w, considers the words καὶ Μεσσηνίωνος in § 11 to be an interpolation. But this assumption of interpolation is only due to the exigencies of chronology. The testimony of Aristotle may be summed up as follows: on the one hand he favours the traditional date; for he connects the name of Charillus an ancient king with that of Lycurgus c. 10. § 2: and on the other hand it is very possible that he may not have known, or may not have remembered the date of the Messenian Wars.

Grote (p. 2. c. 6, p. 516, n. 3) defends the Spartan women against the charges of Aristotle and Plato (the Ἰλολάκων) *Laws* vii. p. 806, reiterated by Plutarch (*Ages.* c. 31), and even supposes that ‘their demonstration on that trying occasion (i.e. the invasion of Laconia) may have arisen quite as much from the agony of wounded honour as from fear.’ Yet surely Aristotle writing not forty years afterwards, who is to a certain extent supported by the contemporary Xenophon (vi. 5, 28 see above), could hardly have been mistaken about a matter which was likely to have been notorious in Hellas.

αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν αἴτιαι τῶν γενομένων.

Sc. the women:* or ‘these are the causes’ (αἴτιαι by attraction for ταντα). The first way of taking the words gives more point to the clause which follows.

τίτι δὲ σὺγγνώμην ἔχειν.

‘We have not to consider whether we are to blame Lycurgus, or to blame the women; but whether such a state of things is right.’

ὁ μόνον ἔπρεπείαν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτὸν καθ’ αὐτήν.

αὐτὸν καθ’ αὐτὸν must agree with πολιτείαν understood in ἔπρεπείαν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας, these words being equivalent to ἔπρεπείαν ποιεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν: or αὐτῆς, which appears to have been the reading of the old translator (ipsius), may be adopted instead of αὐτήν.

μετ’ ἑρ τὸ νῦν ἠθέντα τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἰσχυρίαν τῆς κτήσεως ἰπιτιμήσειεν ἢ τις.

1)* The mention of avarice, or 2) the mention of women naturally leads Aristotle to speak of the inequality of property. The connexion is either 1) that avarice tends to inequality or 2) that inequality is produced by the great number of heiresses.

Plutarch (Agis, c. 5) apparently ascribes to the Ephor Epitadeus the law which enabled a Spartan to give or bequeath his property as he pleased. Either Aristotle has followed a different tradition, or the legislator is only a figure of speech for the institution (cp. supra, note at beginning of chapter).

τω?ν τ? ?πικλήρων.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5, ?νίστε δ? ?ρχουσιν α? γυνα??κες ?πίκληροι ον??σαι.

? κα? μετρίαν.

‘Or even a moderate one.’ κα? is here qualifying. ‘Better have no dowries or small ones, or you may even go so far as to have moderate ones.’

ων?ν δ? ?ξεστι δον?ναι τ?ν ?πίκληρον ?τ? ?ν βούληται.

ων?ν, not ‘now,’ as opposed to some former time, but ‘as the law stands.’ See note on c. 5. § 23 supra. δον?ναι, sc. τινά.

‘A man may give his heiress to any one whom he pleases’: i.e. heiresses may be married by their relatives to rich men, and the evil of accumulating property in a few hands will thus be increased. Herodotus, vi. 57, says that the giving away of an heiress whom her father had not betrothed was a privilege of the kings of Sparta. There may have been a difference in the custom before and after the days of Epitadeus (cp. note on § 14), though this is not expressed by the particle ων?ν.

ο?δ? χίλιοι τ? πλη?θος ??σαν, sc. ?π? τη?ς Θηβαίων ?μβολη?ς, §§ 10, 16.

γένονε δ? δι? τω?ν ?ργων α?τω?ν δη?λον ?τι ?άλλως α?το??ς ε??χε τ? περ? τ?ν τάξιν ταύτην.

τ? περ? τ?ν τάξιν ταύτην, sc. their arrangements respecting property described in the previous sentence. For the use of ταύτην with a vague antecedent, cp. below ταύτην τ?ν διόρθωσιν: also i. 2. § 2.

μίαν πληγήν.

The battle of Leuctra (b.c. 371) at which, according to Xenophon, Hellen, vi. 4. § 15, one thousand Lacedaemonians and four hundred out of seven hundred Spartans perished. The population of Sparta was gradually diminishing. In the time of Agis IV. reg. 240-248 b.c. according to Plutarch (Agis, c. 5), the Spartans were but 700, and only about 100 retained their lots.

?π? μ?ν τω?ν προτέρων βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τη?ς πολιτείας.

Yet Herodotus (ix. 35) affirms that Tisamenus of Elis, the prophet, and Hegias, were the only foreigners admitted to the rights of citizenship at Sparta. According to Plutarch, Dion was also made a Spartan citizen (Dio, c. 17).

καί ἄσιν ἐγγίναί ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίου.

The ancient number of Spartan citizens is variously given: here at 10,000; in Herod. vii. 234, at 8,000; according to a tradition preserved by Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 8), there were 9,000 lots which are said to have been distributed partly by Lycurgus, partly by Polydorus, the colleague of the king Theopompus.

Ἐναντίος δὲ καὶ ἕπερ τῆ τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.

At Sparta the accumulation of property in a few hands tended to disturb the equality of the lots. The encouragement of large families, though acting in an opposite way, had a similar effect. According to Aristotle, depopulation and overpopulation alike conspired to defeat the intention of Lycurgus. Yet it does not seem that the great inducements to have families were practically successful; perhaps because the Spartans intermarried too much.

Like Plato and Phaleas, the Spartan legislator is accused of neglecting population. (Cp. supra c. 6. §§ 12, 13, and c. 7. §§ 4-8.) It is clearly implied in the tone of the whole argument (against Mr. Grote, vol. ii. c. 6) that there was an original equality of property, but that it could not be maintained; cp. τῶν κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα, 6. § 10; τῶν χώρας ὁμοῦ διηρημένης, 9. § 19; and so Plato, Laws 684 D.

διὲς τὴν ἰσορίαν ἴνοι ἴσαν.

Cp. Thuc. i. 131, etc. where we are told that Pausanias trusted to escape by bribery, πιστεύων χρήμασιν διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Also Rhet. iii. 18. § 6, 1419 a. 31, Καὶ ἴς ἰσάκων ἐθονόμενος τῆς ἰσορίας, ἰρωτώμενος ἐδοκονῶσιν ἀτῶ δικάίως ἰπολωλέναι ἴτεροι, ἴη. ἴ δέ, ‘ὁκονῶν σὺ τούτοις ταῦτ’ ἴθου;’ Καὶ ἴς ἴη. ‘ὁκονῶν δικάίως ἴν,’ ἴη ‘καὶ σὺ ἰπόλοιο;’ ‘ὁ δῆτα,’ ἴη, ‘ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες τανῦτα ἴπραξαν, ἴγ’ ὁκ, ἴλλ’ ἴγνώμ.’

καὶ νῦν δ’ ἴν τοῖς ἴνδρίοις.

ἴνδριοι is a proper name, probably referring to some matter in which the Andrians were concerned. It is unlikely that Aristotle would have used the archaic word ἴνδρια for ἴδίτια or συσσίτια. For this use of the word ἴνδρια cp. c. 10. § 5, καὶ τό γε ἴρχαῖον ἴκάλουν ὁ Λάκωνες ὁ ἴδίτια ἴλλ’ ἴνδρια, καθάπερ ὁ Κρηῖτες, ἴῶ καὶ δῆλον ἴτι κέῶθεν ἴλήλυθεν.

The event to which Aristotle refers is wholly unknown to us, though the strange expression which he uses indicates the great importance of it (ἴσον ἴῶ ἴαντοῖς ἴλην τὴν πόλιν ἴπώλεσαν).

ἴστε καὶ ταῦτ’ συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν.

‘So that in this way, as well as by the venality of the Ephors, together with the royal office the whole constitution was injured.’

δε?? γ?ρ τ?ν πολιτείαν τ?ν μέλλουσαν σώζεσθαι πάντα βούλεσθαι τ? μέρη της πόλεως ε??ναι κα? διαμένειν τα?τά.

The nominatives which occur in the next sentence, ο? μ?ν ον??ν βασιλε??ς, ο? δ? καλο? κ?γαθοί, κ.τ.λ. show that the corresponding words τ? μέρη της πόλεως are the subject of βούλεσθαι = δε?? πάντα τ? μέρη της πόλεως βούλεσθαι τ?ν πολιτείαν σώζεσθαι κα? διαμένειν τα?τά.

τα?τ? is to be taken adverbially with διαμένειν = κατ? τα?τά.

??θλον γ?ρ ? ?ρχ? α?τη της ?ρετης ?στίν.

Nearly the same words occur in Demosthenes, c. Lept. § 119, p. 489, where speaking of the γερουσία, he says, ?κε?? μ?ν γάρ ?στι της ?ρετης ??θλον της πολιτείας κυρί? γενέσθαι μετ? τω?ν ?μοίων.

παιδαριώδης γάρ ?στι λίαν.

It is not known how the Ephors were elected. Possibly in the same way as the γέροντες (vide note on § 27 infra), which Aristotle likewise calls παιδαριώδης. Plato, Laws iii. 692 A, says that the Ephoralty is ?γγ?ς της κληρωτης δυνάμεως, by which he seems to mean that the election to the Ephoralty was almost as indiscriminate as if it had been by lot.

As in the funeral oration of Pericles, the Spartan discipline is everywhere described as one of unnatural constraint. There was no public opinion about right and wrong which regulated the lives of men. Hence, when the constraint of law was removed and they were no longer ?ρχόμενοι but ?ρχοντες, the citizens of Sparta seem to have lost their character and to have fallen into every sort of corruption and immorality. The love of money and the propensity to secret luxury were kindred elements in the Spartan nature.

τ?ν τρόπον δ? τον?τον πεπαιδευμένων ?στε κα? τ?ν νομοθέτην α?τ?ν ?πιστε??ν ?ς ο?κ ?γαθο??ς ?νδράσιν, ο?κ ?σ?αλές.

‘But when men are so educated that the legislator himself cannot trust them, and implies that they are not good men, there is a danger.’ The remark is resumed and justified in § 30 (?τι δ’ ? νομοθέτης, κ.τ.λ.), by the general suspicion of their citizens which the Spartan government always showed, and also (§ 26) by the circumstance that the Gerontes were placed under the control of the Ephors.

ο?κ ?σ?αλές, sc. τ? κυρίου? α?το?ς ε??ναι μεγάλων.

δόξειε δ’ ?ν κ.τ.λ.

The discussion about the Ephors and Gerontes is a sort of dialogue, in which objections are stated and answers given, but the two sides of the argument are not distinctly opposed.

ἤτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀρεσῶν ἅν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατὰ τε τῶν κρίσιν ἤστ?
παιδαριώδης κ.τ.λ.

For the mode of the election cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 26: ‘The election took place after this fashion: When the assembly had met, certain persons selected for the purpose were shut up in a building near at hand, so that they could not see or be seen, but could only hear the shouting of the assembly. For, as with other matters (cp. Thuc. i. 87, κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῆ?? καὶ οὐ ψή??), the Lacedaemonians decided by acclamation between the competitors. One by one the candidates were brought in, according to an order fixed by lot, and walked, without speaking, through the assembly. The persons who were shut up marked on tablets the greatness of the shout given in each case, not knowing for whom it was being given, but only that this was the first or the second or the third in order of the candidates. He was elected who was received with the loudest and longest acclamations.’

δε?? γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὲ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τῶν ἄξιον τῆς ἄρχης.

Cp. Plat. Rep. 345 E ff., 347 D.

ὡν δὲ ἄπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ἄ νομοθέτης ἄίνεται ποιῶν ἄιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας τοῦτοις κέχρηται πρὸς τῶν ἀ[Editor: illegible character]ρεσῶν τῶν γερόντων.

According to the view of Aristotle and of Plato nobody should seek to rule, but everybody if he is wanted should be compelled to rule. Yet this is rather a counsel of perfection than a principle of practical politics. And it seems hardly fair to condemn the work of Lycurgus, because like every other Greek state, Sparta had elections and candidatures.

διόπερ ἄξέπεμπον συμπρεσβευτὺς τοὺς ἄχθρούς.

συμπρεσβευτὺς does not refer to the kings, but is an illustration of the same jealousy which made the Spartans consider the dissensions of the kings to be the salvation of their state. διόπερ = ‘by reason of a like suspicion.’

It has been argued that Aristotle in this section is criticising the kings only. And we might translate (with Bernays and others) ‘they sent enemies as colleagues of the king,’ e.g. in such cases as that of Agis (Thuc. v. 63). But these could hardly be described as συμπρεσβευταί, any more than the Ephors who, according to Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. c. 13. § 5), were the companions of the king—not his active counsellors, but spectators or controllers of his actions.

Ancient historians are apt to invent causes for the facts which tradition has handed down. Cp. note on c. 9. § 11 supra; also v. 11. § 2; Herod. v. 69; Thuc. i. 11, &c. It may be easily believed that there were frequent παραπρεσβε??αι among Spartans, but

that these were the result of a deeply-laid policy is the fancy of later writers. Still less can we suppose the double royalty which clearly originated in the ancient history of Sparta to be the work of the legislator. Compare the Laws (iii. 691 D) of Plato (who probably first suggested the notion of a special design), 'A god who watched over Sparta gave you two families of kings instead of one and thus brought you within the limits of moderation.'

τῶν σύνοδον.

Either 1) the gathering for meals; or 2) the contribution, as in Hdt. i. 64.

βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὴν εἶναι τὴν κατασκευάσασθαι τῶν συσσιτίων.

It may be admitted that the common meals had a sort of leveling or equalizing tendency; but this could hardly have been the original intention of them, whether they were first instituted at Sparta by Lycurgus or not (cp. vii. 10. § 2 ff.). They are more naturally connected with the life of a camp (§ 11) and the brotherhood of arms. They may also be the survival of a patriarchal life.

The remark that the office of admiral was a second royalty appears to be justified chiefly by the personal greatness of Lysander. Teleutias the brother of Agesilaus was also a distinguished man. It cannot be supposed that Eurybiades or Cnemus or Alcidas or Astyochus were formidable rivals to the king.

τούτου δὲ μάρτυρα οὐκ ἔλαττον νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τῶν γὰρ τὴν περιμάχητα δι' ῥετηγῶν μάλλον ἢ κακίας· καὶ τὸν το μὲν καλῶς, ἢ τι μέντοι τὰ κρείττω τῆς ῥετηγῶν πολυαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς.

'The Spartans were right in thinking that the goods of life are to be acquired by virtue, but not right in thinking that they are better than virtue' (cp. vii. c. 2. and c. 14). The 'not less error' is that they degrade the end into a means; they not only prefer military virtue to every other, but the goods for which they are striving to the virtue by which they are obtained.

τῶν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν χρήματων, τοῦ δὲ διώτας ἰλοχρημάτων.

It is quite true that many Spartans, Pausanias, Pleistoanax, Astyochus, Cleandridas, Gylippus and others were guilty of taking bribes. But it is hard to see how their crime is attributable to the legislator. Not the institutions of Lycurgus, but the failure of them was the real source of the evil.

The love of money to whatever cause attributable was held to be characteristic of Sparta in antiquity. The saying χρήματα χρήματ' ἢνῆρ is placed by Alcaeus (Fr. 50) in the mouth of a Spartan, and the oracle ἰλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ἢεῖ ἢλλο δὲ οὐδὲν is quoted in the Aristotelian Πολιτεῖαι fr. Rei. Lac. 1559 b. 28.

πᾶρεγγυς μὲν ἔστι ταύτης.

Polyb. vi. 45 denies the resemblance between Crete and Lacedaemon, ἢ πῶς δὲ τῶν τῶν Κρητῶν μεταβάντες (πολιτείαν) ἴξιον ἴπιστηῖσαι κατὰ δύο τρόπους πῶς οὐ λογιώτατοι τῶν ῥαχίων συγγραφέων Ἰσοκράτης, Ξενοφῶν, Καλλισθένης, Πλάτων, πρῶτον μὲν ἴμοίαν ἐῖναί ἴασι κατὰ τῶν ἀτῶν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων, δεύτερον δὲ ἴπαινετῶν ἴπάρχουσιν ἴποῖαίνουσιν. ὠτῶν οὐδέτερον ἴληθῶς ἐῖναί μοι δοκεῖ. He contrasts the two states in several particulars; 1) the equal distribution of land in Sparta did not exist in Crete; 2) the greed of wealth which existed in Crete is said, strangely enough, to have been unknown at Sparta; 3) the hereditary monarchy of Sparta is contrasted with the life tenure of the γέροντες; 4) the harmony which prevailed at Sparta is contrasted with the rebellions and civil wars of Crete.

τῶ δὲ πλεῖστον ἴττον γλαῦρωτος.

Compare what is said of Charondas in c. 12. § 11, τῆς ἴκριβείῃ τῶν νόμων ἴστῶ γλαῦρότερος κατὰ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.

According to this view the Spartan institutions are not Dorian but Pre-Dorian, having been established originally by Minos; received from him by the Lacedaemonian colony of Lyctus in Crete, and borrowed from the Lyctians by Lycurgus.

διῶ κατὰ νῦν οὐ περίοικοι τῶν ἀτῶν τρόπον χρωτῶνται ἀτοῖς, ἴς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω πρῶτου τῶν τάξιν τῶν νόμων.

The connexion is as follows:—The Lacedaemonian Laws are borrowed from the Cretan. Among the Lyctians, a colony of the Lacedaemonians who settled in Crete and whom Lycurgus is said to have visited, these laws were already in existence, and he adopted them. And even at this day, the laws of Minos are still in force among the subject population or aborigines of Crete. διῶ is unemphatic; the logical form outruns the meaning.

Either the laws of Minos had ceased to be enforced among the freemen of Crete or the freemen of Crete had themselves changed (Bernays); and therefore any vestiges of the original law were only to be found among the ancient population. Thus communistic usages may be observed among the peasants of India and Russia, which have disappeared in the higher classes. Yet Aristotle also speaks of the common meals in Crete as still continuing. Does he refer only to the survival of them among the Perioeci? By Dosiades (b.c.?) the Cretan Syssitia are described as still existing (see the passage quoted in note on § 6). Aristotle supposes that Lycurgus went to Crete before he gave laws to Sparta. According to other accounts his travels, like those of Solon, were subsequent to his legislation.

Ephorus, the contemporary of Aristotle [see fragment quoted in Strabo x. 480], argues at length that the Spartan Institutions originally existed in Crete but that they were perfected in Sparta, and that they deteriorated in Cnossus and other Cretan cities; both writers agree in the general view that the Cretan institutions are older than the Spartan and in several other particulars, e.g. that the Lyctians were a Lacedaemonian colony, that the common meals were called ἴνδρια or ἴνδρεῖα, that the Cretan institutions had decayed in their great towns but survived among the Perioeci; and also in the

similarity of offices at Lacedaemon and Crete. The great resemblance between this account and that of Aristotle seems to indicate a common unknown source.

The existence of the same institutions in Sparta and Crete and the greater antiquity of the Cretan Minos may have led to the belief in their Cretan origin. Others deemed such an opinion unworthy of Sparta and argued plausibly that the greater could not have been derived from the less; Strabo l.c.

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νηΐσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ῥαχὴν τὴν ἑλληνικὴν περὶ ὑκέναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς.

Aristotle, like Herodotus, Thucydides, Aeschylus, is not indisposed to a geographical digression; cp. vii. 10. §§ 3-5.

It may be observed that the remark is not perfectly consistent with §§ 15, 16. The 'silver streak' and 'the empire of the sea' are the symbols of two different policies.

Διὲ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ῥαχὴν κατέσχευεν ἡ Μίνως.

Cp. Herod. iii. 122, Thuc. i. 4.

γεωργονοσί τε γῆρ τοῖς μὲν ἐλωτες τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι.

But if Sosicrates, a writer of the second century b.c., quoted by Athenaeus vi. 84 is to be trusted, Aristotle is here at fault in his use of terms; τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρηῖτες καλονοῦσι μνοῖαν, τὴν δὲ ῥοδίαν ἡ ἀμιώτας, τοῖς δὲ περιόικους ἡπηκόους; see c. 9. § 3.

ἢ καὶ δηλῶν ἦτι κεῖθεν ἠλήλυθεν.

These words may be compared with the passage in Book vii. 10. § 2, ῥαχία δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις, τὴ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὴ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἑταλίαν πολλῶν παλαιότερα τούτων. In both passages Aristotle says that the common meals came from Crete to Sparta.

οἱ μὲν γῆρ ἡ ἄλλοι τὴν ἀτὴν ἡχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἢ τῆς Κρήτης καλουμένοις κόσμοις.

The office of the Cosmi is identified by Aristotle with that of the Ephors. But the resemblance between them is very slight. The fact that at Sparta there were kings, while in Crete the kingly power, if it ever existed at all, had long been abolished, makes an essential difference. The Ephors were democratic, the Cosmi were oligarchical officers. And although both the Ephors and the Cosmi were an executive body, yet the Ephors, unlike the Cosmi, never acquired the military command, which was retained by the Spartan kings. Aristotle observes that the Cosmi were chosen out of certain families, the Ephors out of all the Spartans, a circumstance to which he ascribes the popularity of the latter institution.

οἱ καλονοῦσιν οἱ Κρηῖτες βουλήν.

Yet we are told that the term βουλῆ was generally used to signify ‘the council in a democracy.’ Cp. iv. 15. § 11 and vi. 8. § 17, also v. 1. § 10, [at Epidamnus] ἦντ’ ἰσθῆναι ἡλικίαν βουλῆν ἠποίησεν. In the Cretan use of the term βουλῆ there may be a survival of the Homeric meaning of the word.

βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον μὲν ἦν.

Probably an inference from the legendary fame of Minos. No other king of Crete is mentioned.

Dosiades, quoted by Ath. iv. c. 22. p. 143, gives the following account of the Cretan Syssitia: ‘The Lyctians collect the materials for their common meals in the following manner: Every one brings a tenth of the produce of the soil into the guild (ἑταιρία) to which he belongs, and to this [are added] the revenues of the city, which the municipal authorities distribute to the several households. Further, each of the slaves contributes a poll-tax of an Aeginetan stater. All the citizens are divided among these guilds which they call andreia. A woman takes care of the syssitia with three or four of the common people to help in waiting; and each of these has two attendants, called καλοῦροί, to carry wood for him. Everywhere in Crete there are two buildings for the syssitia, one called the andreion, the other, which is used for the reception of strangers, the dormitory (κοιμητήριον). And first of all they set out two tables in the room for the syssitia, called “strangers’ tables,” at which any strangers who are present take their place. Next to these come the tables for the rest. An equal portion is set before every man: the children receive a half portion of meat, but touch nothing else. On every table a large vessel is set full of diluted wine: from this all who sit at that table drink in common; and when the meal is finished another cup is put on. The children too drink in common from another bowl. The elders may, if they like, drink more. The best of the viands are taken by the woman who superintends the syssitia in the sight of all, and placed before those who have distinguished themselves in war or council. After dinner their habit is first of all to consult about state affairs, and then to recount their deeds in battle and tell the praise of their heroes. Thus they teach the youth to be valiant.’

ἦσθ’ ἕκ κοινον’ τρέφεισθαι πάντα, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας.

ἕκ κοινον’, ‘out of a common stock’; not necessarily at common tables. The syssitia or common meals of women are said by Aristotle in chap. 12 to be an invention of Plato in the Laws, and if so they could hardly have existed at Crete. Nor is there any allusion to them in the fragment of Dosiades (supra). The name ἄνδρια or ἄνδρεῖα also affords a presumption against the admission of women to the public tables. But if the words ἕκ κοινον’ are interpreted as above, there is no reason that with Oncken (Staatslehre der Arist. ii. 386) we should suppose the words γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας on this ground to be spurious; nor is such a mode of textual criticism legitimate.

πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἄλιγοσιτίαν.

The connexion appears to be as follows: ‘And as there were so many mouths to feed,’ the legislator had many devices for encouraging moderation in food, which he thought a good thing, as well as for keeping down population.

τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ῥρρενας ποιήσας ἡμίλιαν, περὶ ἧς εἶ ἡαύλωσ ἢ μὴ ἡαύλωσ ἡτερος ἡσται τονὴ διασκῆσθαι καιρός.

If these words refer to this work, the promise contained in them is unfulfilled. Nothing is said on the subject in Book vii. c. 16, when the question of population is discussed. The promise, however, is somewhat generally expressed; like the end of c. 8. § 25 supra, Διὴ νῦν μὴν ἡῶμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν, ἡλλων γάρ ἡστι καιρῶν.

ἡντανῦθα δ’ οἷκ ἡξ ἡπάντων ἀῦρονῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἡλλ’ ἡκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς γέροντας ἡκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων. περὶ ὡῦν τοὺς ἀῦτοὺς ἡν τις εῦπειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡν Λακεδαίμονι γινομένων. τὴ γῦρ ἡνυπεύθυνον, καὶ τὴ διὴ βίου μεῦῦζόν ἡστι γέρας τῆς ἡξίας ἀῦτοῦς. . . τὴ δ’ ἡσυχάζειν, κ.τ.λ.

περὶ ὡῦν. Do these words refer to* the γέροντες (Susemihl, Bernays) or to the κόσμοι (Stahr)? The connexion would lead us to suppose the latter; for what precedes and what follows can only be explained on this supposition. Yet the Cosmi appear not to have held office for life (cp. γέροντας ἡκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων), perhaps only for a year (Polyb. vi. 46), though nothing short of a revolution could get rid of them; see infra, § 14. It is better to suppose that Aristotle has ‘gone off upon a word’ as at c. 9. § 30, and is here speaking of the γέροντες, but returns to his original subject at τὴ δ’ ἡσυχάζειν. περὶ ὡῦν and γινομένων have also been taken as neuters: ‘about which things,’ i. e. the mode of electing: but this explanation does not agree with the next words, which relate, not to the mode of election, but to the irresponsibility of the office.

καὶ τὴ μὴ κατὴ γράμματα ἡρχειν, ἡλλ’ ἀῦτογνώμονας ἡπισῦαλές.

Cp. c. 9. § 23 where similar words are applied not, as here, to the Cosmi and elders, but to the Ephors. Another more general censure is passed on the γέροντες, § 25.

οἷδὴ γῦρ λήμματός τι τοῦς κόσμοις ἡσπερ τοῦς ἡῦροις, πόρρω γ’ ἡποικονῦσιν ἡν νῆσῦ τῶν διαῦθερούντων.

Yet to say that the Cosmi could not be bribed because they lived in an island appears to be rather far-fetched. Probably Aristotle is thinking of the bribery of Hellenes by foreign powers, and for this there was little opportunity because the Cretans were isolated from the world.

οἷ γῦρ ἡσῦαλῦς ἡ κανών.

The expression is not quite accurate, for the caprice of an individual cannot be called a κανών. He means that to make the caprice of man a rule is unsafe.

πάντων δὴ ἡαυλότατον τὴ τῆς ἡκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν, ἡν καθισταῦσι πολλάκις ἡταν μὴ δίκας βούλωνται δονῦναι.

The words ἔν καθισταῖσι πολλάκις which follow and the preceding ἑκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινῶς show that the expression τῶ τῆς ἑκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν means not the insubordination of the notables, but the temporary abrogation of the office of Cosmi by their violence, or, possibly, their defiance of its authority.

ἔστι δ' ἑπικίνδυνος οὔτως ἑχουσα πόλις τῶν βουλομένων ἑπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων.

Translated in the English text: 'A city is in a dangerous condition, when those who are willing are also able to attack her.' More correctly, 'A city which may at any time fall into anarchy (οὔτως ἑχουσα) is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her.'

Διὶ καὶ τῶ τῶν περιοίκων μένει.

'And this is also a reason why the condition of the Perioeci remains unchanged.'

οὔτε γὰρ ἑξωτερικῆς ἑρχῆς κοινωνοῖσι.

Either 1*) have no foreign domains; or 2) have no relation to any foreign power. The language is not quite clear or accurate; for although a nation may possess foreign dominions it cannot 'share' in them. The Cretans were not members either of the Delian or of the Lacedaemonian confederacy.

νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικῶς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον.

The date of this event is said to be b. c. 343 when Phalaecus, the Phocian leader, accompanied by his mercenaries, crossed into Crete and took service with the inhabitants of Cnossus against those of Lyctus over whom he gained a victory, but shortly afterwards perished (Diod. xvi. 62, 63). This however is rather a civil than a 'foreign war.' Others refer the words to the war in the time of Agis II. (b.c. 330), or to the Cretan rising against Alexander.

νεωστὶ τε refers to σώζεται διὶ τῶν τόπων, 'Quite lately [her isolation did not save her,] foreign mercenaries brought war into the island.'

καὶ πολλὰ περιττώς πρὸς τοῦς ἑλλοῦς.

'And in many respects their government is remarkable when compared with those of other nations' or 'with the others of whom I have been speaking.' For the use of περιττός, cp. c. 6. § 6.

αἰσθηταὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς ἑλλήλαις τε σύνεγγύς πῶς εἶσι.

Yet the differences are far more striking than the resemblances, which seem to be only 'the common tables,' the analogous office of kings at Sparta and Carthage, and the council of Elders. The real similarity to one another of any of these institutions may be doubted (see note on § 3 infra): while the entire difference in spirit is not noticed by Aristotle. The Semitic trading aristocracy has little in common with the

Hellenic military aristocracy; the prosperity of Carthage with the poverty and backwardness of Crete. But in the beginnings of reflection mankind saw resemblances more readily than differences. Hence they were led to identify religions, philosophies, political institutions which were really unlike though they bore the impress of a common human nature.

σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης.

‘And the proof that they were an organized state’ or ‘that they had a regular constitution.’ The insertion of ἐν before συντεταγμένης (Schneider) is unnecessary. Cp. supra ii. 9. § 22.

τὴν δῆμον ἔχουσιν agrees with some word such as πόλιν understood from πολιτείαν = ‘the city with its democracy.’ There is no need to change ἔχουσιν into ἔκοντα (Bernays) or ἑκούσιον (Spengel).

μήτε στάσιν γεγενησθαι.

For the inconsistency of these words with another statement of Aristotle (v. 12. § 12) that ‘the Carthaginians changed from a tyranny into an aristocracy,’ which is also irreconcilable with the further statement in v. 12. § 14, that they never had a revolution, see note in loco.

ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὴν μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιρῶν τοῖς ἑιδιτίοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν κατὰ τετάρων ἄρχων τοῖς ἑτέροις . . . τοῖς δὲ βασιλεῦσι καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἑνάλογον τοῖς ἑτέροις βασιλευσὶ καὶ γέρουσιν.

Yet there could hardly have been much resemblance between the common tables of guilds or societies in the great commercial city of Carthage, and the ‘camp life’ of the Spartan syssitia; or between the five ephors of Sparta and the hundred and four councillors of Carthage: or between kings who were generals and elected for life at Sparta and the so called kings or suffetes who seem to have been elected annually and were not military officers at Carthage, but are distinguished from them, infra § 9.

οὐ γέρον.

Is to be taken as an adverb agreeing with the sentence, ‘and this is an improvement.’

καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι μήτε κατὰ τὴν ἀτὴν εἶναι γένος, μηδὲ τὸν τοῦ τῶν τυχόν, εἴτε διαφέρων ἢ τούτων ἀρετοῖς μάλλον ἢ καθ’ ἡλικίαν.

The true meaning of this rather perplexed passage is probably that given in the English text which may be gathered from the words as they stand. With διαφέρων supply τὴν γένος ἑστί. The correction of Bernays, τυχόν, εἴτε δὲ γερουσίαν ἢ πλουσίων ἀρετοῖς is too great a departure from the MSS. Lesser corrections, εἴτε δέ, ἢ ἢ εἴτε τι, εἴτε τι have some foundation in the Latin Version, but are unnecessary. εἴτε τε is to be read as two words and answers to μήτε, as διαφέρων does to μηδὲ τὸν τοῦ τῶν τυχόν. ‘It is a great advantage that the kings are not all of the same family and that their family

is no ordinary one, and if there be an extraordinary family, that the kings are elected out of it and not appointed by seniority.’

μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστώτες, ἢ ἐτελεῖς ὡς, μεγάλα βλάπτουσι καὶ βλάψαν ἢ δὴ τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

He elsewhere speaks of the Spartan monarchy in a somewhat different spirit (iii. 14. § 3, 15. § 1 ff.). The praise here given to the elective Monarchy or Consulate of the Carthaginians at the expense of the Spartan kingship is considerably modified by the fact mentioned in § 10, that they not unfrequently sold the highest offices for money.

τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας,

sc. ἰπιτιμηθέντων ἢ κ.τ.λ. Lit. ‘But of the things which would be censured when compared with the ideal of aristocracy and constitutional government, etc.’

The constitution of Carthage was an aristocracy in the lower sense, and like Aristotle’s own πολιτεία, a combination of oligarchy and democracy (iv. 8. § 9, v. 7. §§ 5-7). While acknowledging that wealth should be an element in the constitution, because it is the condition of leisure, Aristotle objects to the sale of places and the other abuses which arose out of it at Carthage. The Carthaginian constitution is expressly called an ‘aristocracy’ in iv. 7. § 4, because it has regard to virtue as well as to wealth and numbers; and once more (in v. 12. § 14) a democracy in which, as in other democracies, trade was not prohibited. According to Aristotle the people had the power 1) of debating questions laid before them; 2) of deciding between the kings and nobles when they disagreed about the introduction of measures, but 3) they had not the power of initiation.

ἢ ταῖς ἑτέροις πολιτείαις.

Sc. Crete and Sparta. Cp. supra § 5, ταῖς ἐρημέναις πολιτείαις.

τὸ δὲ τῆς πενταρχίας κ.τ.λ.

Of these pentarchies, or of the manner in which they held office before and after the regular term of their magistracy had expired, nothing is known. We may conjecture that they were divisions or committees of the γερουσία. Their position may be illustrated by that of the Cretan Cosmi, who became members of the γερουσία when their term of office had expired (cp. c. 10. § 10).

τὴν τῶν ἑκατόν.

Possibly the same which he had previously (§ 3) called the magistracy of 104. The magistracy here spoken of is termed μεγίστη ῥογή, the other is said to consist of great officers who are compared with the Ephors. If the two institutions are assumed to be the same, we might adduce for an example of a like inaccuracy in number, a passage, c. 6. § 5, where the citizens in Plato’s Laws who number 5040 are called the 5000. But it is not certain that they can be identified. According to Livy and Justin the ordo iudicum consisted of 100. ‘Centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur.’ Justin

xix. 2. (Cp. Livy xxxiii. 46.) They were appointed about the year b.c. 450, to counteract the house of Mago, and are spoken of as a new institution. These facts rather lead to the inference that the 100 are not the same with the magistracy of 104, which was probably more ancient. But in our almost entire ignorance of early Carthaginian history the question becomes unimportant.

κα? τ? τ?ς δίκας ?π? τω?ν ?ρχείων δικάζεσθαι πάσας [?ριστοκρατικόν], κα? μ? ?λλας ?π' ?λλων, καθάπερ ?ν Λακεδαίμονι.

Either 1)* καθάπερ ?ν Λακεδαίμονι refers to the immediately preceding clause, μ? ?λλας ?π' ?λλων:—or 2), to the words δίκας ?π? τω?ν ?ρχείων δικάζεσθαι πάσας, in which case κα? . . . ?λλων must be taken as an explanatory parenthesis.

According to the first view, Aristotle is opposing Carthage and Lacedaemon. In Carthage all cases are tried by the same board or college of magistrates (or by the magistrates collectively), whereas in Lacedaemon some magistrates try one case and some another. The former is the more aristocratical, the second the more oligarchical mode of proceeding: the regular skilled tribunal at Carthage is contrasted with the casual judgments of individuals at Lacedaemon. The difficulty in this way of taking the passage is that we should expect ?π? τω?ν α?τω?ν ?ρχείων, unless the words κα? μ? ?λλας ?π' ?λλων be regarded as suggesting α?τω?ν by antithesis.

According to the second view, Aristotle, as in iii. 1. § 10, is comparing the general points of resemblance in Carthage and Lacedaemon. 'Both at Carthage and Lacedaemon cases are tried by regular boards of magistrates, and not by different persons, some by one and some by another.' The difference between the professional judges of the Carthaginians and the casual magistrates of the Spartans is noted in iii. 1. § 10, but here passed over in silence. The Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian arrangements may thus be considered as both aristocratic and oligarchic,—aristocratic because limiting judicial functions to regular magistrates; oligarchic, because confining them to a few. They are both contrasted with the judicial institutions of a democracy. The difficulty in this way of construing the passage is not the parenthesis, which is common in Aristotle, but the use of ?λλων vaguely for 'different persons,' and not, as the preceding words ?π? τω?ν ?ρχείων would lead us to expect, for 'different magistracies,' or 'boards of magistrates.'

In neither way of taking the passage is there any real contradiction to the statement of iii. 1. § 10. The words of the latter are as follows: 'For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly; but only extraordinary ones; suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates; at Lacedaemon, for instance, suits about contracts are decided, some by one Ephor and some by another; while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes probably fall to some other magistracy. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes.'

For the sale of great offices at Carthage, see Polyb. vi. 56. § 4, παρ? μ?ν Καρχηδονίοις δω?ρα ?ανερω?ς διδόντες λαμβάνουσι τ?ς ?ρχάς: παρ? δ? ?ωμαίοις θάνατος ?στι περ? τον?το πρόστιμον.

δε?? δ? νομίζειν ?μάρτημα νομοθέτου τ?ν παρέκβασιν ε??ναι της ?ριστοκρατίας ταύτην κ.τ.λ.

The error consists in making wealth a qualification for office; the legislator should from the first have given a competency to the governing class, and then there would have been no need to appoint men magistrates who were qualified by wealth only. Even if the better classes generally are not to be protected against poverty, such a provision must be made for the rulers as will ensure them leisure. See *infra* § 12, βέλτιον δ' ε? κα? προε??το τ?ν ?πορίαν τω?ν ?πεικω?ν ? νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ.

ε? δ? δε?? βλέπειν κα? πρ?ς ε?πορίαν χάριν σχολη?ς, ?αν?λον τ? τ?ς μεγίστας ?νητ?ς ε??ναι τω?ν ?ρχω?ν, τήν τε βασιλείαν κα? τ?ν στρατηγίαν.

Of this, as of many other passages in the Politics, the meaning can only be inferred from the context. In the Carthaginian constitution the element of wealth superseded merit. But whether there was a regular traffic in offices, as the words τ?ς μεγίστας ?νητ?ς ε??ναι τω?ν ?ρχω?ν would seem to imply, or merely a common practice of corruption, as in England in the last century, Aristotle does not clearly inform us. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 544 D, ? τινα ?λλην ?χεις ?δέαν πολιτείας, ?τις κα? ?ν ε?δει δια?ανε?? τιν? κε??ται; δυναστε??αι γ?ρ κα? ?νητα? βασιλε??αι κα? τοιαν?ταί τινες πολιτε??αι μεταξύ τι τούτων πού ε?σιν, ε?ροι δ' ?ν τις α?τ?ς ο?κ ?λάττους περ? το?ς βαρβάρους ? το?ς ?λληνας.

βέλτιον δ' ε? κα? προε??το τ?ν ?πορίαν τω?ν ?πεικω?ν ? νομοθέτης.

The MSS. vary between ?πορίαν and ε?πορίαν without much difference of meaning: 'Even if the legislator were to give up the question of the poverty' [or 'wealth] of the better class.' A similar confusion of ?πορος and ε?πορος occurs elsewhere: iii. 17. § 4, ?πόροις and ε?πόροις: v. 1. § 14, ?ποροι and ε?ποροι: v. 3. § 8, ?πόρων and ε?πόρων: vi. 2. § 9, ?πόροις and ε?πόροις.

κοινότερόν τε γάρ, καθάπερ ε?πομεν, κα? κάλλιον ?καστον ?ποτελε??ται τω?ν α?τω?ν κα? θα?ττον.

κοινότερον, 'more popular,' because more persons hold office.

καθάπερ ε?πομεν, cp. § 13.

?καστον τω?ν α?τω?ν, i.e. because each thing remains the same. The insertion of ?π? before τω?ν, suggested by the Old Translation *ab eisdem*, is unnecessary. τω?ν α?τω?ν, 'where the duties are the same.'

κάλλιον ?ποτελε??ται, i.e. if many share in the government each individual can be confined to the same duties, a division of labour to which frequent reference is made in Aristotle. (Cp. ii. 2. §§ 5, 6; iv. 15. §§ 7, 8; vi. 2. § 8, and Plat. Rep. ii. 374 A, iii. 397 E.) And there is more political intelligence where everybody is both ruler and subject.

?κ?εύγουσι τ?? πλουτε??ν. See note on text.

So England has been often said to have escaped a revolution during this century by the help of colonization: nor is there ‘any more profitable affair of business in which an old country can be engaged’ (Mill). That Aristotle was not averse to assisting the poor out of the revenues of the state when any political advantage could be gained, or any permanent good effected for them, we infer from vi. 5. §§ 8, 9.

ἄλλ’ οὐτὶ ἔστι τύχης ἔργον.

Though the government of the Carthaginians is in good repute (§ 1), Aristotle regards this reputation as not wholly deserved, their stability being due to the power of sending out colonies which their wealth gave them; but this is only a happy accident. In a similar spirit he has remarked that the permanency of the Cretan government is due to their insular position (c. 10. § 15).

ἢν τύχῃ γένηται τις.

The later reflection on the accidental character of the stability which he attributes to Carthage is not quite in harmony with the statement of § 2, in which he cites the lastingness of the government as a proof of the goodness of the constitution.

Grote in his eleventh chapter (vol. iii. p. 167, ed. 1847) says that, according to Aristotle, Solon only gave the people the power to elect their magistrates and hold them to accountability. What is said in §§ 2 and 3 he considers not to be the opinion of Aristotle himself, but of those upon whom he is commenting. This is true of § 2: but not of § 3, which contains Aristotle’s criticism on the opinion expressed in § 2. Thus we have the authority of Aristotle (at least of the writer of this chapter) for attributing the institution of the δικαστήρια to Solon (cp. Schömann’s Athenian Constitution, transl. by Bosanquet, pp. 36 ff.). The popular juries are said to be a democratic institution (τῶν δὲ δημοῦν καταστηῖσαι, τῶν δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἕκ πάντων); but it is obvious that, so long as the jurors were unpaid, the mass of the people could make no great use of their privileges. The character of the democracy was therefore far from being of an extreme kind; cp. iv. 6. §§ 5, 6 and 13. §§ 5, 6, vi. 2. §§ 6, 7.

The sum of Aristotle’s (?) judgment upon Solon (§ 3) is that he did create the democracy by founding the dicasteries, but that he was not responsible for the extreme form of it which was afterwards established by Ephialtes, Pericles, and their followers.

ἄκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν.

The writer of this passage clearly intended to class Pericles among the demagogues. He judges him in the same depreciatory spirit as Plato in the Gorgias, pp. 515, 516.

ἢπερ Σόλων γε οὐκ ἔνναγκαισάτην ἢποδιδόναι τῶν δήμων δύναμιν.

Cp. Solon, Fragm. 4 in Bergk Poet. Lyr. Graeci, Δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον κράτος, ἔσσον ἢπαρκεῖν, | Τιμηρὸς οὐτ’ ἢἔλθῃ οὐτ’ ἢπορξάμενος.

τῆς δ' ἄρχης ἕκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν ἐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἕκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμων καὶ ζευγίτων καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλουμένης ἑπτάδος· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικόν, οὗτος οὐδεμίαν ἄρχην μετήν.

The arrangement of the classes here is somewhat disorderly, the second class or Knights being placed third in the series. That Aristotle should have supposed the Hippeis to have formed the third class is incredible; but it is difficult to say what amount of error is possible in a later writer. See an absurd mistake in Suidas and Photius about ἑπταεῖς and ἑπταεῖς (Boeckh, P. E. ii. 260) under ἑπτάς, which in Photius *s. v.* is called a fifth class; while in the next entry four Athenian classes are cited in the usual order with a reference to Aristotle (*de Rep. Atheniensium*), and an addition 'that ἑπτάδες belong to ἑπταεῖς' (?).

νομοθέται δ' ἑγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῦς τοῦτος ἑπιξευρίους, καὶ Χαρώνδας ἑ Καταναῖος τοῦτος ἀτονὲ πολίταις.

Strabo (vi. 260), quoting Ephorus, says that Zaleucus made one great innovation, in taking away from the dicasts, and inserting in the law, the power of fixing the penalty after sentence was given.

Aristotle attributes greater precision to Charondas than to modern legislators. But early laws have a greater appearance of precision because society is simpler, and there are fewer of them.

Θάλητα.

Thales, called also Thaletas, probably the Cretan poet who is said by Ephorus apud Strabonem, x. p. 481, to have been the friend of Lycurgus; and also to have introduced the Cretan rhythm into vocal music. Mentioned in Plut. de Musica, pp. 1135, 1146. Clinton supposes him to have flourished from 690 to 660 b.c. But chronology cannot be framed out of disjointed statements of Plutarch and Pausanias.

Λυκονόργον καὶ Ζάλευκον.

A greater anachronism respecting Lycurgus is found in the fragments of Ephorus (Strabo x. 482, ἑντυχόντα δ', ἕς ἑασί τινες, καὶ ἑμῶς διατρίβοντι ἑν Χίῳ, quoted by Oncken, Staatslehre des Aristoteles, ii. p. 346).

ἑγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ἑ Κορίνθιος.

The δὲ is not opposed to μὲν at the end of the last sentence, ἑλλ' ἑτανῶτα μὲν λέγουσιν κ.τ.λ., but is a resumption of the δὲ at the beginning of the previous sentence, πειρῶνται δέ. The story, if any reason is required for the introduction of it, may be intended to explain how Philolaus a Corinthian gave laws for Thebes.

Of Onomacritus, Philolaus, Androdamas, nothing more is known: of Zaleucus not much more. A good saying attributed to him has been preserved in Stobaeus xlv. p. 304, Ζάλευκος, ἑ τῶν Λοκρῶν νομοθέτης, τοῦτος νόμους ἑἑησε τοῦτος ἑραχνίους ἑμοίους ἑἑναι· ἑσπερ γῶρ ἑς ἑκεῖνα ἑἑν μὲν ἑμπέσῃ μῦθῶ ἑ κώνωψ, κατέχεται,

ἄν δὲ σφῆξ ἢ μέλιττα, διαφθῆξασα ἴπταται, οὕτω καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους ἄν μὲν ἄμπεσ' πένης, συνέχεται· ἄν δὲ πλούσιος ἢ δυνατὸς λέγειν, διαφθῆξας ἄποτρέχει, an apophthegm which in Aristotle's phraseology (i. 11. § 10) may be truly said 'to be of general application.' Stobaeus has also preserved (xliv. p. 289) numerous laws which are attributed to Charondas and Zaleucus. They are full of excellent religious sentiments, but are evidently of a late Neo-Pythagorean origin. The same remark applies still more strongly to the citations in Diodorus xii. c. 12 ff.

Πλάτωνος δ' ἢ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οἰσίας κοινότης καὶ τῆς συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἢ τι δ' ἢ περὶ τῶν μέθην νόμος, τῆς τοῦ νῆοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἢ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ ἢ σκησιν ἢ πως ἢ μὴ ἰδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τῶν μελέτην, ἢς δέον μὲν τῶν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τοῦν χεροῦν τῶν δὲ ἄχρηστον.

The reference to Plato's communism in contrast with Phaleas' proposal of equality is not unnatural; but the allusion to three unconnected, two of them very trivial, points in the 'Laws,' is strange, and looks like the addition of a later hand. This whole chapter has been often suspected. It consists of miscellaneous jottings not worked up, some of them on matters already discussed. But mere irregularity and feebleness are no sufficient ground for doubting the genuineness of any passage in the sense in which genuineness may be ascribed to the greater part of the Politics. The chapter may be regarded either as an imperfect recapitulation or as notes for the continuation of the subject. The story of Philolaus, and the discussion respecting Solon, are characteristic of Aristotle.

καὶ τῶν ἢ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ ἢ σκησιν. The change of construction arises from the insertion of the clause ἢ περὶ τῶν μέθην νόμος. The accusative may be explained as the accusative of the remote object after ἢ μὴ ἰδέξιοι γίνονται, or may be taken with περὶ.

It may be remarked that Aristotle looks on the ἢ μὴ ἰδέξιος as an exception to nature (cp. Nic. Eth. v. 7. § 4, ἢ ὕσει γὰρ ἢ δεξιῶν κρείττων καίτοι ἢ νδέχεται τινὰς ἢ μὴ ἰδεξίους γενέσθαι), whereas in Plato (Laws 794 D, E) the ordinary use of the right hand only is regarded as a limitation of nature.

Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι.

Cp. Plut. Solon 17. Another reference to Draco occurs in Rhet. ii. 23, 1400 b. 21, καὶ Δράκοντα τῶν νομοθέτην, ἢ τι οὐκ ἢ θρόπου οὐ νόμοι ἢλλ' δράκοντος· χαλεποὶ γάρ.

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BOOK III.

τῶν περὶ πολιτείας ἠπισκοπονῶντι.

The particle δὲ after τῶν was probably omitted when the treatise was divided into books.

τον δὲ πολιτικὸν καὶ τον νομοθέτου

are a resumption of the opening words τῶν περὶ πολιτείας ἠπισκοπονῶντι. 'The legislator or statesman is wholly engaged in enquiries about the state. But the state is made up of citizens, and therefore he must begin by asking who is a citizen.' The clause τον δὲ πολιτικὸν . . . περὶ πόλιν is a repetition and confirmation of the previous sentence, τῶν περὶ πολιτείας . . . ἠ πόλις, the enquirer being more definitely described as the legislator or statesman.

οἷ δ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οἷ τῶς ἴστε καὶ δίκην ἠπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι.

καὶ is closely connected with οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες. 'Nor those who share in legal rights, so that as a part of their legal rights they are sued and sue, as plaintiffs and defendants.'

καὶ γὰρ τὰν ταῦτοις ἠπάρχει.

These words are omitted in the old translation and in several Greek MSS. and are bracketed by Susemihl (1st ed.). If retained, they either 1) refer to the remote antecedent μέτριοι above, 'for the metics have these rights, and yet are not citizens,' whereupon follows the correction, 'although in many places metics do not possess even these rights in a perfect form.' Or 2*) they are only a formal restatement of the words immediately preceding (for a similar restatement, which is bracketed by Bekker, see iv. 6. § 3), and are therefore omitted in the translation. Other instances of such pleonastic repetitions occur elsewhere, e. g. infra c. 6. § 4, where τον ζῆν ἠνεκεν αἰτονῶν is repeated in κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αἰτῶν μόνον: also iv. 1. § 1, καὶ γὰρ τον το τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἠστίν, and v. 1. § 1.

Aristotle argues that the right of suing and being sued does not make a citizen, for *a*) such a right is conferred by treaty on citizens of other states: (cp. Thuc. i. 77, καὶ ἠλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἠν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις καὶ παρ' ἠμῶν αἰτοῦντες ἠν τοῖς ἠμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τῆς κρίσεις ἠιλοδικεῖν δοκονῶμεν). *b*) The metics have this right, which, as he proceeds to remark, in many places is only granted them at second-hand through the medium of a patron.

οἷ γὰρ ἠπλωῶς δὲ λίαν.

λίαν qualifies and at the same time emphasises ἠπλωῶς: 'But not quite absolutely.'

ἤπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡτίμων κ.τ.λ.

I. e. doubts may be raised about the rights to citizenship of exiles and deprived citizens, but they may also be solved by the expedient of adding some qualifying epithet.

ἡνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πῶς δικαστὸν καὶ ἡκκλησιαστὸν?

‘This is a merely verbal dispute arising out of the want of a word; for had there been a common name comprehending both dicast and ecclesiast it would have implied an office.’ Cp. Laws, vi. 767 A: ‘Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates; for every magistrate must also be a judge of something, and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, is a very important magistrate when he is determining a suit.’

δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ἅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἢν οἷός τ’ ἡποκείμενα διαφέρει τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ τὸ μὴν ἀποτῶν ἢστ’ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δ’ ἡχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οἰδέν ἢστιν, ἢἢ τοιανῶτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχωρος.

τὸ ἡποκείμενα. 1*) ‘the underlying notions’ or ‘the notions to which the things in question are referred,’ i. e. in this passage, as the connexion shows, ‘the forms of the constitution on which the idea of the citizen depends’ (see Bonitz s. v.). 2) ἡποκείμενα is taken by Bernays to mean the individuals contained under a class, and he translates ‘where things which fall under one conception are different in kind.’ But it is hard to see how things which are different in kind can fall under one class or conception, and the meaning, even if possible, is at variance with the immediate context which treats not of citizens but of constitutions.

τῶς δὲ πολιτείας ἡρωμεν εἰδει διαφερούσας ἡλλήλων, καὶ τῶς μὴν ἡστέρας τῶς δὲ προτέρας οἰσας.

The logical distinction of prior and posterior is applied by Aristotle to states, and so leads to the erroneous inference that the perfect form of the state has little or nothing in common with the imperfect. So in Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 2, ‘there are no common ideas of things prior and posterior.’ The logical conceptions of prior and posterior have almost ceased to exist in modern metaphysics; they are faintly represented to us by the expressions ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori,’ or ‘prior in the order of thought,’ which are a feeble echo of them; from being differences in kind, they are becoming differences of degree, owing to the increasing sense of the continuity or development of all things.

διόπερ ἢ λεχθεῖς ἢν μὴν δημοκρατίῃ μάλιστ’ ἢστ’ πολίτης.

Yet not so truly as in Aristotle’s own polity hereafter to be described, in which all the citizens are equal (cp. infra, c. 13. § 12). Democracy is elsewhere called a perversion (infra, c. 7. § 5), but he here uses the term carelessly, and in a better sense, for that sort of democracy which is akin to the μέση πολιτεία.

κατ’ μέρος.

Generally 'in turn,' but the examples show that the phrase must here mean 'by sections' or 'by different bodies or magistracies.'

τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνια· πάσας γὰρ ἴσχυαι τινες κρίνουσι τῶς δίκας.

τῶν αὐτῶν, i. e. because in both these cases the administration of justice is taken out of the hands of the people and entrusted to the magistrates, either the same or different magistrates.

The oligarchies or aristocracies of Carthage and Sparta are here contrasted, not with each other, but with democracy. A minor difference between them is also hinted at: at Carthage there were regular magistrates to whom all causes were referred; at Lacedaemon causes were distributed among different magistrates. See note on ii. 11. § 7.

ἄλλ' ἵκει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν διορισμός.

The particle γὰρ implies an objection which is not expressed. 'But how, if our definition is correct, can the Lacedaemonians, Carthaginians, and others like them be citizens; for they have no judicial or deliberative assemblies.' To which Aristotle answers, 'But I will correct the definition so as to include them.' Finding ὁριστός ἴσχυαι to be a definition of citizenship inapplicable to any state but a democracy, he substitutes a new one, 'admissibility to office, either deliberative or judicial.'

ταύτης τῆς πόλεως.

Namely, of that state in which the assembly or law-court exists.

πολιτικῶς.

'Popularly' or 'enough for the purposes of politics.' Cp. Plat. Rep. 430 C. So νομικῶς (viii. 7. § 3), 'enough for the purposes of law.'

For ταχέως Camerarius and Bernays needlessly read παχέως.

Γοργίας μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν Ἰωνίος, τὸ μὲν ἴσως ἴσχυαι τὸ δ' ἐρωτησόμενος, ἴσχυαι, καθάπερ ἴσχυαι εἶναι τοῦ ἴσχυαι τῶν ἴσχυαι πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισσαίους τοῦ ἴσχυαι τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους· εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρισσοποιούς.

ἴσχυαι. 'In doubt about the question who is a citizen?'

δημιουργῶν. Properly the name of a magistrate in some Dorian states. The word is used here with a double pun, as meaning not only 'magistrates,' but 1) 'makers of the people,' 2) 'artisans.' The magistrates, like artisans, are said to make or manufacture the citizens because they admit them to the rights of citizenship.

There is also a further pun upon the word Λαρισσαίους, which probably meant kettles, or was used as a characteristic epithet of kettles derived from their place of manufacture:—

‘Artisans make kettles.
Magistrates make citizens.’

The sentence may be translated as follows:—‘Gorgias, very likely because he was in a difficulty, but partly out of irony, said that, as mortars are made by the mortar-makers, so are the Larisseans manufactured by their ‘artisan-magistrates; for some of them were makers of kettles’ (Λάρισσαι or Λαρισσαῖοι).

For the term ἐρῶνευόμενος, applied to Gorgias, compare Rhet. iii. 7, 1408 b. 20, ? μετ’ ἐρῶνείας, ?περ Γοργίας ?ποίει: and for Λάρισσαι compare Τάναγρα Ταναγρίς, a kettle, (Hesych., Pollux); also an epigram of Leonides of Tarentum (Anth. vi. 305):—

Λαβροσύν? τάδε δω?ρα, ?ιλευλείχ? τε Λα?υγμ??
θήκατο δεισόζου* Δωριέως κε?αλά,
τ?ς Λαρισσαίως βουγάστορας ?ψητη?ρας,
κα? χύτρω? κα? τ?ν ε?ρυχαδη? κύλικα,
κα? τ?ν ε?χάλκωτον ?ύγναμπτόν τε κρεάγραν,
κα? κνη?στιν, κα? τ?ν ?τνοδόνον τορύναν.
Λαβροσύνα, σ? δ? ταν?τα κακον? κακ? δωρητη?ρος
δεξαμένα, νεύσαι? μή ποκα σω?ροσύναν.

ξένους κα? δούλους μετοίκους. (See note on text.)

Mr. Grote, c. 31. vol. iv. 170. n., would keep the words as they stand, taking μετοίκους with both ξένους and δούλους. He quotes Aristoph. Knights 347 (ε? που δικίδιον ε??πας εν?? κατ? ξένου μετοίκου), and infers from the juxtaposition of the words δούλους μετοίκους, that they mean, ‘slaves who, like metics, were allowed to live by themselves, though belonging to a master.’ That is to say μέτοικοι are spoken of in a general as well as in a technical sense. According to Xen. de Vect. 2. § 3, all kinds of barbarians were metics. Cp. for the general subject, Polit. vi. 4. § 18, where measures, like those which Cleisthenes the Athenian passed when he wanted to extend the power of the democracy, are said to have been adopted at Cyrene. Such a reconstruction of classes also took place at Sicyon under Cleisthenes the tyrant, who gave insulting names to the old Dorian tribes (Herod. v. 68).

τ? δ’ ?μ?ισβήτημα πρ?ς τούτους ?στ?ν ο? τίς πολίτης, ?λλ? πότερον ?δίκως ? δικαίως. καίτοι κα? τον?τό τις ?τι προσαπορήσειεν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle means to say that what is true in fact may be false in principle. These two senses of the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ were confused by sophistical thinkers. See Plat. Euthyd. 284, ff.

τη?ς τοια?σδε ?ρχη?ς refers to τινί, sc. ?ορίστ?, supra 1. § 7, ‘an office such as we spoke of.’

δηλον ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι ἑατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τὸν δίκαιως ἢ μὴ δίκαιως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἡμισβήτησιν.

A doubt is raised whether the δίκως πολιτεύων is truly a πολίτης. The answer is that the δίκως ῥαχων is truly an ῥαχων. But the πολίτης is by definition an ῥαχων, and therefore the δίκως πολίτης may be rightly called a πολίτης.

καὶ τούτους, sc. τοὺς ἡμισβητουμένους (§ 4), ‘these as well as the legitimate citizens.’

πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἡμισβήτησιν is the question touched upon in c. 1. § 1, and resumed in the words which follow. The controversy concerning the *de jure* citizen runs up into the controversy respecting the *de jure* state, which is now to be discussed.

Ἐταν ἕξι ἡλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὸ σὺμβόλαια ἄνιοι βούλονται διαλύειν.

A question which has often arisen both in ancient and modern times, and in many forms. Shall the new government accept the debts and other liabilities of its predecessor, e.g. after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, or the English or French Revolution or Restoration? Shall the Northern States of America honour the paper of the Southern? Shall the offerings of the Cypselids at Delphi bear the name of Cypselus or of the Corinthian state? Or a street in Paris be called after Louis Philippe, Napoleon III, or the French nation?

Ἐπερ οὐκ ἔστιν καὶ δημοκρατονῶνται τινες καὶ τὴν τρόπον τὸντόν, ἡμοίως τῆς πόλεως ἑατέον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τῆς ἢ τῆς ἡλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.

The mere fact that a government is based on violence does not necessarily render invalid the obligations contracted by it; at any rate the argument would apply to democracy as well as to any other form of government. Cp. Demosth. πρὸς Λεπτίνην, p. 460, where it is mentioned that the thirty tyrants borrowed money of the Lacedaemonians, which, after a discussion, was repaid by the democracy out of the public funds, and not by confiscation of the property of the oligarchs. Cp. also Isocr. Areopag. vii. 153, where the same story is repeated.

Ἄνδέχεται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι τὴν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄνθρώπους.

E.g. the case of the Athenian κληρονόμοι, who, while possessing land in other places, remained citizens of Athens; or of migrations in which a whole state was transferred; or possibly a dispersion like that of the Arcadian cities which were afterwards reunited by Epaminondas. Yet, ii. 1. § 2, ἢ τόπος εἶς ἢ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως.

πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης ἕστι πῶς ἐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως.

‘When difficulties are raised about the identity of the state, you may solve many of them quite easily by saying that the word “state” is used in different senses.’

μοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν τῶν ἀτῶν τρόπον κατοικούντων,

sc. ἡ πόρις ἴστί, supplied from τῆς πόρις ταύτης.

τοιαύτη δ' ἴσως ἴστω καὶ Βαβυλών.

'Such as Peloponnesus would be, if included within a wall,'—further illustrated by ἡ γ' ἀλωκυίας κ.τ.λ.

ἡ γέ ἴσιν ἀλωκυίας τρίτην ἡμέραν οὐκ ἀσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως.

Cp. Herod. i. 191: 'The Babylonians say that, when the further parts of the city had been taken by Cyrus, those in the centre knew nothing of the capture, but were holding a festival.' Also Jeremiah li. 31: 'One post shall run to meet another, and one messenger to meet another to show the king of Babylon that his city is taken at one end.'

ἄλλο περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς πόρις εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἢ σκέψις· περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἦθος ἢ ἢ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὲν λανθάνειν τῶν πολιτικόν.

The subject is resumed in Book vii. 4. § 4, ἴστω δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πληθὸς τῶν ἰσθῶπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινῶν ἴστω δεῖ ἴσσει, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἴσων ἴσῶτως, ἴσων τε εἴστω καὶ ποίαν τινῶν ταύτην, and § 11. In the words τῶν πολιτικῶν Aristotle identifies himself with the statesman or politician of whom he is speaking.

πότερον ἦθος ἢ ἢ πλείω, cp. vii. 9. § 8 and 10. § 13.

ἄλλο τῶν ἀτῶν κατοικούντων τῶν ἀτῶν τρόπον, πότερον ἴσως ἢ ἢ τὸ γένος ταῦτ' ἀτῶν κατοικούντων, τῶν ἀτῶν εἴστω ἴσῶν πόλιν, καίπερ ἴστω τῶν μὲν ἴσθῶμένων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ἴσπερ καὶ ποταμοῦ εἴσθῶμεν λέγειν τοῦ ἀτῶ καὶ κρήνας τῶν ἀτῶ, καίπερ ἴστω τῶν ἴσθῶμένου νάματος, τῶν δὲ ἴσθῶντος, ἢ τῶν μὲν ἰσθῶπους ἴσῶν εἴστω τῶν ἀτῶ δι' τῶν τοιαύτην ἀτῶν, τῶν δὲ πόλιν ἴσῶν; εἴπερ γάρ ἴστω κοινῶνία τῶν πόλιν κ.τ.λ.

From the digression into which he has fallen respecting the size of the state, Aristotle returns to the original question, What makes the identity of the state? He answers in an alternative: Shall we say that the identity of the state depends upon the race, although the individuals of the race die and are born—like a river which remains the same although the waters come and go? Or is not the truer view that the form or idea of the state makes the state the same or different, whether the race remain or not? This latter alternative he accepts, illustrating his meaning by the simile of a chorus (§ 7), which may be Tragic or Comic, although the members of it are the same; and of musical harmony (§ 8) in which the same notes are combined in different modes.

This is the conclusion which Aristotle intends to draw from the words εἴπερ γάρ ἴστω κοινῶνία τῶν πόλιν κ.τ.λ., and is clearly the general drift of the passage. But the alternatives ἄλλο τῶν . . . ἴσῶν create an obscurity, because Aristotle begins by

opposing the continuance of the race to the transitoriness of the individuals who are always going and coming, when he is really intending to oppose the idea of the state to both of them, §§ 7, 9.

δι? τ?ν τοιαύτην α?τίαν. ‘For the same reason as the rivers;’ i.e. because there is an unbroken succession of citizens as of waters.

The argument is neither clearly expressed nor altogether satisfactory. For 1) the identity of a state consists in many things, such as race, religion, language, as well as government, and therefore cannot be precisely defined; 2) it is always changing for better or for worse; 3) whether the identity is preserved or not is a question of degree; a state may be more or less the same, like the English constitution, and yet be continuous in the course of ages. Aristotle would have done better to have solved this question by having recourse once more to the different senses of the word πόλις (§ 4). Cp. iv. 5. § 3; v. 1. § 8.

ε?περ γάρ ?στι κοινωνία τις ? πόλις, ?στι δ? κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γινομένης ?τέρας τ?? ε?δει κα? δια?ερούσης της πολιτείας ?ναγκα??ον ε??ναι δόξειεν ?ν κα? τ?ν πόλιν ε??ναι μ? τ?ν α?τήν.

‘For a state being a community, and a community of citizens being a community in a constitution, ?στι δ? κοινωνία πολιτῶν κοινωνία πολιτείας, when the form of this community changes, the state also changes’: or, if this construction is deemed harsh πολιτείας, may be thought to have crept in from the next line, and may be omitted as in the English text.

The particle γ?ρ implies assent to the second alternative (supra).

‘The sailor besides his special duties has a general duty, which is the safety of the ship; the citizen has also a general duty, which is the salvation of the state—the nature of this duty will vary according to the character of the state. And besides the general duty citizens, like sailors, will have special duties and functions in the state, as in the ship.’

ο? μ?ν ?λλ? κα? κατ’ ?λλον τρόπον ?στι διαπορον?ντας ?πελθε??ν τ?ν α?τ?ν λόγον περ? της ?ρίστης πολιτείας.

The last words are an explanation of κατ’ ?λλον τρόπον.

Two conceptions of the state are continually recurring in the Politics of Aristotle, first the ideal state, in which the best has a right to rule and all the citizens are good men: secondly, the constitutional state, which approaches more nearly to actual fact (ii. 2. § 6; vii. 14. §§ 2-5). In the first, the good man and the good citizen, or rather the good ruler, are said to coincide; in the second, they have a good deal in common, but still the virtue of the citizen is relative to the government under which he lives, and the occupation in which he is engaged.

These two points of view are apt to cross (?παλλάττειν in Aristotle’s own language), and they appear to be here confused.

εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν ἔστι πάντων σπουδαίων ἕντων εἶναι πόλιν, δεῖ δὲ ἕκαστον τὸ καθ' αἵτην ἕργον ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸντο δὲ πρὸς ῥετήϊς· ἕπερ δὲ δυνατόν ἑμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἔστι μίᾳ ῥετῇ πολίτου καὶ ἄνδρος ἕγαθον. τὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸν σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ παρῆσιν ἄρχειν (οἷτω γὰρ ῥίστην ἄναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὸν δὲ τὸν ἄνδρος τὸν ἕγαθον δυνατόν, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἄναγκαῖον ἕγαθοῦς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας.

The argument is that the perfect state is not composed only of perfectly good men; for such absolute goodness is incompatible with the different occupations or natural qualities of different citizens, or their duties toward the government under which they live. All the citizens are not the same, and therefore the one perfect virtue of the good man cannot be attained equally by all of them. But they may all have a common interest in the salvation of society, which is the virtue of a good citizen. The Pythagorean doctrine of the unity of virtue still lingers in the philosophy of Aristotle. (Compare Ethics ii. 5. § 14, ἕσθλο? μὲν γὰρ ἄπλω?ς, παντοδαπῶ?ς δὲ κακοί.)

καὶ οὐκία ἔστι ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικῶ?ς καὶ κτη?σις ἕκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου.

κτη?σις is here omitted by Bernays, because the slave is a part of the οὐκία: but it may be observed that in i. 4. § 1, κτη?σις is a subdivision of the οὐκία under which the slave is included.

ἄμὲν δὲ τὸν ῥχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἕγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ῥόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἄναγκαῖον εἶναι ῥόνιμον.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5, where Pericles is spoken of as a type of the ῥόνιμος; and vi. 8. § 1, where πολιτικ? is described as a species of ῥόνησις.

ἄλλ' ἕρα ἔσται τινῶ?ς ἄτ? ῥετῇ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἄνδρος σπουδαίου; ἄμὲν δὲ τὸν ῥχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἕγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ῥόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἄναγκαῖον εἶναι ῥόνιμον. καὶ τὸν παιδείαν δ' ἐ[Editor: illegible character]θῶ?ς ἕτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες τὸν ῥχοντος, ἕπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων υἕε?ς ἕπικὸν καὶ πολεμικὸν παιδευόμενοι.

Aristotle having determined that the good citizen is not always a good man, now proceeds to ask the question whether some good citizens are not good men? Yes, the ruler must be a good and wise man; and the difference between him and other citizens is partly proved by the fact that he has a different education.

καὶ τὸν παιδείαν δ' εἕθῶ?ς κ.τ.λ. 'Some persons say that, if we go no further than education, even this should be different.' So in § 6 above, εἕθῶ?ς ἕκ ψυχη?ς καὶ σώματος. Cp. i. 5. § 2; Met. iii. 2, 1004 a. 5, ἕπάρχει γὰρ εἕθῶ?ς γένη ἕχοντα τ? ἔν κα? τ? ἔν.

μή μοι τ? κόμψ'.

The whole fragment, which appears to contain a piece of advice addressed to young princes, is given by Nauck, Eurip. Aeol. Fr. 16:—

λαμπροῦ δ' ἔν ἀρχαῖς ἄρεος ἔν τε συλλόγοις,
μή μοι τ' κομψῶ ποικίλοι γενοῖατο,
ἄλλ' ὠφ' ἐν πόλει δεῖν, μεγάλα βουλευοῖντ' εἶ.

Two points strike us about quotations from the poets which occur in Aristotle: 1) The familiarity with the words which they imply in the reader; for they are often cited in half lines only, which would be unintelligible unless the context was present to the mind. We are reminded that the Greek like some of our English youth were in the habit of committing to memory entire poems (Plat. Laws vii. 810 E). 2) The remoteness and ingenuity of the application. For a similar far fetched quotation, cp. infra c. 5. § 9.

εἴ δ' ἄρα τ' ἄρετ' ἄρετ' ἄρχοντός τε ἄγαθον καὶ ἄνδρος ἄγαθον, πολίτης δ' ἄστ' καὶ ἄρχόμενος, οἷον ἄρα τ' ἄλλω ἔν εἰη πολίτου καὶ ἄνδρός, τινὲς μέντοι πολίτου.

'If the good man and the good ruler are to be identified, and the subject is also a citizen, then the virtue of the good man is not coextensive with the virtue of all good citizens, but only with that of a certain citizen,' i.e. the citizen of a perfect state who is also a ruler, and therefore has a sphere for the employment of his energies, cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 8. § 4.

οἷον γὰρ ἄρα τ' ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ δι' τὸν τ' ἄσως ἄσων ἄρα πεινην, ἄτε μὲν τυραννοῦ, ἄς οἷον ἄπιστάμενος ἄδιώτης εἰη.

Another illustration of the difference in the nature of the ruler and of the citizen is contained in the saying of Jason, 1) 'that he had no choice between starvation and tyranny, for he had never learned how to live in a private station'; or 2)* 'that he felt a sensation like hunger when not a tyrant; for he was too proud to live in a private station.' The two interpretations differ according to the shade of meaning given to πεινην and ἄπιστάμενος.

The Jason here referred to is Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly.

Another saying of Jason is quoted in Rhet. i. 12, 1373 a. 26, 'δεῖν ἄδικεῖν ἄνια, ἄπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν.'

εἴ οὐκ ἄρα τ' ἄν μὲν τὸν ἄγαθον ἄνδρος τίθεμεν ἄρχικὴν, τ' ἄν δ' τὸν πολίτου ἄμῶ, οἷον ἄν εἰη ἄμῶ ἄπαινετ' ἄμοίως.

1) Aristotle here lights upon a paradox, which he cannot resist mentioning, but does not pursue further. 'If the virtue of the good man is of a ruling character, but the virtue of the citizen includes ruling and being ruled, their virtues cannot [from this point of view] be equally praiseworthy, [for the good man has one virtue only, the citizen two].'

2) Or the meaning may be, 'that the virtue of the good man being the virtue of ruling is higher than that of the citizen who only rules at times, or who obeys as well as rules.'

The words ο?κ ?ν ε?η ?μ?ω ?παινετ? ?μοίως according to the first way = ‘the citizen is more to be praised than the good man’: according to the second, ‘the virtue of the two, i.e. of ruler and citizen, are not equally praiseworthy’; in other words, the virtue of the good man is the higher of the two.

The whole passage is perplexed, not from any corruption of the text, but from the love of casuistry and a want of clearness in distinguishing the two sides of the argument.

?πε? ον??ν ποτ? δοκε?? ?μ?ότερα, κα? ο? τα?τ? δε??ν τ?ν ?ρχοντα μανθάνειν κα? τ?ν ?ρχόμενον, τ?ν δ? πολίτην ?μ?ότερ’ ?πίστασθαι κα? μετέχειν ?μ?ο??ν, τ?ν τε ν?θεν ?ν κατίδοι τις.

Aristotle seems to mean that the citizen acquires a knowledge of the duties of both ruler and ruled, which are different. Since the ruler and the ruled must learn both, and the two things are distinct, and the citizen must know both and have a part in both, the inference is obvious. But what is this obvious inference we are uncertain:—either, 1)* that some kind of previous subjection is an advantage to the ruler; or 2) that the citizen who knows both at once is to be preferred to the ?ρχων and ?ρχόμενος, taken separately.

The sentence is awkwardly expressed and is perhaps corrupt. The change of ?μ?ότερα into ?μ?ω ?τερα (Bernays) would give much the same meaning with rather less difficulty, (‘since the two must learn different things, and the ruler and the ruled are not required to learn the same things’), because τ?ν ?ρχοντα κα? τ?ν ?ρχόμενον have not then to be taken in two senses, collective and distributive. It might be argued in favour of Bernays’ emendation that ?μ?ότερα may have crept in from the ?μ?ότερα in the next line; and against it that the two words ?μ?ω ?τερα, the one having a collective, the other a distributive sense, are not happily combined.

§ 11 seems to be intended as a summing up of §§ 8-10. The thread of the argument is resumed at the words ταύτην γ?ρ λέγομεν in § 14.

?στι γ?ρ ?ρχ? δεσποτική κ.τ.λ.

is a digression introduced for the sake of distinguishing the ?ρχ? δεσποτικ? to which the preceding remarks do not apply, from the ?ρχ? πολιτικ? to which they do.

?στι γ?ρ refers back to τ?ν ?ρχοντα, ‘We are speaking of the ruler who is also a subject; for we must remember that there is a rule of the master over his slave with which we are not here concerned.’

δι? παρ’ ?νίοις ο? μετε??χον ο? δημιουργο? τ? παλαι?ν ?ρχω?ν, πρ?ν δη?μον γενέσθαι τ?ν ?σχατον.

διό, referring to ?νδραποδω?δες and the various kinds of menial duties in which the artisan class were employed, ‘Because of their servile and degraded character.’

τω?ν ?ρχομένων ο?τως.

I. e. those who (like household servants) are subject to the rule of a master.

εἴ μὴ ποτε χρείας χάριν αἴτιον ἢ πρὸς αὐτόν, ὁ γὰρ τί κ.τ.λ.

*‘For if men practise menial duties, not only for the supply of their own occasional wants, but habitually’ (indicated by ποτέ), ‘there is no longer any difference between master and slave,’ i. e. the natural distinction of classes is effaced. It has been proposed to read τότε μὲν, τότε δέ, instead of τὸν μὲν, τὸν δέ, ‘for then the case no longer occurs of a man being at one time master and at another time servant’—an arbitrary emendation (Riese, Susemihl) which gives a poor sense.

ὅκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ῥῆμα μὴ ῥηθέντα.

An ancient proverb naturally attributed by tradition (Diog. Laert. i. 60; Stobaeus xlvi. p. 308) to Solon. Cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 215 D, who assigns the saying to Agis, ῥωτηθεὶς τί μάθημα μάλιστα ἔν Σπάρτῃ ἴσκειται, τὸ γινώσκειν, εἴπεν, ῥχεῖν τε καὶ ῥχεσθαι.

καὶ ἄνδρῶν δὲ ῥαθονῶν ἴσως.

At first Aristotle appeared to draw an artificial line between the good citizen and the good man; but he now shifts his point of view. The good man may be supposed to have all virtue; he must therefore have the virtues both of the ruler and subject, although the virtue of the ruler is of a peculiar character, and the virtue of the subject, if he be a freeman, takes many forms. So the virtue of a man and of a woman differ in degree and even in kind, yet both are included in the idea of virtue.

καὶ γυνὴν ἀλάως, εἴ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ἴσπερ ἡ ἄνδρῶν ῥαθός.

Compare for the ideal of womanly virtue, Thuc. ii. 45, τῆς τε γὰρ ῥαρχούσης ἴσως μὴ χεῖροσι γενέσθαι ἴσως μὴ μεγάλην δόξα, καὶ ἴσως ἔν τῷ ῥαχιστῶν ῥετηὶς πέρι τὸ ψόγου ἔν τοῖς ῥσεσι κλέος ἴσως.

ῥχομένου δὲ γε ὅκ ἔστιν ῥρετῶν ῥρόνησις, ἴσως δόξα ῥληθῆς ἴσπερ ἀλοποιὶς γὰρ ῥ ῥχόμενος, ἴσως ῥχων ἀλητῶν ῥ χρώμενος.

Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 601 D, E, where the distinction is drawn between the ποιητῆς who has only πίστις ῥρῶν and the χρώμενος who has πιστήμη, and where there is the same illustration from the difference between the ἀλοποιὶς and the ἀλητῆς, and Cratylus 388 ff. also Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, ‘ἴσως μὴ γὰρ ῥρόνησις ῥπιτακτικὴ ἴσως . . . ἴσως δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον.’

The discussion which follows is not unconnected with the preceding. For if, as has been assumed, a freeman or citizen is one who commands as well as obeys, then it would seem that the artisan or mean person, even though not a slave, must be excluded.

ὅσως γὰρ πολίτης.

Sc. ἢ ἄρα τὴν τοιαύτην ἄρετήν. See note on English text.

ἢ διὰ γε τὸν τὸν τὴν λόγον οὐδὲν ἤσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐ δὸν ἄλλοι τῶν ἐξηρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδ' οὐ ἄελεύθεροι.

‘But if the artisan is not included in the number of citizens where is he to be placed? He is not a metic, nor a stranger. Yet no real difficulty is involved in his exclusion any more than in that of slaves or freedmen.’

διὰ γε τὸν τὸν τὴν λόγον = so far as this objection goes, viz. the implied objection that he has no place in the state.

τῶν ἐξηρημένων refers to οὐδὲ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος.

ἢ ἄρα ποθέσεως.

‘On the supposition that they grow up to be men.’

τῶν δ' ἄναγκαίων.

‘But in respect to servile occupations’; either an anacoluthon resumed in τὴν τοιαύτην, or governed by the idea of ἄρα contained in λειτουργοὶν.

The point is how to determine the position of the artisan or mean person. There is no difficulty in seeing that some who live in states are not citizens, but how is the mechanic to be distinguished from the slave? The answer is that the slave ministers to a single master, artisans and serfs belong to the state.

ἄνερ δ' ἄντεθεν μικρὸν ἠπισκεψαμένοις πῶς ἄρα χειρὸς ἀτῶν· ἀτῶ γὰρ ἄντ' τὸν λέχθ' ἄν ποιῶν δὴ λον. ἢ περὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

‘What has been said at once (ἄντ') makes the matter clear.’ It has been *said* that the best form of state will not admit the artisan class to citizenship (§ 3), and that the citizen will vary with the state (*supra* c. 1. § 9), a remark which he repeats in what follows. ‘For there are many forms of states; virtue is the characteristic of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy. Now although the mechanic or skilled artisan cannot have virtue, he may have wealth, and therefore he may be a citizen of some states, but not of others.’

περὶ ἀτῶν, sc. about the lower class.

ἢ τὴν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἔστι τὴν δέκα τῶν μὲν ἄεσχημένον τῆς ἄγορας μὲν μετέχειν ἄρχης.

Cp. *infra* vi. 7. § 4, where the fact respecting Thebes is repeated.

It is clearly for the common interest and for the security of the state, that the passage from one class to another should be as easy as possible under all forms of government. Such a power of extending, and including other classes is necessary to

the very existence of an oligarchy or of an aristocracy, or even of a constitutional government. And the avenue by which the lower naturally pass into the higher is personal merit or fitness which ought to overcome circumstances and not beat helplessly against the bars of a prison. The gold which the god has implanted in a person of an inferior class should be allowed to find its place (Plat. Rep. iii. 415), even if we cannot degrade the brass or lead in the higher. The higher class too have governing qualities which pass into the lower, and they themselves receive new life and new ideas from the association.

προσεφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων νόμος . . οὐ μὲν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

ξένων is partitive: ‘The law goes so far as in addition to include some of the stranger class. Nevertheless, when there are citizens more than enough the law which extended, again contracts, the right.’ For restrictions of population see Plat. Laws v. 740.

τοῖς πατρὶσιν γυναικῶν.

I. e. whose mothers were free women and their fathers not slaves (for this case has been already provided for in the words κούλου), but strangers or resident aliens.

τέλος δὲ μόνον τοῖς ξένοισιν αὐτῶν.

The MSS. read αὐτῶν: Schneider, following Perizonius, has changed αὐτῶν into στῶν, and the emendation is adopted by Bekker in both editions: but 1) the word στῶν is of very rare occurrence in Aristotle; 2) it would be in awkward proximity to πολίτης; and 3) the change is unnecessary. Lit. ‘they make only those of them (αὐτῶν) citizens, who are children of citizens both on the father’s and mother’s side.’ αὐτῶν, though not exactly needed, is idiomatic.

τοῖς ἐκ τινῶν τιμητῶν μετανάστην.

Quoted also in Rhet. ii. 2, 1378 b. 33. Compare for a similar application of Homer bk. i. 2. § 9. Aristotle has given a new turn to the meaning of τιμητος = τιμῶν μετέχων. But there is nothing singular in this; for quotations are constantly cited in new senses.

ἄλλ’ ἵπου τῶν τοιοντων πικεκρυμμένον στίβον, πάτης χάριν τῶν συνοικούντων στίβον.

τῶν τοιοντων = τῶν μετέχειν τῶν τιμῶν, i.e. the exclusion from office of certain classes is concealed in order to deceive the excluded persons. The reference is not to such cases as that of the 5000 at Athens, whose names were concealed for a political purpose (Thuc. viii. 92); but more probably to such deceptions as those of which Aristotle speaks in iv. 12. § 6 and c. 13 whereby the poor, though nominally citizens, were really deprived of their privileges because they had no leisure to exercise them. The intention was to trick them, but they were not dissatisfied; for they did not find out the trick. The English translation is defective, and should have run, ‘the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow-citizens.’

Another way of explaining the passage is to place an emphasis on τῶν συνοικούντων, which is taken in the sense of ‘fellow-colonists’: ‘the intention is to attract settlers by deceiving them into the belief that they will become citizens, when the rights of citizenship are really withheld from them.’ (For examples of fraud practised by colonists on strangers or fellow settlers, see v. 3. §§ 11-13.) But the words refer to states generally and not merely to colonies.

κῆκενος.

Sc. ἢ ἄρα γὰρ καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος ἔν. In his later edition Bekker reads κῆκείνης, a correction of one MS. All the rest, and the old translator, read κῆκενος. With either reading the meaning of the passage is much the same. ‘Even where the virtues of the good man and the good citizen coincide (i. e. in the perfect state), it is not the virtue of every citizen which is the same as that of the good man, but only that of the statesman and ruler.’ κῆκενος = καὶ ἢ ἄρα γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ.: κῆκείνης = ἔν ἢ ἄρα γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία . . . πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων.

Lit. ‘The state [πολιτεία] is the ordering of the powers of a state, and especially of the supreme power. The government [πολίτευμα] is this supreme power, and the state or constitution (ἡ πολιτεία subj.) is what the government is. In democracies, for example, the people are the ruling power, in oligarchies the few. Accordingly we say that they differ in their constitutions.’ The three words πολίτευμα, πολιτεία, πόλις have three primary gradations of meaning: 1) πολίτευμα = the government, i. e. the persons through whom the government acts; πολιτεία = the government administering and being administered, i. e. the state or constitution; πόλις = the whole state including the government. But these senses pass into one another.

καθ’ ἑσὸν ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζητῶν καλῶς.

μέρος is to be taken with καθ’ ἑσὸν, the genitive τῶν ζητῶν καλῶς is partitive. ἐπιβάλλει, sc. ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζητῶν καλῶς or impersonally. For the meaning of this word cp. note on ii. 3. § 4.

συνέρονται δὲ καὶ τῶν ζητῶν ἕνεκεν αὐτῶν (ἴσως γὰρ ἕνεστί τι τῶν καλῶν μόνον), καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μόνον, ἔν μὲν τοῦ χαλεποῦ κατὰ τὴν βίον ἐπεβάλλῃ λίαν.

Cp. Plat. Polit. 301 E, 302 A: ‘And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation, would be utterly undermined,—there can be no doubt of that. Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perishing and have perished and will hereafter perish, through the incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths,—I mean to say, that they are wholly

unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.’

ἴς ἡνούσης τινὲς ἐημερίας ἢν ἀττῶ καὶ γλυκύτητος ἡυσικηῖς: cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 7, τῶ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ’ ἀττῶ ἡγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων κ.τ.λ.

ἴταν δὲ τούτων ἐῖς γένηται καὶ ἀττός.

ἀττῶς refers inaccurately either to the trainer or to the pilot.

τῶ ἀττονῶ ἡγαθόν.

The reflexive refers to the principal subject ἡξιονῶντες: but is changed into the singular by the introduction of τινά. Translated into the first person the sentence would run, ‘Some one should now look after my interest as I looked after his when in office.’ For the ‘disinterestedness’ of traders cp. Plat. Rep. i. pp. 345, 346.

ννῶν δέ.

Answering to πρότερον μῶν above. ‘The natural principle that men should rule and be ruled in turn was once the practice; but now from corrupt motives, they insist on ruling perpetually.’

ἡ γῆρ οῦ πολίτας ἡατέον ἐῖναι τοῖς μετέχοντας, ἡ δεῖς κοινῶνεῖν τονῶ συμῆροντος.

The meaning of γῆρ is as follows: ‘Since there are perverted, as well as true states, there are states of which the members are not to be called citizens; or, if they were, they would partake of the common good.’ For, as has been said at the beginning of the treatise, παῖσαν πόλιν ἡρωῖμεν κοινῶνίαν τινῶ ὀνῶσαν καὶ παῖσαν κοινῶνίαν ἡγαθῶν τινῶς ἡνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν. And the true forms of government are those which regard the good of the governed.

ἡριστοκρατίαν, ἡ διῶ τῶ τοῖς ἡρίστους ἡρχεῖν, ἡ διῶ τῶ πρῶς τῶ ἡριστον.

Of course in reality the first of the two etymologies is the true one, but Aristotle, like Plato in the Cratylus, regards the relation which the component parts of words bear to one another as variable. He is fond of etymological meanings and sometimes forces the etymology to suit the meaning, e.g. σωῖροσύνη, ἴς σώζουσα τῶν ἡρόνησιν, Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5; ἡθικῶ from ἡθος, Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 1; δίκαιον ἡτι δίχα ἡστίν, Nic. Eth. v. 4. § 9; μακάριον ἡπῶ τονῶ χαίρειν, Nic. Eth. vii. 11. § 2; τιμοκρατία . . ἡ πῶ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 1.

The first of the two explanations of ἡριστοκρατία is more in accordance not only with the principles of etymology but with the facts of history, if we take ἡριστοι in the sense in which the word would have been understood by Alcaeus or Theognis: the second answers best to Aristotle’s ideal state.

πολιτεία.

In Ethics viii. 10. § 1 this is identified with τιμοκρατία = ἡ ἐκ τῶν τιμημάτων πολιτεία, a government based upon a property qualification (ἐν τιμοκρατικῶν λέγειν ὁ κεῖθεν αἰνεται, πολιτείαν δ' ἀτὲν ἐώθασιν ὁ πλεῖστοι καλεῖν). No example of the word τιμοκρατία occurs in the Politics. It is used by Plato in another sense = the government of honour (ἡ ἐκ τῆς τιμῆς πολιτεία, Rep. viii. 545 B).

πολιτεία originally meaning, as in Thucydides, any form of government, a sense which is continued in Aristotle, has also like our own word 'constitution' a second and specific sense, apparently coming into use in the age of Aristotle, though not invented by him. Cp. iv. 7. § 1, πέμπτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ προσαγορεύεται τῶν κοινῶν νόμα πασῶν (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλονῦσιν), ἄλλ' διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοῖς πειρωμένους ῥιθμεῖν τὴν τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐξῆς, καὶ χρωῦνται ταῖς τέτταρσι μόνον, ὅσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις: also ii. 6. § 16.

The subject of this chapter is again referred to in iv. c. 4. The discussion which follows affords a curious example of the manner in which Aristotle after passing through a maze of casuistry at length arrives at the conclusions of common sense.

διὲς καὶ ὁ συμβαίνει τῶν ἡθείσας ἀτίας γίνεσθαι διαφοράς.

The MSS. have διαφοράς ('That the already mentioned differences are the true causes,' a reading which gives a somewhat unusual sense to ἀτίας). The old translator has 'differentiae' in the genitive. Better to take διαφοράς as a genitive, making ἀτίας the predicate, and repeating the word with ἡθείσας. 'And thus the so-called causes of difference are not real causes.' Bernays inserts πολιτείας after ἡθείσας without authority, and appears to translate the passage rather freely: 'And they cannot therefore create any form of constitution which can be specifically named.'

The argument is intended to show that the essential differences between oligarchy and democracy are not made by the governing body being few or many (τῶν ἡθείσας ἀτίας), but by poverty and wealth. It is an accident that the rich are few, and the poor many.

καὶ ἴσθιν, ἄλλ' ὁ παῖσιν, ἄλλ' τοῖς σοῖς.

'And so it is; not however for all, but only for the equal.' Cp. Cic. de Rep. i. c. 34, 'Cum par habetur honos summis et infimis . . . ipsa aequitas iniquissima est.' Burke, French Revol. (vol. v. p. 106. ed. 1815), 'Everything ought to be open, but not indifferently to every man.'

τὸ δ' ἀτιον ἔτι περὶ ἀτῶν κρίσις.

Men think themselves to be as good or better than others, and therefore claim equal or greater political rights; e.g. they claim to exercise the franchise without considering whether they are fit or not. They can never see that they are inferior, and that therefore it may be just for them to have less than others: cp. below § 3.

ἦγε . . . διῆρηται τὴν ἀτῶν τρόπον ἥτις τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ὁρῶς.

Lit. 'Since justice is distributed in the same manner (i.e. equally) over things and over persons.' τὴν αὐτὴν τρόπον is to be taken not with διῶρηται, but with the words which follow = ἰσῶς.

τὴν δὲ οὕτως ἰσῶς.

τὴν δέ, sc. ἰσῶς is accusative after ἰσῶς.

οὕτως as above τὸ οὕτως, the technical word for persons, lit. 'in relation to the whom.'
Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 3. §§ 6, 7.

οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἕσπον μετέχειν τῶν κατὰ μῶν τὴν ἐσενέγκαντα μίαν μῶν
τὴν δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν παρὰ, οὔτε τῶν ἕξ ἰσῶς οὔτε τῶν ἰσῶς.

Either 1)* τῶν ἕξ ἰσῶς is in apposition with τῶν κατὰ μῶν or with some more general word, such as χρημάτων, understood; or 2) the words may = τῶν ἕξ ἰσῶς ἐσενεγκάντων τινά i.e. either any of those who originally contributed, or any subsequent generation of contributors. Cp. Burkē, Ref. on F. R. (vol. v. p. 121, ed. 1815), 'In these partnerships all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint stock.'

εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸν ζῆλον μόνον νεκεν κ.τ.λ.

εἰ δὲ introduces the opposite side of the question. 'If a good life is the object, then the oligarch is wrong' (cp. above, § 5, ἴσθ' ὅτι τῶν ἰσῶς λόγος δόξειεν ἴσχυειν), but the apodosis is lost in what follows. For a similar anacoluthon cp. infra c. 12. § 1.

καὶ γὰρ ἴσχυει καὶ τῶν ἰσῶς ζῶν ἴσχυει πόλις.

Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 8, ἐξαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἰσῶς μεταδίδωσιν εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου.

οὕτως ἴσχυει σύμβολα πρὸς ἰσῶς.

Cp. above, c. 1. § 4, τοῦτο πρὸς συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν. μὴ λόγου χάριν

is either 1)* taken with περὶ ἰσῶς ἐπιμελῆς εἶναι, or 2) is an explanation of ἴσχυει, which it pleonastically emphasizes.

γίνεται γὰρ ἴσχυει.

'For otherwise the state becomes' or 'would be.'

συμμαχία τῶν ἰσῶς τῶν διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἰσῶς συμμάχων.

The construction is unsymmetrical, passing, as elsewhere, from the abstract to the concrete. 'A city is an alliance differing from any other allies [= alliances], who are at

a distance, in place only.' Or τῶν ἄλλων may be taken with συμμαχῶν, τῶν ἄποθεν συμμαχῶν being epeexegetic = other alliances of which the members live apart.

Λυκόφρων ἡ σοφιστής.

An obscure rhetorician who is censured in the Rhetoric (iii. c. 3. §§ 1-3) for frigidity of style. It is also said that when set to make an encomium on the lyre he attacked some other thesis (Soph. Elench. c. 15, 174 b. 32), or, according to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, he began with the earthly lyre, and went on to speak of the constellation Lyra. Lycophron seems to have held the doctrine that 'the state is only a machine for the protection of life and property.' Cp. Rhet. i. 15, 1376 b. 10, ἀτὰρ ἡ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἑστίν.

The opposite view is maintained in Burke, French Revolution (vol. v. ed. 1815, p. 184): 'The state ought not to be considered nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the partners. It is to be looked upon with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.'

ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν ὁμοῦ κοινωνοῦντες, ἡκαστος μὲντοι χρῆται τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίας ὡς περ πόλει καὶ σίσι αἰτοῦσθαι ἡπιμαχίας ὁμοῦ βοηθοῦντες ἢ τοῦ δικονοῦντος μόνον, ὁ δ' ὁμοῦ εἶναι δόξειε πόλις τοῦσθαι ἡκριβῶς θεωροῦσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἡμοίως ἡμιλοῦσθαι συνέλθόντες καὶ χωρὶς.

'As a confederacy is not a city, so a number of individuals uniting in the same manner in which cities form a confederacy, would not be a city, unless they changed their manner of life after the union.' The main distinction which Aristotle draws between the confederacy, in which many cities are united by a treaty, and the single city is that the object of the one is negative, of the other positive,—the one regards the citizens in some particular aspect, e. g. with a view to the prevention of piracy or the encouragement of commerce; the other takes in their whole life and education.

χρῆται τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίας ὡς περ πόλει. I. e. 'If every man were lord in his own house or castle, and only made a treaty with his neighbours like the cities in a federation;' in other words, if the inhabitants of the common city had no social relations.

βοηθοῦντες is parallel with κοινωνοῦντες, and in apposition with the nominative to συνέλθοιεν.

καὶ διαγωγὰς τῶν συζητήσεων.

Nearly = τρόποι τῶν συζητήσεων, 'pleasant modes of common life,' or more freely 'enjoyments of society,' not 'relaxations for the sake of society,' a construction not admissible in prose.

ἡγεῖ δ' ἡπορίαν κ.τ.λ.

The argument of this chapter consists of a series of ῥητορικά which may be raised against the claims of any one person or class to have the supreme power. The ῥητορικά are restated somewhat less sharply in the next chapter. They are indirectly, but not distinctly or completely, answered in the latter part of c. 13.

ῥδοξε γῶρ νῶ Δία τῶν κυρίῶν δικαίως.

It is difficult to account for this sudden outburst of vivacity. Compare infra c. 11. § 5, ῥσως δῶ νῶ Δία δηῶλον ῥτι περῶ ῥνίων ῥδύνατον: cp. Xen. Mem. v. 1. 4, ῥλλῶ ναῶ μῶ Δία τόδε ῥξιόν μοι δοκεῶν εῶναι: Dem. de Chersones. §§ 9, 17; Polyb. vi. 3. § 6, πότερον ῥς μόνας ταύτας ῥ καῶ νῶ Δίῶ ῥς ῥρίστας ῥμῶν εῶσηγονῶνται πολιτειῶν; and the use of Hercule in Tacit. Ann. i. 3.

The whole passage is a kind of suppressed dialogue in which two opposite opinions are abruptly brought face to face. No conclusion is drawn; the only inference being really the impossible one that all forms of government are equally baseless, because they are not based on justice, and therefore in all of them abuse of power is possible.

πάλιν τε πάντων ληῶθέντων κ.τ.λ.

ληῶθέντων has been explained, either 1) as neut. or 2) masc. Either 1)* ‘when everything, i.e. when all the property of the rich has been exhausted;’ for this meaning of the word cp. iv. 4. § 8; or 2) ‘when all the citizens are taken together,’ but this is a doubtful use of ληῶθέντων and does not give a good sense.

The passage is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the previous argument: ‘When the many poor have taken all the property of the few rich, and the majority go on subdividing among themselves, the property of the minority will become smaller and smaller, and the state will be ruined.’

Or, expressing the same idea in numbers, let us suppose a state of 1000 citizens. If a mere numerical majority constitutes rightful sovereignty, 600 citizens may resolve,—and rightly, according to the hypothesis,—to confiscate the goods of the remaining 400, and divide them among themselves. Thus 400 will cease to be citizens. Of the remaining 600, 400 may go on to divide the property of the others, and thus the state becomes reduced to 400 and so on, till it disappears altogether.

It may be remarked that in all schemes for the division of property, the wealth which has been created under a system of accumulation is supposed to continue when the motives for accumulation have ceased. The poor are not fitted to govern the rich. But neither are the rich fitted to govern the poor. The truth is that no class in the state can be trusted with the interests of any other.

ῥλλῶ μῶν οῶχ ῥ γῶ ῥρετῶ ῥθείρει τῶ ῥχον αῶτήν.

For the virtue of anything is that quality by which it fulfils its own proper ῥργον. Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 608 E.

ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ νόμος μὲν ἢλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἢ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἢπορημένων;

‘Even if we assume the law to rule and not the few or many, where is the difference? For the law may only represent the prejudices or interests of oligarchy or democracy.’ Compare *infra* c. 11. §§ 20, 21.

δόξειεν ἢν λύεσθαι καὶ τιν’ ἢχειν ἢπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κ’ἢν ἢλήθειαν.

This passage has been thought corrupt. Two conjectures have been proposed, 1) εἰπορίαν for ἢπορίαν (but the sense which would be given to εἰπορία is not natural or idiomatic), and 2) the omission of λύεσθαι or λύεσθαι καὶ, the latter words being thought to be suggested by the mention of ἢπορίαν, or to be a corruption of ἢλήθειαν. There is a want of order in the thought, but the same disorder occurs in a parallel expression (c. 12. § 2), ἢχει γὰρ τοντ’ ἢπορίαν καὶ ἢλοσοφίαν πολιτικῆν. The text may therefore be accepted.

ἢσπερ καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν τοῖς καλοῦς (διαφέρειν) ἢσι καὶ τὴν γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἢληθινῶν, τὴν συνηχθαι τὴν διεσπαρμῆνα χωρὶς εἰς ἢν, ἢπερ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἢχειν τοντ’ γεγραμμένου τουδὲ μὲν τὴν ἢθαλμόν, ἢτέρου δὲ τινος ἢτερον μῶριον.

The combination of qualities in the multitude is compared to the combination of qualities in the individual: e. g. in a statue or picture of which the features taken separately may be far excelled by others, but when combined make a better portrait, because they are adapted to one another. (Cp. *Plat. Rep.* iv. 420 C, D, ff.) Thus the multitude may be supposed to have a generalized excellence, and to be superior as a whole. This rather doubtful principle is not of universal application [§ 5]. We must presuppose the many to be good citizens and good men (*infra* c. 15. § 9).

Contrast the opposite view of Plato (*Rep.* vi. 493 A, B), in which he describes the multitude under the figure of a great beast, a view which is modified by his apology for them in *Rep.* vi. 498-500.

Compare the saying of Goethe: ‘Nothing can be more certain than that this great Public, which is so honoured and so despised, is almost always in a state of self-delusion about details, but never or hardly ever about the broad truth (*das Ganze*).’

Yet we may also make the opposite reflection, that a few wise men when they meet and act together are apt to fall short of the average intelligence of mankind: a Ministry of All the Talents may have less sense than any man in it—a coalition may never coalesce—individuality may be too much for unity; or unity may only be enforced by the strong will of a single person.

ἢσως δὲ νῦν Δία δηῶλον ἢτι περὶ ἢνίων ἢδύνατον. ἢ γὰρ ἀτῶς κ’ἢν ἢπὲρ τῶν θηρίων ἢρμόσειε λόγος. καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἢνιοι τῶν θηρίων;

‘Assuredly,’ retorts the opponent, or Aristotle himself, struck by an objection which had not previously occurred to him, ‘this principle cannot be true of all men. For it

would be a *reductio ad absurdum* to say that it was true of beasts, and some men are no better than beasts.’

Admitting the objection Aristotle still maintains that his doctrine of ‘collective wisdom’ is true of some men, though not of all. He proceeds to argue that deliberative and judicial functions may be safely granted to the many, and cannot be safely denied to them; but that it would be dangerous to entrust them with high office.

δί τε γὰρ δίκιαν καὶ δι’ ἡροσύνην τὸ μὲν δικεῖν ἢ τὸ δ’ ἡμαρτάνειν αὐτούς.

The sentence is an anacoluthon; it has been forgotten that no words such as ἐκός ἔστιν or ἡνάγκη have preceded, and that they cannot be easily gathered from the context.

ἄχουσι συνελθόντες ἄκανῶν ἀσθησιν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, where the distinction is drawn between σύνεσις (= ἀσθησις in this passage), which is κριτικὸν μόνον, and ῥόνησις, which is ἡπιτακτικὴ. And with both places, cp. Thuc. ii. 40, where Pericles, speaking in the name of the Athenian democracy, says, ἄτοι κρίνομέν γε ἡ ἡθυμούμεθα ῥθωῶς τὸ πρᾶγματα.

Aristotle is now stating the other side of the argument:—‘The physician is a better judge than he who is not a physician. And it must be remarked that under the term “physician” is included 1) the higher sort of physician, 2) the apothecary, and 3) the intelligent amateur whether he practises medicine or not. In all of these there exists a knowledge which is not to be found in the many. Apply this principle to the art of politics. Even in the choice of magistrates the well-informed man, whether he be a statesman or not, is better able to judge than the multitude.’ This argument is then refuted in what follows, § 14.

The context is rendered difficult by the correction of the word ‘artist,’ for which Aristotle substitutes ‘one who has knowledge’ (§§ 11, 12). For the distinction between the δημιουργ[Editor: illegible character]ς and the ῥχιτεκτονικῶς ἄτρῶς cp. Plat. Laws iv. 720, where the doctor, who attends the slaves, is humorously distinguished from the doctor who attends freemen. And for the notion of the ἡδιώτης ἄτρῶς (? πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τῶν τέχνην) cp. Politicus 259 A, ‘ἔτ τὸ τις τῶν δημοσιευόντων ἄτρῶν ἄκανῶς ξυμβουλεύειν ἡδιωτέων ἀτός, ἡῖρ’ οἰκ ἡναγκαῖον ἀτῶν προσαγορεύεσθαι τῶνομα τῆς τέχνης τᾶτῶν ἡπερ ἡῖ συμβουλεύει.’

Aristotle proceeds to argue that there is a judgment of common sense equal, if not superior to that of the artist himself, which is possessed by the many.

Without pretending that the voice of the people is the voice of God, it may be truly said of them, 1) that they are free from the hypercriticism which besets the individual; 2) that they form conclusions on simple grounds; 3) that their moral principles are generally sound; 4) that they are often animated by noble impulses, and are capable of great sacrifices; 5) that they retain their human and national feeling. The intelligent populace at Athens, though changeable as the wind (Thuc. ii. 65; Demosth. 383, ἡ μὲν ἡῖμος ἡσπερ ἡν θαλάττῃ πνεύμα ἡκατάστατον) and subject to fits of panic

and fanatical fury (Thuc. vi. 27), were also capable of entertaining generous thoughts (Id. iii. 49), and of showing a wise moderation (Id. viii. 97), and in nearly every respect were superior to their oligarchical contemporaries, far less cunning and cruel (Id. iv. 80), and far more willing to make sacrifices (Id. i. 74) for the public interest.

The more general question which is here suggested by Aristotle, § 11, ‘whether the amateur or the artist is the better judge of a work of art or literature’ is also worthy of attention. It is probable that either is a better judge than the other, but of different merits or excellences. The artist e.g. may be expected to be the best judge of points in which a minute knowledge of detail is required; the amateur has the truer sense of proportion because he compares many works of art and is not under the dominion of a single style. He judges by a wider range and is therefore less likely to fall into eccentricity or exclusiveness.

See *infra* at the beginning of c. 12.

κα? τ? τίμημα δ? πλε??ον τ? πάντων τούτων ? τ? τω?ν καθ’ ?να κα? κατ’ ?λίγους
μεγάλας ?ρχ?ς ?ρχόντων.

Aristotle seems here to have fallen into the error of confounding the collective wealth of the state with the wealth of individuals. The former is the wealth of a great number of persons which may be unequally distributed and in infinitesimally small portions among the masses, thus affording no presumption of respectability or education; whereas the wealth of the individual is the guarantee of some at least of the qualities which are required in the good citizen. Cp. *infra* c. 13. §§ 4, 10.

? δ? πρώτη λεχθε??σα ?πορία κ.τ.λ.

That is to say the certainty that any single individual or class, if dominant, will infringe upon the rights of others renders it indispensable that the law should be above them all. Cp. c. 10. § 1.

According to Bernays (Transl. of Pol. I-III. p. 172) c. 12 and 13 are a second sketch of the same discussion which has been commenced in c. 9-11 and is continued in c. 16 and 17. But though in what follows there is some repetition of what has preceded, e.g. c. 12. §§ 1, 2 and c. 13. § 2 compared with c. 9. §§ 1, 2. c. 13. § 1 and c. 9. §§ 14, 15, and c. 13. § 10 with c. 11. § 2 ff., the resemblances are not sufficient to justify this statement. In c. 13 new elements are introduced, e.g. the discussion on ostracism; and the end of c. 11 in which the supremacy of law is asserted (§ 20) has no immediate connexion with c. 14 in which the forms of monarchy are considered; while the transition from the end of c. 13, in which the claim of the one best man to be a monarch is discussed, is not unnatural.

?πε? δ’ ?ν πάσαις κ.τ.λ.

Again, as in c. 9. § 6, the apodosis appears to be lost in the length of the sentence. It is also possible to gather it from the words ποίωv δ’ ?σότης κ.τ.λ. (§ 2). The process of reasoning will then be as follows: ‘Seeing that the end of the state is “justice” which is

the common good, etc., and is also equality between equals, of whom or what is this equality or inequality?’

δοκεῖ δὲ παρῶν . . . τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγους.

Compare Topics i. 14, 105 b. 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν.

εἰ γὰρ μάλλον τὸ τὸ μέγεθος, κατὰ ἴσους ἢ τὸ μέγεθος ἰνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς λευθερίαν. ἴστος εἰ πλεονάζει δὲ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ ὅδ’ κατὰ ῥετήν, καὶ πλεονάζει ἴσως ῥετηῆς μέγεθος, εἴη ἢ συμβλητὸν πάντα· τοσόνδε γὰρ μέγεθος εἰ κρεῖττον τοσονδε, τοσονδε δηλον ἢ ἴσον.

That is to say, If different qualities can be compared in the concrete, they can be compared in the abstract, and degrees of difference can be compared even when two things differ in kind. If a tall man can be compared with a virtuous, then virtue can be compared with height, and all degrees of height and virtue can be compared. But this is impossible, for they have no common measure. Qualities can only be compared when they have a common relation, such as virtue and wealth have to the state.

εἰ γὰρ μάλλον, ‘for if we begin by saying that size in the concrete can be compared with wealth and freedom then we cannot avoid saying the same of size in the abstract: which is absurd.’

The bearing of this argument on the general discussion is as follows: Aristotle is explaining the nature of political equality which can only exist between similar or commensurable qualities and therefore between persons who possess such qualities: in the case of the state for example only between qualities or persons which are essential to the state, not between such as are indifferent, not between flute-playing and virtue, but between virtue and wealth.

ἢνευ τῶν προτέρων . . . ἢνευ δὲ τούτων.

1) freedom and wealth . . . 2) justice and valour.

ἢνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις.

In a certain sense even the government of virtue is a perversion, if we could suppose the virtuous to govern for their own interests and to disregard those of others (cp. *infra* §§ 10, 20). At any rate virtue is not the only element required in a state.

ἢ δὲ χώρα κοινόν.

‘The common or inclusive element of the state,’ ‘an element in which all are concerned’; or, if the phrase be modernized, ‘the land is a great public interest.’

The word is here used nearly as in τὸ κοινόν = ‘public’ or ‘common’: elsewhere in the sense of ‘comprehensive,’ ‘general,’ (Nic. Eth. ii. 2. § 2); applicable to the larger or

more inclusive class, the more popular constitution (supra ii. 6. § 4), the more generally useful branch of knowledge (Rhet. i. 1, 1354 b. 29).

καθ' ἡκάστην μὲν οὐρανὴν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἡναμισθήτητος ἢ κρίσις τίνας ἔρχειν δεῖ; τοῦτο γὰρ κυρίως διαφέρουσιν ἡλλήλων, οὐρανὸν ἢ μὲν τῶν διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τῶν διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἡνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἡλλων ἡκάστη τὴν ἀτὴν τρόπον. ἄλλ' ἢ μὴ σκοποῦμεν, ἢ ταν περὶ τὴν ἀτὴν τανθ' ἢ ἀρχὴ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον.

‘There is no difficulty in determining who are to be the governing body in an oligarchy or aristocracy or democracy; for the nature of these is really implied in the name. The difficulty arises only when the few and the many and the virtuous are living together in the same city: how are their respective claims to be determined? For any of them, carried out consistently, involves an absurdity.’

εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡριθμὸν εἶεν ἡλίγοι πάνπαν οὐ τὴν ἡρετὴν ἡχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τὴν τρόπον;

‘How are we to decide between them; or how are we to arrange the state having regard both to virtues and number?’ For διελεῖν see ii. 2. § 1: also τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, iv. 1. § 10.

ἢ τὴν ἡλίγοι πρὸς τὴν ἡργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν [Editor: illegible character] τοσοντοὶ τὴν πληθὸς ἢ εἶναι πόλιν ἢ ἄτω;

‘Must we consider their fewness relatively to their duties, and whether they are able to govern a state, or numerous enough to form a state of themselves?’

τὴν ἡλίγοι = ‘the idea of the few,’ like τὴν οὐρανὸν supra c. 9. § 2.

πρὸς τὴν ἡργον may be taken either with δεῖ σκοπεῖν, or with τὴν ἡλίγοι.

τοσοντοὶ is dependent on εἶ, understood from εἰ δυνατόν = ἢ δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ τοσοντοὶ τὴν πληθὸς εἶσι.

διὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἡπορίαν, ἢ ζήτωνσι καὶ προβάλλουσί τινες, ἢ δέλεται τοντον τὴν τρόπον ἡπαντῶν. ἡπορονσι γὰρ τινες πότερον τῶν νομοθέτῶν νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῶν τίθεσθαι τοῦτο ἡρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὴν τῶν βελτιόνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πλειόνων, ἢ ταν συμβαίνῶν τὴν λεχθέν. τὴν δὲ ἡρθὴν ληπτέον ἡσως τὴν δὲ ἡσως ἡρθὴν πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἡλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν.

Aristotle here raises the question whether the laws shall be enacted for the good of all or of a privileged class when several classes exist together in a state. He answers that the laws must be equal, and this equal right, or law, means the principle which conduces to the good of the whole state.

1)* ἢ ταν συμβαίνῶν τὴν λεχθέν refers immediately to § 10, which suggests the co-existence of classes in a state, and to § 4, which contains a more formal statement to the same effect.

2) Bernays alters the punctuation by enclosing ἡπορον?σι . . . πλειόνων in a parenthesis explanatory of τ?ν ἡπορίαν. This gives a sufficient sense; but a short clause at the end of a sentence following a long parenthesis is not in the manner of Aristotle. He also refers ἡταν συμβαίν? τ? λεχθ?ν to the words τ? πλη?θος ε??ναι βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., not ‘when all the elements co-exist,’ but ‘when the whole people is better and richer than the few.’

ἡστε μ? συμβλητ?ν ε??ναι τ?ν τω?ν ἡλλων ἡρετ?ν πάντων μηδ? τ?ν δύναμιν α?τω?ν τ?ν πολιτικ?ν πρ?ς τ?ν ἡκείνων.

The virtue here spoken of seems to be the virtue of the kind attributed by Thucydides viii. 68 to Antiphon, viz. political ability, and the characters who are ‘out of all proportion to other men’ are the master spirits of the world, who make events rather than are made by them, and win, whether with many or with few, such as Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander the great, Caesar, and in modern times a Marlborough, Mirabeau, Napoleon I, Bismarck.

ο? γ?ρ ἡθέλειν α?τ?ν ἡγειν τ?ν ἡργώ.

The legend is preserved by Apollodorus (i. 9. § 19). According to him the ship Argo, speaking with a human voice, refused to take on board Hercules, ἡθεγξαμένη μ? δύνασθαι ἡερειν τ? τούτου βάρος. This agrees with the text of the Politics if the word ἡγειν is taken to mean ‘convey,’ ‘take on board,’ as in Soph. Phil. 901, ἡστε μή μ’ ἡγειν ναύτην ἡτι. Stahr translates wrongly: ‘Hercules would not row with his comrades, because he was so far superior to them in strength.’

τ?ν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλ? συμβουλίαν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Herod. v. 92, who reverses the characters, the advice being given not by Periander to Thrasybulus, but by Thrasybulus to Periander; and Livy i. 54: also Shakes. Rich. II. act iii. sc. 4:—

‘Go thou, and, like an executioner,
Cut off the heads of too fast-growing sprays
That look too lofty in our commonwealth.’

δι? κα? το?ς ψέγοντας τ?ν τυραννίδα κα? τ?ν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλ? συμβουλίαν ο?χ ἡπλω?ς ο?ητέον ἡρθω?ς ἡπιτιμα?ν.

Because all governments rest on the principle of self-preservation, and at times extreme measures must be allowed.

? ἡστρακισμ?ς τ?ν α?τ?ν ἡχει δύναμιν . . . τ?? κολούειν.

In this passage there is a doubt about the reading, and also about the construction. Several MSS. read τ? κωλύειν = ‘have the same effect in respect of putting down the chief citizens.’

If we retain the reading of Bekker's text, it is doubtful whether τῶν κολούειν 1) is to be taken after τῶν ἀτῶν (Bernays), or 2)* is the dative of the instrument. To the first way of explaining the words it may be objected that τῶν κολούειν must then be referred to the particular instance of the counsel of Periander, whereas ostracism has been just asserted to be general, and to represent the policy of oligarchy and democracy as well as of tyranny. 'It has the same effect with the "lopping off" the chief citizens.'

It can hardly be supposed that the legislator who instituted ostracism had any definite idea of banishing the one 'best man' who was too much for the state. The practice seems to have arisen out of the necessities of party warfare, and may be regarded as an attempt to give stability to the ever-changing politics of a Greek state. It certainly existed as early as the time of Cleisthenes, and is said to have been employed against the adherents of Peisistratus. Every year on a fixed day the people were asked if they would have recourse to it or not. If they approved, a day was appointed on which the vote was taken. To ostracise any citizen not less than 6000 citizens must vote against him. We may readily believe, as Aristotle tells us (§ 23), that 'instead of looking to the public good, they used ostracism for factious purposes.' Aristides, according to the well-known legend, was banished because the people were tired of his virtues. Themistocles, the saviour of Hellas, was also ostracised (Thuc. i. 137). The last occasion on which the power was exercised at Athens was against Hyperbolus, who was ostracised by the combined influence of Nicias and Alcibiades. Other states in which the practice prevailed were Argos (v. 3. § 3), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, Ephesus.

ὅσον θηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους καὶ Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους.

For the Samians, cp. Thuc. i. 116; for the Chians, Thuc. iv. 51; for the Lesbians, Thuc. iii. 10.

ἴστε διὰ τὸν μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοῖς μονάρχουσιν συμῶνεσσι τὰς πόλεις, ἐπὶ τῆς οὐκείας ῥῆσις ἐλίμου τὰς πόλεις οὐσης τὸν δρῶσιν.

1)*, 'as far as the application of this principle of compulsion is concerned, there is nothing to prevent agreement between kings and their subjects, for all governments must have recourse to a similar policy' (cp. note on § 16). τὸν δρῶσιν refers to the whole passage: sc. if they use compulsion for the benefit of the whole state.

Or 2), 'there is nothing to make the policy of kings differ from that of free states.' It is an objection, though not a fatal one, to this way of taking the passage that τὰς πόλεις then occurs in two successive lines in different senses.

κατὰ τῆς ἡμολογουμένης περοχᾶς.

The meaning is that where the superiority of a king or government is acknowledged, there is a political justification for getting a rival out of the way.

ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲ ῥῆσιν γε τὸν τοιούτου· παραπλήσιον γὰρ κῆν ἐπὶ τὸν Διῆς ῥῆσιν ῥῆσιον, μερίζοντες τῆς ῥῆσιν.

See note on text. ‘Nay, more; a man superior to others is like a god, and to claim rule over him would be like claiming to rule over Zeus.’ The words μερίζοντες τῶν ἰσχυρῶν may refer either 1)* to the Gods or 2) to men; either 1)* ‘as if in making a division of the empire of the Gods’ according to the old legend, they, i.e. the gods, should claim to rule over Zeus; or 2) more generally, ‘as if when persons were distributing offices they should give Zeus an inferior place.’ Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 607 C, ἡ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ἄλλος κρατῶν, Nic. Eth. vi. 13. § 8, ἴμοιον κῶν εἴ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀίη ἰρχειν τῶν θεῶν, and Herod. v. 49, τῶν Διῶ πλοῦτου πέρι ἰρίζετε: also Plat. Polit. 301 D, 303 B.

Bernays translates μερίζοντες ‘upon the principle of rotation of offices,’ but no such use of μερίζειν occurs.

κτεῖναι γῶρ οἶ κύριος, εἶ μῶ ἴν τινι βασιλείῶ, καθάπερ ἴπῶ τῶν ἰρχαίων ἴν ταῶς πολεμικαῶς ἰξόδοις ἴν χειρῶς νόμῶ.

οἶ κύριος, sc. ἴ βασιλεύς, supplied from ἴ βασιλεία. We have a choice of difficulties in the interpretation of the words which follow. Either 1) ἴν τινι βασιλείῶ must be explained ‘in a certain exercise of the royal office,’ i.e. when the king is in command of the army. This way of taking the passage gives a good sense and the fact is correct; but such a meaning cannot be extracted from the Greek. Or 2), ‘for a king has no power to inflict death, unless under a certain form of monarchy’; Aristotle, writing in a fragmentary manner, has reverted from the kings of Sparta to monarchy in general. Or 3)*, possibly the words ἴν τινι βασιλείῶ, bracketed by Bekker, are a clumsy gloss which has crept into the text, intended to show that the remark did not apply to every monarchy, but only to the Spartan. The conjecture of Mr. Bywater, who substitutes ἴνεκα δειλίας for ἴν τινι βασιλείῶ, though supported by the citation from Homer, is too far removed from the letters of the MSS; and there is no proof that the Spartan kings had the power of putting a soldier to death for cowardice.

ἴν χειρῶς νόμῶ is often translated ‘by martial law.’ But the comparison of passages in Herodotus (e.g. ix. 48) and Polybius (iv. 58. § 9, etc.) shows that the word νόμος is only pleonastic, and that ἴν χειρῶς νόμῶ = ἴν χειρσίν, ‘hand to hand,’ or ‘by a sudden blow.’

ἴν δέ κῶ ἴγῶν ἴπάνευθε μάχης κ.τ.λ.

Il. ii. 391-393. These lines which are rightly assigned here to Agamemnon are put into the mouth of Hector in Nic. Eth. iii. 8. § 4.

πῶρ γῶρ ἴμοῶ θάνατος.

These words are not found either in this or any other passage of our Homer, though there is something like them in Iliad, xv. 348: —

ἴν δῶ ἴν ἴγῶν ἴπάνευθε νεῶν ἴτέρῶθι νοήσω,
αῶτονῶ οἶ θάνατον μητίσομαι κ.τ.λ.

The error is probably due, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 9. § 3 and iii. 8. § 4, to a confused recollection of two or more verses. For a similar confusion of two lines of Homer cp. Plat. Rep. 389 E.

ἄλλοι δ' ἀποκαταστήσονται τὴν δύναμιν παρὰ τὴν ἀποκαταστήσαντα τυραννικῶς· ἕσθ' ἂν ἴσως κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατριῶν.

The MSS. vary greatly: The Milan MS. reads τυραννίσι καὶ κατὰ, instead of τυραννικῶς· ἕσθ' ἂν ἴσως. So Paris 1, 2, but omitting καί: other MSS. preserve traces of the same reading. Others read παραπλησίως τυραννικῶν. Out of these Bekker has extracted the Text, in which however ἴσως seems to be unnecessary and to rest on insufficient authority. Susemihl reads τυραννίσιν· ἕσθ' ἂν καὶ κ.τ.λ.

For the distinguishing characteristics of nations, see Book vii. 7. §§ 1-4.

καὶ ἴσως ἂν βασιλικῶς καὶ οὐ τυραννικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀποκαταστήσαντα· οὐ γὰρ πολλοὶ τὴν ἴσως ἂν βασιλικῶς, τοὺς δ' ἂν τυράννους ξενικόν.

διὰ τὴν ἀποκαταστήσαντα. 'Because the form of government is legal.'

The omission of the article before ξενικῶν emphasizes the opposition between οὐ πολλοὶ καὶ ξενικῶν—'their own citizens' are contrasted with 'any mercenary body.'

τὴν κακοπάτριδα.

Either on analogy of ἐπατρις,* 'the base born,' or possibly 'the injurer of his country,' like κακόδουλος, 'the maltreater of his slaves.'

διὰ γὰρ τὴν τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τὸν πλῆθος ἐργέτας καὶ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὴν συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, γίνονται βασιλικῶς ἢ κόντων καὶ τοῦ παραλαμβάνουσι πατριῶν.

Cp. v. 10. §§ 7-9, where royalty is said to be based on merit; and i. 2. § 6, where it is assumed to have arisen from the Patriarchal relation: and for what follows vi. 8. § 20, where the ministers of Public Sacrifices are called Kings or Archons.

ἴσως δ' ἴσως ἐπεὶ ἂν ἐπὶ βασιλείαν κ.τ.λ.

The kings who became priests retained only the shadow of royalty; but where they held military command beyond the borders, the name might be applied with greater propriety.

ἴσως τὴν σκέμμα σχεδὸν περὶ δυοῖν ἴσως, ἴσως μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῦς πόλεσι στρατηγῶν ἴσως ἐπὶ, καὶ τὸν τὸν ἴσως κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος, ἴσως συμφέρει ἴσως δ' πότερον ἴσως συμφέρει κύριον ἐπὶ πάντων, ἴσως συμφέρει.

κατὰ μέρος, not 'by rotation in a fixed order,' (as in iv. 14. § 4) but more simply, 'by a succession of one citizen to another.' It is implied, though not expressed, that they are

chosen by vote: cp. supra c. 14. § 5, ἢ μὴν ὀνομαζόμενον τὸν ἐξουσίαν βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου· τούτων δ' αὐτῶν κατὰ γένος ἐστίν, αὐτῶν δ' ἀφαιρεταί.

Three MSS. read καθ' ἀφαιρέσιν instead of κατὰ μέρος. It is more likely that καθ' ἀφαιρέσιν is a gloss on κατὰ μέρος, than the reverse.

τὸ μὴν ὀνομαζόμενον περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπῆς νόμων ἢ χειρὸς ἀλλοῦ ἐξουσίαν πολιτείας.

'Is a legal, rather than a constitutional question,' 'is to be regarded as a matter of administration.' ἐξουσίαν νόμων ἀλλοῦ πολιτείας is an abridgment of ἐξουσίαν τῶν ἐπισκοπῆς περὶ τῶν νόμων ἀλλοῦ πολιτείας.

ἐξουσίαν (like ἕξις i. 8. § 10, νόμος iii. 14. § 4) is pleonastic as in i. 4. § 2, ἢ γὰρ ἰσχυρῆς ἢ ἰσχυροῦ ἐστὶν, 'has the form or character of an instrument.'

ἢ τὸ ἐξουσίαν τὴν πρώτην.

After reducing the different forms of a monarchy to two, he now rejects one of them,—namely, the Lacedaemonian, because the Lacedaemonian kings were only generals for life, and such an office as this might equally exist under any form of government. This is a strange notion; for although the kings of Sparta were not generally distinguished, it can hardly be said with truth that Archidamus or Agesilaus were no more than military commanders.

ἢ ἐξουσίαν, sc. τὸν τὸ ἐξουσίαν.

τὴν πρώτην is to be taken adverbially in the sense of 'to begin with' or 'at once': so τὴν ταχίστην, (Dem.). The phrase also occurs in Xenophon Mem. iii. 6. § 10, περὶ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τὴν γε πρώτην ἐπιστήσομεν: and in Arist. Met. ζ. 12, 1038 a. 35, τὸσαντα ἐρήσθω τὴν πρώτην. Aristotle refers to the Lacedaemonian kings again in v. 11. § 2, and to the life generalship, c. 16. § 1, infra.

This passage is closely connected with a similar discussion in Plato's Politicus 293-295, where the comparative advantages of the wise man and the law are similarly discussed, and the illustration from the physician's art is also introduced. Cp. also Rhet. i. 1354 a. 28, where Aristotle argues, besides other reasons, that the law is superior to the judge, because the judge decides on the spur of the moment.

μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον,

sc. ἡμέραν = μετὰ τὴν τετάρτην ἡμέραν. The MSS. vary between τριήμερον and τετρήμερον.

ἢ ἄλλοις ἢ αἰὲν τις ἐστὶν τούτου βουλευσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα κάλλιον. ἢ τι μὴν τοίνυν ἄναγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δηλονότι, καὶ κεῖσθαι νόμους, ἢ μὴ κυρίους ἐπὶ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἢ περὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δεῖν κυρίους.

α?τόν, sc. τ?ν βουλευόμενον, incorrectly translated in the text ‘a king:’ better, ‘whether you call him king or not’ there must be a legislator who will advise for the best about particulars.

ἄλλ? μ? κυρίου? ??? παρεκβαίνουσιν is a qualification of what has preceded:—‘although they have no authority when they err,’ i. e. there must be laws and there must be cases which the laws do not touch, or do not rightly determine. This is one of the many passages in Aristotle’s Politics in which two sides of a question are introduced without being distinguished. The argument would have been clearer if the words ἄλλ? μ? . . . δε?? κυρίου? had been omitted. Aristotle concedes to the opponent that there must be a correction of the law by the judgment of individuals. In fact both parties agree 1) that there must be laws made by the legislator; 2) that there must be exceptional cases. But there arises a further question: Are these exceptional cases to be judged of by one or by all?

The supposition contained in the words ἄλλ? ἴσως . . . κάλλιον is repeated in a more qualified form in the sentence following, ἴτι μ?ν τοίνυν . . . κυρίου?.

ἄλλ? ἴστ?ν ἴ πόλις ἴκ πολλῶν, ἴσπερ ἴστίασις συμ?ορητ?ς καλλίων μια?ς κα? ἴπλη?ς. δι? τον?το κα? κρίνει ἴμεινον ἴχλος πολλ? ἴ ε?ης ἴστισον?ν.

Compare the saying ‘that the House of Commons has more good sense or good taste than any one man in it;’ and again, Burke, ‘Besides the characters of the individuals that compose it, this house has a collective character of its own.’

ἴκε?? δ’ ἴργον ἴμα πάντα ἴργισθη?ναι κα? ἴμαρτε??ν.

It is true no doubt that the passions of the multitude may sometimes balance one another. But it is also true that a whole multitude may be inflamed by sympathy with each other, and carried away by a groundless suspicion, as in the panic after the mutilation of the Hermae, or the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, or the English Popish Plot, or the witch hunting mania at Salem in Massachusetts, or the French reign of Terror; and commonly in religious persecutions.

α?ρετώτερον ἴν ε?η τα??ς πόλεσιν ἴριστοκρατία βασιλείας, κα? μετ? δυνάμεως κα? χωρ?ς δυνάμεως ο?σης τη? ἴρχη?ς, ἴν ??? λαβε??ν πλείους ἴμοίους.

That is to say aristocracy, or the rule of several good men, is better than the rule of one—we may leave out the question of power, if only it be possible to find the many equals who will constitute this ‘aristocracy of virtue.’ In other words, the superiority of the aristocracy, who are many, to the king, who is one, does not simply consist in greater strength.

ἴμοίους, ‘equal in virtue to one another,’ an idea which is to be gathered from the mention of ἴριστοκρατία in the preceding clause, and explained in the words which follow, πολλο?ς ἴμοίους πρ?ς ἴρετήν, § 11.

ἴντεν?θέν ποθεν ε?λογον γενέσθαι τ?ς ἴλιγαρχίας.

Yet in v. 12. § 14 he repudiates the notion of Plato that the state changes into oligarchy, because the ruling class are lovers of money. Royalty, aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny, democracy—the order of succession in this passage—may be compared with that of Plato (Rep. viii. and ix)—the perfect state, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny. The order in which constitutions succeed to one another is discussed in Nic. Eth. viii. 10.

ἢ περὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους ἐπινοεῖ συμβέβηκε τῶν πόλεις, ἢ ὥς οὐδὲ ἴδιον ἢ τι γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἢ τέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν.

Here as elsewhere iv. 6. § 5, he accepts democracy not as a good but as a necessity, which arises as soon as wealth begins to flow and tradesmen ‘circulate’ in the agora, vi. 4. § 13; and the numbers of the people become disproportioned to the numbers of the governing class.

ἢ μὴ ἄναγκαῖον ἢ ἀρχεῖν ἀτρεπὴ δύναμιν, ἢ ἢ ὑλάξει τὸς νόμους.

Compare what was said above c. 13. § 22, ἢ ὅστε διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ. that ‘there need be no disagreement between a king and his subjects, because he is sometimes obliged to use force to them.’ Or, according to the other mode of interpreting the passage, ‘there is no difference between a king and a free state because’ &c.

διδόναι τοσοῦτους.

Either 1)* with emphasis ‘so many and no more’; or better 2) with reference to the previous words ἐπινοεῖ δὲ τοσαύτην τὴν ἰσχὺν ἢ ὅστε ἢ κάστου μὴ καὶ ἢ ἢ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τὸν δὲ πλήθους ἢ ττω, ‘so many as would not make him dangerous.’

Nearly the whole of this chapter is a series of ἢ πορίαι; as in c. 15, Aristotle states, without clearly distinguishing, them.

Yet the στρατηγὸς ἢ ἴδιος, who in time of peace is deprived of functions, and on the battle-field has arbitrary power, is not really the same with ἢ κατὰ νόμον βασιλεύς.

περὶ ἢ πονηρὰ δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος (sc. τῆς διοικήσεως) ἢ λαττον (sc. τῆς ἢ πιδάμνου).

‘With a somewhat more limited power than at Epidamnus.’

δοκεῖ δὲ τίσιν.

Either the construction may be an anacoluthon, or δὲ after δοκεῖ may mark the apodosis.

διόπερ οὐδὲν μάλλον ἢ ρχειν ἢ ἢ ρχεσθαι δίκαιον. καὶ τὸ ἢ μέρος τοίνυν ἢ σαύτως. τὸν τοιοῦτον δὲ ἢ ἢ νόμος.

καὶ τὸ ἢ μέρος = καὶ τὸ ἢ μέρος ἢ ρχειν ἢ σαύτως δίκαιον.

Aristotle, taking the view of an opponent of the *παμβασιλεία*, asserts that equals are entitled to an equal share in the government; there is justice in their ruling and justice in their being ruled: and therefore in their all equally ruling by turns. 'And here law steps in; for the order of their rule is determined by law.'

ἄλλ' μὲν ἴσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν νόμος, οἷον δ' ἄνθρωπος μὴ δύναται γνωρίζειν. ἄλλ' ἰσότηδες παιδεύσας νόμος ἰσότησι τῶν λοιπῶν τηρεῖ δικαιοτάτ' γνώμην κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. τί δ' ἄπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ἢ τί μὴ δόξῃ περιωμένοις μείνον ἐπιτελεῖν τῶν κειμένων.

ἄλλ' μὲν κ.τ.λ. 'But surely if there are cases which the law cannot determine, then neither can an individual judge of them.'

τῶν λοιπῶν, what remains over and above law.

The connexion of the whole passage is as follows: Instead of one man ruling with absolute power, the law should rule, and there should be ministers and interpreters of the law. To this it is answered that the interpreter of the law is no more able to decide causes than the law itself. To this again the retort is made, that the law trains up persons who supply what is wanting in the law itself, to the best of their judgment.

ἢ μὴ οὐκ ἐπιτελεῖ τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχεῖν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχεῖν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νομῶν μόνους, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον.

This is a reflection on the *παμβασιλεύς*. The rule of law is the rule of God and Reason: in the rule of the absolute king an element of the beast is included.

The reading of τὸν νομῶν (instead of τὸν νόμον), which has the greater MS. authority, gives no satisfactory sense because it transposes the natural order of ideas. It has been therefore rejected. Schneider and Bekker, 2nd Edit., who are followed in the text, retain τὸν νόμον in the beginning of the clause and read τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νομῶν μόνους, a very ingenious and probable emendation, partly derived from a correction νομῶν which is found in the margin of two or three MSS. instead of θεόν.

ἵστε δὴ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ἢ γὰρ νόμος τὸ μέσον.

'And so, because men cannot judge in their own case, but are impelled this way and that, they have recourse to the mean, which is the law.'

τί κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα ἐσὶν, ἵστε τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἰσάλευστος, ἄλλ' οἱ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα.

The defects of written law are supplied not only by the judgments of individuals but by tradition and precedent. In any comparison of the judgments of law and of individuals, these have to be reckoned to the credit of law. And in early times this unwritten law is more sacred and important than written. Hence arises an additional argument against the superiority of the individual to the law. For the importance of unwritten law cp. Thuc. ii. 37, τῶν τε θεῶν ἄρχων ἰσάλευστος καὶ τῶν νόμων

καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ἧσοι τε ἢ ἡεὶ τῶν ἡδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ἧσοι ἡγραφοὶ ἡντες αὐσχύνῃ ἡμολογουμένην ἡέρουσιν, and Rhet. i. 10, 1368 b. 7, λέγω δὲ ἡδιον μὲν καθ' ἡν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται, κοινὲν δὲ ἡσα ἡγραφα παρ' ἡαῖσιν ἡμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ.

τοντον τὲν τρόπον.

Referring to the words which have preceded—κατ' τὴ πλείονας εἶναι τοῖς ἢ αὐτον καθισταμένους ἡρχοντας.

In the whole of this passage Aristotle is pleading the cause of the law against absolute monarchy. He shows that the law is not liable to corruption, that its deficiencies are supplied by individuals, that it trains up judges who decide not arbitrarily but according to a rule, that many good men are better than one. But the monarch too must have his ministers; he will surround himself by his friends, and they will have ideas like his own. Thus the two approximate to a certain extent. In either case the rulers must be many and not one. But if so it is better to have the trained subordinates of the law than the favorites of a despot.

εἰ τούτους οἰεται δεῖν ἡρχεῖν τοῖς ἡσοῖς καὶ ἡμοίους ἡρχεῖν οἰεται δεῖν ἡμοίως.

Even in the *παμβασιλεία* there is an element of equality. ἡμοίως either 1) 'equally with himself'; or 2) with a slight play of words 'after the manner of equals.'

εἰ μὲν τρόπον τινά.

To be taken after ἡμείων 'better in a certain manner, i.e. the imaginary and rather absurd case, to which he returns in § 5, of the virtue of the individual being more than equal to the collective virtue of the community.

ἡν ἡπέθηκε [καὶ ἡν] ἡγγίνεσθαι πληθὸς πολεμικόν.

The reading of Bekker, καὶ ἡν, which is wanting in the best MSS. and is omitted by Bernays, may have arisen out of the termination of πέθηκεν. If they are retained the meaning will be 'in which there is likewise a single' or 'compact body, defined by their all carrying arms' (ii. 6. § 16, etc.) as other forms of government by virtue, wealth, etc.

κατ' νόμον τὲν κατ' ἡξίαν διανεμόντα τοῖς εἰπόροις τῶν ἡρχάς.

The citizens of a polity are here called εἰποροι, 'respectable' or 'upper class,' though a comparatively low qualification is required of them (iv. 3. § 1; 9. § 3). They are 'the hoplites' (ii. 6. § 16) who are also elsewhere called εἰποροι (vi. 7. § 1). τοῖς εἰπόροις is found in the better MSS.: *al.* ἡπόροις.

οἱ μόνον . . . ἡλλ' κατ' τὴ πρότερον λεχθέν.

‘He has a right to rule not only on the general ground which is put forward by all governments, but also upon the principle which we maintain, that he is superior in virtue.’

ῥχεσθαι κατ᾽ μέρος· οἱ γὰρ πέφυκε τῷ μέρος ῥπερέχειν τον᾽ παντός, τῷ δ᾽
τηλικαύτην ῥπερβολῶν ῥχοντι τον᾽το συμβέβηκεν.

‘This miraculous being cannot be asked to be a subject in turn or in part, for he is a whole, and the whole cannot be ruled by the part.’ The double meaning of μέρος is lost in English. The idealization of the whole or the identification of the perfect man with a whole of virtue is strange. Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2. τον᾽το = τῷ εἶναι παῖν.

ῥχεσθαι δυναμένων.

Bekker’s insertion of κατ᾽ ῥχειν after ῥχεσθαι (ed. sec.) is unnecessary. The idea is already implied in the previous words. Under any of the three forms of government, the virtue of obedience is required in some, of command in others.

ῥν δ᾽ τοῖς πρώτοις ῥδείχθη λόγοις ῥτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ῥναγκαῖον ῥνδρῶς ῥρετῶν εἶναι
κατ᾽ πολίτου τηῶς πόλεως τηῶς ῥρίστης.

The views of Aristotle respecting the relation of the good citizen to the good man may be drawn out as follows:—

- 1) The good citizen is not the same with the good man in an ordinary state, because his virtue is relative to the constitution (c. 4. § 3).
- 2) But in the perfect state he is the same: and this appears to be upon the whole the principal conclusion (c. 18. § 1, and iv. 7. § 2).
- 3) Yet even in the perfect state the citizens cannot all conform to a single type of perfection; for they have special duties to perform and special virtues by which they perform them (c. 4. §§ 5, 6).
- 4) It is therefore the good ruler who is really to be identified with the good man (§ 7; also i. 13. § 8, where the subject is introduced for the first time).
- 5) And still a ‘grain of a scruple may be made’; for if the good ruler be merely a ruler, the private citizen who knows both how to rule and how to obey will have more complete virtue.
- 6) And therefore in the perfect state the citizens should rule and be ruled by turns (§ 11), cp. vii. c. 9.

This seems to be the result of many scattered and rather indistinct observations made from different points of view and not arranged in a clear logical order.

ῥνάγκη δ᾽ τῶν μέλλοντα περ᾽ ἀγαθῶς ποιήσασθαι τῶν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν.

These words are removed from the end of this book by Bekker, who in his Second Edition adopts the altered arrangement of the books. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle's Writings.

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BOOK IV.

The statesman has four problems to consider,

- 1) What is the best or ideal state?
- 2) What state is best suited to a particular people?
- 3) How any given state, even though inferior to what it might be, may be created or preserved?
- 4) What is the best state for average men?

1) is the best possible; 2) the best relatively to circumstances; 3) neither the best possible nor the best under the circumstances, but any constitution in which men are willing to acquiesce, even though ill-provided and ill-administered—such are to be found in the world and must therefore enter into the consideration of the statesman; 4) the best for mankind in general.

ταύτην ἴστω τὴν δύναμιν.

The MSS. vary between ἴτω and ἴστω: ἴτω has rather the greater MSS. authority, but ἴστω is required for the construction, and the recurrence of ἴτω which was the first word of the sentence at the end of it is displeasing.

ἄχρηστον τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων.

Explained in the text, with Susemihl, *‘not possessing the outward means necessary for the best state,’ but the words ‘for the best state,’ are not found in the Greek. Better ‘not possessing the common necessities or simple requisites of life,’ a hard but not impossible condition, e.g. in a remote colony. Cp. c. 11. § 21, πολλάκις ὁμοίως ἄλλης πολιτείας ἀρετωτέρας ἰσθὶν κωλύσει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μάλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν, which is similar but not the same with this passage. For ἀχρηστον, cp. κερηρημένον in § 1, and δεομένην πολλῆς χρηστίας in § 6.

τὴν ὑπαρχούσας ἴσθωντες πολιτείας τὴν Λακωνικὴν . . . ἴσθωνσιν.

Although the language is inaccurate (for the Lacedaemonian is an ‘existing’ constitution), the meaning is plain. ‘They put aside their own constitution and praise the Lacedaemonian or some other.’

ἄλλο δὲ τοιαύτην ἐπισημασθαι τάξιν ἢ ἰδίως ἢ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ἢ ἴσθων οὐκ ἄλλοττον ἔργον τὴν ἴσθωνσιν πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἴσθων, ἢ ἴσθων καὶ τὴν μεταμανθάνειν τὴν ἴσθων ἢ ἴσθων.

‘The legislator should introduce an order of government into which the citizens will readily fall, and in which they will be able to co-operate; for the reformation of a state is as difficult as the original establishment of one and cannot be effected by the legislator alone, or without the assistance of the people.’

ἢ κ τῶν ἢ παρχουσῶν (sc. πολιτειῶν) may be taken either with τάξιν or with κοινῶνεσσιν, either we ought to introduce 1) ‘from among existing constitutions’; or 2) ‘in passing out of existing constitutions that form,’ &c.; cp. in next sentence ταῖς παρχούσαις πολιτείαις βοηθεσσιν.

κοινῶνεσσιν is the reading of the majority of MSS. Some have κινεσσιν. The emendation κινεσσιν [Susemihl], taken from ‘consequi’ in the old Latin translation, is an unnecessary conjecture; nor does the word occur commonly, if at all, in Aristotle; καινονῶν is open to the objection of introducing a special when a general word is required. But no change is really needed.

ἢς ἔστιν ὁ κ λαττον ἔργον κ.τ.λ. The connexion of these words is difficult: Aristotle seems to mean that the legislator should select a constitution suited to the wants of the people: for however good in itself, if unsuited to them, they will not work it, and he will have as great or greater difficulty in adapting it than he would originally have had in making one for which they were fitted.

Διὰ πρῶς τοῖς ἐρημένοις καὶ ταῖς παρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεσσιν.

We may paraphrase as follows: Therefore, i. e. because it is difficult to introduce anything new in addition to what has been said [about the highest and other forms of government by the unsatisfactory political writers mentioned in § 5], we ought also to be able to maintain existing constitutions, [which they would get rid of].

καθάπερ ἠλέχθη καὶ πρότερον.

There is nothing in what has preceded, which precisely answers to this formal reference. § 4 may perhaps be meant.

ἢν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν ὄνται τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ἡλιγαρχίαν.

This is true of Plato, who is probably intended under this general form. For the anonymous reference to him cp. i. 1. § 2, ἢσοι μὲν ὄνται κ.τ.λ., and c. 2. § 3 infra.

συντίθενται ποσαχῶς.

That is to say, either 1) the different ways in which the judicial and other elements of states are combined; or 2) the different ways in which the spirit of one constitution may be tempered by that of another: for the latter cp. infra c. 5. §§ 3, 4; c. 9. §§ 4-9.

καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἡκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἔστιν.

‘And what is the end of each individual form of society?’ i. e. whether or not the good of the governed (cp. iii. c. 6).

ἡκάστης, with the article following, is emphatic.

κοινωνία is the state under a more general aspect.

νόμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τῶν πολιτείαν.

Either 1)* the words τῶν δηλούντων are governed by κεχωρισμένοι, ‘are separated from those things which show the nature of the constitution’; i. e. they are rules of administration and may be the same under different constitutions; but see infra § 11. Or 2), the genitive is partitive: ‘Laws are distinct and belong to that class of things which show the nature of the constitution.’

τῶν διαφορῶν ἡναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν ἡριθμῶν ἡχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἡκάστης καὶ πρὸς τῶν νόμων θέσεις.

Either 1), ‘we must know the differences of states (sc. πολιτειῶν) and the number of differences in each state, with a view to legislation; or 2)*, referring τῆς πολιτείας ἡκάστης only to διαφορᾶς, and supplying πολιτειῶν with ἡριθμόν, ‘the difference of each state and the number of states;’ or 3), τῶν ἡριθμῶν means ‘the order of classification’ (Susemihl; cp. iii. 1. § 9, where the defective (corrupt) states are said to be ‘posterior’ to the good states). This gives a good sense, but is with difficulty elicited from the words.

ἢν τῆς πρώτης μεθόδου.

Cp. infra c. 8. § 1, where the words ἢν τοῦ κατ’ ἡρχῶν refer to iii. c. 7. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle’s Writings.

περὶ μὲν ἡριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἰρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἡρίστης πολιτείας θεωρησᾶν ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τούτων ἡστῶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἡνομάτων).

He seems to mean that in discussing the ideal state he has already discussed Aristocracy and Royalty. But the discussion on the ideal state has either been lost, or was never written, unless, as some think, it is the account of the state preserved in Book vii.

Other allusions to the same discussion occur in what follows: c. 3. § 4, ἡτι πρὸς ταῦτα κατ’ ἡπλοῦτον διαφορᾶς ἡστῶν ἢ μὲν κατ’ ἡγένος ἢ δὲ κατ’ ἡρετήν, κῶν εἴ τι δὲ τοιονῶτον ἡτερον εἰρηται πόλεως εἰῶναι μέρος ἢν τοῦ περὶ τῶν ἡριστοκρατίαν, a passage which is supposed to refer to vii. i. e. iv. c. 8 and 9, by those who change the order of the books (Susemihl, &c.). But in this latter passage the allusion to the perfect state is very slight, and the point of view appears to be different; for no hint is given that it is to be identified with royalty or aristocracy. Whether the words of the text have a reference, as Schlosser supposes, to the end of Book iii. c. 14-18, where Aristotle discusses the relation of the one best man to the many good, is equally doubtful. A reference to the discussion of aristocracy in some former part of the work

also occurs *infra* c. 7. § 2, ῥιστοκρατίαν μὲν οὐκ ἄλλωδὲ ῥχει καλεῖται περὶ ῥδς δὴλθομεν ῥν τοῦδς πρῶτοις λόγοις.

βούλεται γῥρ ῥκατέρα κατ' ῥρετῥν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην.

‘For royalty and aristocracy, like the best state, rest on a principle of virtue, provided with external means.’

πότε δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν.

Not ‘when we are to consider a constitution to be a royalty,’ for there is no question about this, but νομίζειν is taken in the other sense of ‘having,’ ‘using,’ ‘having as an institution,’ like *utor* in Latin. For this use of the word *cp.* νομίζειν ῥκκλησίαν, iii. 1. § 10; and for the matter *cp.* iii. 17. §§ 4-8.

τῥν δῥ βασιλείαν ῥναγκαῖον ῥ τοῦνομα μόνον ῥχειν οῦκ οὐκ ὄσαν, ῥ διῥ πολλῥν ῥπεροχῥν εῖναι τῥν τονῥ βασιλεύοντος, ῥστε τῥν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὐκ ὄσαν πλεῖστον ῥπέχειν πολιτείας, δεῦτερον δῥ τῥν ῥλιγαρχίαν (ῥ γῥρ ῥριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ῥπῥ ταύτης πολῥ τηῥς πολιτείας).

Royalty and tyranny both depend upon the individual will of the king or tyrant: hence it is argued that if royalty is the best, tyranny must be the worst of governments, because one is the preeminence of good, the other of evil. Aristotle, who is overmastered by the idea of opposites, naturally infers that the very worst must be the opposite of the very best.

πολιτείας. We might expect ἀτήδς, or τηῥς ῥρίστης to be added; but Aristotle substitutes the more general πολιτεία here, as elsewhere, used in a good sense. Compare *infra* c. 8. § 2, τελευταῖον δῥ περὶ τυραννίδος εῖλογόν ῥστι ποιήσασθαι μνείαν διῥ τῥ πασωῦν ῥκιστα ταύτην εῖναι πολιτείαν, ῥμῥν δῥ τῥν μέθοδον εῖναι περὶ πολιτείας: also for the general meaning, *Plat. Polit.* 301 D, *Rep.* ix. 576 D, etc.

In the phrase ταύτης τηῥς πολιτείας the word refers to ῥλιγαρχίαν.

ῥδη μὲν οὐκ ἄλλωδὲ τις ῥπερήγατο καῥ τῶν πρότερον οῦτως.

The difference between Plato (*Polit.* 303) and Aristotle, which is dwelt upon so emphatically, is only verbal: the latter objecting to call that good in any sense, which may also be evil, a somewhat pedantic use of language, which is not uniformly maintained by Aristotle himself. *Cp.* vi. 4. § 1, δημοκρατιῶν οῦσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη ῥ πρώτη τάξει.

καῥ τῶν πρότερον is a strange form of citation from Plato which would seem more appropriate to a later generation than to Aristotle. See *Essay on the Criticism of Plato in Aristotle.*

The programme corresponds fairly, but not very accurately, with the subjects which follow. At chap. 14, before discussing the causes of ruin and preservation in states, having analysed in general outline the various types of oligarchy, democracy, polity,

tyranny, Aristotle introduces a discussion respecting the powers and offices which exist in a single state: but of this new beginning which interrupts the sequence of his plan he says nothing here.

The diversity of governments has been already discussed, but not in detail, in bk. iii. c. 6-8.

ἵτις πρὸς ταύτας κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοράς ἵστῶν ἢ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἢ δὲ κατὰ ἡμετέραν, κῶν ἐπὶ τὴν δὲ τοιοντόν ἵτερον ἐρηται πόλεως ἐῶναι μέρος ἵν τὸς περὶ τῶν ἵριστοκρατίαν.

The parts of the state are spoken of in vii. 8. § 7. The opening sentence of book vii. itself also professes to speak of aristocracy. But the writer goes on to treat rather of the ἵποθέσεις or material conditions of the best state, than of the best state itself. These references are vague; if they were really the passages here cited, we should have to suppose that the seventh book preceded the fourth. But they are not precise enough to be adduced as an argument in favour of the changed order.

καὶ ἵρ ταντῶν ἐῶδει διαῶρει τῶ μέρη σῶων ἀῶων.

‘As the parts of states differ from one another (σῶων ἀῶων), so must states differ from one another.’ Compare the curious comparison *infra* c. 4. §§ 8, 9.

πολιτεία μὲν ἵρ τῶν ἵρχων τάξις ἵστί, ταύτην δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἵ κατὰ τῶν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἵ κατά τινῶ ἀῶων ἵσότητα κοινήν, λέγω δὲ ἵον τῶν ἵπόρων τῶν ἐπόρων, ἵ κοινήν τινῶ μῶον.

The last words, κοινήν τινῶ μῶον, which are obscure and do not cohere very well with δύναμιν, are bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. But there is no reason for doubting their genuineness. Aristotle means to say that governments subsist according to the powers of those who share in them; or according to equality, whether that equality be an equality of the rich among themselves, or of the poor among themselves, or an equality of proportion which embraces both rich and poor: cp. *infra* c. 4. § 2. The words ἵον τῶν ἵπόρων τῶν ἐπόρων may be an explanation of κατὰ τῶν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων, which comes in out of place, and ἵ κοινήν τινῶ μῶον, as in the English text, may be an explanation of ἵσότητα κοινήν.

κατά τινῶ ἀῶων ἵσότητα κοινήν, ‘More power may be given to the poor as being the more numerous class, or to the rich as being the more wealthy; or power may be given upon some principle of compensation which includes both;’ as e. g. in a constitutional government. In this way of explaining the passage the difficulty in the words ἵ κοινήν τινῶ μῶον, which has led Bekker to bracket them, is avoided.

For the winds compare *Meteorologica* ii. 4, 361 a. 4 ff., a passage in which Aristotle argues that north and south are the chief winds because wind is produced by evaporation and the evaporation is caused by the movement of the sun to the north or south. Also for the two principal forms of government cp. Plato’s *Laws* iii. 693 C: according to Plato they are democracy and monarchy.

ἡλιθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ἢ ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, δύο τῶν ἑμῶν οὐκ ἴσως τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τῆς ἡλλας ἐπιναί παρεκβάσεις, τῆς μὲν τῆς ἐν τῇ κεκραμένης ἡρμονίας, τῆς δὲ τῆς ἡρίστης πολιτείας.

Aristotle having compared the different forms of states with the different sorts of harmonies, now blends the two in one sentence, and corrects the opinion previously expressed by him: ‘There are not two opposite kinds of harmonies and states, but one or at the most two, δύο τῶν ἑμῶν (the two states are royalty and aristocracy), which are not opposed but of which all the rest are perversions.’ From this transcendental point of view polity or constitutional government itself becomes a perversion; but in c. 8. § 1 it is said not to be a perversion, though sometimes reckoned in that class.

ἡσπερ τῶν Ἀθιοπίων ἡσί τινες.

According to Herod. iii. 20, the Ethiopians are the tallest and most beautiful of mankind: and they elect the tallest and strongest of themselves to be their kings.

ἡλλ’ ἡπερ πλείονα μόρια καὶ τῶν δῆμου καὶ τῆς ἡλιγαρχίας ἐστίν κ.τ.λ.

It is argued that neither freedom alone, nor numbers alone are a sufficient note of democracy, nor fewness of rulers, nor wealth of oligarchy: neither a few freemen, as at Apollonia, nor many rich men, as at Colophon, constitute a democracy. But there must be many poor in a democracy and few rich in an oligarchy. A slight obscurity in the passage arises from the illustrations referring only to democracy and not to oligarchy. Cp. iii. cc. 7, 8; infra c. 8. § 7.

Aristotle would not approve a classification of states such as that of Sir G. C. Lewis and the school of Austin, who define the sovereign power according to the number of persons who exercise it (cp. G. C. Lewis’ ‘Political Terms,’ Edit. 1877, p. 50). An opposite view is held by Maine, who argues truly ‘that there is more in actual sovereignty than force’ (Early Institutions, p. 358 ff.). Aristotle insists that the character of a government depends more on the *quality* than on the *quantity* of the sovereign power.

τῶν πόλεμον τῶν πρὸς Λυδούς.

Possibly the war with Gyges mentioned in Herod. i. 14. The Colophonians like the other Ionians (Herod. i. 142) appear to have been the subjects of Croesus at the time of his overthrow. A testimony to their wealth and luxury is furnished by Xenophanes apud Athenaeum xii. c. 31. 526 C, who says that a thousand citizens arrayed in purple robes would meet in the agora of Colophon.

ἡτι μὲν οὐκ ἡν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ δι’ ἡν ἀτίαν, ἐρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν ἐρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ δι’ τί, λέγωμεν ἡρχῶν λαβόντες τῶν ἐρημένην πρότερον ἡμολογονῶμεν ἡρ οἡ τῶν μέρος ἡλλ’ πλείω παῖσαν ἡχειν πόλιν.

It is remarkable that Aristotle should revert to the parts of states which he professes to have already determined when speaking of aristocracy (cp. c. 3. § 4). His reason for

returning to them is that he is going to make a new sub-division of states based upon the differences of their parts or members.

πλείους τῶν ἐρημένων. As he says, *infra* § 20, ἴτι μὲν ὄντων ἐστὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους καὶ δι᾽ τίνων ἀτίας ἐρηται πρότερον· ἴτι δὲ ἴστὶ καὶ δημοκρατίας ἐδη πλείω καὶ ἴλιγαρχίας λέγωμεν. Compare Book vii. 8. § 9.

The illustration from animals may be worked out as follows. Suppose the different kinds of teeth were *a*, *a'*, *a''*, *a'''*, etc., the different kinds of claws, feet, etc. were *b*, *b'*, *b''*, *b'''*, *c*, *c'*, *c''*, *c'''*, and so on with the other organs which are important in determining the character of an animal. Then, according to Aristotle, the different combinations of these will give the different species. Thus:—

a', *b*, *c''*, will be one species,
a, *b'*, *c''*, another and so on.

So with constitutions:—

If we combine γεωργοί, having some political power and coming occasionally to the assembly, with disfranchised βάνουσοι, and a politically active wealthy class, the result will be an oligarchy or very moderate democracy: or if we combine politically active γεωργοί, βάνουσοι, θηῆτες with a feeble or declining oligarchy, the result will be an extreme democracy: and so on.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the illustration taken from the animals is the reverse of the fact. The differences in animals are not made by the combination of different types, but by the adaptation of one type to different circumstances. Nor is there in the constitution of states any such infinite variety of combinations as the illustration from the animals would lead us to suppose; (one kind of husbandmen with another of serfs and so on). Nor does Aristotle attempt to follow out in detail the idea which this image suggests.

The eight or more classes cannot be clearly discriminated. The sixth class is wanting, but seems to be represented by the judicial and deliberative classes in § 14, yet both reappear as a ninth class in § 17. Aristotle is arguing that Plato's enumeration of the elements of a state is imperfect—there must be soldiers to protect the citizens, there must be judges to decide their disputes, there must be statesmen to guide them (although it is possible that the same persons may belong to more than one class). 'Then at any rate there must be soldiers' (§ 15). This rather lame conclusion seems to be only a repetition of a part of the premisses. At this point the writer loses the thread of his discourse and, omitting the sixth, passes on from the fifth class τῶν προπολεμησῶν in § 10 to a seventh class of rich men (§ 15), and to an eighth class of magistrates (§ 16). A somewhat different enumeration of the classes, consisting in all of six, is made in vii. 8. §§ 7-9.

διόπερ ὄντων Πολιτεῖς κ.τ.λ.

The criticism of Aristotle on Plato (*Rep.* ii. 369) in this passage, to use an expression of his own, is παιδαριώδης λίαν. Plato, who was a poet as well as a philosopher, in a

fanciful manner builds up the state; Aristotle, taking the pleasant fiction literally and detaching a few words from their context, accuses Plato of making necessity, and not the good, the first principle of the state, as if the entire aim of the work were not the search after justice. There is also an ambiguity in the word *ἀναγκαία* of which Aristotle here takes advantage. Plato means by the *ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις*, 'the barest idea of a state' or 'the state in its lowest terms.' But when Aristotle says judges are 'more necessary' than the providers of the means of life, he means 'contribute more to the end or highest realization of the state.' The remarks on Plato are worthless, yet they afford a curious example of the weakness of ancient criticism, arising, as in many other places, from want of imagination. But apart from the criticism the distinction here drawn between the higher and lower parts, the 'soul' and 'body' of the state, is important. Cp. vii. 9. § 10, where Aristotle introduces a similar distinction between the *μέρη* of the *πόλις* and the *mere* conditions (*ὡς ἂν οἴκ ἕνευ*) of it. 'Husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and counsellors.'

ἢ τῆς Πολιτείας?

Here evidently the title of the book.

ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.

Equally with τῆς καλόν.

ἢ περὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον.

ἢ περὶ grammatically refers to τῆς βουλευέσθαι, suggested by τῆς βουλευόμενον.

ἢ ὅτι ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰν ἄλλα καὶ ἡκεῖνα.

τὰν ἄλλα = τῆς περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, gathered from τῆς τοιανῶτα in § 14.

ἡκεῖνα = τῆς ἐξ τῆς ἀναγκαίαν χρησίν συντείνοντα. If the higher and the lower elements of a state are both necessary parts of it, then the warriors (who may in some cases also be husbandmen) are necessary parts: Aristotle is answering Plato, § 13, who in the first enumeration of the citizens had omitted the warriors.

ταύτην τῆς λειτουργίαν,

sc. τῆς περὶ τῆς ἡράς.

πολλοῖς.

1) 'To many' or 'in many cases' opposed to πάντες in what follows; or 2*) πολλοῖς may be taken with δοκεῖ, the meaning being 'many (differing from Plato) think, etc.'; the appeal is to the common sense which Plato is supposed to contradict.

ἢ ντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἡρετῆς πάντες.

The connexion is as follows:—‘Different qualifications often coexist or are thought to coexist in the same persons; and indeed virtue is a qualification for office to which all men lay claim. But no man can be rich and poor at the same time.’

ἴτι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὲ τίνας ἀτίας, ἐρηται πρότερον is a repetition with a slight verbal alteration (διὲ τίνας ἀτίας for διὲ ἴν ἀτίαν) of the first words of § 7.

ἴκ τῶν ἐρημένων.

I. e. from what has been said respecting differences in the parts of states (supra §§ 7, 8). Yet the curious argument from the parts of animals is an illustration only; the actual differences of states have not been worked out in detail.

κὲν ἐτὶ τοιοντόν ἴτέρου πλήθους ἐῖδος.

Susemihl (note 1199) objects that there are no others and so the freedmen must be meant. But surely in this phrase Aristotle is merely adding a saving clause = ‘and the like.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 7. § 21, τῶν ῥχωῖν ἀ μὲν ἴπαγωγηῖ θεωρονῖνται ἀ δὲ ἀσθήσει ἀ δὲ ἴθισμῖν τινὲ καὶ ἴλλαι δὲ ἴλλως, where the last words only generalize the preceding.

τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων.

Sc. ἐῖδη, here used inaccurately for differences or different kinds of ἐῖδη.

τὲ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὲ τὲν ἀτὲν διαῖοράν.

τούτοις, dative after τὲν ἀτὲν, and refers to πλονῖτος, ἐῖγένεια, κ.τ.λ. Lit. ‘the things which are spoken of according to the same principle of difference with these,’ or ‘similar differences having a relation to these,’ e. g. the habits and occupations of the notables.

τὲ μηδὲν μαῖλλον ἴάρχειν τοῖς ἴπόροις ἴ τοῖς ἐῖπόροις.

If the reading ἴάρχειν is retained, the emphasis is on the words μηδὲν μαῖλλον which must be taken closely with it, ‘that the poor shall be no more’—which is a feeble way of saying, shall have no more power—‘than the rich’; or ‘shall have no priority,’ which gives a rather curious sense to ἴάρχειν. A doubt about the propriety of the expression has led to two changes in the text. 1) ἴπερέχειν (Susemihl) for which there is slight MS. authority, P¹, P⁴; and Aretino’s transl. 2) ἴρχειν an emendation of Victorius adopted by Coraes, Schneider, Stahr, and supposed to be confirmed by a parallel passage in vi. 2. § 9; see note on English Text. 3) The Old Translation ‘nihil magis existere egenis vel divitibus’ seems to favour ἴάρχειν τοῖς ἴπόροις ἴ τοῖς ἐῖπόροις.

δημοκρατίαν ἐῖναι ταύτην.

ταύτην is slightly inaccurate = ‘the state in which this occurs.’

ἄν μὲν οὐκ ἐξ ἑξῆς κ.τ.λ.

Five forms of democracy are reckoned: but the first of these is really a description of democracy in general, not of any particular form. The words in § 24 ἄλλο δὲ seem to have been introduced by mistake. The five forms are thus reduced to four, as in c. 6 the five forms of oligarchy given in c. 5 appear as four.

ἄλλο δὲ ἐξ ἑξῆς δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν πάντας τοὺς πολίτας ἅσοι ἄνυπεύθουνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον. ἄλλο δὲ ἐξ ἑξῆς δημοκρατίας τὸ παῖσι μετεῖναι τῶν ἄρχων, ἄν μόνον ἄν πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον.

The words ἅσοι ἄνυπεύθουνοι agree with τοῖς ἄνυπευθούνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, as the ἄν ἄν πολίτης does with the ἅσοι ἄν ἄλεύθεροι ὡς in the recapitulation of the passage which follows (c. 6. § 4). In both cases all citizens are eligible and the law is supreme: but in the first of the two the rights of citizenship have been scrutinized; in the second, all reputed freemen are admitted to them without enquiry. The latter case may be illustrated by the state of Athenian citizenship before the investigation made by Pericles; the former by the stricter citizenship required after the change. The meaning of the word ἄνυπεύθουνοι is shown by the parallel passage (c. 6. § 3, ἄνυπευθούνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος) to be, 'not proved to be disqualified by birth.'

ἄλλο δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑξῆς πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ τὴν πλείους ὡς οὐκ ἄρχοντες ἢ ἄκαστος, ἄδηλον.

It would be a poetical or historical anachronism to suppose that Homer in the words cited intended one of the senses which Aristotle seems to think possible. The collective action of states as distinguished from that of individuals is the conception, not of a poet, but of a philosopher. No modern reader would imagine that Homer is seeking to enforce any other lesson than the necessity of having one and not many leaders, especially on the field of battle. This anti-popular text is adapted to the argument.

τῶν δὲ καθ' ἄκαστα τῶν ἄρχων κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν κρίνειν.

For use of gen. after κρίνειν cp. Plat. Rep. 576 D, Laws i. 646 D. τὴν πολιτείαν (πολιτεία here = πολίτευμα) is contrasted as 'the collective government' with αἱ ἄρχαί, 'the individual magistrates.' Yet in the context, both preceding and following, the word has the more general meaning of a 'form of government' or 'constitution.'

ἄν μὲν οὐκ ἐκ πάντων τούτων.

τούτων, 'out of all the qualified persons,' all those referred to in the two previous sentences τῶν ἄρχων τμήματα τηλικαντα ἄστε κ.τ.λ. or τῶν ἄρχων μακρὰ τμήματα.

In what follows the *dynastia* is the exclusive hereditary oligarchy, ruling without law.

For the forms of these hereditary oligarchies and the dangers to which they are exposed, cp. v. 6. § 3. We may remark that, though the most common, they are not included in Aristotle's definition of oligarchy (iii. c. 8).

τῶν πρώτων μικρῶν πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ' ἄλλήλων.

Not accurate, for the meaning is, not that the two encroach on one another, but that the dominant party encroaches on the other.

The form of a constitution is here supposed to be at variance with its spirit and practice. Thus England might be said to be a monarchy once aristocratically, now democratically administered; France a republic in which some of the methods of imperialism survive (cp. note on c. 1. § 8); while in Prussia the spirit of absolute monarchy carries on a not unequal contest with representative government.

διὲς παῖσι τοῖς κτωμένοις ἕξεσσι μετέχειν.

Omitted by ii² (i. e. the MSS. of the second family except p⁵) and Aretino's translation, bracketed by Bekker in both editions, is a repetition or pleonasm of the previous thought, though not on that account necessarily to be reckoned spurious. Cp. iii. 1. § 4 and note.

διὲς τῶν ἠχομένην ἀρεσιν.

'The principle of election which follows next in order' (cp. c. 4. § 24, ἕτερον εἶδος). This use of the word ἠχομένη is supported by iii. 11. § 15, ἄλλη δ' ἄστυν (ἠπορία) ἠχομένη ταύτης, and vi. 8. § 4, ἕτερα δ' ἠπιμέλεια ταύτης ἠχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς, and several other passages. The other interpretation of ἠχομένη, given in a note to the English text, 'proper to it' is scarcely defensible by examples and is probably wrong. The first form of democracy required a small property qualification, the second admitted all citizens who could prove their birth. The third admitted reputed citizens without proof of birth; though in both the latter cases the exercise of the right was limited by the opportunities of leisure. For the laxity of states in this matter, cp. iii. 5. §§ 7, 8.

διὲς τῶν μὲν εἶναι πρόσοδον.

The public revenues could not be distributed, for there were none to distribute, cp. infra § 8. The want of pay prevented the people from attending the assembly.

διὲς τῶν ἠπεροχῶν τὸν πλῆθος.

Either 1*) 'on account of the preponderance of their numbers,' or 2) more definitely 'on account of the preponderance of the multitude'; (cp. c. 12. § 1 and iii. 15. § 13). The numbers of the people give the power and the revenues of the state provide pay.

καὶ διὲς τῶν πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τὸν πολιτεύματος ἠνάγκη μὲν τοῖς ἠνθρώπους ἄλλ' τῶν νόμον εἶναι κύριον.

The more numerous the members of the oligarchy, and the greater the difficulty of finding the means of living, the less possibility is there of the government of a few and therefore the greater need of law; cp. *infra* § 9.

μήθ' οἴτως ἄλιγην ὅστε τρέφεσθαι ἴπ[Editor: illegible character] τῆς πόλεως, ἰνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἄξιον ἔν αἰτοῦσιν ἄρχειν.

‘When numerous, and of a middle condition, neither living in careless leisure nor supported by the state, they are driven to maintain in their case (αἰτοῦσιν) the rule of law.’

πλείω δέ,

sc. οἴσιν ἄρχοντες.

τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον.

Sc. they make the law oligarchical.

ἴπ δ' ἰπιτείνωσι.

‘But when they stretch (the oligarchical principle) further.’

ὅπερ Πλάτων ἔν ταῖς πολιτείαις.

Either 1)* in his works on Politics, meaning especially the Republic (as in v. 12. § 7, ἔν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ) and Politicus; or 2) in his treatment of the various forms of government, i.e. in Books viii. and ix. of the Republic. The latter explanation is less idiomatic. Without referring to the Republic or the Politicus, the statement is inaccurate; for if the perfect state be included, the number of constitutions is in the Republic five, in the Politicus (302) seven.

ἄριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ καλεῖται περὶ τῆς διήλομεν ἔν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις: τὸν γὰρ ἄκ τῶν ἄριστων ἄλλως κατ' ἄρετῆν πολιτείαν, καὶ μὲν πρὸς ἰσοθεσίαν τινα ἄγαθὸν ἄνδρῶν, μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἄριστοκρατίαν.

The discussion is apparently the same to which he has already referred in iv. 2. § 1: the particle γὰρ seems to imply that he had in that discussion spoken of aristocracy as the government of the truly good. The passage most nearly corresponding to the allusion is iii. 4. § 4 ff., in which Aristotle treats of the relation of the good ruler to the good man.

καλονῆται ἄριστοκρατία.

According to a strict use of terms aristocracy is only the government of the best; in popular language it is applied to the union of wealth and merit, but is not the same either with oligarchy or with constitutional government.

καὶ γὰρ ἔν ταῦς μὲ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἡπιμέλειαν ἡρετῆς ἐστὶν ἡμῶς τινὲς οἱ ἐδοκιμονῶντες καὶ δοκονῶντες εἶναι ἡπικεῖν.

Cp. Plat. Laws xii. 951: 'There are always in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities.'

οἷον ἐν Καρχηδόνι . . . οἷον ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ.

Elsewhere (ii. 11. § 9) the constitution of Carthage is spoken of as a perversion of aristocracy because combining wealth and virtue; here it is called in a laxer sense an aristocracy because it combines wealth, virtue and numbers. That Sparta with all its secrecy (τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτόν, Thuc. v. 68) might be termed a democracy and, with all its corruption and infamy, had a sort of virtue (τὸ πιστὸν τῆς πολιτείας, Id. i. 68) is the view, not wholly indefensible, of Aristotle, who regards the Spartan constitution under many aspects, cp. ii. 9. §§ 20, 22, and infra c. 9. § 5, but chiefly as consisting of two elements, numbers and virtue.

καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ εἰς ἡρετὴν τε καὶ δῆμον, καὶ ἔστι μῆξις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἡρετῆς.

The want of symmetry in the expression εἰς ἡρετὴν τε καὶ δῆμον, followed by δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἡρετῆς, instead of δήμου τε καὶ ἡρετῆς, probably arises out of a desire to avoid tautology.

ἡριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἡρίστην πολιτείαν τὰντα δύο ἐδη- καὶ τρίτον ἔσαι τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας ἔπουσι πρὸς τὴν ἡλιγαρχίαν μάλλον.

There are three imperfect kinds of aristocracy beside the perfect state (ἡ πρώτη, ἡ ἡρίστη πολιτεία): 1) the governments, such as that of Carthage, in which regard is paid to virtue as well as to numbers and wealth; 2) those in which, as at Sparta, the constitution is based on virtue and numbers; 3) the forms of constitutional government (πολιτεία) which incline to oligarchy, i.e. in which the governing body is small.

ἡτάξαμεν δ' οὕτως οὐκ οὐσαν οὔτε ταύτην παρέκβασιν οὔτε τῆς ἡριθείας ἡριστοκρατίας, ἡτι τὸ μὲν ἡληθῆς παῖσαι διημαρτήκασι τῆς ἡρθοτάτης πολιτείας, ἡπειτα καταριθμονῶνται μετὰ τούτων, ἐσὶ τ' αὐτῶν αὐτῶν παρέκβάσεις, ἡσπερ ἐν τοῦς κατ' ἡρχῶν ἐπομεν.

αὐτῶν refers to τούτων, sc. τῶν παρεκβεβηκυῶν or διημαρτηκυῶν πολιτειῶν, and this to the singular παρέκβασιν.

ἡσπερ ἐν τοῦς κατ' ἡρχῶν ἐπομεν. Sc. iii. 7. § 5.

ἡανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ.

'Now that we understand what democracy and oligarchy are, it is easier to see what the combination of them will be.'

δι? τ? μαλλον ακολουθε??ν παιδείαν κα? ε?γένειαν το??ς ε?πορωτέροις.

Men tend to identify nobility with wealth (cp. infra § 8), not unreasonably, for wealth gives leisure, and in the second generation commonly education. For ε?γένεια, see Rhet. i. 5, 1360 b. 31.

δοκε?? δ' ε??ναι τω?ν ?δυνάτων τ? μ? ε?νομε??σθαι τ?ν ?ριστοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ?λλ? πονηροκρατουμένην.

The words ?λλ? πονηροκρατουμένην (omitted in the translation) are read by all the MSS. (and supported by W. de Moerbeke), and therefore though pleonastic are unlikely to be a gloss. If retained we must 1) supply ε?νομε??σθαι from τ? μ? ε?νομε??σθαι, 'A state cannot be ill governed by good men, or well governed by evil men.' 2) We may alter the order of words by placing μ? before ?ριστοκρατουμένην, instead of before ε?νομε??σθαι (Thurot, Sussem.). Or 3), with Bekker (2nd ed.), we may insert μ? before πονηροκρατουμένην. Or 4) alter πονηροκρατουμένην into πονηροκρατε??σθαι, answering to ε?νομε??σθαι.

δι? μίαν μ?ν ε?νομίαν . . τ? πείθεσθαι το??ς κειμένοις νόμοις.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, where Cleon says, πάντων δ? δεινότατον ε? βέβαιον ?μ??ν μηδ?ν καθεστήξει ω??ν ?ν δόξ? περί, μηδ? γνωσόμεθα ?τι χείροσι νόμοις ?κινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ?στ?ν ? καλω?ς ?χουσιν ?κύριοις.

τον?το δ' ?νδέχεται διχω?ς κ.τ.λ.

Refers back to the words τ? καλω?ς κε??σθαι το?ς νόμους ο??ς ?μμένουσιν, the clause ?στι γ?ρ . . . κειμένοις being a parenthesis.

? γ?ρ το??ς ?ρίστοις κ.τ.λ.

Sc. ?στι πείθεσθαι.

?ν μ?ν ον??ν τα??ς πλείσταις πόλεσι τ? τη?ς πολιτείας ε??δος καλε??ται.

Sc. πολιτεία. Preserving the play of words and supplying πολιτεία with καλε??ται from τη?ς πολιτείας, we may translate, 'in most cities the form of the constitution is called constitutional.' But are there 'many' such governments? Cp. supra c. 7. § 1; infra c. 11. § 19. For the answer to this question see Essay on the μέση πολιτεία, &c.

μόνον γ?ρ ? μ??ξις.

'It is called by a neutral name, e.g. a constitution or commonwealth, for it is a mixture which aims only at uniting the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich; ?λευθερία answering to ?πόρων as πλούτου to ε?πόρων.

As in some other summaries of Aristotle the first division seems to be a general description of those which follow. (Cp. supra note on c. 4. § 24.) We cannot distinguish between 1 and 3, unless in one of them we suppose Aristotle to have in his

mind a syncretism of two general principles of government (see § 6), in the other an eclectic union of elements taken from different governments.

σύμβολον.

Something cut in two and capable of being put together, so that the parts fitted into one another; a die or coin or ring thus divided, which friends used as a token when desirous of renewing hospitality on behalf of themselves or others, and which was also used in buying or selling. See Schol. on Eur. Med. 613, ο? ?πιξενούμενοι, ?στράγαλον κατατέμνοντες, θάτερον μ?ν α?το? κατε??χον μέρος, θάτερον δ? κατελίμπανον το??ς ?ποδεξαμένοις· ?να ε? δέοι πάλιν α?το?ς ? το?ς ?κείνων ?πιξενον?σθαι πρ?ς ?λλήλους, ?παγόμενοι τ? ?μισυ ?στραγάλιον, ?νευον?ντο τ?ν ξενίαν: and cp. Plat. Symp. 191 D, ?νθρώπου ζύμβολον ?τε τετμημένος . . ?ξ ?ν?ς δύο.

? γ?ρ ?μ?ότερα ληπτέον ω??ν ?κάτεροι νομοθετο?σιν κ.τ.λ.

‘For either they must take the legislation of both.’ These words are resumed in ε??ς μ?ν ον??ν ο??τος τον? συνδυασμον? τρόπος and followed by ?τερος δ? instead of repeating ?.

The first case is a union of extremes, the second a mean taken between them; the third seems to be only another example of the first.

?μ?αίνεται γ?ρ ?κάτερον ?ν α?τ?? τω?ν ?κρων.

From the democratical aspect a polity or timocracy has the appearance of an oligarchy or aristocracy; from the oligarchical aspect, of a democracy. Aristotle cites as an example of this many-sidedness the constitution of Lacedaemon, which he himself elsewhere (c. 7. § 4) calls an aristocracy, but which in this passage he acknowledges to have many features both of a democracy and of an oligarchy. Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 7. § 8, ?πιδικάζονται ο? ?κροι τη?ς μέσης χώρας.

το?ς μ?ν γ?ρ γέροντας α?ρον?νται, τη?ς δ? ??ορείας μετέχουσιν.

I.e. ‘The people choose the elders, but are not eligible themselves; and they share in the Ephoralty.’ Whether they elected the Ephors is nowhere expressly said. We are only told that the mode of election was extremely childish (ii. 9. § 23).

?πειδ? κα? ταύτην τίθεμεν τω?ν πολιτειω?ν τι μέρος.

Tyranny is and is not a form of polity, in the sense in which the word ‘polity’ is used by Aristotle. Cp. c. 8. § 2, τελευτα??ον δ? περ? τυραννίδος ε?λογόν ?στι ποιήσασθαι μνειάν δι? τ? πασω?ν ?κιστα ταύτην ε??ναι πολιτείαν, ?μ??ν δ? τ?ν μέθοδον ε??ναι περ? πολιτείας.

περ? μ?ν ον??ν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ?ν το??ς πρώτοις λόγοις, ?ν ο??ς περ? τη?ς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ?ποιούμεθα τ?ν σκέψιν.

Either ‘royalty* commonly so called,’ or ‘the most truly called royalty,’ which would seem to be the *παμβασιλεία*. Cp. iii. c. 16.

τίνα κα? πόθεν δε?? καθιστάναι, κα? πω?ς.

Two slightly different senses are here combined in δε??, 1) ‘what we ought to establish,’ and 2), incorrectly, ‘how or by what means we may or must establish it.’

τυραννίδος δ’ ε?δη δύο μ?ν διείλομεν ?ν ο??ς περ? βασιλείας ?πεσκοπον?μεν.

Sc. iii. 14. §§ 6-10. The two forms of tyranny there mentioned are the hereditary monarchy of barbarians, and the Aesymnetia of ancient Hellas. The barbarian monarchs are here called elected sovereigns, though before spoken of as hereditary (iii. 14. § 6), and contrasted with the elected Aesymnetes of ancient Hellas, with whom they are here compared.

δι? τ? τ?ν δύναμιν ?παλλάττειν πως α?τω?ν κα? πρ?ς τ?ν βασιλείαν.

Not ‘because their powers in a manner change into one another, and pass into royalty;’ for the words ‘change into one another’ would not be a reason why they should be spoken of in connexion with royalty, but ‘because the power of either of these forms of tyranny easily passes likewise into royalty;’ likewise i.e. besides being forms of tyranny. For the use of ?παλλάττειν, cp. vi. 1. § 3, and i. 6. § 3.

τοσαν?τα δι? τ?ς ε?ρημένας α?τίας.

ε?ρημένας, sc. in the previous sentences. ‘There is more than one kind of tyranny, because the tyrant may rule either with or without law, and over voluntary or involuntary subjects.’

Aristotle now proceeds to speak of the best average constitution to which he alluded in c. 1. § 5.

τ?ν μέσον ?ναγκα??ον βίον ε??ναι βέλτιστον, τη?ς ?κάστοις ?νδεχομένης τυχε??ν μεσότητος.

The gen. μεσότητος is a resumption of μέσον, and depends on βίον. Here, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 7, the mean is admitted to be relative.

ταν?τα δ’ ?μ?ότερα βλαβερ? τα??ς πόλεσιν.

?μ?ότερα, sc. either 1) *‘their rogueries and their unwillingness to perform public duties, whether military or civil,’ or 2) simply ‘their dislike both of civil and military duties.’ It is possible also that ταν?τα ?μ?ότερα may refer to the μεγαλοπόνηροι and μικροπόνηροι, in which case the words ?τι . . . ?ρχουσι are either inserted or misplaced.

The ?ύλαρχοι at Athens were the cavalry officers under the ?ππαρχοι. See Liddell and Scott. The term is also sometimes used to denote civil magistrates, as in v. 1. § 11 to

describe the oligarchical rulers of Epidamnus. βουλαρχεῖν literally = ‘to be a chief of the senate.’ The word very rarely occurs, and can here only have a generalized meaning. William de Moerbeke, apparently finding in some Greek MS. ἡλαρχονῶσι, translates by an obvious mistake, ‘minime amant principes et volunt esse principes.’ For the association of political inactivity with the idea of crime, cp. Solon’s law forbidding neutrality in a sedition (Plut. Solon 20), τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἀτονῶ νόμων ἴδιος μὲν μάλιστα καὶ παράδοξος ἡ κελεύων ἴτιμον εἶναι τὴν ἑν στάσει μηδετέρας μερίδος γενόμενον: and Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40, μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οἷα ἡπράγμονα ἄλλ’ ἡχρεῖον νομίζομεν.

οὐ δὲ καθ’ ἡπερβολὴν ἢ ἡνδραίῳ τούτων ταπεινοῦ λίαν.

τούτων, sc. τῶν ἐπιτυχημάτων κ.τ.λ. supra.

ἡρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμίᾳ ἡρχῆῳ.

Dative of the manner; ‘to be ruled in any fashion.’

ἡστ’ ἡναγκαῖον ἡριστα πολιτεῦσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἡστὴν ἡξ ὡς ἡ ἀμὲν ἡύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.

‘So that a city having [like and equal] citizens, who in our view are the natural components of it, will of necessity be best administered.’ ταύτην, sc. τὴν ἡξ ἡσων καὶ ἡμοίων . . . ἡξ ὡς κ.τ.λ.

πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἡριστα.

‘Many things are best to those who are in the mean;’ or as we might say in modern phraseology, ‘The middle class have many advantages.’ Cp. Eur. Suppl. 238-245:—

τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οὐ μὲν ἡλβιοὶ
ἡνωῖελεῖς τε πλειόνων τ’ ἡρωσ’ ἡεῖ·
οὐ δ’ οἷα ἡχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες βίου,
δεινοί, νέμοντες τῶ ἡθόνῳ πλεῖον μέρος,
εἰς τοῖς ἡχοντας κέντρ’ ἡἡασιν κακά,
ἡλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν ἡηλούμενοι·
τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ ἡν μέσῳ σώζει πόλεις,
κόσμον ἡυλάσσουσ’ ἡντιν’ ἡν τάξῃ πόλις.

(Quoted by Oncken, ii. 225, note 1.)

Σόλων τε γὰρ ἡἡν τούτων (δηλοῖ δ’ ἡκ τῆς ποιήσεως).

The passage referred to may be that quoted by Plutarch v. Solonis, c. 3,

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτεῖσι κακοί, ἡγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται,
ἡλλ’ ἡμεῖς ἀτοῖς οὐ διαμειψόμεθα
τῆς ἡρετῆς τὴν πλονῶτον.

In classing Solon with the middle rank Aristotle appears to be thinking only of the tradition of his poverty and of the moderation inculcated in his poems. He has ignored or forgotten the tradition of his descent from Codrus.

ο? γ?ρ ??ν βασιλεύς.

The feebleness of the argument is striking; because Lycurgus, who was the guardian and is said also to have been the uncle of the king, was not a king, he is here assumed to be of the middle class! Cp. Plut. Cleom. 10, perhaps following this passage, νν?ν δ? τη?ς ?νάγκης ?χειν συγγνώμονα τ?ν Λυκον?ργον, ?ς ο?τε βασιλε?ς ?ν, ο?τ' ?ρχων, ?διώτης δ? βασιλεύειν ?πιχειρῶν ?ν το??ς ?πλοιοις προη?λθεν ε?ς ?γοράν· ?στε δείσαντα τ?ν βασιλέα Χαρίλαον ?π? βῶμ?ν κατα?υγε??ν. Yet Plutarch is inconsistent with himself; for he also says (Lyc. 3) that Lycurgus reigned for eight months, and resigned the royal office when the infant Charilaus was born.

?τι δ? κα? τῶν ?ν ?γεμονί? γενομένων τη?ς ?λλάδος πρ?ς τ?ν παρ' α?το??ς ?κάτεροι πολιτείαν ?ποβλέποντες ο? μ?ν δημοκρατίας ?ν τα??ς πόλεσι καθίστασαν, ο? δ' ?λιγαρχίας, ο? πρ?ς τ? τῶν πόλεων συμ?έρον σκοπον?ντες ?λλ? πρ?ς τ? σ?έτερον α?τῶν. ?στε δι? ταύτας τ?ς α?τίας ? μηδέποτε τ?ν μέσην γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ? ?λιγάκις κα? παρ' ?λίγοις.

Cp. Thuc. i. 19, 76, 99, 144, iii. 82 and elsewhere.

τῶν ?ν ?γεμονί? γενομένων. Either of the leading states, opposed to ?ν τα??ς πόλεσι the states of Hellas generally.

ε??ς γ?ρ ?ν?ρ συνεπίσθη μόνος τῶν πρότερον [??' ?γεμονί? γενομένων] ταύτην ?ποδον?ναι τ?ν τάξιν.

The variety of opinions entertained by commentators respecting the person here alluded to, who has been supposed to be Lycurgus (Zeller), Theopompus (Sepulveda), Solon (Schlosser), Pittacus (Goettling), Phaleas (St. Hilaire), Gelo (Camerarius), the king Pausanias II (Congreve), Epaminondas (Eaton), Alexander the Great (Zeller formerly), seems to prove that we know nothing for certain about him. Of the various claimants Solon is the most probable. He is regarded by Aristotle (ii. 12. §§ 1-6) as a sort of conservative democrat, the founder of a balanced polity, whom he contrasts with Pericles and the later Athenian demagogues (cp. Solon Frag. 5, δῆμ? μ?ν γ?ρ ?δῶκα τόσον κράτος ?σσον ?παρκε??). The omission of the name, and the words τῶν πρότερον, tend to show that a well known and traditional legislator is meant. Yet it might be argued also that the phrase τῶν ??' ?γεμονί? γενομένων seems to describe some one holding the position of Lysander or Philip of Macedon in Hellas, rather than the legislator of any single city.

If 'one man' only gave this form of constitution to Hellas it must have been rare indeed or rather imaginary, cp. supra c. 7. § 1, δι? τ? μ? πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει. But how is this to be reconciled with c. 8. § 8?

?? ?γεμονί? γενομένων, 'the leading men.' For ?? cp. ο? ?? το??ς πράγμασιν.
(Dem.) But are not the words a copyist's repetition of τω?ν ?ν ?γεμονί? γενομένων
above?

ταύτην ?ποδον?ναι τ?ν τάξιν. Not necessarily 'to restore' or 'give back' but more
simply 'to give what is suitable, assign,' like [ο? ε?κονογρά?οι] ?ποδιδόντες τ?ν ?δίαν
μορ?ήν, Poet. 15, 1454 b. 10.

τίς μ?ν ον??ν ?ρίστη πολιτεία, κα? δι? τίν' α?τίαν.

Here, as limited in § 1, ?ρίστη τα??ς πλείσταις πόλεσι.

δι? τίν' α?τίαν, i. e. the moderation and stability of the state. Cp. v. 1. § 16 where it is
implied that the safety of democracy is due to its approximation to the μέση πολιτεία.

λέγω δ? τ? πρ?ς ?πόθεσιν, ?τι πολλάκις ο?σης ?λλης πολιτείας α?ρετωτέρας ?νίοις
ο?θ?ν κωλύσει συμ?έρειν ?τέραν μα?λλον ε??ναι πολιτείαν.

'It may often happen that some constitution may be preferable [in itself] and some
other better suited to the peculiar circumstances of some state.'

πρ?ς ?πόθεσιν here (as in c. 1. § 4) means any supposed or given constitution, which
may not be the best possible under the circumstances, but is the one to be preferred, in
some states of society.

?νδέχεται δ? τ? μ?ν ποι?ν ?πάρχειν ?τέρ? μέρει της πόλεως, ?ξ ω??ν συνέστηκε
μερω?ν ? πόλις.

'Namely to one of those parts which make up the state'; the clause ?ξ ω??ν κ.τ.λ. is
explanatory of ?τέρ? μέρει = ?τέρ? τω?ν μερω?ν.

?που ?περέχει τ? τω?ν ?πόρων πλη?θος τ?ν ε?ρημένην ?ναλογίαν.

'When the poor exceed in number the [due] proportion implied in the last words.'

κα? της ?λιγαρχίας τ?ν α?τ?ν τρόπον ?καστον ε??δος κατ? τ?ν ?περοχ?ν τον?
?λιγαρχικον? πλήθους.

'And in like manner (not only oligarchy in general, but) each sort of oligarchy varies
according to the predominance of each sort of oligarchical population (sc. ? ?πάρχει
α?τη??).

πανταχον? δ? πιστότατος ? διαιτητής, διαιτητ?ς δ' ? μέσος.

The middle class are the arbiters between the extremes of oligarchy and democracy.
When Aristotle calls the arbiter [Editor: illegible character] μέσος, this is probably
meant in the same sense in which δικαιοσύνη is said to be a mean because it fixes a
mean. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 17, ? δ? δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ?στ?ν ο? τ?ν α?τ?ν τρόπον
τα??ς πρότερον ?ρετα??ς, ?λλ' ?τι μέσου ?στίν, and v. 4. § 7, Δι? κα? ?ταν

ἢ μισθωτοῖσιν, ἢ πῶς τὸν δικαστὴν καταεύχουσιν· τὸ δ' ἢ πῶς τὸν δικαστὴν εἶναι εἶναι
ἔστιν ἢ πῶς τὸ δίκαιον· ἢ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι ὁ ἴσον δίκαιον ἢ μισθωτῶν· καὶ
ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἄντιοι μεσιδίους, ἢς, ἢ τὸν μέσου τύχῳσι,
τὸν δίκαιον τευξόμενοι.

ἢνάγκη γὰρ χρόνῳ ποτὶ ἢκ τῶν ψευδῶν ἢγαθῶν ἢληθῶς συμβῆναι κακόν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ
πλεονεξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἢπολλύουσι μάλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αὐτὸν δῆμον.

Aristotle gives no reason for this statement. He may have thought that the designs of an oligarchy are more deeply laid and corrupting, while the fickleness of the multitude is in some degree a corrective to itself. The oligarchies of Hellas were certainly worse than the democracies: the greatest dishonesty of which the Athenians were guilty in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 23) is far less hateful than the perfidy of the Spartans narrated Id. iv. 80. The cruelty of the four hundred or of the thirty tyrants strikingly contrasts on both occasions with the moderation of the democracy which overthrew them.

It is a curious question, which we have not the means of answering, whether all these artifices (σοφίσματα) are historical facts or only inventions of Aristotle, by which he imagines that the democracy or oligarchy might weaken the opposite party. Some of them, such as the pay to the people, we know to have been used at Athens: but there is no historical proof, except what may be gathered from this passage, that the richer members of an oligarchical community were ever compelled under a penalty to take part in the assembly, or in the law courts. Cp. infra p. 178 note: also c. 15. § 14-18.

τοῦτο μὲν μεγάλην, τοῦτο δὲ μικράν, ἢσπερ ἢν τοῦτο Χαρόνδου νόμοις.

Yet the penalty must have been relatively as well as absolutely greater or smaller, or the rich would have had no more reason for going than the poor for abstaining. The meaning is not that Charondas inflicted a larger fine on the rich and a proportionally small one on the poor for absence from the assembly; but generally that he adapted his fines to the circumstances of offenders.

ἢθέλουσι γὰρ ὁ πένητες καὶ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν ἢσυχίαν ἢχειν, ἢν μὴ ἢβρίζῃ
τις αὐτοῦ μήτε ἢαιρητῆται μὴθὲν τῆς ὁσίας.

The connexion is as follows: 'The qualification must be such as will place the government in the hands of a majority [and then there will be no danger]: for the poor, even though they are not admitted to office, will be quiet enough if they are not outraged.'

ἢν Μαλιενῶσι δὲ ἢ μὲν πολιτεία ἢν ἢκ τούτων κ.τ.λ.

'Among the Malians the governing or larger body was elected from those who were past service, the magistrates from those on actual service'; the past tense (ἢν) has been thought to imply that the government had changed possibly in consequence of Philip and Alexander's conquests: compare a similar use of the past, v. 1. § 11 respecting the government of Epidamnus, and note.

ἄστ' ἔν τοις ἑπενῶσιν εἶναι τὴν ἰσχύν.

Yet the tendency of some of the Greek states to the use of cavalry was as much due to the suitability of large regions, such as Thessaly, for the breeding and support of horses, as to the form of government. Nor can the remark be true of Greek oligarchies in general, considering how ill suited the greater part of Hellas was to the training or use of horses. Cp. supra c. 3. § 3, a passage in which Aristotle has made a similar observation.

ἔς νῦν καλονόμεν πολιτείας, οἱ πρότερον κάλουν δημοκρατίας.

I.e. what appeared to the older Greeks to be a large governing class was to the later Greeks a small or moderate one.

κατ' τὴν σύνταξιν μάλλον ἑπέμενον τ' ἴρχεσθαι.

1*) Some word like ἰσθνεῖς has to be supplied from ἄλιγοι ἔντες τ' πληθός before κατ' τὴν σύνταξιν; or 2) κατ' τὴν σύνταξιν may be taken after ἑπέμενον, 'and also through a (want of) organization, they were more willing to endure the dominion of others.'

Πάλιν δ' καὶ κοινῆ? καὶ χωρῆ? περ' ἰκαστῆ? λέγωμεν περ' τῶν ἑξῆ?ς, λαβόντες ἴρχῆ?ν τὴν προσήκουσαν αἰτῶν.

From a consideration of the differences between states, and the causes of them, Aristotle in his accustomed manner, proceeding from the whole to the parts, passes on to consider the mode in which different powers are constituted in states, cc. 14-16. He will hereafter show how the wholes are affected by the parts.

A somewhat similar discussion occurs in bk. vi. c. 8. See note on vi. 1. § 1.

ἔστι δ' τῶν τριῶν τούτων (sc. μορίων) ἔν μὲν τι τ' βουλευόμενον περ' τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δ' τ' περ' τῆ? ἴρχῆ?ς (τοντο δ' ἔστῆ?ν ἔς δεῖ? καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποίαν τιν? δεῖ? γίνεσθαι τὴν αἰρεσιν αἰτῶν), τρίτον δὲ τι τ' δικάζον.

Aristotle divides the state, much as we should do, into three parts, 1) the legislative, (which has in certain cases power over individuals; see infra § 3); 2) the administrative or executive: 3) the judicial. The words τοντο δ' ἔστῆ?ν seem to refer back to δεῖ? θεωρεῖ?ν τὴν νομοθέτην. But if so there is a verbal irregularity. For the duties and modes of appointment to offices are not a part of the state, but questions relating to a part of the state.

τι not interrogative, to be taken closely with ἔν and with τρίτον.

Nothing more is known about Telecles. From the manner in which he is spoken of he appears to have been an author rather than a legislator. ἔν τη? πολιτεί? τον? Τηλεκλέους is said like ἔν τη? πολιτεί? τον? Πλάτωνος, ii. 1. § 3, iv. 4. § 11.

ἔως ἔν διέλθῃ?

Some word implying the right of succession to office has to be supplied, e. g. ἡ ἀρχὴ from τῆς ἀρχῆς. The same phrase occurs infra c. 15. § 17.

συνιέναι δὲ μόνον

is governed by ἐπιμὴν τρόπον above.

ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.

A reduplication of the preceding, although there may also be a shade of distinction in the greater stress which is laid upon voting and scrutinies. Here, as in other places (c. 4. §§ 22-24; c. 6. §§ 3, 4), we have a difficulty in discriminating Aristotle's differences. There is only an incomplete order in the catalogue of democracies. First of all comes the most moderate, in which the assembly plays a very subordinate part, then two more which are almost indistinguishable, lastly the most extreme.

τὸ δὲ ἄλλα τῆς ἀρχῆς διοικεῖν ἀρετῆς ὅσας ἴσας ἡνδέχεται· τοιανῶται δὲ ἐστὶν ἴσας ἄρχειν ἡναγκαῖον τοῦ ἐπισταμένου.

The words ἴσας ἡνδέχεται can only mean 'as many elective offices as can be allowed to exist in a democracy consistently with the democratic principle of electing the magistrates by lot.' The excepted magistracies will be those in which special skill or knowledge is required. Cp. vi. 2. § 5, τὴν κληρωτῆς ἐπιμὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢ πάσας ἴσας μὴ ἡμπερίας δέονται κατὰ τέχνης. Susemihl has introduced κληρωτῆς ὅκ before ἡνδέχεται = ἴσας ὅκ ἡνδέχεται κληρωτῆς ἐπιμὴν· τοιανῶται δὲ ἐστὶν referring to ἀρετῆς. But the change has no MS. authority, and though ingenious is unnecessary.

ἴταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τὸν βουλευέσθαι μετέχωσιν ἄλλ' ἀρετοί, κατὰ νόμον δὲ ἄρχωσιν ὅσπερ κατὰ πρότερον, ἡλιγαρχικόν.

Opposed to the milder πολιτικὴ ἡλιγαρχία in the previous sentence, and repeated with greater emphasis in the words which follow ἡλιγαρχικὸν ἡναγκαῖον ἐπιμὴν τὴν τάξιν ταύτην (§ 9). μὴ πάντες, i. e. 'not all [who possess the required qualification].' Yet these latter words, which are necessary to the sense, are wanting in the text.

Compare for several verbal resemblances, supra c. 5.

τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες, κατὰ ὁρισμὸν ἀρετῆς ἢ κληρωτοί.

For in an aristocracy or oligarchy, as in a democracy, a magistrate might be elected by lot, but only out of a select class.

ἄριστοκρατία μὴ ἢ πολιτεία.

Aristocracy is elsewhere said to include numbers, wealth, and virtue; here the aristocratical element seems to reside in the magistrates who have superior merit, and control the whole administration of the state except war, peace, and the taking of scrutinies.

Compare c. 7. § 3; c. 8. §§ 3, 9, in which the near connexion between aristocracy and polity is pointed out.

διῆρηται μὲν ὅτι τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τῶν τῶν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖται ἡκάστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν ἐρημμένον διορισμόν.

κατὰ τὸν ἐρημμένον διορισμόν, i. e. each constitution will be variously administered according to some one of the principles on which the governing body is elected, e.g. out of some, or out of all; and as acting either according to law, or without law, etc.

διοικεῖται has been changed into διοίσει and διοικεῖται, for which latter there is perhaps the authority of Moerbeke, who reads *disponitur*. But no change is needed. For use of διοικεῖται, cp. v. 10. § 36.

συμῆρει δὲ δημοκρατίῃ τῆς μάλιστα ἐπιναί δοκούσῃ δημοκρατίῃ νῦν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle remembering the short life of the extreme democracy which is above law, proposes various ways of strengthening or moderating it; he would have the notables take part in the assembly; and he would enforce their attendance by the imposition of penalties analogous to the fines which the oligarchy inflict on judges for neglect of their duties. (Cp. v. cc. 8, 9 on the preserving principles of state.)

Of the advantage of combining the few with the many there can be no question: but will the upper classes ever be induced to take an active part in a democracy? They have not done so in France or America; may we hope that they will in England?

ἡποκληρονῶν τοῖς πλείους.

I. e. he on whom the lot fell was not included, but excluded until the numbers were sufficiently reduced.

ἀπορονῶνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί.

‘Even ambassadors, whom we might be more inclined to call magistrates, and who are elected by lot, are ἡτερόν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἡρχάς.’

ὁποῖον στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων,

sc. ἡπιμελεῖται implied in ἡπιμελειῶν.

ἡλλὰ τὰντα διαῆρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ὁποῖον ἡς ἐπεῖν· ὁ γὰρ πῶ κρίσις γέγονεν ἡμῖσθητούντων περὶ τὸν ἡνόματος. ἡχει δὲ τινὲς ἡλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν.

‘Verbal questions, such as the definition of an office, are of no practical importance, although some intellectual interest may attach to them.’ ἡλλην is redundant.

μαῖλλον ἡν τις ἡπορήσειε.

I. e. rather than dispute about the name.

βέλτιον ἢ καστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἡπιμελείας μονοπραγματοῦσης ἢ πολυπραγματοῦσης.

Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 370 B ff.

καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαίρεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς ἄνθρώπους, λέγω δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ τῆς ἐκκοσμίας, ἢ παίδων ἄλλων καὶ γυναικῶν.

Two offices are mentioned in the latter part of the sentence: cp. infra § 13, παιδονόμος καὶ γυναικονόμος; and vi. 8. § 22, ἡδὲ δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικωτέραις καὶ μάλλον ἐημερούσαις πόλεσιν . . . γυναικονομία . . . παιδονομία κ.τ.λ.

ἔτεροι ἢ ἑτέροις, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν μὲν ταῖς ἡριστοκρατίαις ἢ πεπαιδευμένων.

‘Differing,’ i. e. in the character of those from whom the election is made. Though the word ἔτεροι is inaccurate, the meaning is the same as that of ἑτέρων, which Susemihl, on very slight authority, has introduced into the text.

πότερον διαφέρει . . . ἢ τυγχάνουσι μὲν τινες ὄντας καὶ κατὰ αὐτὰς τῆς διαφορῆς τῶν ἄρχων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἢ που συμφέρουσιν αὐτὰς.

The alternative πότερον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. is repeated and expanded. ‘Are offices the same in different states, or not the same? Are they the same, but elected out of different classes in aristocracy, monarchy, oligarchy, democracy? Or do the offices differ naturally according to the actual differences in forms of government, the same offices being sometimes found to agree and sometimes to disagree with different forms of government, and having a lesser power in some states and a greater in others? For example, has the president of the assembly, in whatever way appointed, the same functions at Sparta and at Athens? Are not probuli suited to an oligarchy, a censor of boys and women to an aristocracy, a council to a democracy? And will they be equally suited to other forms, or may not their powers require to be extended or narrowed?’

According to this explanation the natural order of the words is somewhat inverted, for τῶν ἄρχων is taken with τινές; and with κατὰ αὐτὰς τῆς διαφορῆς has to be supplied τῶν πολιτειῶν from κατὰ τῆς πολιτείας supra. We may also supply πολιτεῖαι with τινές, and translate ‘may not some states essentially derive their character from offices.’ But the abrupt transition to a new subject (ἄρχαί) in the next clause shows this way of taking the passage to be inadmissible.

Bekker (2nd Edit.) after Victorius reads διαφορά for τῆς διαφοράς.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν τῶν προβούλων ἀτὴν γὰρ ὁ δημοκρατικὴ.

πρόβουλοι, as he says vi. 8. § 17, are oligarchical officers, because they alone have the initiative, and, therefore, the people cannot of themselves make any change in the constitution; supra c. 14. § 14.

ε?σ? δ' α? δια?ορα? κ.τ.λ.

The meaning of the text may be illustrated by the following scheme:—

ο? τρε??ς ?ροι.

i. τίνες ο? καθιστάντες τ?ς ?ρχάς. α) ? πάντες. β) ? τινές. γ) ? τ?ς μ?ν πάντες, τ?ς δ? τινές. α? τρε??ς δια?οραί.	ii. ?κ τίνων. α) ? ?κ πάντων. β) ? ?κ τινω?ν ??ωρισμένων. γ) ? τ?ς μ?ν ?κ πάντων, τ?ς δ' ?κ τινω?ν. α? τρε??ς δια?οραί.	iii. τίνα τρόπον. α) ? α?ρέσει. β) ? κλήρ?. γ) ? τ?ς μ?ν α?ρέσει, τ?ς δ? κλήρ?. α? τρε??ς δια?οραί.
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ο? δώδεκα τρόποι.

ο? τέσσαρες τρόποι	ο? τέσσαρες τρόποι	ο? τέσσαρες τρόποι
1. πάντες ?κ πάντων α?ρέσει.	A. τιν?ς ?κ πάντων α?ρέσει.	α. τ?ς μ?ν ?ρχ?ς πάντες, τ?ς δ? τιν?ς ?κ πάντων α?ρέσει.
2. πάντες ?κ πάντων κλήρ?.	B. τιν?ς ?κ πάντων κλήρ?.	β. τ?ς μ?ν πάντες, τ?ς δ? τιν?ς ?κ πάντων κλήρ?.
3. πάντες ?κ τινω?ν α?ρέσει.	C. τιν?ς ?κ τινω?ν α?ρέσει.	γ. τ?ς μ?ν πάντες, τ?ς δ? τιν?ς ?κ τινω?ν α?ρέσει.
4. πάντες ?κ τινω?ν κλήρ?.	D. τιν?ς ?κ τινω?ν κλήρ?.	δ. τ?ς μ?ν πάντες, τ?ς δ? τιν?ς ?κ τινω?ν κλήρ?.

ο? δύο συνδυασμοί

τ? μ?ν κλήρ?. τ? δ? α?ρέσει.
τ? μ?ν ?κ πάντων. τ? δ? ?κ τινω?ν.

All, or some, or all and some, elect out of all, or some, or out of all and some, by vote or by lot; or by vote and by lot.

The three modes give rise to twelve possible varieties:

All elect	by vote out of all, by lot out of all, by vote out of some, by lot out of some;
Some elect	by vote out of all, by lot out of all, by vote out of some, by lot out of some;
All and some elect	by vote out of all, by lot out of all, by vote out of some, by lot out of some;

and to the two further combinations (οἱ δύο συνδυασμοί): partly by vote and partly by lot, partly out of all and partly out of some.

It is not to be supposed that, even in such a ‘bazaar of constitutions’ (Plat. Rep. viii. 557 D) as Hellas furnished, all these different forms of government were really to be found. Aristotle derives them not from his experience of history, but out of the abundance of his logic.

ἄσπερ ἄν Μεγάροις.

Cp. v. 3. § 5 and 5. § 4, where the overthrow of the Megarian democracy is attributed to the corruption and oppression practised by demagogues; also Thuc. iv. 74 (though it is not certain whether Aristotle is speaking of the return of the exiles there mentioned or of some earlier or later one); and Arist. Poet. c. 3. § 5, 1448 a. 32, where he refers to an ancient democracy existing in Megara, of which the recent establishment is deplored by Theognis, line 53 ff., Bergk. There was an alliance between Athens and Megara in 458 (Thuc. i. 103, 114), which terminated at the battle of Coronea 447; probably during the alliance, but not afterwards, Megara was governed by a democracy. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War the oligarchs were in exile, but were restored by the influence of Brasidas. In the year b.c. 375 the democracy had been re-established: Diod. xv. 40.

τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν δύο κ.τ.λ.

The vote is considered less democratical than the lot: both are admissible in a democracy, but it is essential to its very nature that all should elect. If any limitation takes place the government becomes an aristocracy or a polity, which alike tend to oligarchy in so far as they reduce the number of electors or of persons who are eligible, though differing in other respects. When some only appoint, in whatever manner, out of all, or all out of some, and the elections do not take place all at once (ἄμα, i.e. when the governing body retire by rotation), we have a constitutional government, which inclines to an aristocracy when the two opposite principles of ‘some out of some’ and ‘some out of all’ are combined. The high oligarchical doctrine is ‘some out of some, by vote or by lot or by both,’ the lot being employed in an oligarchy, as in a democracy, to exclude favour or merit. Cp. v. 3. § 9.

γίνεσθαι.

If genuine, is used in a pregnant sense = καθίστασθαι, the construction being changed from the active, which is resumed in the clause which follows, to the neuter or passive. Though the word appears to disturb the sentence, it is found in all the MSS.

ἄλιγαρχικώτερον δ' αἱ τὴν ἄξιν ἄμφοτερον.

ἄξιν ἄμφοτερον seems naturally to mean τῶν μὲν ἅκων, τῶν δ' ἅκων, cp. § 19 fin. But if so the same words which here describe the oligarchical government, are applied in the next sentence to the polity or constitutional government which inclines to aristocracy. Nor can any reason be given why the election ‘out of all and out of some’ should be ‘more oligarchical’ than the election out of some. Another way of taking

the words is to explain $\xi \mu\omicron\upsilon$ as a double election. But in this passage ξ is always used to introduce the persons out of whom the election is made; and therefore $\xi \mu\omicron\upsilon$ could not = $\mu\omicron\upsilon$. Some corruption of the text is probable; the numerous repetitions are likely to have confused the eye of the copyist. $\tau \kappa \tau\iota\omega\upsilon \mu\omicron\upsilon$ is the ingenious and probably true emendation of Mr. Evelyn Abbott. If the principle of 'some out of some' is maintained, the election in both ways, i. e. by vote out of persons elected by lot, or by lot out of persons elected by vote, would clearly be more oligarchical than the simple election by vote or by lot.

$\mu \gamma\epsilon\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu \delta' \mu\omicron\iota\omega\varsigma$,

sc. $\lambda\iota\gamma\alpha\rho\chi\iota\kappa\omicron\nu$. These words which are translated in the text 'though not equally oligarchical if taken by lot' would be better rendered 'and equally oligarchical if not appointed by lot' (Stahr): that is to say, whether appointed by vote or by lot they would equally retain their oligarchical character, if some were chosen out of some. μ must be taken with $\gamma\epsilon\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$.

$\tau\iota\nu\zeta \kappa \tau\iota\omega\upsilon \mu\omicron\upsilon$.

'In both ways,' sc. $\kappa\lambda\eta\rho \kappa\alpha \alpha\rho\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota$.

$\tau\iota\nu\alpha \delta' \tau\iota\sigma\iota \sigma\upsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota \kappa\alpha \pi\omega\zeta \delta\epsilon \gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota \tau\zeta \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma \mu\alpha \tau\alpha\zeta \delta\upsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\sigma\iota \tau\omega\upsilon \rho\chi\omega\upsilon \tau\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\varsigma \epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu, \upsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\iota \lambda\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$.

Neither the reading nor the meaning of this passage is quite certain. Some MSS. and the old translation omit* $\kappa\alpha$ before $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$, thus referring $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\varsigma \epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu$ to $\delta\upsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\sigma\iota$. If with Bekker and several MSS. we retain $\kappa\alpha$ before $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\varsigma \epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu$, the words may receive different interpretations. Either 1), 'how to establish them and what their powers and their nature are will be manifest,' i. e. need no explanation; or 2), 'we shall know how to establish them and their nature when we know their powers.'

$\tau \upsilon \Phi\rho\epsilon\alpha\tau\tau\omicron \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$.

Nothing certain is known about this court; it is here spoken of only as a matter of tradition. The cases of which it took cognizance were rare, and therefore it is not strange that the court which tried them should have become obsolete. According to Pausanias (i. 28. § 12) Phreattys was a spot in the Piræus near the sea, whither banished persons, against whom some fresh accusation was brought after their banishment, went to defend themselves out of a ship before judges who were on the land. This explanation is repeated by several of the scholiasts; but Aristotle, with much greater probability, supposes the banished man to offer himself for trial of the original offence. So in Plat. Laws ix. 866 D, a law is proposed, probably founded on some ancient custom, that the banished homicide, if wrecked upon his native shore, should sit with his feet in the sea, until he found an opportunity of sailing.

$\lambda\lambda \pi\epsilon\rho \mu\upsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\nu \epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\omega \kappa\alpha \tau\omega\upsilon \nu\omicron\kappa\omega\upsilon \kappa\alpha \tau\omega\upsilon \nu \zeta\epsilon\nu\iota\kappa\omega\upsilon, \pi\epsilon\rho \delta \tau\omega\upsilon \nu \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\iota\kappa\omega\upsilon \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\mu\epsilon\nu, \pi\epsilon\rho \omega\upsilon \nu \mu \gamma\iota\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\zeta \delta\iota\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma \gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\iota \kappa\alpha \tau\omega\upsilon \nu \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\omega\upsilon \alpha \kappa\iota\nu\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$.

This sentence appears to be out of place; for no special mention occurs of political causes in what follows; but the writer at once returns to his former subject, and treats the appointment of judges on the same principles which he has applied to the appointment of other magistrates. It is possible that they connect with the beginning of Book v, and that the rest of the chapter is only a repetition in an altered form of c. 15. §§ 17-22.

ο? τρόποι τέτταρες.

The scheme on which judges are appointed, though abridged, is the same as that on which magistrates are appointed; and the various modes correspond in like manner to different forms of government.

The judicial institutions of a country reflect the political, but with a difference. The legislature is active, the courts of law are passive; they do not move until they are set in motion, they deal with particular cases which are brought before them by others; and through these only do they rise to general principles. They do not make laws, but interpret them; nor can they set aside a law unless by appealing to a higher law. They are the conservative element of the state, rooted in habit and precedent and tradition.

But there is also a certain analogy between the political and judicial institutions of a country. In a free state the law must be supreme, and the courts of law must exercise an independent authority; they must be open and public, and they must include a popular element. They represent the better mind of the nation, speaking through certain fixed forms; and they exercise indirectly a considerable influence upon legislation. They have their place also in the education of the people: for they, above all other instructors, teach the lesson of justice and impartiality and truth. As good actions produce good habits in the individual, so the laws of a state grow and strengthen and attain consistency by the decisions of courts.

That Aristotle was not ignorant of the connexion between the judicial and political institutions of a people is shown by his remark that ‘Solon established the democracy when he constituted the dicasteries out of the whole people’ (ii. 12. § 2).

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BOOK V.

The first sentence implies that we are approaching the end of the treatise; but see Essay on the Structure of the Aristotelian Writings.

ἴτι δὲ σωτηρίαί τινες καὶ κοινῆς καὶ χωρῆς ἰκαστῆς ἐσίν, ἴτι δὲ δι᾽ τίνων ἴν μάλιστα σώζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἰκαστῆ.

The latter of these two clauses is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition as being a mere repetition of the preceding. If spurious it is probably a duplicate incorporated from some other ancient form of the text, not a gloss. But Aristotle often draws oversubtle logical distinctions, and in striving after completeness he may easily have written σωτηρίαί τινες and δι᾽ τίνων ἴν σώζοιτο, with little or no difference of meaning between them.

δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ἴπολαβεῖν τῶν ἴρχῆν.

The last words may be either 1) taken adverbially; or 2)* may be the accusative after ἴπολαβεῖν, 1) ‘We must in the first place begin by conceiving’ or 2)* ‘we must in the first place conceive our starting point to be.’

τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ ἴναλογίαν ἴσον.

In Bekker’s 2nd edition καὶ is altered to ἐῖναι without MSS. authority. The sense thus obtained would coincide with the conception of justice in the Nic. Eth. v. 3. § 8.

But the same thought is less accurately expressed by the text. The καὶ here, as elsewhere in Aristotle, may be taken in the sense of *id est*. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 2, τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αῖτῆ καὶ ἴοσία πρότερον τηῖ ἴύσει τον᾽ πρὸς τι: Metaph. iv. 14, 1020 b. 3, τὸ ἴκίνητα καὶ τὸ μαθηματικ᾽ where τὸ ἴκίνητα = τὸ μαθηματικά. And it may be further argued that the more general form of words is better suited to this passage. For Aristotle is here expressing not his own opinion but the consensus of mankind. And although the democrat in some sense acknowledges proportional equality, he would hardly go so far as to say that justice is identical with it. The reading of the MSS. is therefore preferable.

In Book iii. cc. 9 and 12 it has been assumed that justice and proportionate equality, not mere class interests, are the principles on which the state is based and which give a right to citizenship. Aristotle proceeds to show how the neglect or misconception of these principles leads to the overthrow of states.

οἱ δ᾽ ἴς ἴνισοι ἴντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζήτον᾽σι: τὸ γ᾽ ἴρ πλεῖον ἴνισον.

The last words are an explanation of πλεονεκτεῖν. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 2. § 9, τὸ μ᾽ν γ᾽ ἴρ πλεῖον ἴπαν ἴνισον, τὸ δὲ ἴνισον οἱ παῖν πλεῖον.

ἡμαρτημένοι δ' ἄπλωτος ἐσὶ.

Spengel reads ἡμαρτηκῶται δ' τον ἄπλωτος, though there is no trace of variation in the MSS. Nearly the same meaning may be elicited from the text as it stands: 'They are perversions, when regarded simply,' i. e. 'by an absolute standard of justice'; that is to say, their justice is relative to aristocracy, oligarchy or democracy, and hence becomes a cause of revolution.

Δι? κα? α? μεταβολα? γίγνονται διχως.

The commentators are puzzled to find a connexion for these words, which the various reading δικαίως shows to have been an ancient difficulty. Either 1)* the particle δι? is attributable to the superabundance of logical expression and therefore is not to be strictly construed; or to the condensation of two clauses into one, the word διχως referring to what follows: 'Hence arise changes; and in two ways.' Or 2) we must gather, however obscurely indicated, out of what has preceded some distinction corresponding to that between changes of forms of government and changes of persons and parties under the same form of government. Love of equality may perhaps be thought to lead to a change of the constitution; impatience of inequality to a change of persons and offices. But this connexion of ideas, if intended, is not clearly stated. It would be rash, after the manner of some editors (Conring, Susemihl, etc.), in a book like Aristotle's Politics to infer a 'lacuna' between the words στάσεων ἐσιν and ἔθεν στασιάζουσιν from the want of connexion.

ὅσπερ ἔν Λακεδαιμονί? ασι Λύσανδρον τινες ἡπχειρη?σαι καταλν?σαι τ?ν βασιλείαν.

Cp. Plut. Lys. 24-26 for an account (partly taken from Ephorus and wearing rather an improbable appearance) of the manner in which Lysander by the aid of oracles and religious imposture conspired to overturn the monarchy of Sparta and to throw open the office of king to the whole family of the Heraclidae, of which he was himself a member; or, according to another statement, to all the Spartans.

Παυσανίαν τ?ν βασιλέα.

He was not king, though of the royal family; cp. Thuc. i. 132, ἔνδρα γένους τε τον βασιλείου ἔντα κα? ἔν τ?? παρόντι τιμ?ν ἔχοντα (Πλείσταρχον γ?ρ τ?ν Λεωνίδου ἔντα βασιλέα κα? νέον ἔτι ἔνεπι?ς ἔν ἡπετρόπευεν). The same mistake is repeated in vii. 14. § 20.

κα? ἔν ἡπιδάμν? δ? μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατ? μόριον· ἔντ? γ?ρ τω?ν ἡυλάρχων βουλ?ν ἡποίησαν. ἐ?ς δ? τ?ν ἡλιαίαν ἡπάναγκές ἔστιν ἡτι τω?ν ἔν τ?? πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τ?ς ἡρχάς, ἔταν ἡπιψη?ίζηται ἡρχή τις. ἡλιγαρχικ?ν δ? κα? ἡ ἡρχων ἡ ἐ??ς ἔ?ν ἔν τη?? πολιτεί? ταύτ?.

The revolution at Epidamnus was only partial. The change of ἡύλαρχοι into a βουλ? made the state less oligarchical. Cp. vi. 8. § 17, καλε??ται δ? [τ? κύριον τη?ς πολιτείας] ἔνθα μ?ν πρόβουλοι . . . ἡπου δ? πλη?θός ἔστι βουλ? μα?λλον. But according to an ancient custom in the governing body the magistrates (τ?ς ἡρχ?ς = το?ς ἡρχοντας) were required to go to the Heliaea at every election — this relic of

oligarchy survived in the democracy. A like oligarchical spirit was indicated in the appointment of 'the single magistrate' (cp. iii. 16. § 1).

It is also possible to take the words in another way, connecting τῶν τῶν πολιτεύματι with ἐς τὴν ῥαίαν instead of with τῶν ῥαίαν. 'It was compulsory that the magistrates should attend the assembly of the ruling classes, when a certain magistracy took a vote requiring it.' Which of the two modes of translating the passage is correct, we can only guess, as we have no independent knowledge of the procedure mentioned. The latter is the mode of taking them adopted by Müller (Dorians, iii. 9. § 6); but the use of ῥαία simply in the sense of an assembly, and not as a proper name, and therefore its construction with τῶν τῶν πολιτεύματι is doubtful.

τῶν τῶν πολιτεύματι. Either 1)* the ruling class; or better 2) the governing body. The two meanings cannot always be clearly distinguished. Cp. c. 6. § 11; iv. 6. § 9 and v. 4. § 2. Compare also iii. 7. § 2, πῆ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταυτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἑστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, and infra v. 8. § 5, τοῦτο ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῦτο τῶν πολιτεύματι, which show that the two meanings of πολίτευμα, as of πολιτεία, like the two senses of the English word 'government' or 'state,' pass into one another. The genitive is partitive.

ῥαίων ἐς τὴν. ῥαίαν is omitted in several MSS. and is not confirmed by iii. 16. § 1, (. . . πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἅνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως τοιαύτη γὰρ ῥαίη τις ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμον) where Aristotle speaks of the single Archon at Epidamnus, not in the past, but in the present tense. Yet it is not impossible that he may have spoken of an office which had recently existed at Epidamnus, first, in the present, and afterwards, more correctly, in the past tense.

πανταχοῦ γὰρ διττὸν ἴσον ἢ στάσις· οὐ μὲν τοῦτο ἴσους ἴσους ἴσους ἴσους ἴσους ἴσους γὰρ βασιλεία ἴσους, ῥαίαν ἴσους ἴσους ἴσους ἴσους ἴσους ἴσους.

οὐ μὲν . . . ἴσους is a parenthetical explanation of the word ἴσον. 1) 'Certainly to unequals there is no proportion.' According to this way of taking the passage ἴσους is the nom. to ἴσους. 2) Others supply τὸ ἴσον from the preceding sentence (sc. ἴσους ἴσους). '*I mean the inequality in which there is no proportion.' This is illustrated by an example. 3) Others again connect ἴσους with τοῦτο ἴσους. 'Not that real inequality exists among those who are only proportionately unequal.' According to any explanation the connexion is harsh: and therefore there is some reason for suspecting that a marginal note has crept into the text.

The punctuation of Bekker, who places a comma after τὸ κατ' ἴσους, in his 2nd Edition (see note on Text) accords with his correction of the text in § 2, ἴσους ἴσους τὸ δίκαιον ε[Editor: illegible character]ναί τὸ κατ' ἴσους ἴσους instead of καὶ τὸ κατ' ἴσους.

ἐγένεα γὰρ καὶ ῥαίαν ἴσους, τὰντα δ' ἴσους.

The antecedent of ταν?τα is wealth and poverty, latent in δη?μος and ?λιγαρχία. The conj. τ?ναντία, adopted by Bekker following Lambinus in his 2nd Edition, is unnecessary.

?ποροι δ? πολλο? πολλαχον?.

‘But there are in many places a large class of poor.’ Some MSS. read ε?ποροι, some omit πολλοί, and it has been contended by Stahr that ?ποροι δ? κα? ε?ποροι πολλαχον? is the true reading. But the text, which is the reading of several Greek MSS. and is confirmed by Moerbeke, is better.

τ? δ? ?πλω?ς πάντ? καθ’ ?κατέραν τετάχθαι τ?ν ?σότητα ?αν?λον.

‘Either equality of number or equality of proportion, if the only principle of a state, is vicious’: cp. *infra* c. 9. § 13; iv. 13. § 6; vi. 5. § 2.

?π? τον? πρώτου κα? τον? ?ν ?ρχη?? ?μαρτημένου.

?μαρτημένου is to be taken with τον? πρώτου as well as with τον? ?ν ?ρχη??.

? πρ?ς τ?ν ?λιγαρχίαν.

?λιγαρχία is here used for the oligarchical party, το?ς ?λίγους, parallel to δη?μος in the previous clause, although in the preceding sentence the same word means a form of government—an example of Aristotle’s transitional and uncertain use of language.

α?τ?? δ? πρ?ς α?τόν, ? τι κα? ?ξιον ε?πε??ν, ο?κ ?γγίγνεται τ?? δήμ? στάσις.

This reflection is probably true of Greek democracies, but can hardly be justified by modern experience either of the Italian Republics, which swarmed with factions and conspiracies, or of France in the first French revolution, or of England under the Commonwealth, or of Switzerland in the war of the Sonderbund, or of N. America in the war of North and South, or of the S. American Republics. Differences of character, climate, religion, race, affect democracies as well as other forms of government.

?τι δ? ? ?κ τω?ν μέσων πολιτεία ?γγυτέρω τον? δήμου ? ? τω?ν ?λίγων, ?περ ?στ?ν ?σ?αλεστάτη τω?ν τοιούτων πολιτειω?ν.

Aristotle is giving a further reason why democracy is safer than oligarchy, because it more nearly approximates to the μέση πολιτεία, which is the safest of all *such* forms of government, [i. e. of all except the perfect one]. Cp. iv. 11. § 14.

?περ refers to ? ?κ τω?ν μέσων πολιτεία. τοιούτων = the imperfect forms.

An obscurity arises from the inversion of the subject. The sentence = δη?μος ?γγυτέρω της τω?ν μέσων πολιτείας ? ? τω?ν ?λίγων ?στι της τω?ν μέσων πολιτείας. The meaning would be improved if, as in some MSS., ? before τω?ν ?λίγων was omitted.

The *πρωτες ἄρχαι, τῶν ἰσχυρῶν, τινες ἄρχαι τῶν στάσεων* are the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions.

περὶ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν τυγχάνομεν ἐρηκότες.

Sc. in what he has said about *ἰσχυρῶν* and *ἰσχυρῶν* in the previous chapter.

αὐτὰ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν κινήσεων, ἅθνη ἀπὸ τῶν διατίθενται τῶν ἐρηκόμενον τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ὅτι μὲν ἕως τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἄρχει τυγχάνουσιν ὁμοίως, ὅτι δ' ἕως πλείους.

The seven causes are *κέρδος, τιμή, ἄβρις, ἄδολος, ἄπειρος, καταφρόνησις, ἀξίσις* *παρὰ τὴν ἀνάλογον*. Or, according to another way of reckoning (*ἄλλον τρόπον*), other elements, partly the same, and partly different, are added, viz. *ἰσχυρία, ἄλιγωρία, μικρότης, ἰσομοιότης*.

As often happens both in the *Politics* (cp. bk. iv. c. 1) and in the *Ethics* (cp. vii. cc. 1-10) of Aristotle, the order in which the cases are at first enumerated is not the order in which they are afterwards discussed; the latter is as follows: *ἄβρις, κέρδος, τιμή, ἄπειρος, ἄδολος, καταφρόνησις*: the rest retain their original place.

περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων. To be taken closely with *τῶν ἐρηκόμενον τρόπον*, 'in the manner which I have described, and about the things which I have described,' sc. *κέρδος* and *τιμή* to which *τοῖς ἐρηκόμενοις* (§ 5) also refers.

ἄλλ' ὁμοῦ ἰσχυρῶς,

sc. *ἰσχυρῶς ἰσχυρῶς*. They are the same and not the same. 'The love of gain seeks gain for itself, the love of honour is jealous of honour bestowed upon others.'

διὰ μικρότητα,

sc. *τῆς κινήσεως*. Cp. below, c. 3. § 10, *τίτι διὰ τὴν παρὰ μικρόν· λέγω δὲ παρὰ μικρόν, ὅτι πολλάκις λαμβάνει μεγάλη γινομένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ἅταν παρορωσῶσι τὸ μικρόν κ.τ.λ.* for the explanation of the term.

συνέστησαν ὁμοῦ γνώριμοι ἄρχει τῶν δημοῦν διὰ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν δίκας.

This and the revolution in Rhodes mentioned below (§ 5) appear to be the same with that of which a more minute but somewhat obscure account is given in c. 5. § 2—mentioned here as illustrating fear and contempt; in c. 5, as showing that revolutions arise from the evil behaviour of demagogues in democracies; two accounts of the same event taken from different points of view, but not inconsistent with each other. Rhodes was transferred from the alliance of Athens to Sparta in 412, and remained the ally of Sparta until after the battle of Cnidos in the year 394 b.c. when the people, assisted by the Athenians, drove out the notables who were afterwards restored by the help of Teleutias the Lacedaemonian b.c. 390. Diod. Sic. xiv. 97; Xen. Hell. iv. 8. Whether this latter revolution can be identified with the *ἰσχυρία* mentioned by Aristotle is uncertain.

δι' τῆς περομένης δίκας. Cp. *infra* c. 5. § 2, where the suits against the rich at Rhodes appear to have been brought by private individuals; also Thuc. iii. 70.

οἷον καὶ τὴν Θήβαις μετ[Editor: illegible character] τὴν τὴν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων τὴν δημοκρατία διεθάρη.

Yet the destruction of the democracy seems hardly consistent with the preponderance which the Athenians retained in Boeotia during the nine years following the battle of Oenophyta (456), at the end of which time, and not until after they had won the battle of Coronea (447), all the Boeotians regained their independence. (Thuc. i. 112.) Compare as bearing on Aristotle's knowledge of Theban history, *infra* c. 6. § 15, and note.

τὴν Μεγαρέων [δημοκρατία διεθάρη] δι' ἑταξίαν καὶ τὴν ναρχίαν ττηθέντων.

Probably the same event mentioned *infra* c. 5. § 4, but apparently not the same with the revolution in Megara, mentioned in Thuc. iv. 74, which occurred after, and in consequence of, the retirement of the Athenians (b.c. 424); possibly the same with the occasion mentioned in iv. 15. § 15, when the government was narrowed to the returned exiles and their supporters. See on iv. 15. § 15.

τὴν Συρακούσας πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος,

sc. τὴν δημοκρατία διεθάρη. According to the narrative of Herod. vii. 155, the γαμόροι were driven out by the Syracusan populace, and returned under the protection of Gelon, to whose superior force the Syracusans opened their gates. The destruction of the democracy may therefore be said to have been caused by the violent conduct of the people towards the landowners. But if so, the contradiction which Mr. Grote finds between the statements of Herodotus and Aristotle admits of a reconciliation. See note on c. 43, vol. v. 286, original edit. He thinks that for Gelo we should substitute Dionysius, and observes that the frequent confusion of the two names was noted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiq. Rom.* vii. c. 1. p. 1314.

τὴν Τάραντι ττηθέντων.

Called by Herodotus (vii. 170) 'the greatest slaughter of Greeks within his knowledge.' Diodorus, 'the Sicilian,' (xi. 52. § 5), apparently in ignorance of the geography of Italy, says that the Iapygian victors pursued the Rhegians into the town of Rhegium (a distance of about 200 miles), and entered with them!

δημοκρατία γένετο τὴν πολιτείας.

Cp. vi. 5. §§ 10, 11, where the Tarentines are described in the present tense as being under a sort of πολιτεία or moderate democracy, to which they probably reverted at some time later than that referred to in the text. In the Syracusan expedition they were hostile to the Athenians (Thuc. vi. 44), and are therefore not likely at that time to have been a democracy.

κα? ?ν ?ργει τω?ν ?ν τη?? ?βδόμ? ?πολομένων ?π? Κλεομένους τον? Λάκωνος
?ναγκάσθησαν παραδέξασθαι τω?ν περιοίκων τινάς.

The meaning of the name Hebdomê was unknown to the Greeks themselves. The victory of Cleomenes over the Argives is mentioned in Herodotus (vi. 76-83), Pausanias (iii. 4), and in Plutarch (De Mulierum Virtutibus, iv. 245 D). In the narrative of the latter various plays on the number seven occur, which probably originated in the word ?βδόμη. The number of the dead slain by Cleomenes is said to have been 7777: the battle is said to have been fought on the seventh day of the month (?βδόμ? ?σταμένου μηνός, Ib.); or during a truce of seven days which Cleomenes violated by attacking the Argives during the night, he arguing that the seven days did not include the nights, or, perhaps with better reason, that vengeance on an enemy was deemed preferable to justice both by Gods and men (Apophth. Lacon. 223 B). The word may have been the name of the wood mentioned in the accounts of Herodotus and Pausanias (loc. cit.) or of some other place* called after the number seven; but more likely of a festival held on the seventh day, which gave its name to the battle.

?πολομένων ?π? Κλεομένους κ.τ.λ. Read in the English text: 'the Argives, after their army had been cut to pieces.'

κα? ?ν ?θήναις ?τυχούντων πεζη?? ο? γνώριμοι ?λάττους ?γένοντο δι? τ? ?κ καταλόγου στρατεύεσθαι ?π? τ?ν Λακωνικ?ν πόλεμον.

The κατάλογος ?πλιτω?ν mentioned in Thuc. vi. 43, κα? τούτων ?θηναίων μ?ν α?τω?ν ??σαν πεντακόσιοι μ?ν κα? χίλιοι ?κ καταλόγου, and elsewhere, Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 1, in which the Θη?τες, or lowest of the four classes, were not included.

?κ καταλόγου. Every one was obliged to take his turn in the order of the roll, and no substitutes were allowed, because the number of soldiers willing to offer themselves was not sufficient.

?π? τ?ν Λακωνικ?ν πόλεμον. As in the Syracusan expedition, to which the word ?τυχούντων chiefly refers. Cp. Thuc. vii. 27.

πλειόνων γ?ρ τω?ν ?πόρων γινομένων.

Most of the extant MSS. are in favour of ε?πόρων. But ?πόρων, which is the reading of the old translator, is not wholly indefensible. The meaning may be that power falls into the hands of the few, either when the poor become more numerous, or when properties increase; the extremes of want and of wealth coexisting in the same state. The two cases are really opposite aspects of the same phenomenon, 'when the citizens become more and more divided into rich and poor.' The argument from the more difficult reading is in favour of ?πόρων.

?ν ?ρε??.

A later name of Hestiaea in Euboea, or rather (Strabo x. p. 446) of an Athenian city established in the time of Pericles, on the same site, to maintain control over Euboea.

After the fall of Athens it passed into the hands of Sparta and received an oligarchical constitution, reverting to Athens in the year 377. Probably at this time κατελύθη ἡ ἑλιγαρχία. For another reference to Hestiaea, which never entirely lost its old name (Pausan. vii. p. 592), see c. 4. § 4.

τέλος δ' οἰθενῶς ἦρχον.

οἰθενῶς is taken in the text as the genitive of value. If this way of explaining the word is rejected as unidiomatic, or rather, not likely to be employed when according to the more familiar idiom οἰθενῶς would be governed by ἦρχον, we may adopt the emendation of Bekker's 2nd Edition, ἢπ' οἰθενός.

οἰῶν Τροϊζηνίους ἦχαιοι συνῆκισαν Σύβαριν, ἐπειτα πλείους οἱ ἦχαιοι γενόμενοι ἔξεβαλον τοὺς Τροϊζηνίους· ἦθεν τὸ ἦγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις.

The foundation of Sybaris (b. c. 720) is recorded in Strabo vi. p. 263, but nothing is said of the joint occupation of the place by the Troezenians: nor of the curse. The fall of Sybaris is attributed to a very different cause in a gossiping story told by Athenaeus xii. p. 520, of a Sybarite having beaten his slave at the altar to which he fled for refuge. A rather fabulous account of the war between Sybaris and Croton, in which Milo the athlete figures as a sort of Heracles, is given by Diod. Sic. xii. 9.

καὶ τὸν Θουρίοις Συβαρῆται τοῖς συνοικήσασιν.

Sc. ἦστασίασαν or some similar word gathered from the preceding sentence. For a more detailed though not very trustworthy narrative of the event referred to, see Diod. Sic. xi. 90; xii. 10, 11. Thurii being founded on the site of Sybaris, the Sybarites who joined in the colony naturally looked upon the country as their own.

Ζαγκλαῖοι δὲ Σαμίους ἠποδεξάμενοι ἔξεπεσον καὶ αὐτοί.

This, which is one of the blackest stories in Greek history, is narrated at length by Herodotus vi. 23. The Zancleans had invited Hippocrates tyrant of Gela to assist them against Anaxilaus tyrant of Rhegium, but were betrayed by him and delivered over to the Samians.

Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὸ τυραννικὸν τοῖς ξένους καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόρους πολίτας ποιησάμενοι ἦστασίασαν καὶ ἐξ μάχης ἦλθον.

Another instance of the danger of incorporating foreigners in a state. The foreigners in this case were the mercenaries of Hiero and Gelo. After the expulsion of Thrasybulus they were allowed to remain in the city, but deprived of political privileges. The narrative of their revolt, of their seizure of Acradina and Ortygia, and of the troubles which followed the attempt to drive them out in the ill-fated island of Sicily, is to be found in Diod. xi. 72 ff.

καὶ ἡμιπολλῆται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδέων ἠποίκους ἔξεπεσον ἢπ' τούτων οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν.

α?τω?ν is to be taken with ο? πλε??στοι, which is in partitive apposition with ?μ?ιπολ??ται. The event referred to cannot be shown to have any connexion with the revolt of Amphipolis during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 105). Nor do we know of any other event which corresponds with the account given either here or in c. 6. § 8 where the revolution is spoken of ‘as an insurrection against an oligarchy, made by the aid of Chalcidians’ who had settled in the place. But an oligarchy could not have existed under the control of Athens; nor would a democracy be likely to have joined the Peloponnesian confederacy.

στασιάζουσι δ’ ?ν μ?ν τα??ς ?λιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ.

‘There are other differences besides those of race which divide cities. There may be two cities in one (c. 12. § 15), both in oligarchies and democracies.’ This general reflection is introduced awkwardly amid the special causes of revolutions in states. But a similar confusion of general and particular occurs in several other passages; e. g. iv. 4. § 22 ff.

καθάπερ ε?ρηται πρότερον.

Probably c. 1. §§ 3, 4.

Κολο?ώνιοι κα? Νοτιε??ς.

That the Colophonians and Notians were torn by dissensions may be gathered from Thucydides iii. 34.

μα?λλον δημοτικο? ο? τ?ν Πειραια? ο?κον?ντες τω?ν τ? ?στν.

The great power of the democracy at Athens dated from the battle of Salamis; and as the sailors were the lowest class of citizens, naturally the Piraeus was its headquarters. Liberty was saved by the fleet in the days of the Four Hundred; and when driven out of Athens by the thirty took refuge at the Piraeus, from which it returned victorious.

γίνονται μ?ν ον??ν α? στάσεις ο? περ? μικρω?ν ?λλ’ ?κ μικρω?ν.

Do not wars or revolutions always or almost always arise from a combination of large public and political causes with small personal and private reasons? Some spark sets fire to materials previously prepared. If Herodotus overestimates the personal and private causes of great events, does not Thucydides underestimate them, explaining everything on great principles and ignoring the trifles of politics to which Aristotle here directs attention? The course of ancient or of modern history taken as a whole appears to be the onward movement of some majestic though unseen power; when regarded in detail, it seems to depend on a series of accidents. The Greek was a lover of anecdotes; and for him this gossip about trifles had a far greater interest than the reflections of Thucydides upon the course of human events. (See Introduction, vol. i. p. xcii.)

μετέβαλε γ?ρ ? πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.

The same story is told with additions and embellishments by Plutarch 'Praecepta gerendae reipublicae' p. 825 C.

ἦθεν προσλαμβάνοντες τοὺς ἑν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας.

Here as infra c. 6. § 8 the word διεστασίασαν may be causal and active, 'they took the members of the government to their respective sides and so split all the people into factions.' (Cp. καταστασιάζεσθαι v. 6. § 14). Or as in the English text (taking διαστασιάζω, like στασιάζω, as a neuter) 'they then drew all the members of the ruling class into their quarrel and made a revolution.'

ἦστε καὶ τὸ ἑν ἀτῆρῷ μικρὸν ἡμάρτημα ἡνάλογόν ἦστι πρὸς τὸ ἑν τοῦτο ἄλλοις μέρεσιν.

The argument is that the beginning is half the whole, according to the old proverb, and therefore that an error at the beginning is equivalent to half the whole amount of error. The proverb is again cited, Nic. Ethics i. 7. § 20.

καὶ ἑν Δελφοῦσι ἡκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφύρατος ἦρχε πασῶν ἡγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν ἡστερον.

This narrative, like the story of the Syracusan affair, is told, but in a more romantic manner, in the passage of Plutarch quoted above (Praec. geren. reip. p. 825 B) and also by Aelian, Var. Hist. xi. 5. The narrative of Plutarch contains the names of the persons concerned, Crates and Orgilus, and is therefore probably taken not from Aristotle but from some other source. τῶν στάσεων κ.τ.λ., the sacred war to which another origin is assigned infra in § 7. See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.

καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ ἦξ ἡπικλήρων στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἡγένετο ἦρχε κακῶν καὶ τονὸν πολέμου τονὸν πρὸς ἡθηναίους, ἑν ἡ Πάχης ἡλαβε τὸν πόλιν ἀτῶν. Τιμοῖανους γῆρ τῶν ἐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπόντος δύο θυγατέρας, ἡ περιωσθεὺς καὶ οὐ λαβὸν τοῦτο ὑέσιν ἀτονὸν Δόξανδρος ἡῖρξε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοὺς ἡθηναίους παρῶξυνε, πρόξενος ἑν τῆς πόλεως.

No mention of Doxander occurs nor is there any hint of this story in Thucydides (iii. 2 ff.). The revolt of Mitylene is ascribed in his narrative entirely to political causes, and was long premeditated. The only point of coincidence between the two accounts is the mention of the proxenus, who is said in Thucydides to have given information to the Athenians. They are not, however, necessarily inconsistent: for Aristotle may be speaking of the slight occasion, Thucydides of the deeper cause. Nor can any argument be drawn from the silence of the latter. He may have known the tale, but may not have thought fit to mention it, any more than he has recorded the singular episode of the suicide of Paches in the public court on his return home, recorded by Plutarch iv. 8 (Nicias 6). There is also an omission in the account of Aristotle which is supplied by Thucydides. For the proxenos who gave information to the Athenians is afterwards said to have repented, and to have gone on an embassy to Athens petitioning for peace (Thucyd. iii. 4). Such stories as this about Doxander have been

common in modern as well as in ancient history; they are very likely to be invented, but may sometimes be true.

Mnason, according to Timaeus, was the friend of Aristotle (Athenaeus vi. p. 264).

ἢ ἢν ῥεῖ? βουλ? εἰδοκιμήσασα ἢν τοῦ?ς Μηδικοῦ?ς.

According to Plut. Themistocles c. 10 Aristotle narrated that ‘at the time [of the battle of Salamis] when the Athenians had no public resources the council of the Areopagus gave to each sailor a sum of eight drachmas and thus enabled the triremes to be manned.’ Whether such a statement was really to be found in Aristotelian writings, perhaps in the Politics to which it is commonly ascribed, or whether Plutarch is confusing the more general statement of Aristotle contained in this passage with information which he had derived from some other source, is uncertain.

συντονωτέραν ποιη?σαι τ?ν πολιτείαν.

Cp. iv. 3. § 8, ῥιγαρχικ?ς μ?ν τ?ς συντονωτέρας κα? δεσποτικωτέρας, τ?ς δ’ ἢνειμένας κα? μαλακ?ς δημοτικ?ς, sc. πολιτείας. σύντονος means the more highly pitched note given by the greater tension of the string, and hence the stricter and more rigid form of government.

ἢ ναυτικ?ς ῥγλος γενόμενος τη?ς περ? Σαλαμῶ?να νίκης κα? δι? ταύτης τη?ς ῥγεμονίας δι? τ?ν κατ? θάλατταν δύναμιν, τ?ν δημοκρατίαν ῥσχυροτέραν ῥποίησε.

δι? ταύτης, sc. τη?ς νίκης, ‘by means of this victory.’

τη?ς ῥγεμονίας, sc. αἰτιος γενόμενος. δι? τ?ν κατ? θάλατταν δύναμιν follows τη?ς ῥγεμονίας.

Plut. Arist. 22 says that after the battle of Salamis Aristides extended the right of voting to the fourth class. He had already mentioned in c. 13 that many of the higher classes had fallen into poverty; they would therefore have been degraded but for this extension. The merits and sufferings of all classes in the war were a natural justification of such a measure. The nobility and the common people vied with one another in their defence of Hellas against the invader. No element lay deeper in the Hellenic character than the sense of superiority which all Hellenes acquired in the struggle with Persia.

περ? τ?ν ἢν Μαντινεί? μάχην.

I. e. the first battle of Mantinea (419 b.c. described by Thuc. v. 70-74) in which, though the Argive army was defeated, the 1000 chosen Argives (doubtless belonging to the noble families) remained unconquered, and cut their way through the enemy. There is nothing in the account of Thucydides inconsistent with this statement, though he naturally dwells more on the influence of Lacedaemon in effecting the change of government (Ib. 81).

ἢν Συρακούσαις ἡ δημοκρατία γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς
Ἀθηναίους ἡ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν.

These words are not in perfect accord with the statement of Thucydides that the Athenians were unable to cope with the Syracusans because they had a form of government like their own, Thuc. vii. 55; but they agree with Diod. xiii. 34 fin., who says that the extreme form of democracy was introduced at Syracuse by Diocles after the overthrow of the Athenians. Nor is Thucydides quite consistent with himself; for the overthrow of the Athenian expedition was effected by the aristocratic leader Hermocrates and by the aid of Corinthians and Lacedaemonians. (See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.)

καὶ ἢν Ἰμβρακίῃ.

See note on English text. Ambracia is said to have been founded by Gorgus, who is described by Antonin. Liberalis (i. 4. 19 ed. Westermann) as the brother of Cypselus (cp. Neanthes apud Diog. Laert. i. 98, who says that the two Perianders were ἑνεψιοὶ ἑλληλοῖς): by Scymnus (454) he is called his son. Periander is supposed by Müller (i. 8. § 3) to have been the son of Gorgus; but this is conjecture. Whether there was any real connexion, or whether the stories of relationship arise only out of an accidental similarity of names, it is impossible to determine.

οἱ δυνάμει αἱ αἰτίαι.

‘Who are the causes of the power of a state:’ cp. supra, § 9, ἡ δημοκρατία γενόμενος τῆς νίκης. The elements of strength are also the elements of danger.

ἢν μὲν γὰρ ἡξιαπατήσαντες . . . ἔρχουσιν αἰτιῶν κ.τ.λ.

I. e. when fraud is succeeded by force or the old fraud by a new one. To take an example from Modern History, as the presidency of Louis Napoleon was succeeded by the *coup d'état*, and ended in the *plébiscite* by which he was made Emperor of the French; or as in ancient history the tyranny of Gelo and Hiero was acquiesced in after a time by their Syracusan subjects.

οἷον ἢν τῶν τετρακοσίων τῶν δημοῦν ἡξιαπάτησαν, ἄσκοντες τῶν βασιλεία
χρήματα παρέξειν.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 53, where Peisander demonstrates to the Athenian assembly that their only hope lay in the alliance of the Persian king.

ψευδόμενοι.

‘Having once told the lie’ which, it is inferred, was detected,

καὶ ἢν ἡδὲ· μισθοῦραν τε γὰρ οἱ δημογωγοὶ ἠπόριζον, καὶ ἡκόλουν ἠποδιδόναι τῶν
ἠεὶλόμενα τοῖς τριηράρχοις· οἱ δὲ διὰ τῆς ἠπιερομένης δίκης ἠναγκάσθησαν
συστάντες καταλῆσαι τῶν δημοῦν.

‘The demagogues gained influence over the assembly by procuring pay for them: [probably they obtained the money for this purpose by not paying the trierarchs]. These were sued by their sailors or other creditors, and, not having been paid themselves, were unable to pay others; so in self-defence they overthrew the government.’ Such appears to be the meaning of this passage, a little amplified, on which no light is thrown from other sources.

The revolution here mentioned would seem to be the same as that which has been already referred to, *supra*, c. 3. § 4. The words διὰ τῶν περομένων δίκας occur in both passages.

κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἡ ῥακλείη δημοκρατία.

Probably the Heraclea of Pontus founded by the Megarians in b. c. 559. The poems of Theognis imply that already in the sixth century b. c. a democratical party existed in the mother-city. Nine places bear the name of Heraclea. The Heraclea in Pontus is the most important of them and may be presumed to be meant when there is no further description as here or in c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

ἡ ἡν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία.

Cp. *supra* c. 3. § 5.

ἡ τῶν προσόδους ταύτης λειτουργία.

Some word containing the idea of diminishing has to be supplied from ἡναδάστους ποιόντες.

Demagogues like Cleon, Lysicles, Eucrates, Hyperbolus, Cleophon, were of a different type from Peisistratus or Periander, and equally different from Hiero and Gelo or Dionysius the First.

Three reasons are given for the frequent attempts to establish tyrannies in early Greek history—1) there were great magistracies in ancient states; 2) the people were scattered and therefore incapable of resistance; 3) the demagogues were trusted by them, because they were supposed to be the enemies of the rich.

Πεισίστρατος στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς πεδιακοὺς.

According to the narrative of Herodotus, i. 59 ff., Attica was at this time divided into factions, that of the inhabitants of the plain led by Lycurgus, and of the sea coast by Megacles, to which was added a third faction of the inhabitants of the highlands whom Peisistratus used as his instruments. He was restored to the tyranny by a combination of his own adherents and those of Megacles against the inhabitants of the plain.

Θεαγένης ἡν Μεγάροις.

Theagenes is mentioned in Thuc. i. 126 as the father-in-law of Cylon the conspirator; and in Arist. Rhet. i. 2, 1357 b. 33, as an example of a tyrant who like Peisistratus had asked for a guard.

Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου.

Cp. Diod. Sic. (xiii. 86, 91, 92) who narrates how Daphnaeus, having been elected general by the Syracusans, failed to relieve Agrigentum and on the motion of Dionysius was deposed from his command.

ἢ κ τῆς πατρίδος δημοκρατίας.

The same phrase is used in ii. 12. § 2 where Solon is said to have established ἢ πατριὸς δημοκρατία, the ancient or traditional democracy, ‘the good old democracy,’ as opposed to the later and extreme form.

ἢ κος δὲ τον? ἢ μ? γίνεσθαι ἢ τον? γίνεσθαι ἢ ττον τ? τ?ς ἢ υλ?ς ἢ ἔρειν το?ς ἢ ρχοντας, ἢ λλ? μ? πάντα τ?ν δη?μον.

τον? μ? γίνεσθαι, sc. κύριον τ?ν δη?μον τῶν νόμων = ‘a remedy against the people becoming master.’ That is to say, when the magistrates were elected by the tribal divisions the power of the people was not so great as when they voted all together.

When the larger units of government or representation are broken up into very small ones, local interests are likely to be preferred to the general good, and local candidates for office take the place of better men—a nation ceases to be inspired by great political ideas, and cannot effectually act against other nations. On the other hand, if England, or France, or the United States were represented in the national council only as a whole, what would be the result? Aristotle might have replied that a state is not a state in which 30,000,000 of people are united under a single government, or are represented in a single assembly, having no other connecting links; nor yet when they are subdivided into parishes: cp. vii. 4. § 11.

These are extremes by which a principle may be illustrated, but no one would think of accepting either alternative. The question which Aristotle here touches has a modern and recent interest to us, and may be put in another form: ‘What should be the area of a constituency?’ Some considerations which have to be kept in view are the following: 1) The facilities of locomotion and communication; 2) The habit or tradition of acting together among the natives of a country or district; 3) The question of minorities—should the aim of a constitution be to strengthen the government, or to give a perfectly fair representation of all parties, opinions, places? 4) The greater opportunity of a political career afforded by more numerous elections and smaller bodies of electors; and, on the other hand, 5) The greater independence of the representatives of large constituencies; and 6) The advantages or disadvantages of local knowledge and of local interests have to be placed in the scale. We may conclude that in so far as the political life of a country is affected by the area of representation, it should not be so extended as to interfere with the power of common

action; nor so localized that the members of the national assembly cease any longer to think in the first place of great national interests.

α? δ' ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι δι? δύο μάλιστα τρόπους το?ς ἀνερωτάτους . . . ?χει δ? κα? ? ?ξ ἄλλων ἄρχ? στάσεως δια?οράς.

According to c. 1. § 16, ἂν μ?ν γ?ρ τα??ς ὀλιγαρχίαις ?γγίνονται δύο, ? τε πρ?ς ἄλλήλους στάσις κα? ?τι ? πρ?ς τ?ν δη?μον there are two modes of revolutions in oligarchies,—1) That arising from dissensions among the oligarchs themselves; 2) that arising from dissensions between the oligarchs and the people. The order of the two is reversed in this passage. The first which is here the second is generalized into 'that arising from those outside the governing body' (? ?ξ ἄλλων, § 2), under which four cases are included (see Introduction). Το?να μ?ν (§ 1) corresponds grammatically μάλιστα δέ, which introduces one of the cases of στάσις arising ?ξ ἄλλων although the leader comes ?ξ ἀ?τη?ς τη?ς ὀλιγαρχίας. The other mode of revolution from within is discussed at the end of § 5 κινον?νται δ? κ.τ.λ., with which the second main division begins.

ἂν Νάξ? Λύγδαμις.

For a silly story about a bargain over some fish which is said to have been the origin of the revolt led by Lygdamis at Naxos, see Athenaeus viii. 348 who derives it from the Ναξίων πολιτεία in the so-called 'Polities' of Aristotle.

?χει δ? κα? ? ?ξ ἄλλων ἄρχ? στάσεως δια?οράς.

Goettling would interpret ἄλλων as = ἄλλων ? τον? πλῆθος which is harsh. The conjectures ἀ?των and ἄλλήλων seem, at first sight, to simplify the passage, as everything from μάλιστα δ' in § 1 onwards would then apply to the same mode of στάσις (? ?ξ ἀ?των): but Aristotle in § 2 expressly distinguishes the ἐ?ποροι who are not in the government from the oligarchs, and therefore a revolution begun by them could not be described as arising ?ξ ἄλλήλων or ?ξ ἀ?των.

ο??ον ἂν Μασσαλί?.

In vi. 7. § 4 Massalia is described by Aristotle, speaking probably of a later period, as having enlarged the narrow oligarchy by the admission of new citizens. The oligarchy thus became more like a πολιτεία (πολιτικωτέρα ?γένετο ? ὀλιγαρχία).

The difference was settled, not by throwing open the government to a lower class, but by the admission in greater numbers of members of the same families.

των?ν ἂν τη?? πολιτεί?.

Here the members of the governing body, see note on c. 1. § 10.

ἂν το??ς τριάκοντα ?θήνησιν ο? περ? Χαρικλέα ?σχυσαν το?ς τριάκοντα δημαγωγον?ντες, κα? ἂν το??ς τετρακοσίους ο? περ? Φρόνιχον.

From Xenophon's Hellenics ii. 3 we might be led to infer that Critias was the leading spirit of the thirty, but in Lysias contra Eratosthenem § 56, p. 125, we find that the name of Charicles precedes that of Critias among the leaders of the more extreme party. Charicles and Critias are also named together among the νομοθέται whom the thirty appointed in Xen. Mem. i. 2. § 31.

It is singular that the leadership of a party in the 400 should be ascribed to Phrynichus who was late in joining the attempt (Thuc. viii. 68) and was soon assassinated (c. 92). He was however a man of great ability and is said by Thucydides to have shown extraordinary energy when he once took part.

καὶ ἄν ἴσταις ὀλιγαρχίας οὐχ οἴονται ἀρῶνται τὰς ῥῆξιν ὡς οἱ ῥηχόντες εἰσιν.

The people will always be able to elect those members of the oligarchy who favour their interests. The representative depends upon his constituents, and must do their bidding. The remark of Aristotle is true, and admits of several applications. Yet the opposite reflection is almost equally true, that the popular representative easily catches the 'esprit de corps' of the society in which he mingles, and of the order or assembly to which he is admitted.

ἄπερ ἄν ἴβυδὲ συνέβαινε.

We cannot be certain whether these words illustrate οὐ πλῆται ἢ δημοί or δημοί only. That the membership of a club should have been the qualification for an office of which the election was in the hands of the people is remarkable (see note on § 13 infra).

καὶ ἴπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὲν ἴκ τονὴ πολιτεύματος ἴστιν· δημαγωγῶντες γὰρ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Compare ii. 12. § 3, where Solon is said to have established the democracy by appointing the courts of law from the whole people.

γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ἴταν ἴναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες ἴσελγῶς.

So Plat. Rep. viii. 555 D. Compare also infra c. 12. § 17.

Hipparinus, the father of Dion, was the chief supporter of Dionysius (Plut. Dio c. 3), who married his daughter.

Καὶ ἴν Αἴγινὴ ἴ τὴν πρῶξιν τὴν πρὸς Χάρητα πρῶξας ἴνεχείρησε μεταβαλεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν.

Probably the well-known general Chares who flourished between 367-333 is here intended. He was a man who, in spite of his disreputable character, contrived by corruption to maintain a great influence over the Athenian people in the decline of their glory. Of the transaction here referred to nothing more is known.

δι? τοιαύτην ἀ?τίαν,

sc. δι? τ? ?ναλω?σαι τ? ?δια το?ς ἐ?πόρους ζω?ντας ?σελγω?ς.

?τ? μ?ν ον??ν ?πιχειρον?σί τι κινε??ν, ?τ? δ? κλέπτουσι τ? κοινά· ?θεν πρ?ς ἀ?το?ς στασιάζουσιν ? ο??τοι ? ο? πρ?ς τούτους μαχόμενοι κλέπτοντας.

ἀ?το?ς = ‘the government, or the other oligarchs, from whom the theft is made.’

ο??τοι = ‘the thieves or peculators.’ The revolution arises in two ways, from the attack either of the thieves upon the government, or of the government upon the thieves.

?μοίαν τη?? τω?ν ?ν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων.

I. e. the election of the Elean elders, besides being an election out of certain families (δυναστευτικήν), resembled that of the Lacedaemonian elders who were chosen but ‘in a ridiculous fashion’ by the whole people. See ii. 9. § 27.

Timophanes was a Corinthian general, who was about to become, or for a short time became, tyrant of Corinth. He was slain either by the hand (Diod. xvi. 65), or at the instigation, of his brother Timoleon (Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4).

τω?ν περ? Σ??μον.

σάμον is found in all the Greek MSS. and in the old Latin translator. It shews at any rate the faithfulness with which they copied an unmeaning reading. Σ??μον which is adopted by Bekker in both editions is an ingenious conjecture of Schlosser. Simus, if he be the person mentioned in Demosthenes (de Cor. p. 241), was a Larissaeon who betrayed Thessaly to king Philip.

?ν ?βύδδ? ?π? τω?ν ?ταιριω?ν ω??ν ??ν μία ? ??ιάδου.

The name of Iphiades occurs in Demosthenes (in Aristocratem, p. 679), where it is said that his son was, or ought to have been, given up as a hostage to the Athenians by the town, not of Abydos but of Sestos. It will be remembered that at Abydos (supra c. 6. § 6) some of the magistrates were elected by the people from a political club. The manner in which he is spoken of would lead us to suppose that Iphiades was tyrant of Abydos, and that by the help of his club he had overthrown the oligarchy.

Of the great Euboean cities Chalcis and Eretria, as of so many other Hellenic states which were famous in the days before the Persian War, little is known. We are told in bk. iv. 3. § 3 that the Chalcidians used cavalry against their opponents, and there is an allusion in Thuc. i. 15 to the ancient war between Chalcis and Eretria which ‘divided all Hellas,’ again mentioned by Herod. v. 99.

τω?ν δ’ ?ν Θήβαις κατ’ ?ρχίου.

The only Archias of Thebes known to us was an oligarch, who betrayed the citadel of Thebes to the Spartans, and was afterwards himself slain by Pelopidas and his fellow conspirators. An oligarchical revolution could not therefore be said to have arisen out of his punishment. Yet the uncertainty of the details of Greek history in the age of Aristotle should make us hesitate in assuming a second person of the name. The mention of Heraclea in juxtaposition with Thebes may suggest that this is the Heraclea not in Pontus, but in Trachis. Cp. note on c. 5. § 3.

ἡλιονείκησαν αὐτούς.

Const. *preg.* = ἡλιονεικόντες ἡδίωκον. The infinitive δεθῆναι helps the construction of αὐτούς, 'They carried their party spirit against them so far.'

διὰ τὴν γὰρ δεσποτικὴν εἶναι τῆς ἡλιγαρχίας . . . ἢ ἢν Χίῳ ἡλιγαρχία.

The Chians in the later years of the Peloponnesian War were governed by an oligarchy: cp. Thuc. viii. 14. The island was recovered by Athens under the Second Empire, but again revolted in the year 458. The population is said to have been largely composed of merchant-seamen, *supra*, iv. 4. § 21.

πολλάκις γὰρ τὴν ταχθῆναι πρῶτον τίμημα . . . τοῖς μέσους

is an *accusativus pendens*; 'Often when there has been a certain qualification fixed at first . . . the same property increases to many times the original value,' etc.

οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτ' ἡλίγοι.

The exclusiveness of aristocracy and oligarchy is equally the ruin of both, though arising in the one case from the fewness of men of virtue and good manners, in the other from the fewness of men of wealth and birth.

Παρθενίαι (ἢ κ τῶν ἡμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν).

According to the legend the Partheniae were the progeny of Spartan women and of certain slaves or citizens of Sparta called ἡπεινάκτοι. They had in some way incurred the reproach of illegitimacy or inferiority. The fertile imagination of ancient writers, who were clearly as ignorant as ourselves, has devised several explanations of the name: they were the children of Spartans who remained at home during the Messenian war and were made Helots (Antiochus of Syracuse, fr. 14 Müller Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. i. p. 184); or of Helots who married the widows of those who had fallen in the war (Theop. fr. 190 Müller i. p. 310); or of the youngest of the army who had not taken the oath to remain until the war was finished (Ephor. fr. 33 Müller i. p. 247), and were sent home to beget children.

Λύσανδρος.

For the narrative of the later life of Lysander and of his attempt to open the Spartan monarchy to all the Heraclidae of whom he himself was one, and of his overthrow by

Agesilaus whose claim to the kingdom he had previously supported, see Plutarch's Life of Lysander, 24-26.

Κινάδων ἢ τῶν ἢ π' ἢ γησιλά? συστήσας ἢ πίθεσιν ἢ π? τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις.

For a very curious account of the conspiracy of Cinadon, to which he was instigated by a desire to become one of the Spartan peers, see Xen. Hell. iii. 3. §§ 4-11.

ἢ π' ἢ γησιλά? if genuine must mean 'against Agesilaus' and (less directly) against the Spartans.

δη?λον δ? κα? τον?το ἢ κ της Τυρταίου ποιήσεως της καλουμένης Ε?νομίας.

See Bergk Frag. 2-7, p. 316.

Hanno is mentioned by Justin, xxi. 4. He is said to have lived in the time of Dionysius the younger about the year 346 and to have attempted to poison the senate and raise an insurrection among the slaves. Being detected and taken he was crucified with his family.

ταν?τα γ?ρ α? πολιτε??αί τε πειρω?νται μιν γνῶναι κα? α? πολλα? τῶν καλουμένων ἢ ριστοκρατιῶν.

ταν?τα refers to τ? δύο, democracy and oligarchy. The great difficulty is the combination of the many and the few; not of virtue with either, except from the circumstance that it so rarely exists: cp. iv. 7. §§ 3, 4, and c. 8. § 8.

δια?έρουσι γ?ρ τῶν ἢ νομαζομένων πολιτειῶν α? ἢ ριστοκρατίαι τούτ?, κα? δι? τον?τ' ε?σ?ν α? μ?ν ἢ ττον α? δ? μα?λλον μόνιμοι α?τῶν. τ?ς γ?ρ ἢ ποκλινούσας μα?λλον πρ?ς τῶν ἢ λιγαρχίαν ἢ ριστοκρατίας καλον?σιν, τ?ς δ? πρ?ς τ? πλη?θος πολιτείας.

τούτ? and δι? τον?το have been taken as follows: 1)* 'Aristocracies differ from what are termed polities in the number of elements which they combine (supra § 5), and the nature of the combination makes some of them more and some less stable.' The words which follow return to δια?έρουσι: 'there are such differences; for those of them which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, those which incline to democracy, polities.'

2) τούτ? and δι? τον?το may be thought to refer rather to what follows than to what precedes. 'Aristocracies differ from polities in that polities include numbers, and because of this difference some of them are less and some of them more stable, some inclining more to oligarchy or the government of a few, others to polity, which is the government of a larger number.'

Susemihl takes the whole passage nearly in the same manner: 3) 'Aristocracies differ from the so-called polities in this respect (i. e. in having the three elements of δη?μος, πλον?τος, ἢ ρετ? instead of the first two only), and for this reason, the former of these two kinds of governments (α?τῶν) are less stable and the latter more so. For those

which incline rather to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy are called polities; and for this reason they are safer than the others: for the greater number have more influence, and because they have equality they are more content.' Polity has only two elements, while aristocracy has three. The δημος being one-half of the polity but only one-third of the aristocracy are better pleased with the existing government and therefore less disposed to revolution.

This way of explaining the passage gives an excellent sense. But the words α? μ?ν ??ττον, α? δ? μαλλων, are partitive of α?τω?ν, which refers to α? ριστοκρατίαι and cannot therefore be applied α? μ?ν μαλλων μόνιμοι to timocracies α? δ? ??ττον μόνιμοι to aristocracies. The passage is ill written and inaccurately worded, though the general meaning is tolerably clear, namely, that there is often an ill mingling of constitutions, which in various degrees seek to unite numbers and wealth, and that of the two, numbers are the safer basis.

συνέβη δ? τ? ερημένον ?ν Θουρίοις.

Sc. the tendency of the constitution towards the prevailing element spoken of in § 7, as at Thurii from aristocracy towards oligarchy, followed by a reaction to democracy.

?ν Θουρίοις. Thurii was founded in the year 443 under the protection of Athens, and had nearly ceased to exist in 390. Yet in this short time it was subjected to at least two serious revolutions, 1) that which is mentioned here from an oligarchical aristocracy into a democracy; 2) another revolution, noted infra § 12, by which it passed from a polity into an oligarchy of a few families, whether earlier or later than the preceding, is unknown. It may be conjectured, but it is only a conjecture, that the narrowing of the aristocracy briefly alluded to in this passage is the same change with that which is afterwards mentioned more fully in § 12, and their overthrow which ensued may be further identified with the expulsion of the Sybarites soon after the foundation of the city. It may also be conjectured with considerable probability that the government of Thurii became an oligarchy at the time when the Athenian citizens were driven out, after the failure of the Syracusan expedition.

δι? μ?ν γ?ρ τ? ?π? πλείονος τιμήματος ε??ναι τ?ς ?ρχ?ς ε?ς ?λαττον μετέβη κα? ε?ς ?ρχε??α πλείω, δι? δ? τ? τ?ν χώραν ?λην το?ς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρ? τ?ν νόμον.

Lit. 'For because the qualification for office was high and also because the whole country was monopolized by the notables contrary to law, the qualification was reduced and the number of offices increased.' Either the apodosis which is attached to the first member of the sentence belongs also to the second; or a clause answering to the second has been forgotten. The revolution at Thurii was a change from aristocracy or polity to democracy. The government had grown narrow and oligarchical, and the governing class had contrived to get the land into their own hands. But the people rose against the oligarchy, lowered the qualification, increased the number of offices, and got back the land. Two reasons are given for the rising of the people, 1) the increase of the qualification for office, and 2) the monopoly of land which had passed into the hands of the notables.

For ες ῥχεῖα πλείω, cp. ii. 11. § 14, ἄσθ' ἔπου μὲ μικρὴ πόλις, πολιτικώτερον πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ῥχῶν, καὶ δημοτικώτερον· κοινότερόν τε γάρ, καθάπερ ἐπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἄκαστον ἔποτελεῖται τῶν ἀτῶν καὶ θαῖττον.

ἔτι δι' τὴν πάσας τῆς ῥριστοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἄλιγαρχικῆς εἶναι μάλλον κ.τ.λ.

Aristocracies are in fact more oligarchical than aristocratical, and 'the few' are always grasping at wealth. Cp. *infra*, c. 8. § 16.

Ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις.

The mother of Dionysius the younger was Doris a Locrian woman, and when expelled from Syracuse he was received by the citizens of Locri in a most friendly manner, but he afterwards availed himself of their good will to impose a garrison on the town. They ultimately drove out his garrison [Diodorus xiv. 44, Justin xxi. 2 and 3].

ἔν ἄν δημοκρατίῳ οἷον ἔν γένετο, οἷδ' ἔν ἄν ῥριστοκρατίῳ εἶναι μεμιγμένον.

But why not? Aristotle seems to mean that no well-governed city would have allowed one of its citizens to marry into the family of a tyrant or would have entered into relation with him in consequence: or perhaps that in a democracy or well ordered aristocracy the marriage of a single citizen could not have become a great political event.

ἔπερ συνέβαιεν ἔπ' ἄθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων.

We may paraphrase this rather singular expression, 'In the days when the Greek world was divided between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.'

παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ἔπ' ἀτῶν, ἔσπερ ἡ σοῖστικῆς λόγος.

ἔπ' ἀτῶν, sc. τῶν δαπανῶν.

σοῖστικῆς λόγος = ἡ σωρός, or 'acervus.'

τῆ μὲ ἔδικεῖν

and the following are causal or instrumental datives after δι' τὴν εἶναι χρῆσθαι. The article is to be continued with the second μὲ ἔδικεῖν.

τῆ τοῖς ἄγεμονικῆς ἀτῶν ἐσάγειν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν.

For the expression of a similar spirit acting in a wider field and giving a mythological origin to the traditional policy of Rome, cp. Tac. Ann. xi. 24: 'Quid aliud exitio Lacedaemoniis et Atheniensibus fuit, quamquam armis pollerent, nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebant? At conditor nostri Romulus tantum sapientia valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit,' and the real speech of Claudius (given by Orelli and Nipperdey in their editions).

ἴσπερ δηῆμος ἴδη οἱ ἴμοιοι, διῆ καῆ ἴν τούτοις ἴγγίγονται δημαγωγοῆ
πολλάκις, ἴσπερ ἐῆρηται πρότερον.

ἴδη, sc. ἴταν πλείους ὠῆῆσι.

ἴσπερ ἐῆρηται πρότερον refers only to the clause, διῆ καῆ . . . πολλάκις as will be seen from the comparison of c. 6. § 6 (demagogues in an oligarchy) where nothing is said about equals in an aristocracy becoming a democracy.

πρῆν παρειληῆναι καῆ ἀῆτούς.

The construction is πρῆν τῆς ἴλωνεικίας παρειληῆναι καῆ ἀῆτοῆς (sc. τοῆς ἴξω), ἴσπερ τοῆς ἴλλους.

ἀῆτοῆς may be either the subject or the object of παρειληῆναι, with a slightly different meaning. Either *‘before the spirit of contention has also carried away or absorbed them,’ or, ‘before they too have caught the spirit of contention.’

τονῆ τιμήματος τονῆ κοινονῆ τῆ πληῆθος.

i. e. the amount of the whole rateable property. The object is to preserve the same number of qualified persons, when the wealth of a city has increased or diminished.

συμῆρει τονῆ τιμήματος ἴπισκοπεῆῆν τονῆ κοινονῆ τῆ πληῆθος πρῆς τῆ παρελθῆν κατῆ τονῆτον τῆν χρόνον, ἴν ἴσαις μῆν πόλεσι τιμῆνται κατῆ ἴνιαυτόν, κ.τ.λ.

The words κατῆ τονῆτον τῆν χρόνον, though somewhat pleonastic, have a sufficiently good sense. The government is to compare the present with the past value of property at that time, i. e. with the property serving as a qualification at the time when the change is occurring (ἐῆπορίας νομίσηματος γιγνομένης). The words are placed after κατῆ ἴνιαυτῆν by Susemihl following the authority of William of Moerbek, but the meaning is thus over emphasized.

With κατῆ ἴνιαυτῆν repeat κατῆ ἴνιαυτῆν ἴπισκοπεῆῆν κ.τ.λ.

ἴν δήμῆ καῆ ἴλιγαρχίῆ καῆ μοναρχίῆ καῆ πάση πολιτείῆ.

καῆ μοναρχίῆ is omitted by Bekker in his second edition, but is found in the best MSS. The advice given is at least as applicable to kings as to other rulers of states. πάση πολιτείῆ = not ‘every constitutional government’ but in a more general sense ‘every form of government.’ (See note on text.)

τῆς παραστάσεις ἀῆτωνῆ.

= τοῆς παραστάτας, ‘their followers’ or ‘followings.’

τοῆς ζῆντας ἴσυμῆόρωσ πρῆς τῆν πολιτείαν.

As an example of a life unsuited to the state of which they are citizens may be cited the case of the Spartan Ephors, ii. 9. § 24.

τούτου δ' ἄκοσ τ' ἔε' τοῦτο ἄντικειμένοις μορίοις ἄγχειρίζειν τῶς πράξεις κα' τῶς ἄρχάς.

In this favourite remedy of 'conservation by antagonism,' which is really only an 'unstable equilibrium,' Aristotle does not seem to see how much of the force of the state is lost.

μοναχῶς δ' κα' ἄνδέχεται ἄμα ἔσθαι δημοκρατίαν κα' ἄριστοκρατίαν, ἐ' τοντο κατασκευάσειέ τις.

τοντο, sc. τ' μ' ἄπ' τῶν ἄρχῶν κερδαίνειν, to be gathered from the previous sentence.

ἄντίγραφα κα' ἄρατρίας κα' λόχους κα' ἄυλῶς τιθέσθωσαν.

λόχοι are military divisions to which in some states civil divisions appear to have corresponded. Cp. Xen. Hier. c. 9. § 5, διῄρηται μ'ν γ' ἄπασαι ἄ πόλεις ἄ μ'ν κα' ἄυλῶς ἄ δ' κα' μοίρας ἄ δ' κα' λόχους κα' ἄρχοντες ἄ ἄκάστ' ἄμέρει ἄἔσθήκασιν. The accounts apparently are to be deposited at the bureaus or centres of such divisions.

μ' μόνον τῶς κτήσεις μ' ποιεῖ ἄναδάστους, ἄλλ' ἄμηδ' τοῶς καρπούς, ἄ ἄν ἄνίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν λανθάνει γινόμενον.

As might be done by taxes or state services exclusively imposed on the rich, or by a tax of which the rate increased in proportion to the amount assessed. Infra c. 11. § 10, Aristotle tells us how Dionysius contrived in five years to bring the whole property of his subjects into his treasury. Cp. also vi. 5. § 5.

κ'ν τις ἄβρίσ' τῶν ἐπόρων ἐς τούτους, μείζω τ' ἄπιτίμια ἐσθαι ἄ ἄν σῶν ἄτῶν.

The construction is ἄν τις ἄβρίσ' τιν' σῶν ἄτῶν; but whether σῶν ἄτῶν refers 1) to ο' ἐποροι or 2)* to τούτους, i. e. τοῶς ἄπόρους, is not clear.

μηδ' ἄπλειόνων ἄ μίας τ' ἄτ' κληρονομεῖ.

Cp. Mill, Pol. Econ. Bk. v. c. 9. § 1, where he urges, much in the spirit of Aristotle and Plato, 'that no one person should be permitted to acquire by inheritance more than the amount of a moderate independence.'

τρία δέ τινα χρ' ἄχειν κ.τ.λ.

In this passage, which has the appearance of a digression, Aristotle is still speaking of the preservatives of the state.

See the summing up, § 5.

Cp. Rhet. ii. 1, 1378 a. 6, τον? μ?ν ον??ν α?το?ς ε??ναι πιστο?ς το?ς λέγοντας τρία ?στ? τ? α?τια· τοςαν?τα γάρ ?στι δι' ? πιστεύομεν ?ξω τω?ν ?ποδείξω. ?στι δ? ταν?τα ?ρόνησις κα? ?ρετ? κα? ε?νοια: also Thuc. ii. 60, where Pericles claims ε?νοια, ?ρόνησις, ?ρετή as the proper qualities of a statesman: καίτοι ?μο? τοιούτ? ?νδρ? ?ργίξασθε ?ς ο?δεν?ς ο?ομαι ?σσω ε??ναι γνω?ναί τε τ? δέοντα κα? ?ρμηνεν?σαι ταν?τα ?ιλόπολις τε κα? χρημάτων κρείσσων.

δύναμιν τω?ν ?ργων τη?ς ?ρχη?ς.

= 'administrative capacity,' 'power to do the duties of the office.'

πω?ς χρ? ποιε??σθαι τ?ν διαίρεσιν.

In this passage (cp. infra πω?ς δε?? ποιε??σθαι τ?ν α?ρεσιν) the words α?ρεσις and διαίρεσις are used almost indifferently, the latter adding to the idea of choice or selection another shade of meaning 'discrimination or separation from others,'—'how we are to discriminate in the choice.'

? ?τι ?νδέχεται κ.τ.λ.

Dependent on some more general idea to be supplied from ?πορήσειεν ?ν τις. 'May not the reason be that those who have these two qualities are possibly wanting in self control?'

?πλω?ς δέ, ?σα ?ν το??ς νόμοις ?ς συμ?έροντα λέγομεν τα??ς πολιτείας.

We need not suppose any allusion to a lost part of the Politics, or to a special treatise called 'ο? νόμοι.' The meaning is that 'enactments in the laws of states which are supposed to be for their good are preservative of states.' το??ς νόμοις = 'their laws,' the article referring to πολιτείας which follows.

ο? δ' ο?όμενοι ταύτην ε??ναι μίαν ?ρετήν.

ταύτην, sc. τ? ?λιγαρχώτατον (or δημοτικώτατον) ε??ναι gathered from the preceding sentence.

Those who consider that rigid adherence to the principles of the existing constitution, whether democracy or oligarchy, is the only object worthy of a statesman, carry their theory to an extreme. They forget that 'happy inconsistencies' may be better than extremes. The *Opportunist* may do greater service to the Republic than the *Intransigent*.

καθάπερ ?ίς.

Cp. Rhet. i. 4, 1360 a. 23, λέγω δ? τ? ?π? ο?κείων ?θείρεσθαι, ?τι ?ξω τη?ς βελτίστης πολιτείας α? ?λλαι πα?σαι κα? ?νιέμεναι κα? ?πιτεινόμεναι ?θείρονται, ο??ον δημοκρατία ο? μόνον ?νιεμένη ?σθνεστέρα γίνεται ?στε τέλος ?ξει ε?ς ?λιγαρχίαν,

ἄλλῃ καὶ ὑπερμετρήσασθαι ὁδοῦ, ὡςπερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ σιμότης οὐ μόνον ὑνιέμενα ὑρχεται ἐς τὴν μέσον, ἄλλῃ καὶ ὁδοῦ γρυπῶς γινόμενα ἡ σιμῶς οὕτω διατίθεται ὥστε μὴδὲ μυκτηῖρα δοκεῖν εἶναι.

διὲς τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἄλλειψιν τῶν ὑναντίων.

‘On account of the excess (cp. above ὑπὲρ ὑπερμετρήσασθαι) and of the defect of the opposite qualities.’

συμβαίνει δὲ τὸν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τῆς ἄλλας πολιτείας.

ἄλλας is used adverbially, as in Plato and Thucydides, in the sense of ‘likewise.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 4. § 3, περὶ τῆς τῆς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν, where ἄλλας = ‘which we are comparing with the virtues;’ and Pol. vii. 10. § 10, διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οὐκίαν.

ἔστ’ ἔχειν.

ἔστε is bracketed by Bekker (2nd edition) without reason; it is found in all the MSS. and in point of Greek is unobjectionable; cp. Περὶ Ψυχῆς ii. 1, 412 b. 25. § 11, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ὑποβεβληκῶς τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν δυνάμει ἢ ἔστε ζῆν, ἄλλ’ ἔστι ἔχον.

ὑθείροντες τοῖς καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν νῦμοις.

Sc. τοῖς ἐπὶ πόρους ἢ τὴν πληθῶς. ‘So that when they destroy either party by laws *carried to excess [or possibly ‘by laws based on superior power’] they destroy the state.’

μέγιστον δὲ πάντων . . . τὴν παιδεύεσθαι περὶ τῆς πολιτείας.

Cp. Rep. iv. 423 E, τὰντα . . . πάντα ὑανῶλα, ὑπὲρ τὴν λεγόμενον ὑν μέγα ὑυλάπτωσι, μαῶλλον δ’ ὑντὸν μεγάλου ὑκανόν. τί τὸν ὅτι; ὑπὲρ τὴν παιδείαν, ὑπὲρ δ’ ὑγῶ, καὶ τροπῆν.

νῦν μὲν γῶρ ὑν ὑνίαις ὑμνύουσι ‘καὶ τὴν δῆμῶς κακόνους ὑσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω ἢ τι ὑν ὑχω κακόν.’

The habit of taking a formal oath of hostility may be illustrated by an Inscription containing an agreement between certain Cretan cities:—

ὑμνῶ . . . θεοῖς πάντας καὶ πάσας, μὲς μὲν ὑγῶ ποκα τοῖς Λυττίοις καλωῖς ὑρονῆσεῖν μῆτε τέχνῶς μῆτε μαχαναῖς μῆτε ὑν νυκτὸς μῆτε πεδῶς ὑμέραν καὶ σπευσίῳ ἢ τι κα δύναιμι κακῶν ταῖς πόλει ταῖς τῶν Λυττίων.

The inscription is given in Vischer’s Kleine Schriften, vol. ii. p. 106.

ὑρὸς δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τὸν ὑναντίον.

‘To have the notion and act the part of one who does no wrong,’ not necessarily implying a mere profession or simulation, as c. 11. § 19 infra, ἄλλ’ τὸν ὅτι μὲν ὑσπερ

ἴσθαι δὲ μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ἰσοκρινόμενον τὴν βασιλικὴν καλῶς.

ὡν δὲ ἕν μὲν ταῦς ἡλιγαρχίαις οὗ τῶν ἰσχυρότων οὗ τρωῶσιν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 556 D, ἴσθαι ἴσχυρος ἴσχυρ πένης, ἡλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἴσχυρ μάχῃ πλουσί; ἴσχυροῦς, πολλὰς ἴσχυρτι σάρκας ἡλιότηρας. ἴσθαι ἴσχυρτος τε καὶ ἴσχυρτιος μεστόν κ.τ.λ.

ἴσθαι ἴσχυρτων.

Probably ἴσθαι is to be supplied. The words do not agree with any known passage of Euripides.

πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἴσθαι τῶν δήμου.

‘The assistance which arises from i. e. is necessitated by the people.’ Such we must infer to be the meaning from the parallel clause ἴσθαι τῶν γνωρίμων which follows.

τῶν ἴσχυρτων.

‘The good’ in the party sense, i. e. the higher classes like the ἴσχυρτος of Theognis 32 Bergk and elsewhere.

Besides the three accounts of the origin of monarchy given in i. 2. § 6 (the patriarchal); and iii. 14. § 12 and infra §§ 7, 8 (election for merit), and iv. 13. § 11 (the weakness of the middle and lower classes), we have here a fourth in which the royal authority is said to have been introduced for the protection of the aristocracy against the people.

Supra, c. 5. § 8, Aristotle speaks of tyrannies arising out of the need which democracies felt of a protector of the people against the rich before they became great (ἴσθαι τὸ μὲν μεγάλας εἶναι τῶν πόλεις); here, when they were already ‘increased in power,’ (ἴσθαι τῶν πόλεων ἡξυμένων). But the discrepancy is verbal. For the terms greatness and littleness might be used of the same states at different periods of Greek history.

οὗ δήμοι.

Not ‘the democracies,’ but ‘the peoples in different states.’

Pheidon, a legitimate king of Argos, tenth or sixth in descent from Temenus, called by Herodotus (vi. 127) a tyrant, who gave the Peloponnesians weights and measures. He is said to have driven out the Elean judges, and to have usurped authority over the Olympic games. According to Ephorus fr. 15, Müller i. p. 236, he recovered the whole lot of Temenus and attempted to reduce all the cities once subject to Heracles. He was at length overthrown by the Eleans and Lacedaemonians.

Phalaris, according to Arist. Rhet. ii. 20. § 5, 1393 b. 8 ff., was elected by his Himerian fellow citizens general and dictator of Himera. It was on this occasion that Stesichorus told the story of the Horse and his Rider. Phalaris has been generally called tyrant of Agrigentum, and it is possible that his power having begun in the one city may have extended to the other.

Panaetius is mentioned in c. 12. § 18 as having changed the government of Leontini from an oligarchy into a tyranny.

For Cypselus, who came into power as the representative of the people against the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae from which he was himself sprung, see Herod. v. 92.

ἄσπερ Κόδρος.

In the common tradition Codrus is supposed to have saved his country in a war with the Dorians by the voluntary sacrifice of his own life; here Aristotle implies that he delivered Athens from slavery by his military services.

ἄλευθερώσαντες ἄσπερ Κυνῆρος,

who delivered the Persians from the Medes. See *infra*, § 24.

κτίσαντες χώραν.

‘Who have settled a country.’

κτίζειν χώραν is said like κτίζειν πόλιν, with a slight enlargement of the meaning of the word.

ἄσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς.

Referring, probably, not to the Lacedaemonian kings generally, who cannot be said to have added, except in the Messenian Wars, to the territory of Sparta, but to the original founders of the monarchy.

Μακεδόνων.

Such as Perdiccas I., Alexander I. (Herod. viii. 137 ff.), Archelaus (Thuc. ii. 100), Philip the father of Alexander the Great and others.

Μολοττων.

Cp. *infra*, c. 11. § 2, where the moderation of the Molossian monarchy is eulogized.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλεῖστον· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὐτὸν συμφέρον σκοπεῖ· ἢ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν ἄρχομένων· οὗ γὰρ ἔστι βασιλεὺς ἢ μὲν ἀτάρκης καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἄγαθόν· ἢ δὲ τοιοντοῦ οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὸ ἔλλειμα οὐκ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι σκοποῖται τὸ ἄγαθόν· ἢ δὲ ἄρχομένοις:—in which the ideal conception of royalty maintained in the Politics also appears.

τ? Περιάνδρου πρ?ς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμα.

See note on iii. 13. § 16.

? μ?ν γ?ρ ?ρμόδιος.

Sc. ?πέθετο, to be supplied from τω?ν ?πιθέσεων, or from ?πιτίθενται (supra, § 14). Cp. Thuc. i. 20, vi. 54-58. The account of Aristotle agrees in the main with that of Thucydides, but there is no mention of the critical question raised by the latter, viz. whether Hippias or Hipparchus was the elder son of Peisistratus. The Peisistratidae are loosely spoken of as the authors of the insult, and the punishment inflicted is assumed to be the punishment of a tyrant. But the language of Aristotle is not sufficiently precise to be adduced on either side of the question.

?πεβούλευσαν δ? κα? Περιάνδρ? τ?? ?ν ?μβρακί? τυράνν?.

Mentioned above, c. 4. § 9, where, not inconsistently with the account here given, he is said to have been attacked by conspirators, although the conspirators failed in attaining their object, for the people took the government.

? ?μύντου τον? μικρον?.

Probably Amyntas the Second who flourished in the generation which followed the Peloponnesian War and succeeded after a struggle to the Macedonian throne b. c. 394, from which however he was deposed but afterwards restored by the help of the Spartans.

Derdas the prince of Elymia his kinsman, and at one time his ally, is probably the conspirator here mentioned.

? δ? Φιλίππου ?π? Πausανίου.

The only direct allusion to Philip which is found in Aristotle except Rhet. ii. 23, 1397 b. 31, κα? πάλιν πρ?ς τ? Θηβαίους διε??ναι Φίλιππον ε?ς τ?ν ?ττικήν, ?τι ε? πρ?ν βοηθη?σαι ε?ς Φωκε??ς ?ξίου, ?πέσχοντο ?ν? ?τοπον ον??ν ε? διότι προε??το κα? ?πίστευσε μ? διήσουσιν. To Alexander there is none.

The murder of Philip by Pausanias occurred at the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus b.c. 336. The mention of the circumstance shows that this passage, if not the whole of the Politics, must have been composed later than the date of this event.

The story here referred to is narrated more fully by Diodorus (xvi. 93). According to his rather incredible narrative Attalus was the uncle of Cleopatra whom Philip married in 337 b.c., and he had a friend also named Pausanias of whom the assassin Pausanias was jealous. Pausanias the friend of Attalus being abused and insulted by his namesake, sought death in battle, and Attalus, to revenge the supposed insult to his friend, invited the other Pausanias to a banquet and outraged him. When Philip could

not or would not punish Attalus, Pausanias turned his anger against the king. Nearly the same story is told by Justin ix. 6. and Plutarch Alex. c. 10.

κα? ? τον? ε?νούχου Ε?αγόρ? τ?? Κυπρί?.

Sc. ? ?πίθεσις. Ε?αγόρ? is governed by the ?π? in ?πίθεσις. The story is differently told by Theopompus (Fragm. 111, Müller i. p. 295). According to his account the eunuch Thrasydaeus got Evagoras and his sons into his power by inducing them to make assignations with a young maiden, who was the daughter of Nicocreon, a revolted subject of Evagoras. According to Diodorus (xv. 47) the name of the eunuch who conspired was Nicocles; but the name is probably a confusion with the son of Evagoras who succeeded him. Isocrates in his 'Evagoras' throws a veil over the whole story. Thus our four authorities all disagree with one another.

Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, reigned in Macedonia 413-399, and had two wives,—the name of the second was Cleopatra, the name of the first is not mentioned. He seems to have thought that he would prevent quarrels in his two families if he married a son and daughter out of each of them to one another. For Archelaus see Thuc. ii. 100 and Plat. Gorg. 470, 471; for Arrhabaeus (or Arrhibaeus) the enemy of Perdiccas, as he was afterwards the enemy of Archelaus, see Thuc. iv. 79. Of Sirra, which appears to be the name of a woman, nothing more is known. The occurrence of the name in this passage has suggested a very ingenious emendation in the words of Strabo, bk. viii. c. 7. p. 327, ? Φιλίππου μήτηρ τον? ?μύντου Ε?ρυδίκη Σί??α δ? θυγάτηρ where read Ε?ρυδίκη Σί??α δ? θυγάτηρ. (Dindorf.)

Cotys was assassinated in 358 b. c. by the brothers Heraclides and Parrhon called also Python, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 659. According to Plut. Adv. Coloten 32 and Diog. Laert. iii. 31 they had been disciples of Plato.

πολλο? δ? κα? δι? τ? ε?ς τ? σω?μα α?κισθη?ναι πληγα??ς ?ργισθέντες ο? μ?ν διέ?θειραν ο? δ' ?νεχείρησαν ?ς ?βρισθέντες, κα? τω?ν περ? τ?ς ?ρχ?ς κα? βασιλικ?ς δυναστείας.

The first κα? means that attempts were also made in consequence of personal ill-treatment of another sort, and the second κα? that they were made not only upon tyrants, but upon magistrates and royal personages. See also note on Text.

In this passage, though speaking primarily of tyrannies, Aristotle digresses into monarchies generally and oligarchies.

?νεχείρησαν, sc. δια?θείρειν.

Πενθαλίδας.

It was Penthilus, the son of Orestes, who according to Strabo, bk. ix. p. 403, xiii. p. 582, and Pausanias iii. 2. p. 207 recolonized Lesbos. The Penthalidae derived their name from him.

? δ' Ε?ριπίδης ?χάλειπαιεν ε?πόντος τι α?τον? ε?ς δυσωδίαν τον? στόματος.

This story, which casts a rather unfavourable light on the character of Euripides, is alluded to in Stobaeus, Serm. 39. p. 237, Εὐριπίδης ἠνειδίζοντος αὐτῶν τινος ἢ τι τὸ στόμα δυσωδὲς ἔην, πολλὰ γὰρ, εἴπεν αὐτῶν, πόσῃ ἡγεῖται ἡ γκατεσάπη, i. e. Some one said to Euripides, 'Your breath smells.' 'Yes,' he replied, 'for many things which might not be spoken have been decomposed in my mouth.'

ὅσπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς μοναρχίας.

We must supply περὶ in thought before μοναρχίας. It is inserted in the margin of P⁵. 'As well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government.'

ὁτι οὐκ ἔβριξεν ἠρταπάνης ἠοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τὴν περὶ Δαρεῖον, ἢ τι ἠκρέαασεν ὁ κελύσαντος ἔβριξου, ἢ ἄλλ' ὁδόμενος συγγνώσεσθαι ἢ ἠμνημονονῆντα διὰ τὸ δειπνεῖν.

The Xerxes here referred to is Xerxes the First, cp. Ctesiae Fragmenta, Περσικὰ § 29 (edit. Didot p. 51), ἠρτάπανος (sic) δὲ μέγα παρὰ ἔβριξεν δυνάμενος, μετ' ἠσπαμίτρον τὸν ἐνούχου καὶ αὐτὸν μέγα δυναμένου βουλεύονται ἠνελεῖν ἔβριξεν, καὶ ἠναιρονῆσι, καὶ πείθουσιν ἠρτοξέβριξεν (sic) τὴν υἱὴν τῆς Δαρείαος (sic) αὐτὴν ἠτερος πατρὸς ἠνεῖλε. Καὶ παραγίνεται Δαρείαος ἠγόμενος ἠπὲρ ἠρταπάνου εἰς τὴν ὀκίαν ἠρτοξέβριξου πολλὰ βῶν καὶ ἠπαρνούμενος ἢ οὐκ εἴη ἠνεῖλε τὸν πατρός· καὶ ἠποθνήσκει. According to Diod. xi. 69, Artabanus an Hyrcanian, having by a false accusation got rid of one of the sons of Xerxes, shortly afterwards attacked the other son Artaxerxes who succeeded him, but he was discovered and put to death. Both these stories, which are substantially the same, are so different from the narrative of Aristotle that it is better not to try and reconcile them by such expedients as the placing ὁ before ἠκρέμασε. The purport of Aristotle's rather obscure words seems to be as follows: Artapanes had hanged Darius the son of Xerxes who was supposed to have conspired against his father; he had not been told to hang him or he had been told not to hang him (for ὁ κελύσαντος may mean either); but he had hoped that Xerxes in his cups would forget what precisely happened.

Ctesias is several times quoted by Aristotle in the Historia Animalium but always with expressions of distrust, ii. 1. 501 a. 25, iii. 22. 523 a. 26, viii. 28. 606 a. 8; also De Gen. An. ii. 2. 736 a. 2.

Σαρδανάπαλον.

A rather mythical person apparently the same with the Assurbanipal of the Assyrian inscriptions, a mighty hunter and great conqueror, who became to the Greeks and through them to the civilized world the type of oriental luxury. The story of his effeminacy is taken by Diodorus (ii. 23-27) from Ctesias and is again referred to by Aristotle in Nic. Eth. i. 5. § 3.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἦν κείνου, ἢ ἄλλ' ἦν ἄλλου γε ἦν γένοιτο ἠληθές.

For another example of a similar manner of treating old legends, see i. 11. § 8.

Διονυσίῳ τῶν ἠστέρων Δίων ἠπέθετο.

See infra §§ 28 and 32.

ὅσπερ οὗ στρατηγόνωντες τοῖς μονάρχοις, οὗτον Κνῆρος ἑστύαγος.

Aristotle in this passage follows a legend, differing from that of Herodotus who selected the tradition about Cyrus' life (i. 95 ff.) and death (i. 214) which seemed to him the most probable. In Aristotle's version Cyrus, not Harpagus, was represented as the general of Astyages. Of a misconception entertained by Herodotus, Aristotle speaks with some severity in his *Historia Animalium*, iii. 22, 523 a. 17.

Σεύθης ἑθραῖος.

A friend and acquaintance of Xenophon who recovered his small kingdom by the help of some of the ten thousand. He is mentioned in *Anab.* vii. 3, *Hell.* iii. 2. § 2, iv. 8. § 26.

οὗτον ῥιοβαρζάνος Μιθριδάτης.

According to Corn. Nepos *Datames*, c. 11, Mithridates the son of Ariobarzanes, a revolted satrap of Pontus, attacked not Ariobarzanes but Datames the celebrated satrap of Caria. It does not therefore become less probable that he may also have attacked his own father; and the latter fact is confirmed by the allusion of Xenophon, *Cyrop.* viii. 8. 4, ὅσπερ Μιθριδάτης τὴν πατέρα ῥιοβαρζάνην προδοῦς.

οὗτος ἑκολουθεῖν δεῖ τὴν Δίωνος ἑπόλησιν.

‘There should be ever present with them the resolution of Dion.’

ἑκάνων ἀτῶν.

Sc. ἑν.

Διὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πλείστας κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας.

Διό, ‘because one form of government naturally hates another.’ Cp. *Thuc.* i. 18, ἑπειδὴ δὲ οὗ τε ἑθιναίων τύραννοι καὶ οὗ ἑκ τῆς ἑλλῆς ἑλλάδος ἑπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὶν τυραννευθείσης οὗ πλεῖστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι, πλὴν τῶν ἑν Σικελίῃ, ἑπὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν: and *Hdt.* v. 92 about the Lacedaemonian hatred to tyranny.

καὶ Συρακούσιοι.

This period of liberty and prosperity lasted for sixty years, 466-406, from the overthrow of Thrasybulus to the usurpation of Dionysius. But more is known of Sicily in the days of the tyrants than of the time when the island was comparatively free.

καὶ νῦν ἑ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον.

The final expulsion of Dionysius the younger by Timoleon occurred b. c. 343; but it is the first expulsion by Dion to which Aristotle is here referring, b. c. 356, as the Politics were written not earlier than 336 (see supra note on § 16). We have thus a measure of the latitude with which Aristotle uses the expression *καὶ νῦν* 'quite lately' which recurs in ii. 9. § 20, *καὶ νῦν ἔν τοις ἑνδείοις*.

οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν.

Either 1) the same persons who are called *οἱ κεῖνοι συστάντες*, or some part of them, *οἱ συστάντες* being taken substantively = *οἱ συστασιῶται*. Or 2) *αὐτῶν* may be understood of the whole people as if *πολλοί* had preceded; *συστάντες* would then refer to another band of conspirators who were not of the family. Bekker in his second edition has inserted *κατ'* before *αὐτῶν* without MS. authority. Susemihl suggests *μετά*. Neither emendation is satisfactory.

The reign of Thrasybulus, if indeed he reigned at all except in the name of his nephew, as seems to be implied in this passage, lasted only eleven months; see infra c. 12. § 6. According to Diodorus (xi. 67, 68), who says nothing of a son of Gelo, he immediately succeeded Hiero, but soon provoked the Syracusans by his cruelty and rapacity to expel him.

Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας, κηδεστὺς ἔν καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν δημόιον, ἑκεῖνον ἑκβαλὼν διεθάρη.

This is a reminiscence of § 28. The emphasis is on *ἑκβαλῶν*. Aristotle is speaking of cases in which tyrants were destroyed by members of their own family. He means to say that Dion drove out Dionysius who was his kinsman, although he himself perished more than twelve months afterwards when the revolution was completed. Or, 'Dion did indeed perish (as I have already implied), but not until he had driven out his kinsman Dionysius.'

ἄλλο μᾶλλον τὸ μῦθος,

sc. *χρηῖται τὸ λογισμὸς* which is supplied from the preceding sentence.

ἴσας ἀτίας ἐρήκαμεν τῆς τε ἡλιγαρχίας,

sc. *τῆς θοράς τῆς ἡλιγαρχίας*, understood from the general meaning of the preceding passage.

οἱ γίνονται δὲ τι βασιλεύουσι νῦν.

Cp. iii. 14. § 13, a passage in which the gradual decline of royalty is described.

ἄλλ' ἔν περ γίνονται, μοναρχίαι [καὶ] τυραννίδες μᾶλλον.

The objection to the *καὶ* (which is found in all the MSS.) is that *μοναρχία* is elsewhere the generic word (cp. supra §§ 1, 2), including *βασιλεία* and *τυραννίς*. If we accept the reading of the MSS., some general idea, 'wherever there are such forms of

government' must be supplied with γίνονται from βασιλεῖαι. 'There are no royalties nowadays: but if there are any,' or rather 'instead of them mere monarchies and tyrannies.' Here 'monarchies' is taken in some specific bad or neutral sense opposed to βασιλεῖαι. But a variation in a technical use of language which he was endeavouring to fix, but was not always capable of himself observing, is not a serious objection to a reading found in Aristotle's Politics.

ἡ δία γὰρ γίνετο κατάλυσις.

'For their overthrow was easily effected.' The imperfect graphically represents the historical fact.

ἢ περὶ Μολοττοῦ βασιλεία.

Cp. supra, c. 10. § 8.

Theopompus is said by Tyrtaeus to have terminated the first Messenian War, Fr. 3 Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graeci:—

ἤμετέρῳ βασιλεῖ θεοῖσι ἦλθεοπόμπῃ,
ἢν διὰ Μεσσήνην ἐλλομεν ἐρύχορον,
Μεσσήνην ἤγαθον μὲν ἤρονον, ἤγαθον δὲ ἠυτεύειν·
ἢμ' ἀτὲν δὲ ἠμάχοντ' ἠνεακαίδεκ' ἠτη
νωλεμέως, ἀεὶ ταλασίφρονα θυμὸν ἠχοντες
ἀχμητὰ πατέρων ἠμετέρων πατέρες·
ἐκοστῆ δ' οὐ μὲν κατὰ πίονα ἠργα λιπόντες,
ἠενῶγον ἠθωμαίων ἠκ μεγάλων ἠρέων.

According to Plutarch, Lyc. 7, he increased the power of the Ephors, but he also made the ἠήτρα more stringent which forbade the people to amend or modify proposals submitted to them.

In this passage the institution of the Ephors is attributed to Theopompus, but in ii. c. 9 it seems to be assumed that Lycurgus is the author of all the Spartan institutions: see note *in loc.*

ἢ γὰρ γινώσκεις πίστιν ποιεῖν μάλλον πρὸς ἠλλήλους.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 66 where the difficulty of overthrowing the 400 is attributed to the uncertainty of the citizens as to who were or were not included in the conspiracy.

καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἠπιδημονῆντας ἠεὶ ἠανεροῦς ἠεῖναι καὶ διατρίβειν περὶ θύρας.

ἠπιδημονῆντας is translated by William de Moerbek without any authority 'praefectos populi,' apparently an etymological guess.

περὶ θύρας. Either *'at his gate' or 'at their own gates.' In whichever way the words are taken, the general meaning is the same, viz. that the people are not to hide but to show themselves.

κα? τ? πένητας ποιε??ν το?ς ?ρχομένους, τυραννικόν, ?πως ? τε ?υλακ? τρέ?ηται.

1) *Reading ? τε with Bekker's second edition after Victorius: 'Also he should impoverish his subjects that he may find money for the support of his guards.' Yet the mode of expression is indirect and awkward. If 2) we retain μήτε with the MSS. we must translate either 'that he may not have to keep soldiers,' for his subjects will keep them for him; or, 'so that a guard need not be kept,' because he will be in no danger on account of the depressed state of his subjects. Neither explanation is satisfactory; there is a balance of difficulties.

?ναθήματα τω?ν Κυψελιδω?ν κ.τ.λ.

See Herod. i. 14.

Florence in the fifteenth century, and Paris in the nineteenth, witness to a similar policy.

τω?ν περ? Σάμον ?ργα Πολυκράτεια.

Lit. and 'among' or 'of the buildings of Samos the works of Polycrates.' Among these splendid works an artificial mountain containing a tunnel forming an aqueduct, a mole in front of the harbour, and the greatest temple known, are commemorated in Herod. iii. 60, but he does not expressly attribute them to Polycrates.

κα? ? ε?σορο? τω?ν τελω?ν, ο??ον ?ν Συρακούσαις; ?ν πέντε γ?ρ ?τεσιν ?π? Διονυσίου τ?ν ο?σίαν ?πασαν ε?σενηνοχέναι συνέβαινεν.

Compare a story equally incredible told of Cypselus in the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomics ii. 1346 a. 32: 'Cypselus the Corinthian made a vow that if he ever became lord of the city he would consecrate to Zeus the whole wealth of the citizens, so he bade them register themselves, and when they were registered he took from them a tithe of their property and told them to go on working with the remainder. Each year he did the like; the result was that at the end of ten years he got into his possession all which he had consecrated; the Corinthians meanwhile had gained other property.'

There are several similar legends respecting Dionysius himself recorded in the Oeconomics, such as the story of his collecting the women's ornaments, and after consecrating them to Demeter lending them to himself, 1349 a. 14; or of his taking the money of the orphans and using it while they were under age, ib. b. 15; or of his imposition of a new cattle-tax, after he had induced his subjects to purchase cattle by the abolition of the tax, ib. b. 6. The fertile imagination of the Greeks was a good deal occupied with inventions about the tyrants; the examples given throw a light upon the character of such narratives.

βουλομένων μ?ν πάντων, δυναμένων δ? μάλιστα τούτων.

Cp. note on text.

κα? γ?ρ ? δη?μος ε??ναι βούλεται μόναρχος.

i. e. 'for they are both alike.'

?λλ? γ?ρ ? ??λος, ?σπερ ? παροιμία.

Sc. ?κκρούεται, 'one nail is knocked out by another' = one rogue is got rid of by another. That is to say; 'The tyrant finds in rogues handy and useful instruments.' Such appears to be the application of the proverb in this passage. Yet the common meaning of it given in collections of proverbs is that 'one evil is mended by another.' Cp. Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, § 7, μυρία δ? κα? ?λλα ?κ τε ποιητῶν κα? συγγραφέων κα? ?ιλοσόφων καταδε??ξαί σοι ?χων, προτιμώντων τ? ?γιαίνειν, τον?το μ?ν παραιτήσομαι, ?ς μ? ε?ς ?πειροκαλίαν τιν? μειρακιώδη ?κπέσ? μοι τ? σύγγραμμα κα? κινδυνεύωμεν ?λλ? ?λλ? ?κκρούειν τ?ν ??λον.

α?τ?ν γ?ρ ε??ναι μόνον ?ξιο?? τοιον?τον ? τύραννος.

Compare the saying attributed to the Russian Emperor Paul, 'Il n'y a pas de considerable ici que la personne à laquelle je parle, et pendant le temps que je lui parle.' Wallace's Russia, p. 280, ed. 8.

ο?θ?ν δ' ?λλείπει μοχθηρίας.

Sc. ? τύραννος; or ο?θ?ν may be the nominative to ?λλείπει.

ε?ς ο?ς μ?ν ον??ν ?ρους . . . ?ρονῶσιν.

The end of § 16 is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd Edition (after Schneider). It is only a repetition of what goes before, the three aims of the tyrant being stated in a different order.

The 1st in § 15 = 3rd in § 16.

The 2nd in § 15 = 1st in § 16.

The 3rd in § 15 = 2nd in § 16.

The parallel words are either a summary or a duplicate.

But there is no reason for excluding either of the two passages any more than for excluding the repetitions in Homer. Both versions can hardly be supposed to have come from the hand of Aristotle, but they belong to a text which we cannot go behind.

? δ' ?τερος σχεδ?ν ?ξ ?ναντίας ?χει το??ς ε?ρημένοις τ?ν ?πιμέλειαν.

Literally, 'the other manner of preserving a tyranny takes pains,' i.e. works, 'from an opposite direction.'

ἂν ὑλάττοντα μόνον τὴν δύναμιν τοντο μὲν ὅπερ ὀφίθειν δεῖ μένειν, τὸ δὲ ἄλλα τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ὀποκρινόμενον τὸ βασιλικὸν καλῶς.

Compare Machiavelli, who in his ‘Prince’ goes much farther than Aristotle in preaching the doctrine of ‘doing evil that good may come’ and of ‘keeping up appearances’ and of ‘fear to be preferred to love.’ ‘Let it be the Prince’s chief care to maintain his authority; the means he employs, be they what they may, will for this purpose always appear honourable and meet applause; for the vulgar are ever caught by appearances and judge only by the event.’ (c. 18, Bohn’s Translation, p. 461.) Again ‘A prince ought to be very sparing of his own or of his subjects’ property.’ . . . ‘To support the reputation of liberality, he will often be reduced to the necessity of levying taxes on his subjects and adopting every species of fiscal resource, which cannot fail to make him odious.’ (c. 16. pp. 454, 455.) And for much of what follows, *infra* §§ 20, 25: ‘He should make it a rule above all things never to utter anything which does not breathe of kindness, justice, good faith and piety; this last quality it is most important for him to appear to possess, for men judge more from appearances than from reality.’ (ib.) Again, *cp.* §§ 22, 23 with Machiavelli c. 19. p. 462: ‘Nothing in my opinion renders a prince so odious as the violation of the rights of property and disregard to the honour of married women. Subjects will live contentedly enough under a prince who neither invades their property nor their honour, and then he will only have to contend against the pretensions of a few ambitious persons whom he can easily find means to restrain. A prince whose conduct is light, inconstant, pusillanimous, irresolute and effeminate is sure to be despised—these defects he ought to shun as he would so many rocks and endeavour to display a character for courage, gravity, energy and magnificence in all his actions.’ Like Aristotle he advises that princes should practise economy and not overcharge the people with taxes; they should give festivals and shows at certain periods of the year and ‘should remember to support their station with becoming dignity,’ p. 476. *Cp.* Hallam, *Mid. Ages* i. 66, ‘The sting of taxation is wastefulness. What high-spirited man could see without indignation the earnings of his labour yielded ungrudgingly to the public defence become the spoil of parasites and speculators?’ (quoted by Congreve).

Bekker in his 2nd edition, following a suggestion of Schneider, adds εἰς before δωρεάς, but unnecessarily.

The moderation here described in everything but ambition was shown by the elder Dionysius as he is pictured by Cornelius Nepos *De Regibus* c. 2: ‘Dionysius prior . . . et manu fortis et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuæ imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum id studuit munire, nullius percipit vitæ, quem ejus insidiatorem putaret.’

The second Dionysius would furnish a tyrant of the opposite type (§ 23), if we may believe the writer of the Aristotelian *Polity* of Syracuse, ἠριστοτέλης δὲ ἦν τῆς Συρακοσίων πολιτείας καὶ συνεχῶς ἦσεν αὐτῶν [Διονύσιον τὴν νεώτερον] ὅσθ’ ἦτε ἦν ἡμέρας ἡνεθήκοντα μεθύειν διὲ καὶ ἡμβλυπότερον γενέσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς. (Arist. *Berl. Ed.* 1568, b. 19.)

φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοντο ποιόντες.

These words curiously illustrate the love of ostentation inherent in the Greek character.

κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δεῖ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

Like Polycrates at Samos, Gelo at Syracuse, Cypselus and Periander at Corinth, Theron at Agrigentum, Peisistratus at Athens.

κολάσεως.

Bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition after Schneider. Certainly the word is not appropriate if taken with ἡλικίαν, but ἄβρεως may be supplied with τῆς ἐξ τῆς ἡλικίαν from the preceding.

διαθείραντες.

Sc. τὴν τύραννον.

χαλεπὴν θυμὸν μάχεσθαι.

Quoted in Nic. Eth. ii. 3. § 10, ἵτι χαλεπότερον ἴδονηθῆ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμὸν, καθάπερ ἴησῆν ἴράκλειτος.

For the arts of the tyrant cp. Machiavelli's 'Prince' quoted above, especially chaps. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23.

μάλιστα μὲν ἴμωτέρους ἴπολαμβάνειν δεῖ σῶζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἴρχην.

The consciousness that no other government could hold the balance between irreconcilable parties seems to have been the main support of recent French Imperialism.

ἵτι δ' ἀτῆν διακέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἴθος ἵτοι καλωῖς πρὸς ἴρετῆν ἢ ἴμίχρηστον ἴντα, κατὰ μὲ πονηρῆν ἴλλ' ἴμπόνηρον.

Cp. Machiavelli, Prince, c. 15. p. 453, in a still more subtle style of reflection: 'It would doubtless be happy for a prince to unite in himself every species of good quality, but as our nature does not allow of so great a perfection a prince should have prudence enough to avoid those defects and vices which may occasion his ruin.' And again: 'He should not shrink from encountering some blame on account of vices which are important to the support of his states; for there are some things having the appearance of virtues which would prove the ruin of a prince, should he put them in practice, and others upon which, though seemingly bad and vicious, his actual welfare and security entirely depend.'

Hdt. vi. 126 gives the Sicyonian tyrants as 1) Andreas, 2) Myron, 3) Aristonymus, 4) Cleisthenes. According to Pausanias x. 7. § 3. p. 814 Cleisthenes is said to have won a

victory in the Pythian games b.c. 582. Grote (vol. iii. c. 9. p. 43) says ‘there is some confusion about the names of Orthagoras and Andreas. It has been supposed with some probability that the same person is designated under both names: for the two names do not seem to occur in the same author.’ Orthagoras, ‘speaker for the right,’ may have been a surname or second name of Andreas. *Infra* § 12, Aristotle supposes the tyranny to have passed directly from Myron to Cleisthenes.

Πεισίστρατον ἡγομεθαί ποτε προσκληθέντα δίκην εἶς ἄρειον πάγον.

According to Plutarch in the life of Solon c. 31 he is said to have gone to the Court of the Areopagus intending to defend himself against a charge of homicide, but his accuser did not appear.

Cypselidae.

The addition in this passage appears to be incorrect.

Cypselus	30 years.
Periander	44 years.
Psammetichus	3 years.

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From these numbers how does Aristotle get a total 73½ years?

Sylburg would change τρία καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα into ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα. Giphanius would omit καὶ τέτταρα after τετταράκοντα. Susemihl would change τέτταρα into ἑμισυ, which would give exactly the sum wanted. Goettling has a very farfetched and groundless supposition that the reign of Psammetichus was omitted by Aristotle in the addition, because he was only a commander of mercenaries and not of Cypselid blood. It might also be suggested that some of the reigns overlap in consequence of a tyrant adopting his successor as colleague. But a mistake either of Aristotle or his copyists is more likely.

All the MSS. read τέτταρα or τέσσαρα.

τριάκοντα καὶ πέντε.

Hdt. v. 65 makes the Peisistratidae rule Athens 36 years.

Peisistratus seized the sovereignty in 560 b.c. and died in 527; he reigned 17 years out of the 33. Hippias reigned 14 years before the death of Hipparchus (514), and in the year 510, four years afterwards, he was expelled. 17 + 14 + 4 = 35.

The whole period 560-510 is 50 years, 35 of actual rule. In the calculation of Herodotus there is a year more. From Thuc. vi. 54 we learn that even at Athens not 100 years after the event, there were erroneous ideas about the expulsion of the Peisistratidae.

Here the addition is correct. $7 + 10 + 1 = 18$, although the time assigned to Hiero's reign does not agree with the statement of Diodorus (xi. 66) that he reigned 11 years. But why does Aristotle omit Dionysius, whose tyranny lasted longer, and therefore afforded a better example? Dionysius I b.c. 405-367, Dionysius II 367-356, and again 346-344, besides the shorter reigns of Dion and others, in all about 60 years.

ἴδιως.

i.e. in any way specially applicable to that form of government.

We may observe that Aristotle criticises the Platonic number as if it had a serious meaning: yet he omits τρῶς ἀξιοθεῖς, words which are an essential part of the calculation, after δύο ἰσωνίας παρέχεται. (See Rep. viii. 546 C.)

διὰ τε τονῶ χρόνου.

Sc. τί ἴδιως ἐνη μεταβολῶ to be supplied from the preceding sentence. 'And in what is any special change made by time?' i.e. What has time alone to do with the changes of states?

With τῶ μὴ ἰσόμενα supply τί or διὰ τί from τί ἴδιως ἐνη above; cp. διὰ τίν' ἀτίαν (infra § 10). 'And why should things which do not begin together change together?'

διὰ τίν' ἀτίαν ἢ καὶ ταύτης ἐς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει;

Aristotle unfairly criticizes Plato's order as if it were meant to be an order in time. The same objection might be taken to his own use of the phrases μεταβάλλειν and μεταβαίνειν in Nic. Eth. viii. 10, where he talks as if states always 'passed over' into their opposites:—the 'passing over' is logical, a natural connexion of ideas, not always historical.

ἴτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει οὐτ' ἐστὶ μεταβολή, οὐτ' ἐμὲ ἴσται, διὰ τίν' ἀτίαν, καὶ ἐς ποίαν πολιτείαν.

1) *'He never says whether tyranny is or is not liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them and into what form it changes'—a condensed sentence in which καὶ is omitted before διὰ τίν' ἐς ποίαν πολιτείαν, sc. ἴσται μεταβολή.

2) It is also possible and perhaps better, with Bekker in his second edition, to place a comma after the second οὐτε: οὐτ', ἐμὲ ἴσται, διὰ τίν' ἀτίαν. (It will be remembered that tyranny is the last development of the Platonic cycle, and it is natural to ask 'Why does not the cycle continue or return into itself?') The meaning may then be paraphrased as follows: 'He never says whether (as might be expected) tyranny, like other forms of government, experiences a change, or if not, what is the explanation of this inconsistency?'

ἴ Χαριλάου.

According to Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 2 Müller) Charillus, as the name is also spelt in ii. 10. § 2, or Charilaus, as here, made himself tyrant during the absence of Lycurgus, who on his return to Sparta restored or introduced good order. The change which he then effected in the constitution of Sparta is called by Aristotle, who appears to follow the same tradition, a change from tyranny to aristocracy.

τὴν Καρχηδόνι.

Sc. τυραννὴς μετέβαλεν εἰς ῥηστοκρατίαν. Yet he says in Book ii. c. 11. § 2 — ‘that Carthage has never had a sedition worth speaking of, nor been under a tyrant,’ and a similar statement occurs in this chapter (§ 14). Cp. also vi. 5. § 9, τοιοντοῦτον δέ τινα τρόπον Καρχηδόνιοι πολιτευόμενοι ἴλον κέκτηνται τὴν δημοκρατίαν· ἔτι γάρ τινας ἠκρόμυνοι τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὴν περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν ἐφόρους κ.τ.λ. To avoid this apparent contradiction St. Hilaire conjectures Χαλκηδόνι, a useless emendation of which there can be neither proof nor disproof; for we know nothing of the history of Chalcedon and not much of the history of Carthage.

It might be argued that the text as it stands may refer to a time in the history of Carthage *before* the establishment of the aristocratical constitution described in Bk. ii. c. 11, as he says in this very passage of Lacedaemon, § 12, that it passed from tyranny into aristocracy. But such a violent supposition is hardly to be assumed in order to save Aristotle’s consistency. In § 14 *infra*, he calls Carthage a democracy. In ii. 11. § 5, he talks of it as having a democratic element.

τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικὴν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle is really objecting to a figure of speech, Plat. Rep. iv. 422 E; viii. 551 D. It may be certainly said of a state which is governed by an oligarchy, with much more truth than of a timocracy or democracy, that it consists of two cities.

Bekker inserts καὶ in his 2nd Edition—ἠστυεῖται (καὶ) κατατοκίζονται. The addition makes no change in the sense.

μεταβάλλουσιν οἱ θῆναι μάλλον οἱ δὲ ποτε εἰς δημοκρατίαν ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν.

Yet in iii. 15. § 12, Aristotle says that oligarchies passed into tyrannies and these into democracies.

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BOOK VI.

The greater part of Book vi. has been already anticipated in iv. There are also several repetitions of Book v. A few sentences may be paralleled out of ii. and iii. (See English Text.) The whole is only a different redaction of the same or nearly the same materials which have been already used; not much is added. The varieties of democracy and oligarchy and the causes of their preservation or destruction are treated over again, but in a shorter form. The management of the poor is worked out in greater detail: the comparison of the military and civil constitution of a state is also more precise and exact. The magistrates required in states are regarded from a different point of view: in iv. they are considered chiefly with reference to the mode of electing them and their effect on the constitution; in vi. they are enumerated and described, and the officers necessary to all states are distinguished from those which are only needed in certain states. There are several passages in which a previous treatment of the same subjects is recognized (1. § 1, § 5, § 8, § 10; 4. § 1, § 15; 5. § 2; 8. § 1). The references seem to have been inserted with a view of combining the two treatments in a single work.

ἤμα τε περὶ ἡκεῖνων ἐστὶ τι λοιπὸν

seems to indicate the supplementary character of this part of the work. 1) ‘As well as any omission of those matters (ἡκεῖνων) which have just been mentioned,’ i. e. the offices, law-courts, etc.; or 2*) ἡκεῖνων may refer to the forms of constitutions [πολιτεῖων].

Bekker in his 2nd edition inserts περὶ τὸ before βουλευόμενον in § 4, and ἤπερ before δεῖ in § 6 without any authority, both apparently in order to make the language smoother and more regular. But this is not a good reason for altering the text of Aristotle.

ἀπὸ τῆς δὲ τῶν ἡκεῖνων καλονοῦσιν τινες ἡλιγαρχίαν,

‘which they call oligarchy,’ is perhaps only an example of unmeaning pleonasm like the expression ἡ καλούμενος ἡρ, Meteor. i. 3, 339 b. 3; τῶν τῶν καλουμένου γάλακτος ἡύσιν, Pol. i. 8. § 10. But it is also possible that Aristotle here uses the term in the wider sense in which he has previously spoken of oligarchy and democracy as the two principal forms of government under which the rest are included (iv. 3. § 6). Cp. note on iv. 8. § 1.

τῆς δὲ ἡπαντα τανῶτα.

‘All the democratic elements of which he has spoken generally and is going to speak more particularly,’ i. e. election by lot, elections of all out of all, no property qualification, payment of the citizens (etc., see infra c. 2. § 5), ‘may exist in the same state.’

ἄς ἔν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείῃ ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἰλευθερίας.

μετέχοντας, accusative absolute, or a second accusative after λέγειν ἐπόθεσιν, the subject and object being nearly the same.

τὸν τ' εἶναι καὶ τέλος, καὶ τὸν τ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον.

‘That is also the end, and that is the just principle.’

ἐπερ τὸν δούλου ἔντος τὸ ζῆν.

The MSS. vary between δουλεύοντος and δούλου ἔντος. Supply ἔστι or some weaker word than ἔργον.

συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἰλευθερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἔσον.

‘The impatience of control passes into the love of equality; mankind are unwilling to be ruled and therefore they rule and are ruled in turn. Thus the two characteristics of freedom meet or coincide.’

τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἕκ πάντων.

The old translator takes this as if he read ἕκ. But we may retain καί, regarding ἕκ πάντων as explanatory of the manner in which the whole people exercised their judicial functions by the election of smaller bodies out of their own number.

τὸ τὴν ἑκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων, ἔρχεν δὲ μηδεμίαν μηθενὲς ἢ ἔτι ἰλιγίστων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν.

The passage as it stands in the MSS. [ἢ ἔτι ἰλιγίστων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν] gives no suitable meaning. It is possible to correct it 1*) by placing the words ἢ τῶν μεγίστων after πάντων, or 2) by inserting μὲ before τῶν μεγίστων [Lambinus].

ἔρχων

is used in the generic sense to include the ἑόριστος ἔρχ of iii. 1. § 7.

μεθόδῃ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης.

Sc. iv. 6. § 5 and c. 15. § 13.

τῶν ἔρχων ἄς ἰνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετ' ἰλλήλων.

i. e. the chief magistrates whom the law required to take their meals together. This, which is a regulation prescribed by Aristotle in vii. 12. § 2, may be inferred to have been the general custom.

ἔτι ἔπειδ' ἰλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῃ καὶ παιδείῃ ἰρίζεται κ.τ.λ.

The term oligarchy is here used nearly in the sense of aristocracy. Education cannot be said to be characteristic of oligarchy in the strict sense of the word. Cp. iv. 8. § 3. 'The term aristocracy is applied to those forms of government which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth.'

ἢ πῶς δὲ τῶν ῥηθῶν τὴν μηδεμίαν ἴδιον εἶναι.

Sc. δημοτικῶν δοκεῖν εἶναι. For the general power of the ancient magistrates cp. iii. 16. § 1; v. 1. §§ 10, 11; c. 10. § 5.

ἢ ῥα[Editor: illegible character]ας μεταβολῆς.

These words are translated in the text *'has survived some ancient change'; they may also mean, though the expression is somewhat inaccurate, 'have survived from the old state before the change.' For an example of such a 'survival' compare the custom at Epidamnus of the magistrates going into the assembly at elections, v. 1. § 10.

τὴν μὲν ὅλην κοινῶς ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταντ' ἴστί.

ταντα, i. e. 'election out of all, all over each, each over all, some payment for services, poverty, mean birth are in various degrees characteristic of all democracies.'

τὴν μὴθ' ἄλλων ῥεῖν τοῖς πῶροις ἢ τοῖς ἐπῶροις

is the reading of all the MSS. except one, and is supported by Moerbek. The phrase is peculiar: 'that the poor should no more have power than the rich' — we might expect rather 'that the rich should no more have power than the poor.' But Aristotle is speaking of democracy in the previous passage. It has been suggested that we should transpose the words; for the confusion of ἐπῶροι and πῶροι (ii. 11. § 12, iii. 17. § 4, and v. 3. § 8) is common, and renders such a transposition not improbable. But a sufficiently good meaning is elicited from the text as it stands.

ἢ δὲ μετὰ τὸντο ῥεῖται πῶς ἕξουσι τὴν ἴσον, πότερον δεῖ τὴν τιμήματα διελεῖν χιλίους ἢ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοῖς χιλίοις ἴσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἢ ὅχι ὁτῶ δεῖ τίθηναι τὴν κατὰ τὸντο ἴσότητα, ἢ διελεῖν μὴν ὁτῶς, ἢ πεῖτα ἢ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἢ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίου εἶναι τῶν διαίρεσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων.

The meaning of the first case (πότερον δεῖ τὴν τιμήματα κ.τ.λ.) is that the five hundred men of property should have as many votes as the thousand; of the second case that the proportion between the rich and the poor being maintained (500 = 1000), the electors instead of voting directly should choose representatives in equal numbers and transfer to them all the electoral and judicial power.

χιλίους is the dative after διελεῖν: 'to distribute to or among the thousand the qualification of the 500.' The clause which follows (καὶ . . . πεντακοσίοις) is explanatory and illustrates the meaning. The qualification of the 500 is to be distributed among the 1000, and so the 1000 are equal to the 500. Others take the words with ἴσον δύνασθαι, placing a comma at διελεῖν, 'and arrange the

qualifications so that the votes of the 500 should be equal to those of the 1000, and the 1000 equal to the 500.' According to this way of taking the passage, τὸ τιμήματα τῶν πεντακοσίων is not parallel with χιλίοις, sc. πολίταις, for which we should have expected τοῖς τῶν χιλίων. The irregularity is not continued in the next clause.

διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως. 'We ought to distribute the qualification in this proportion, i. e. so that 1000 shall have together as much as 500 have together; and carry out the principle by electing an equal number of representatives from both.' In the previous case Aristotle supposes a direct election, in this an election through representatives.

The word διαίρεσιν in this passage is doubtful. If genuine, it probably means the distribution of the citizens in classes or courts, like διελεῖν in the previous sentence (ἄλλ' διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως κ.τ.λ.).

λέγουσι γὰρ ὅτι τῶν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τὸν τ' εἰ[Editor: illegible character]ναί δεῖν κύριον κ.τ.λ.

'It is commonly said that the majority must prevail, but in the majority the elements both of wealth and numbers have to be included. Suppose for example there are ten rich and twenty poor, six rich are of one opinion, fifteen poor of another. Five poor vote with the six rich, and four rich with the fifteen poor. When both are added up, then of whichever side the qualification exceeds, that is supreme.'

In the instance given, assuming the qualification of the poor to be half that of the rich then the votes of the side on which

the poor have a majority = $4 \times 2 + 15 = 23$,

the rich have a majority = $6 \times 2 + 5 = 17$,

Majority of poor . . . 6

The precise arithmetical expression which is given to an imaginary problem is rather curious. It is also remarkable that the formula which is used seems applicable to timocracy rather than to democracy, which is now being discussed. But here as elsewhere Aristotle is always trying to escape from democracy pure and simple.

ποτ[Editor: illegible character]ρων οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ τίμημα ἡπερτείνει συναριθμουμένων ἡμωτέρων ἡκατέροις, τὸν τ' εἰ[Editor: illegible character]ναί δεῖν κύριον.

ἡκατέροις is the dative after ἡπερτείνει and a pleonastic explanation of ἡποτέρων.

λέγω δὲ πρώτην ἡσπερ ἡν τις διέλοι τοῖς δήμοις βέλτιστος γὰρ δηῖμος ἡ γεωργικός ἡστιν, ἡστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἡνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν, ἡπου ζητῆται ἡπληθός ἡπὲρ γεωργίας ἡνομητός.

ἡσπερ ἡν τις κ.τ.λ. is the explanation of πρώτην, 'I call it the first, meaning that which comes first in the classification of democracies,' because it is the best and most natural, implied in βέλτιστος γὰρ δηῖμος.

ποιεῖν ὑδέχεται δημοκρατίαν. The commentators require the addition of βελτίστην which may be supplied from βέλτιστος. Or Aristotle may mean, that you can have a democracy (though not commonly found to exist) among a rustic population, for that is the very best material of a democracy.

π? γεωργίας ? νομη?ς. Aristotle is here speaking not of nomadic tribes ‘cultivating their living farm’ (i. 8. § 6), who are far from being the most peaceable of mortals, not of an exclusively pastoral life at all (cp. § 11 infra), but of the tending of cattle as one of the ordinary pursuits of an agricultural population.

δι? μ?ν γ?ρ τ? μ? πολλ?ν ο?σίαν ?χειν ?σχολος, ?στε μ? πολλάκις ?κκλησιάζειν· δι? δ? τ? μ? ?χειν τ?ναγκα??α πρ?ς το??ς ?ργοις διατρίβουσι κα? τω?ν ?λλοτρίων ο?κ ?πιθυμον?σιν.

It may appear strange that their being poor should be a reason why people do not desire the property of others. But though a little paradoxical the meaning is clear. Aristotle is describing a population which having little or no independent means, is absorbed in labour, and can only obtain through their labour the necessaries of life; they are patient as well as industrious, and too busy to covet the property of others.

κ?ν μ? μετέχουσι τη?ς α?ρέσεως τω?ν ?ρχω?ν ?λλά τινες α?ρετο? κατ? μέρος ?κ πάντων, ?σπερ ?ν Μαντινεί?.

These words probably mean that a body of representatives elected the magistrates, this body consisting of persons elected in turn, or by sections out of all the citizens. A similar principle was adopted in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian (iv. 14. § 4), in which the citizens were to deliberate by turns, as here they elect by turns.

κα? δε?? νομίζειν κα? τον?τ’ ε??ναι σχη?μά τι δημοκρατίας, ?σπερ ?ν Μαντινεί? ποτ’ ??ν.

So iv. 9. § 7, πολλο? γ?ρ ?γχειρον?σι λέγειν ?ς δημοκρατίας ο?σης [τη?ς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας] δι? τ? δημοκρατικ? πολλ? τ?ν τάξιν ?χειν. Mantinea is to be counted as a democracy ‘after a fashion,’ at a certain period of her history, because the electors to offices, although themselves a small body only, were elected by all, and because the whole people had the right of deliberating. Schneider thinks that the names of the magistrates mentioned in the treaty made between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis, b. c. 420 (Thuc. v. 47), likewise indicate a democratic form of government. But this is fanciful. That Mantinea was at that time a democracy may be more safely inferred from the alliance which she formed with Athens and Argos. Aristotle’s cautious language would lead us to suppose that the government of Mantinea, though not strictly speaking a democracy, wore the appearance of one, and was a form of government which he himself greatly admired, being in name a democracy but in reality administered by its chief citizens.

The chief magistrates are to be a select class possessing a high qualification, but they will be controlled by the whole people. Thus the democratical constitution is supposed to be happily balanced. But it may be questioned whether a democracy

which has a supreme power in the assembly would be willing to elect its magistrates from a privileged class. It may equally be doubted, whether a great people like the Athenians would have submitted to the checks and artifices by which democracy is bridled. Such theories of government look well in books, but they are 'paperconstitutions' only. They may sometimes be realized in fact when events have prepared the way for them; but cannot be imposed as the behests of political philosophy on a reluctant people merely with a view to their good.

δι? δ? κα? συμ?έρον ?στ? τη?? πρότερον ?ηθείσ? δημοκρατί?.

δι? refers to what has preceded. 'And because of the general contentment which is thereby secured, it is advantageous to this rural form of democracy to be allowed to elect officers and review and judge': a thought which is illustrated in what follows, § 6.

?ρχειν το?ς ?πεικε??ς ?ναμαρτήτους ?ντας.

Lit. 'and they are blameless,' 'do no wrong,' or taken in connexion with the preceding words, as in the translation, *'are prevented from doing wrong.' An example of a condensed sentence in which two thoughts are compressed into one.

πρ?ς δ? τ? κατασκευάζειν γεωργ?ν τ?ν δη?μον τω?ν τε νόμων τιν?ς τω?ν παρ? το??ς πολλο??ς κειμένων τ? ?ρχα??ον χρήσιμοι πάντες, ? τ? ?λωσ μ? ?ξε??ναι κεκτη?σθαι πλείω γη?ν μέτρου τιν?ς ? ?πό τινος τόπου πρ?ς τ? ?στυ κα? τ?ν πόλιν.

?πό τινος τόπου, 'beginning from a certain place,' reckoned in relation to the town. *If reckoning inwards, we must supply μ? from μ? ?ξε??ναι; if outwards, the force of μ? is not continued.

'The law provided that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land; or, if he did, it was not to be within a certain distance of the city; or, regarded from another point of view, it was to be beyond a certain distance from the city.' In other words he was not to monopolize the valuable portions of the land (cp. Plato's Laws, v. 739 foll.), which were to be distributed among as many of the citizens as possible.

?στυ the city is more precisely defined by πόλις, the Acropolis, as at Athens, cp. Thuc. ii. 15.

?στι δ? κα? ?ν λέγουσιν ?ξύλου νόμον ε??ναι τοιον?τόν τι δυνάμενος, τ? μ? δανείζειν ε?ς τι μέρος της ?παρχούσης ?κάστ? γη?ς.

That is to say, a certain portion of the land could not be pledged, and was therefore always clear of incumbrances. In ancient as well as in modern times there were agricultural troubles; and many plans were devised for securing the peasant proprietor against the money-lender.

νν?ν δ? δε?? διορθον?ν κα? τ?? ??υταίων νόμ?· πρ?ς γ?ρ ? λέγομεν ?στ? χρήσιμος. ?κε??νοι γάρ, καίπερ ?ντες πολλο? κεκτημένοι δ? γη?ν ?λίγην, ?μωσ πάντες

γεωργον?σιν· τιμω?νται γ?ρ ο?χ ?λλας τ?ς κτήσεις, ?λλ? κατ? τηλικαν?τα μόρια
διαιρον?ντες ?στ' ?χειν ?περβάλλειν τα??ς τιμήσεσι κα? το?ς πένητας.

διορθον?ν. 'Now, when through the want of an enactment such as that which is
ascribed to Oxylyus the evil has already sprung up, we should correct it by the law of
the Aphytaeans.'

The object aimed at was to maintain or to preserve a large number of small
proprietors who were freemen. This was effected at Aphytis by dividing the lots into
small portions, each of which gave a qualification for citizenship, so that every one,
however poor, was included: e.g. suppose a citizen of Aphytis to have possessed fifty
acres, and that forty of these were seized by the usurer, still the remaining ten were
sufficient to preserve his rights of citizenship. Or, more generally, 'though the
properties were often larger, the portion of land required for a qualification was
small.'

The meaning of ?περβάλλειν is doubtful. It has been thought to mean that 'even the
small proprietors exceeded in number some other class, i.e. the rich or the inhabitants
of the town,' or* better 'they exceeded the amount required.'

Aphytis was a city in Pallene, which, according to Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 39, Müller,
vol. ii. p. 223, bore an excellent character for honesty among Hellenic cities. Δικαίως
κα? σω?ρόνως βιον?σιν κα? ?λλοτριών ο? θιγγάνουσιν ?νε?γμένων τω?ν θυρω?ν.
Then follows the story of the stranger who bought wine and entrusted it to no one, but
on returning after a voyage found it in the same place.

τ? πρ?ς τ?ς πολεμικ?ς πράξεις.

Not to be taken after γεγυμνασμένοι; nor is it necessary with some editors to bracket
τά. Translate, 'and as regards military actions, their mode of life is an excellent
training for them.' Compare Alexander's speech to his army, made a few months
before his death, 323 b.c., recorded by Arrian, Exped. Alexandri, vii. 9, in which he
contrasts the Oriental luxury of his Macedonian soldiers with their former life as
mountain shepherds.

The pastoral democracies of the Swiss mountains have been among the most lasting
democracies in the world, and they have also furnished some of the best soldiers.

?πομένως δε?? παρεκβαίνειν,

sc. τ?ς ?λλας. 'The other sorts must deviate in a corresponding order.'

?πομένως, i.e. 'in an order corresponding to their goodness or badness,' gathered from
βελτίστην κα? πρότην.

χε??ρον ?ε? πλη?θος χωρίζειν.

'At each stage we shall exclude a population worse in kind than at the preceding
stage.' Thus the first and best kind of democracy excludes the class of τεχν??ται (and

a fortiori of course all below them). The second excludes the θη?τες, and so on till at last nobody remains to be excluded. For the analogous process in oligarchy, cp. *infra* c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

? δ? ?θείρειν συμβαίνει κα? ταύτην κα? τ?ς ?λλας πολιτείας, ε?ρηται πρότερον τ? πλε??στα σχεδόν.

Either the stress is to be laid upon κα? ταύτην, to which the words κα? τ?ς ?λλας are subordinated, for other states have not been spoken of, ‘Most of the causes which are wont to destroy this like other states, have been already mentioned.’ Or, if the emphasis on κα? τ?ς ?λλας πολιτείας is retained, the reference is to the causes of the destruction of states in bk. v.

? δ? . . . ε?ρηται. The connexion is, ‘But I need not speak of the causes which destroy states; for they have been already spoken of.’ For the absolute use of μα?λλον cp. *Plat. Phaedo* 63 D, ?ησ? γ?ρ θερμαίνεσθαι μα?λλον το?ς διαλεγομένους.

?παν γ?ρ ο?κε??ον τον?το τ?? τοιούτ? δήμ? μα?λλον.

The last word qualifies ο?κε??ον: ‘For all this admission of citizens is rather natural than alien to a democracy of this kind.’

?περ συνέβη τη?ς στάσεως α?τιον γενέσθαι περ? Κυρήνην.

?περ = the violence of the democracy which was established after the overthrow of the royal power (*Herod. iv. 161*), about 460 or 450 b.c., and was extended at a somewhat later period in the history of Cyrene.

Κλεισθένης.

Cp. *Hdt. v. 69*, ?ς γ?ρ δ? τ?ν ?θηναίων δη?μον πρότερον ?πωσμένον τότε πάντα (*al. lect. πάντων*) πρ?ς τ?ν ?ωυτον? μο??ραν προσεθήκατο, τ?ς ?υλ?ς μετουνόμασε κα? ?ποίησε πλεν?νας ?ξ ?λασσόνων. δέκα τε δ? ?υλάρχους ?ντ? τεσσέρων ?ποίησε, δέκα δ? κα? το?ς δήμους κατένεμε ?ς τ?ς ?υλάς.

Cp. *Schömann’s Antiquities of Greece, Engl. Transl., p. 336.*

The breaking up old divisions in an army and a state is not a mere change of names, but of traditions, customs, personal relations—to the ancients even of gods. The division of France into departments, the reorganisation of Italy and Germany, or, to take a minor instance, the recent redistribution of the English regiments, are modern examples of the manner in which such changes affect the habits of men or offend their prejudices.

?στι δ’ ?ργον . . . μέγιστον ?ργον.

The repetition of ?ργον is awkward; but the general style of the *Politics* is not sufficiently accurate to justify us in omitting the word in either place.

δι? δε??, περ? ω??ν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτηρία κα? ?θορα? τω?ν πολιτειω?ν, ?κ τούτων πειρα?σθαι κατασκευάζειν τ?ν ?σ?άλειαν.

δι? because of the instability of states; the words περ? ω??ν τεθεώρηται πρότερον are either omitted or altered by those who change the order of the books.

The clause τίνες σωτηρία is the explanation of περ? ω??ν, and is resumed in ?κ τούτων.

κα? ?ερόντων πρ?ς τ? κοινόν.

These words are an explanation of τω?ν καταδικαζομένων, ‘of those who are condemned, and so bring money into the public treasury,’ not voluntarily, but by the penalties which they incur.

Cp. Cleon in Aristoph. Knights (923):

δώσεις ?μο? καλ?ν δίκην,
?πούμενος τα??ς ?σ?ορα??ς.
?γ? γ?ρ ?ς το?ς πλουσίους
σπεύσω σ’ ?πως ?ν ?γγρα?η??ς.

δε?? ποιε??ν ?λίγας ?κκλησίας.

Cp. iv. 14. § 4.

?θρόα χρ? διανέμειν το??ς ?πόροις, μάλιστα μέν, ε? τις δύναται τοσον?τον ?θροίζων ?σον ε?ς γηδίου κτη?σιν.

?θρόα, ‘in lump sums,’ opposed to the piecemeal method of doling out money which he had been describing above.

ε? τις, indefinite ‘if we can only collect.’

δύναται, sc. ?θρόα διανέμειν. The MSS. vary between ?θροίζων and συναθροίζων. Bekker’s emendation ?θροίζειν is unnecessary.

?ν δ? τούτ?.

‘In the meantime,’ i.e. until the poor have all received their share they should be assisted by the rich, who should pay them for attending the assembly.

??ιμένους τω?ν ματαίων λειτουργιω?ν.

They being excused from those services which are useless. Cp. v. 8. § 20.

For Tarentum, see Müller’s Dorians (iii. 9. § 14), who suggests without any proof that the words κοιν? ποιον?ντες τ? κτήματα refer only to the *ager publicus*. Compare ii. 5.

§ 8, where Aristotle describes the Lacedaemonians as using one another's horses and dogs in common.

ἴσται δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον ποιῆσαι καὶ τῆς ἀτιμῆς ῥηγῆς μερίζοντας, τοῖς μὲν κληρωτοῖς τοῖς δ' ἀρετοῖς.

See note on text.

ῥηγῆς is a genitive of respect, assisted by μερίζειν. 'Either there may be two sets of offices, filled up the one by lot and the other by vote, or the same office may be filled up sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote.'

τοῖς μὲν κληρωτοῖς, sc. ῥηγοντας. Either the accusative immediately follows ποιῆσαι, or is in apposition with τὸν τοιοῦτον; or some word like καθιστάντας is to be supplied from μερίζοντας.

The people of Tarentum elected to some of their offices by vote and to some by lot; the same result might have been attained if they had divided each office, and filled up the vacancies alternately by vote and by lot.

πῶς δέ?? ἄνεργον ἴκ τούτων.

With δέ??, κατασκευάζειν from the previous sentence, or some similar word suitable to the construction, has to be supplied.

τὸν μὲν ἐκκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ἡλιγαρχῶν καὶ πρώτην.

With these words have to be supplied, though not therefore to be inserted in the text (Lambinus), πρὸς τὸν βελτίστην δημοκρατίαν καὶ πρώτην from the beginning of chap. 4.

?? δέ??.

?? = ἴν ???. 'And in this.'

μετέχειν ἴξε??ναι,

sc. δέ??.

τοσόντων ἐσαγομένου τον? δήμου πληθος,

'The people being introduced in such numbers.' An accusative of measure. (Matth. G. G. 421. § 5.)

ἴσπερ γὰρ τ? μὲν σώματα ἐν?? διακείμενα πρὸς ἴγειαν καὶ πλο??α τ? πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλω?ς ἴχοντα το??ς πλωτη?ρσιν ἴπιδέχεται πλείους ἴμαρτίας.

καλω?ς ἴχοντα is taken in a double construction with τ? πρὸς ναυτιλίαν and with πλωτη?ρσι. Either (1)* 'well furnished with sailors for navigation,' or (2) 'well

furnished in respect of naval equipments for their sailors.’ τοῖς πλωτηῖσιν may also be construed with πιδέχεται, ‘allow of more errors in their sailors.’ (1) is confirmed by the words which follow πλωτήρων τετυχηκότα αὔλων.

περὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἔστι κ.τ.λ.

Interpreters correctly remark that the four kinds of military force have no connexion with the four classes of the people.

ἦνταν ἄρα μὲν ἐξ ἑωυτοῦ χει κ.τ.λ.

‘There nature favours the establishment of an oligarchy which will be strong,’ or ‘we may naturally expect to establish an oligarchy.’

ποῦ δὲ πλίτην.

Sc. εἶναι συμβέβηκε understood from the previous words though with a slight change of meaning in the word εἶναι. It is not necessary to read 1) πλῆτιν with Bekker (in his second edition), or 2) πλιτικῶν with Susemihl (on the authority of one MS. which reads πλιτικῶν and the old translator who gives ‘armativam’).

The oligarchy find themselves outnumbered and overmatched by the light-armed troops. The remedy for this evil is to combine a light-armed force of their own with their cavalry and heavyarmed.

ἡν μὲν ὄντων ποῦ τοιοντον πολὺ πληθός ἐστιν, ἦταν διαστωσι, πολλακίς γωνίζονται χείρω.

The change in the nominatives is observable, ‘When the two parties (πληθός καὶ εἰποροι) fall out, the rich (εἰποροι) are often worsted in the struggle.’

ἄρμακον . . . στρατηγῶν.

‘A remedy such as military commanders employ.’

ταύτῃ δὲ πικρατονσιν.

The antecedent of ταύτῃ, ‘in this way,’ is not clear. It appears to mean (as we gather from the context) ‘by their superior flexibility’—sc. διὰ τὴν ψιλῶν τῶν δύναμιν εἶναι.

ἠκεκριμένους δὲ ἠκ παίδων ἠθλητῶν εἶναι αἰτοῦς τῶν ἠργῶν.

Lit. ‘and that persons selected out of boys [thus trained] should themselves become actual light-armed warriors.’ The opposition of ἠκεκριμένους δὲ τοῖσι μὲν ἠντας νέους implies that the persons selected had passed the stage of youth. For ἠθλητῶν τῶν ἠργῶν cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 543 B, ἠθλητῶν πολέμου.

ἦν Μασσαλίῃ.

See note on v. 6. § 2.

κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν

should be taken generally of some permanent work, to erect some public building or monument.

τῶν λήμματα γὰρ ζητοῦσιν οὐχ ἕτερον ἢ τὴν τιμὴν.

Cp. Eth. viii. 16. § 3, οὗ γὰρ ἔστιν ἕνα χρηματίζεσθαι ἢ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμαῖσθαι.

The plan of this book, which is for the most part a repetition of Book iv., here abruptly breaks down. For though democracy and oligarchy are fully discussed, nothing is said of other forms of government, notwithstanding the intention expressed at the beginning of the book, c. 1. § 2, of considering 'the modes of organisation proper to each form of government.'

πρωτον μὲν οὐκ ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ περὶ τὴν ἡγοράν, ἢ ἕτερον δεῖ τινα ἔργον εἶναι τὴν ἡγορῶσαν περὶ τε τῶν συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν ἐκκοσμίαν.

τῶν ἀναγκαίων, sc. 1) ἐπιμελειῶν; or *2) ἔργων, cp. supra § 1, τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔργων.

μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἡχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιότητα δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἔργων ἔστιν ἢ περὶ τῶν πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων κατὰ τῶν ἡγορῶσιν.

πράξεις is here used generally to include execution of sentences passed on criminals, and exaction of debts from public debtors.

τῶν προτιθεμένων appears to mean those whose names, having been first entered on the register as defaulters or criminals (κατὰ τῶν ἡγορῶσιν), are publicly posted up. Cp. infra § 10, περὶ τῶν προθέσει τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων: and Plato Laws 784 D where the incorrigible are to be written up (ἀναγεγραμμένοι) and deprived of citizenship.

καὶ πράξεων μὲν γιγνομένων,

sc. κοινῶν ἢ δύνάτων ἡλλήλοισι.

ἢ τι δὲ ἡγιατῆσθαι καὶ τῶν ἔργων τὰς τε ἡλλας καὶ τῶν νέων μᾶλλον τῶν νέας, καὶ τῶν ἡνεστώτων ἢ τῶν καταδικασάσης ἢ τῶν εἶναι τὴν πρακτομένην, οὐκ οὐκ ἡστυνόμους τῶν παρὰ τῶν ἡγορανόμων, τῶν δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἢ τῶν.

'Moreover, in some cases, the magistrates too should execute the sentence; and there should be fresh magistrates to execute the sentences on fresh offences; but in the case of old or existing offences (τῶν ἡνεστώτων opposed to τῶν νέων) one magistrate should condemn, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora.'

With τῶν νέων and τῶν ἡνεστώτων supply δίκας.

τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοῦ ἀπολέμου παρῶν.

Sc. ποιεῖται ὑπονοούμενη ἀπὸ τῆς προηγουμένης διπληῖς.

διὲς βέλτιον καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ ταύτην.

τὸ σόφισμα, 'the suitable or appropriate device.' The correction τὸ σόφισμα, which is supported by the expression ἢ μὴ τι σοφίζονται (ii. 5. § 19), is unnecessary and feeble. Such an idiomatic use of the article is not unknown in English: e. g. 'to find out the way' or 'the proper way of making the office less unpopular.'

καὶ περὶ ταύτην, sc. τὴν ὑλάττουσαν. 'About this as well as the last case,' i. e. the case of the jailor and the executioner, as well as of the judge and the executioner.

τοιαῦται δ' ἐγένετο αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν ὑλάκην τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἔσται τάττονται πρὸς τῆς πολεμικῆς χρείας.

The optative here would seem to require ἴναι, which is inserted by Bekker in his second edition, or ἐγένετο may be altered into ἐστίναι.

τὸ δὲ παρῶν ἢ τι τούτων ἴσται ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν.

The order of the words is τὸ δὲ παρῶν ἐπιμελείας τούτων ἴσται ἢ τι ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. Bekker, in his 2nd edition (after Lambinus), reads ἐπιμέλεια, a change which is unnecessary.

καὶ προσευθύνοντες.

'And which in addition audits them.'

ἢ γὰρ αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἴσται τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἐσθόραν.

The connexion proves that the latter words can only mean 'the final ratification and the introduction of measures.'

ἡχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἢ πρὸς τῆς θυσίας ἡνωρισμένη τῆς κοινῆς πάσας, ἴσται μὲν τοῦτο ἢ ἐρευνῶσιν ἢ ποδίδωσιν ἢ νόμος, ἢ γὰρ ἢ πρὸς τῆς κοινῆς ἴσται ἢ χουσι τὴν τιμὴν.

Either 1)* the words κείνοις ἴσται, or 2) αὐτῶν θυσίαι must be supplied before χουσι.

Aristotle is opposing the priests, who perform the ordinary sacrifices assigned to them by law, to the great officers of state, who offer sacrifice at the public hearth of the city.

καλονῶσιν δ' οὐ μὲν ἰσχυρόντας κ.τ.λ.

Cp. iii. 14. § 13.

ἡπιλογισμούς.

Audits by the officers called λογισταί (cp. § 16). But it is hard to distinguish them from ἡξετάσεις since Aristotle (supra § 16) says that λογισταί and ἡξετασταί are only different names for the same officers.

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BOOK VII.

Bernays (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 69 ff.) has drawn attention to the peculiar style of the opening chapters (1, 2, 3) of this book, which he supposes to be taken from some Aristotelian dialogue. (See Essay on Structure of Aristotelian Writings.) The passage is certainly remarkable for a flow and eloquence which are not common in Aristotle. But though rare, there are other traces of grace and elevation of style to be discovered in the Politics: e.g. in the discussion about education (viii. c. 3-5), where the writer seems to derive inspiration from his subject; in the introduction to the criticism on the forms of government ii. c. 1; parts of ii. c. 5, especially § 11, are easy and flowing; the descriptions of the middle class citizen iv. c. 11; of the tyrant v. c. 11; and of the city vii. cc. 11, 12, are graphic and striking. There are also several passages in the Nicomachean Ethics as well as many fine expressions in which beauty of style shines through the logical analysis, e. g. Eth. i. 10. § 14; c. 10. § 12, ἄμωσ δὲ καὶ . . . μεγάλωνος; ix. 4. §§ 3-6: x. 8. §§ 7, 8. If we could suppose these passages to be a fair sample of any complete writing of Aristotle, we could better understand why his style was so highly praised by Cicero (Acad. ii. 38), and other writers.

Ἰδῆλου γὰρ ἄντος τοῦτου καὶ τὴν ἄριστην ἄναγκαζόντων Ἰδῆλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

‘For the best life may be expected to show us the best state.’

ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοῖς ἄριστα πολιτευομένοις ἢ τῶν ἄρχόντων ἀποτοῦς, ἵνα μὴ τι γίγνηται παράλογον.

ἢ τῶν ἄρχόντων is to be taken closely with πολιτευομένοις. Not ‘they lead the best life, as far as their conditions of life admit, who are governed in the best manner:’ but ‘they lead the best life who have the best form of government possible under their conditions of life.’

The qualification ἢ τῶν ἄρχόντων, though not mentioned in the first sentence, naturally occurs to the mind of Aristotle, who thinks of life under the conditions of life. Cp. infra § 13, ἄνδρῶν δὲ ἄποκείσθω τοσοντόν, ἄτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἄκάστου καὶ κοινῆς ταῦς πόλεσιν, ἢ μετ’ ἄρετης κεχορηγημένης ἄπὸ τοσοντόν ἄστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ’ ἄρετην πράξεων.

Aristotle adds a further qualification ἵνα μὴ τι γίγνηται παράλογον: as we might say without much meaning and almost as a *façon de parler*, ‘under ordinary circumstances.’

νομίσαντας ὀνῶν ἄκανῶς πολλῶ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄν τοῦς ἄξωτετικοῦς λόγους περὶ τῆς ἄριστης ζωῆς, καὶ ἄν ἄρηστέον ἀποτοῦς. ἄς ἄληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν ὀδεῶς ἄμῆσβητήσειεν ἄν ἄς ὀ τριῶν ὀσων μερίδων, τῶν τε ἄκτῶς καὶ τῶν ἄν τῶ σῶματι καὶ τῶν ἄν τῆς ψυχῆς, πάντα τανῶτα ἄπάρχειν τοῦς μακαρίους δεῶς.

κα? τω?ν is partitive, ‘enough has been said among, or in, the things which have been said.’

?ν το??ς ?ξωτερικο??ς λόγοις. ‘Popular writings in general,’ whether those of Aristotle or of others, containing opinions or distinctions which were generally accepted. The threefold division of goods, into goods of the body, goods of the soul, and external goods, here said to be found in the ?ξωτερικο? λόγοι, is again mentioned in Rhet. i. 5. § 4, 1360 a. 25, and would seem to have been a received notion not peculiar to Aristotle. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 2, *νενημημένων δ? τω?ν ?γαθω?ν τριχη??, κα? τω?ν μ?ν ?κτ?ς λεγομένων, τω?ν δ? περ? ψυχ?ν κα? σω?μα, τ? περ? ψυχ?ν κυριώτατα λέγομεν κα? μάλιστα ?γαθά: τ?ς δ? πράξεις κα? τ?ς ?νεργείας τ?ς ψυχικ?ς περ? ψυχ?ν τίθεμεν. ?στε καλω?ς ?ν λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην τ?ν δόξαν παλαι?ν ον??σαν κα? ?μολογουμένην ?π? τω?ν ?ιλοσοφούντων.* The λόγοι ?ξωτερικο? are alluded to in the same manner and nearly in the same words by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. i. 13. § 9. They are opposed to λόγοι κατ? ?ιλοσοφίαν Eud. Eth. 1217 b. 22.

τριω?ν ο?σω?ν μερίδων, sc. τω?ν ?γαθω?ν, which is somewhat strangely omitted. The clause which follows τω?ν τε ?κτ?ς κ.τ.λ., is either dependent on these words, or in apposition with them.

?νδρίας κ.τ.λ.

The virtues here mentioned are the four cardinal virtues of Plato (Rep. iv. 428), who calls ?ρόνησις by the term σοφία, making no such distinction between σοφία and ?ρόνησις as Aristotle afterwards introduced (Nic. Eth. vi.).

το?ς ?ιλτάτους ?ίλους.

?ίλους is bracketed by Bekker in his second edition. But why object to the pleonasm in a rhetorical passage?

?λλ? ταν?τα μ?ν λεγόμενα ?σπερ πάντες ?ν συγχωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ’ ?ν τ?? ποσ?? κα? τα??ς ?περοχα??ς.

?σπερ is bracketed* by Bekker in his second edition, but without reason. If retained it may either be construed with ?ν συγχωρήσειαν, ‘as all would agree in these things the moment they are uttered, so on the other hand they differ’ etc.; or ?σπερ may be a qualification of πάντες, ‘in a manner every one’ (Schlosser, Bonitz s.v.).

διαφέρονται δ’ ?ν τ?? ποσ?? κα? τα??ς ?περοχα??ς.

Cp. infra § 8, κατ? τ?ν ?περοχ?ν ?νπερ ε?λη?ε διάστασιν.

‘Virtue can never be in excess, and he who has the most virtue is the best of men and the happiest; for happiness consists in virtue provided with sufficient means or instruments of good action; and this principle applies equally to individuals and to states, and is the foundation both of ethics and of politics.’

The proof that external goods are inferior to the goods of the soul is twofold:

1) δι? τω?ν ?ργων, from the fact that the former are acquired by the latter and not *vice versa*.

2) κατ? τ?ν λόγον σκοπουμένοις, from reason, i. e. the nature of things, because external goods, being an instrument, have a limit; of the goods of the soul there is no limit.

On the antithesis of facts and reason and the connexion between them in Aristotle, cp. note on i. 5. § 1.

τω?ν δ? περ? ψυχ?ν ?καστον ?γαθω?ν, ?σ?περ ?ν ?περβάλλ?, τοσούτ? μα?λλον χρήσιμον ε??ναι.

Yet this is only true of the goods of the soul in their most general sense; a man cannot have too much justice, or wisdom, or intelligence, but he may have too much memory or too much imagination, and perhaps even too much courage or liberality. He cannot have too much of the highest, but he may have too much of the lower intellectual and moral qualities. Cp. Ethics ii. 6. § 17 where Aristotle, after defining virtue as a μεσότης, is careful to explain that it is also an ?κρότης.

?λωσ τε δη?λον ?ς ?κολουθε??ν ?ήσομεν τ?ν διάθεσιν τ?ν ?ρίστην ?κάστου πράγματος πρ?ς ?λληλα κατ? τ?ν ?περοχήν, ?νπερ ε?λη?ε διάστασιν ω??ν ?αμ?ν α?τ?ς ε??ναι διαθέσεις ταύτας.

The general meaning of this passage is simple enough. 'If one thing is superior to another, the best state of that thing is superior to the best state of the other.' But an awkwardness is caused by the insertion of διάστασιν, after the relative ?νπερ in apposition with ?περοχήν. 'According to the excess or interval which exists between the different states of things.' The subject of ε?λη?ε is the antecedent of ω??ν, i. e. πράγματα, supplied from ?κάστου πράγματος.

Bekker, following the old translation 'sortita est,' reads ε?ληχε for ε?λη?ε in his second edition. The change makes no real difference in the sense.

?τι δ? τη?ς ψυχη?ς ?νεκεν ταν?τα πέ?υκεν α?ρετ? κα? δε?? πάντας α?ρε??σθαι το?ς εν?? ?ρονον?ντας, ?λλ' ο?κ ?κείνων ?νεκεν τ?ν ψυχ?ν.

Cp. Matth. xvi. 26, τί γ?ρ ??εληθήσεται ?νθρωπος ??ν τ?ν κόσμον ?λον κερδήσ? τ?ν δ? ψυχ?ν α?τον? ζημιωθη??;

μάρτυρι τ?? θε?? χρωμένοις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 14. § 8, Δι? ? θε?ς ?ε? μίαν κα? ?πλη?ν χαίρει ?δονήν· ο? γ?ρ μόνον κινήσεώ? ?στιν ?νέργεια ?λλ? κα? ?κινήσις κα? ?δον? μα?λλον ?ν ?ρεμί? ?στ?ν ? ?ν κινήσει: also Ib. x. 8. § 7, ?στε ? τον? θεον? ?νέργεια, μακαριότητα δια?έρουσα, θεωρητικ? ?ν ε?η: and Metaph. xi. c. 7, 1072 b. 26, ? γ?ρ νον? ?νέργεια ζωή, ?κε??νος δ? (sc. ? θε?ς) ? ?νέργεια· ?νέργεια δ? ? καθ' α?τ?ν ?κείνου ζω? ?ρίστη κα? ?ίδιος.

ἡχόμενον δ' ἴσται καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν ἐδαιμόνα τὴν ἰρίστην ἐῖναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς.

The words *πράττουσαν καλῶς* may be taken either with *ἐδαιμόνα* or with *τὴν ἰρίστην*. Either 1)* 'the happy state is that which is (morally) best, and which does rightly': or 2) 'the happy state and that which does rightly is the best': or 3) (and this though not the only allowable rendering of the passage probably has the most point) 'the best state and that which acts rightly is happy,' as God has been said to be happy in the previous sentence. The last words *πράττουσαν καλῶς* are ambiguous, including both our own 'doing well,' and 'faring well.' The argument is that as God is happy in his own nature so the state can be happy only so far as it partakes of virtue or wisdom.

ἡνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡρόνησις τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἡγεῖ δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὡς μὲν μετασχὴν ἡκαστος τῶν ἡνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ ἡρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων.

τὴν ἀγαθὴν δύναμιν, sc. *ἡκείνοις*, to be supplied before *ὡς μὲν μετασχόντων*, 'with that power or force which each man partakes of when he is called just and temperate and wise.' Cp. for construction *supra* § 8.

Bekker, in his second edition (after Coraes), inserts *καὶ σωφροσύνη* after *ἡρόνησις*, and *ἡνδρεῖος καὶ* before *δίκαιος* to make the passage symmetrical; but there is no reason to expect this exact symmetry.

ἐτέρας γὰρ ἴσται ἡργῶν σχολῆς τανῦτα.

Lit. 'For this is the business of another time of leisure,' or 'of another time when we shall be at leisure,' or*, 'of another discussion.' Yet he returns to the subject at the beginning of the next chapter. The word *σχολῆς* is translated 'discussion' in this passage by Stahr, and so explained in Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon*. It is found in this sense in the *Laws of Plato*, 820 C, and perhaps in *Arist. Polit.* v. 11. § 5.

ἡπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου.

'Enquiry,' rather than 'treatise.' No reference is made in the *Politics* to the whole work as a book.

It has been already said, c. 1. § 11, not exactly that the happiness of the state is the same as that of the individual, but that they can be shown to be the same by the same kind of arguments; and again, § 13, the best life for both is declared to be the life of virtue, furnished sufficiently with the means of performing virtuous actions; and in § 14 he proposes to defer matters of controversy for the present. But at the beginning of the second chapter, as if he were dissatisfied with his conclusion, he resumes the question, which has been already in a manner briefly determined, and as if he had forgotten the intention to defer it. There appears to be a latent incongruity even in this rhetorical passage.

It has been thought by Sussemihl that c. 1. § 11, *ἡχόμενον δ' ἴσται καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν λόγων δεόμενον κ.τ.λ.* is another form of what follows, and that if c. 1. §§ 11, 12 be

omitted the connexion of c. 1 and c. 2 would be restored. But the similarity of §§ 11, 12 in c. 1 with c. 2 is not very close; and the difference of style in the two chapters remains as striking as ever.

The analogy of the individual and the state is drawn out at length in the Republic of Plato, iv. 435 ff.

εἴτε παῖσιν ἄντος ἀρετόν; κοινωνεῖν πόλεως εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὴ μὲν τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις.

‘Whether it be a democracy or a timocracy.’ The remark is parenthetical, and is not further expanded.

ἢ περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τῶν τ’ ἴστων ἔργων, ἢ ἄλλ’ οὐ τὴν περὶ ἡκαστον ἀρετόν, ἢ μετὰ δὲ ταύτην προῤῥήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἢ κεῖνο μὴν πάρεργον ἢ ἐν τῶν τοῦ δ’ ἔργων τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ταυτήν, sc. σκέψιν πολιτικὴν supplied from πολιτικῆς.

ἢ κεῖνο, sc. the question, ‘which is the more eligible life?’

τῶν τοῦ, sc. the question, ‘which is the best state?’ Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 2. § 8.

ἢ μισθῆται . . . πότερον ἢ πολιτικῆς καὶ πρακτικῆς βίος ἀρετῆς ἢ μάλλον ἢ πάντων τῶν ἡκτῆς ἢ πολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικός τις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 7, where the relative value of the two kinds of life is fully discussed.

ἢνάγκη γὰρ τὸν τε ἐν τῷ ἴρονοντα πρὸς τὴν βελτίω σκοπῶν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἰνθρώπων ἡκαστον καὶ κοινῶν τῶν πολιτεῖν.

Yet Aristotle does not show how the two lives of action and contemplation are to be transferred to the sphere of politics, the parallel which he sets over against them in this passage being only the life of the tyrant and the life of the private individual. At § 16 he opposes the state in activity to the state in isolation; and this is perhaps the half-expressed contrast which is floating before his mind.

νομίζουσι δ’ οὐ μὴν τὴν τῶν πέλας ἔργων δεσποτικῶς μὴν γιγνόμενον μετ’ ἡδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὴν μὴν ἡδικον οὐκ ἔργων, ἢ μπόδιον δὲ ἔργων τῆς περὶ ἀτῶν ἐημερίων.

ἢ μπόδιον δὲ ἔργων, ‘to contain an impediment.’ The article may be supplied, if necessary from τὴν μὴν ἡδικον.

ἢσπερ ἢν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντάταται σχεδὸν ἢ τε παιδεία καὶ τῶν νόμων πληθός.

Cp. Plato's *Laws*, bk. i. 630 ff., where the principle that the laws of nations should have some higher object than success in war is energetically maintained, and for the approval of these sentiments by Aristotle, *supra*, ii. 9. § 34.

καθάπερ ἕν Καρχηδόνι ἄσφ τῶν κρικῶν κόσμον λαμβάνειν.

It may be instructive and is certainly amusing to remark that William de Moerbek either reading κρινῶν from κρίνον, 'a lily,' or confusing κρινῶν and κρίκων, translated 'lilia.'

ἕν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἔζη ἕν πίνειν ἕν ὄρτην? τινὲ σκύον περιερόμενον τῶν μηθένα ἕπεκταγκότι πολέμιον.

Cp. *Hdt.* iv. 66, where it is said that once in every year the governor of each district mixes a bowl of wine from which those only may drink who have captured enemies.

The accusative σκύον περιερόμενον may be regarded as an accusative absolute, assisted by the verb of cognate signification, 'when the cup was brought round.'

Here is a beginning of national and international morality. The question whether the contemplative or the practical life is the superior was discussed in *Nic. Eth.* x. c. 7, but entirely with reference to the individual. In this passage an analogous question is raised concerning the state. May not an individual find within himself the best kind of action?—May not the state, though isolated and self-centred, lead a true political life? These two questions to us appear distinct; but they are very closely connected in the mind of Aristotle, to whom the individual is the image of the state.

The isolated life of the state is suggested as a possibility by Aristotle. But he is quite aware that all states have relations to their neighbours which they cannot afford to neglect. Cp. ii. 6. § 7; c. 7. § 14.

ἄλλο τὸ πρὸς τὸν το θηρευτόν.

Cp. in i. 7. § 5, ὁσον ἔδραία, and *infra* c. 14. § 21.

καίτοι τάχ' ἕν ἕπολάβοι τις τούτων ὁτω διωρισμένων ἕτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἕριστον· ὁτω γῆρ ἕν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἶη πράξεων. ἕστε ὁ δὲ τῶν δυνάμενον ἕρχειν παριέναι τῶν πλησίον, ἄλλο μαλλον ἕαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε πατῆρας πατρὸς μήθ' ἕλωσ ἕίλον ἕίλου μηθένα ἕπολογεῖν μηδὲ πρὸς τὸν το ἕροντίζειν· τὸ γῆρ ἕριστον ἀρετώτατον.

'It is argued by some that power gives the opportunity for virtue, and if so, the attainment of power will be the attainment of virtue. But power in the higher sense implies the qualities which enable a man to make the true use of it, and these he will not gain but lose by violating the equality which nature prescribes.' Compare the notion of Thrasymachus (*Plat. Rep.* i.) that justice is the interest of the superior and *supra*, note on i. 6. § 3; also the thesis maintained by Callicles (*Gorgias* 484 ff.) that the tyrant is wisest and best and the refutation of this notion by Socrates.

πρὸς τὸν τοῦτο, sc. πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν παίδων, κ.τ.λ.

μὲν διαφέρουσι τοσούτων ἴσων ἄνδρῶν γυναικῶν ἢ πατρῶν τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων.

These family relations are chosen as types of government answering to various kinds of rule, aristocratical, royal, tyrannical (cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10).

Aristotle means to say that a man is harmed by ruling over others unless he have a right to rule; but this right can be given only by a natural superiority.

τοῦτο γὰρ ἰσομοίως τὴν καλὴν καὶ τὴν δίκαιον ἴσως μέρει.

Either 1) 'For equals to share in the honourable is just,' or 2)* 'For to equals the honourable and the just consists in all having a turn.'

ἴσως γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τὸν τοῦτο συμβαίνειν.

καὶ τὸν τοῦτο = οἷον ἴσως; or rather some positive idea which is to be elicited from these words. 'There may be in a state internal as well as external activity.'

ἰσομοίως δὲ τὸν τοῦτο ἴσως καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἴσως ἄνθρωπων.

'Like the state the individual may be isolated, yet he may have many thoughts and powers energizing within him.'

σχολητῶν γὰρ ἴσως ἢ θεῶν ἴσως καλῶς καὶ παρὰ τὸν κόσμον οἷον οἷον ἐστὶν ἴσως πρᾶξις παρὰ τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν αἰσθητήν.

i.e. 'were happiness not possible in isolation.' Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 4. § 4, ἴσως γὰρ καὶ ἴσως ἢ θεῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως ἢ τίποτε ἴσως; ib. x. 8. § 7, quoted supra, c. 1. § 10.

καὶ τὸ ἴσως ἄνθρωποις.

There is no reason for bracketing these words as Bekker has done in his second edition; = 'mankind generally.' Cp. supra c. 2. § 17, where πόλις is joined with γένος ἄνθρωπων.

περὶ αἰσθητήν.

'About these general questions.'

περὶ τὴν ἄλλαν πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ.

'Other than the best.' These words seem most naturally to refer to Books iv, v, and vi, and are therefore inconsistent with the altered order of the books. It is impossible to believe with Hildenbrand and Teichmüller that Book ii., in which Aristotle treats not of different forms of government, but of certain theoretical or historical constitutions, furnishes a sufficient antecedent for these words. (See Susemihl's note, 749, vol. ii. p. 180.)

περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' ἐχθρὸν συνεστάναι πόλεως.

Compare iv. 1. § 3, ὅστε δηλονότι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς ἀληθινῆς ἡπιότητος τὴν ἄριστον θεωρεῖται τίς ἐστίν, καὶ ποία τις ἔν ὧν ἡσά μάλιστ' ἐστὶ κατ' ἐχθρὸν, μηδενὸς ἂν ἔμποδίζοντος τῶν ἄλλων. Aristotle appears to start with a consideration of the perfect state; but in attempting to describe the conditions of it he seems to forget his higher purpose. Unless it may be supposed that the Politics is an unfinished work.

τὴν ὁρεῖαν ἄλλην.

= τῆς ἡποθέσεις, the conditions mentioned in § 1.

ὅστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὅστε τὴν δυναμένην τὸν ἄριστον ἡποτελεῖται, ταύτην ὁρεῖται εἶναι μεγίστην, ὁρεῖται ἡποκράτην ὁρεῖται ἡνθρωπον ἄλλ' ἡατρὸν εἶναι μείζων ἡσείεν ἡν τις τὸν ἡδιαῖροντος κατ' τὸ μέγεθος τὸν ἡσώματος.

‘That city is the greatest, not which is numerically largest, but which is best adapted to its end; just as Hippocrates is greater, not as a man but as a physician, than somebody else who is taller.’ The great city must have the qualities suited to a city, just as the great Hippocrates must have the qualities, not of a tall man, but of a physician. It is the accident of a city that it is populous, just as it is the accident of Hippocrates that he is tall.

ἡ δὲ λῖαν ἡπερβάλλον ἡριθμὸς ὁρεῖται δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως· θεῖας γὰρ δὲ τὸν ἄριστον δυνάμει ἡργον, ἡτις καὶ τὸδε συνέχει τὸ παρ' ἡν ἡπερ τὸ γὰ καλὸν ἡν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἡς μετ' ἡμεγέθους ἡλεχθεῖς ἡρος ἡπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἡναγκαῖον.

The connexion is as follows: ‘The divine power which holds together the universe can alone give order to infinity. For beauty consists in number and magnitude; wherefore that city in which magnitude is combined with the principle of order is to be deemed the fairest.’

In this and similar passages we may note mingling with Pythagorean fancies, a true sense that proportion is the first principle of beauty. Cp. *Metaph.* xii. 8. § 26, 1074 b. 1, παραδέδοται δὲ παρ' τῶν ἡρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἡν μύθου σχήματι καταλειμμένα τῶν ἡστερον ἡτι θεοὶ τέ εἶσιν ὁρεῖται καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ἄλλην ἡύσιν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν μυθικῶς ἡδη προσηῖκται πρὸς τὴν πειθὸν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἶς τῶν νόμους καὶ τὸν συμῖρον χρῖσιν.

τὸν ἄριστον refers to τάξεως, but is neuter because it is attracted by ἡργον.

ἡλεχθεῖς ἡρος, ‘the above-mentioned principle,’ sc. εἶταξία.

διὸ πρῶτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἡναγκαῖον τὴν ἡκ τοσοῦτου πλήθους ἡπρωτον πληθὸς ἀταρκτες πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ζῆν ἡστὶ κατ' τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν.

διὸ refers not to the clause immediately preceding but to the principal idea of the sentence, contained in the words ἡμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλιν, ἡ μὲν ἡξ ἡλίγων λῖαν ὁρεῖται

α?τάρκης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 10. § 3, ο?τε γ?ρ ?κ δέκα ?νθρώπων γένοιτ' ?ν πόλις, ο?τ' ?κ δέκα μυριάδων ?τι πόλις ?στίν.

πρώτην and πρω?τον. 'We then first have a state when we first have a sufficient number.' πρω?τον may be either adjective or adverb.

κατ? τ?ν πολιτικ?ν κοινωνίαν. 'A good life according to the requirements of the political community,' i. e. the life of a freeman and citizen.

ε??ναι μείζω πόλιν.

μείζω is unnecessarily bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. The point is as follows: 'There may be also a greater city than is required by the limit of self sufficiency, but this increase is not unlimited.' He has said above (§ 4) 'that the more numerous city is not necessarily the greater,' but in this case it is or may be.

ε?σ? γ?ρ α? πράξεις της πόλεως τω?ν μ?ν ?ρχόντων, τω?ν δ' ?ρχομένων.

The πράξεις, or actions of a state, are the actions of two classes which act upon each other, the governors and the governed. Cp. i. 5. § 3, ?που δ? τ? μ?ν ?ρχει τ? δ' ?ρχεται ?στί τι τούτων ?ργον.

?ναγκα??ον γνωρίζειν ?λλήλους.

Cp. Plat. Laws v. 738 D, E, ο?? με??ζον ο?δ?ν πόλει ?γαθ?ν ? γνωρίμους α?το?ς (sc. το?ς πολίτας) α?το??ς ε??ναι. ?που γ?ρ μ? ?ω?ς ?λλήλοις ?στ?ν ?λλήλων ?ν το??ς τρόποις ?λλ? σκότος, ο?τ' ?ν τιμη?ς της ?ξίας ο?τ' ?ρχω?ν ο?τε δίκης ποτέ τις ?ν της προσηκούσης ?ρθω?ς τυγχάνοι.

δη?λον τοίνυν ?ς ο??τός ?στι πόλεως ?ρος ?ριστος, ? μεγίστη τον? πλήθους ?περβολ? πρ?ς α?τάρκειαν ζωη?ς ε?σύνοπτος.

This is a condensed sentence, meaning 'the largest number which can be seen at once, and at the same time suffices for the purposes of life.' Aristotle wishes to combine μέγεθος τι with ε?νομία. Cp. Poet. 7, 1451 a. 3, ?στε δε?? καθάπερ ?π? τω?ν σωμάτων κα? ?π? τω?ν ζ?ων ?χειν μ?ν μέγεθος, τον?το δ? ε?σύνοπτον ε??ναι.

?λκοντας,

like the English word 'draw,' is used neutrally, 'those who draw or pull to either extreme.'

The paragraph—τ? δ' ε??δος . . . ε?παρακόμιστον—is ill arranged: it may be analysed as follows: 'The city should be difficult of access to enemies, and easy of egress to the citizens; the whole territory should be seen at a glance (for a country which is easily seen is easily protected): it should be well situated both in regard to sea and land. Herein are contained two principles: 1) the one already mentioned, about inaccessibility to enemies and convenience to friends: to which may be added 2) a second principle, that the situation should be adapted to commerce.'

The words δε?? . . . ?πάντων are a repetition of the words τ? δ' ε?σύνοπτον τ? ε?βοήθητον ε??ναι τ?ν χώραν ?στίν.

ε??ς μ?ν ? λεχθε?ς ?ρος,

sc. περ? τον? ε?δους τη?ς χώρας.

?τι δ? τη?ς περ? ξύλα ?λης, κ?ν ε? τινα ?λλην ?ργασίαν ? χώρα τυγχάνοι κεκτημένη τοιαύτην, ε?παρακόμιστον.

τη?ς ?λης dependent on ε?παρακόμιστον = εν?? ?χουσαν πρ?ς τ?ν κομιδήν: τη?ς περ? ξύλα ?λης either 1) wood (?λη) which is used as timber, or 2) timber which is used as material (?λη).

The echo of these antimaritime prejudices is heard in Cicero, who discusses the subject at length in his De Republica, Book ii. cc. 3 and 4.

κα? τ?ν πολυανθρωπίαν,

sc. ?σύμ?ορον ε??ναί ?ασιν.

?τι μ?ν ον??ν, ε? ταν?τα μ? συμβαίνει, κ.τ.λ.

‘That however, if we could get rid of these evils, there would be an advantage in a city being connected with the sea is obvious.’

α?τη?? γ?ρ ?μπορικῆν, ?λλ’ ο? το??ς ?λλοις δε?? ε??ναι τ?ν πόλιν.

‘Like the individual (i. 9. § 14) the city may receive what she absolutely needs, but is not to import and export without limit.’

Aristotle would restrain foreign trade as much as possible, not because he aims at exclusiveness, but because he dislikes the moneymaking and commercial spirit.

?πε? δ? κα? νν?ν ?ρω?μεν πολλα??ς ?πάρχον κα? χώραις κα? πόλεσιν ?πίνεια κα? λιμένας ε??ω?ς κείμενα πρ?ς τ?ν πόλιν, ?στε μήτε τ? α?τ? νέμειν ?στου μήτε πόρρω λίαν, ?λλ? κρατε??σθαι τείχεσι κα? τοιούτοις ?λλοις ?ρύμασι, ?ανερ?ν ?ς ε? μ?ν ?γαθόν τι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι δι? τη?ς κοινωνίας α?των, ?πάρξει τη?? πόλει τον?το τ? ?γαθόν, ε? δέ τι βλαβερόν, ?υλάξασθαι ??διον το??ς νόμοις ?ράζοντας κα? διορίζοντας τ[Editor: illegible character]νας ο? δε?? κα? τίνας ?πιμίσησθαι δε?? πρ?ς ?λλήλους.

In this passage ?πάρχον the reading of the MSS. has been altered into 1) ?πάρχειν by Schneider and by Bekker in his 2nd Edition; and also 2) into ?πάρχοντα, in the latter case with the omission of καί. The alteration, though probable, is not necessary; for ?μπόριον may be supplied with ?πάρχον from the preceding sentence, the plural words ?πίνεια κα? λιμένας being taken in apposition as an epexegetis. ‘But now-a-days there are many cities and places in which such a mart exists, [containing] docks and harbours conveniently situated in relation to the city; and as is obvious, whatever

evil there may be is avoided and the good secured, when they are placed at a moderate distance, but commanded by walls and similar fortifications.’

The inland position of the ancient Greek cities, as Thucydides (i. 7) remarks, was due to the prevalence of piracy. Their ports were added later, as the Piraeus at Athens, Nisaea at Megara, Cenchreae and Lechaemum at Corinth, Cyllene at Elis, Gythium at Sparta, Nauplia at Argos, Siphiae at Thespieae, Notium at Colophon, etc.

κρατεῖσθαι = to be controlled or held in check by.

εἴ μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ζήσεται βίον.

ἡγεμονικόν, like Athens or Sparta in the days of their greatness, v. 7. § 14. The alteration of πολιτικὴν into πολεμικὴν in Bekker’s 2nd edition is quite unnecessary. For πολιτικῆς βίος, applied to a city, cp. ii. 6. § 7, εἴ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν.

πολλὰς γὰρ ἡκπληρονῶσι τριήρεις [οὗ ἡρακλεώται].

Cp. Xen. Anab. v. 6. § 10, πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστι πλοῖα ἢ ἡρακλείη.

καὶ πόλεων.

πόλεων, if genuine, is a difficult word. It may be taken in the sense of ‘ports like the Piraeus’*; or closely connected with λιμένων of ‘cities in relation to their harbours,’ cp. supra, c. 5. § 3. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. The word has been bracketed by Bekker in his second edition and is probably corrupt. The conjectural emendations ἡπινείων (Coraes), ἡμπορίων (Schmidt), περιπολίων (Broughton) are not fortunate; πλοίων might also be suggested (cp. supra, § 6). But it is more probable that some words have been accidentally transposed and that we should read περὶ μὲν οὐρανὸν χώρας καὶ πόλεων [οὐ πόλεως] καὶ λιμένων κ.τ.λ. or, περὶ μὲν οὐρανὸν πόλεων [οὐ πόλεως] καὶ χώρας κ.τ.λ.

τὴ μὲν ἢ τοῦ ψυχροῦς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὴ περὶ τὴν Ἐρώπην.

According to Aristotle it would seem that Europe includes the colder, that is, the Northern parts of Europe and excludes Hellas. The words καὶ τὴ περὶ τὴν Ἐρώπην are explanatory of τὴ ἢ τοῦ ψυχροῦς τόποις ἔθνη. Compare the Hymn to Apollo l. 250:

ἢ μὲν ἔσοι Πελοπόννησον πείραν ἡχουσιν,
ἔδ’ ἔσοι Ἐρώπην τε καὶ ἡμῖν ἰρύτας κατὰ νήσους,

in which a similar notion of Europe is implied.

Plato too was no stranger to speculations about race. Cp. Laws v. 747 D, μηδὲ τονθ’ ἡμαρ λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων, ἢ οὐκ εἴσῃν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλων τόπων πρὸς τὴ γενναῖαν ἡνθρώπους ἡμείνους καὶ χείρους; and Rep. iv. 435 E, τὴ θυμοειδῆς . . . οὐδὲν οὐ κατὰ τὴν Ἐρῶπην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδὸν τι κατὰ τὴν ἡνωτόπον, ἢ τὴ

ἡλομαθές, ἢ δὲ περὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμῶν μάλιστα ἢ τις ἀγιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὴν ἡλοχρήματον, ἢ περὶ τοὺς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατ' Αἴγυπτον αἴη τις ἢ οὐχ ἢκιστα. Cp. also Herod. ix. 122, ἡλέειν γὰρ ἢκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοῦς ἡνδρας γίνεσθαι· οὐ γάρ τοι τῆς ἀγῆτης γῆς εἶναι καρπὸν τε θωμαστῶν ἡύειν καὶ ἡνδρας ἡγαθοῦς τὴν πολέμια· and iii. 106, ἢ ἡλλῶς τῶν ἡρας πολλὸν τι κάλλιστα κεκρημέναις ἡχει. So Plat. Tim. 24 C, ἢ θεῶς . . . ἡκλεξαμένη τὴν τόπον ἢ ἢ γεγένησθε (viz. Hellas), τὴν ἐκκρασίαν τῶν ἡρωῶν ἢ ἀτῆ κατιδονῶσα, ἢ τι ἡρονιμωτάτους ἡνδρας οἶσοι.

ἢαῶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας.

Could Hellas have been united in a federation, she might have governed the world. But the individuality of Greek cities was too strong to allow of such a union, and the country was too much divided by natural barriers. The cities on the coast might be coerced into an Athenian Empire, but could not be fused into a political whole. Cp. Herod. ix. 2, where the Thebans say to Mardonius that the Greeks if united would be a match for the whole world,—κατ' ἢν γὰρ τὴν ἡσχυρῶν ἡλληνας ἡμοῖρονέοντας, οἶπερ καὶ πάρος ταῦτ' ἡγίνωσκον, χαλεπῶ εἶναι περιγίνεσθαι καὶ ἡπασιν ἡνθρώποισι.

ἡασί τιμες δεῶν ἡπάρχειν τοῦτ' ἡύλαξι, τὴν ἡλητικῶς ἢν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

This, like some of Aristotle's other criticisms on Plato, is chiefly interesting as shewing the difficulty which he found in understanding the play of language which is characteristic of Plato. [See Essay on Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato.] The passage referred to is Rep. ii. 375 E, περὶ ἢν τοῦς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ἢς οἶδόν τε πρῶτα εἶναι, περὶ δὲ τοῦς ἡγνωτάς τοῖς ἀντίον, where we may observe that the word ἡλητικῶς is not used by Plato.

ἢ θυμός.

'Passion' = the depth or force of character which makes a good lover or a good hater. Compare Theognis, l. 1091 Bergk—

ἡργαλέως μοι θυμῶς ἡχει περὶ σῆς ἡιλότητος,
οἶτε γὰρ ἡχθαίρειν οἶτε ἡλεῶν δύναμαι.

But in the Topics ii. 7, 113 b. 1 Aristotle raises the question whether ἡιλία resides in τὴν ἡπιθυμητικῶν and not in τὴν θυμοειδῶν. Like our word passion, θυμῶς has both a wider and narrower use, and is employed by Aristotle here in a more philosophical, but in the Topics in a more popular sense.

Aristotle truly remarks that anger is felt, not against strangers, but against friends who have wronged or slighted us. Cp. Rhet. ii. c. 2, 1379 b. 2, καὶ [ἡργίζονται] ἢλλων τοῦτ' ἡίλοις ἢ τοῦτ' ἢίλοις; and Psalm xli. 9, 'Yea, even mine own familiar friend, whom I trusted, who did also eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.'

οἶ γὰρ δὲ περὶ ἡίλων ἡπάγγεο.

The reading of the MSS. which is repudiated in the translation is not indefensible, though, in the absence of context, it is impossible to interpret it with certainty: 'For were they not friends about whom thou wast plagued or grieved?' cp. again from Psalm lv. 12: 'It is not an open enemy that hath done me this dishonour, for then I could have borne it.' A *mot* attributed to a well-known statesman who had been anonymously attacked in a newspaper is to the point, 'It must have been by a friend,' he said, 'an enemy would not have been so bitter.' The verse is very probably taken from the well-known poem of Archilochus in Trochaic verse beginning θυμὸς θύμῳ μὴχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε, of which a fragment is preserved (Bergk 60): the metre might be restored either by omitting δῆ, which may have been added by Aristotle, or by inserting οὐδὲν before δῆ.

The translators William de Moerbek and Aretino render πάγχεο 'a lanceis,' as if they had read or imagined they read πᾶ γγέων.

οὐδ' ἐστὶν οὐ μαγαλόψυχοι τῶν ὑσὶν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἴδικονόνας.

Yet the μαγαλόψυχος described in Nic. Eth. iv. 3. is rather unapproachable by his neighbours.

οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἀτῶν κριβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διὰ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς ἀσθήσεως.

Cp. below c. 12. § 9. Aristotle is opposing political theories to facts, as in the Ethics he contrasts the moral certainty of Ethics (Nic. Eth. i. 3. § 4) with the absolute certainty of mathematics, though the κριβεια in the two cases is different, meaning in the one the necessity and *à priori* truth of mathematics, in the other exactness of detail.

περὶ δ' ὅσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ ὑσὶν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ἄλης συστάσεως, ὡς ἂν ἕνετ' ἄλον οὐκ ἔν ἐη, δηλονότι οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῦς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἀρχεῖν, οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμίας, ἧς ἧς ἂν τι τὸ γένος.

In this rather complex sentence Aristotle is distinguishing between the conditions and the parts of the whole. The words ὡς ἂν ἕνετ' ἄλον οὐκ ἔν ἐη answer to ὅσα ταῦς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἀρχεῖν in the application to the state.

The editions vary between τανῦτα and ταῦτά. τανῦτα is confirmed by the words of § 6, πόσα τανῦτ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἂν ἕνετ' ἄλον οὐκ ἔν ἐη. If we read ταῦτ' it will be convenient to supply κείνοις with ὡς ἂν ἕνετ', if τανῦτα, κειῖνα.

ἧς ἧς ἂν τι τὸ γένος, i.e. 'out of which is formed,' or 'which forms a lower class having a unity;' 'which in its nature is a whole, and not a mere aggregate,' ἂν τι τὸ γένος = ἂν τί ἐστι τὸ γένος.

'The end has nothing in common with the means; the final cause with the conditions.' Just as in iii. 1. § 9 things prior and posterior are said to have no quality in common with each other. Of course the modern philosopher makes the opposite reflection,

‘that the end is inseparable from the means,’ or, ‘is only the sum of the means’; that causes are indistinguishable from condition; and equally indistinguishable from effects; ‘that no line can be drawn between *à priori* and *à posteriori* truth.’ The common understanding, like ancient philosophy, rebels against this higher view, because it can point to numberless visible instances in which the end is separable from the means, the effect from the causes. Both lines of reflection are constantly returning upon us, and the opposition between them gives rise to many metaphysical problems. It is the old difficulty, as old as the opposition of ideas to phenomena, of finding the similarity where there is difference or contrast.

ῥογάν? τε παντ? πρ?ς τ? γιγνόμενον ῥογον κα? το??ς δημιουργο??ς.

Governed by ο?θ?ν κοινόν ῥστι. ‘The builder and his tools have nothing in common with the work; so property has nothing in common with the State.’

The connexion of this passage in which means and ends, parts and conditions are curiously combined appears to be as follows: ‘Now happiness is imparted in various degrees to states, making them to be what they are according to the degree of happiness which they attain. But we must also ascertain what are the conditions of states, for in these we shall find their parts.’ He seems to mean that through what is outward only we can arrive at the true elements of the state; and that happiness, which is the end of the state, is not to be confounded with the conditions of it. The argument is interrupted by the seemingly irrelevant remark that the character of states is given to them by the degrees of happiness which they attain. Here as in other passages (cp. c. 9. § 2 infra), when speaking of the perfect state, he occasionally goes back to the imperfect forms.

ῥρετη?ς ῥνέργεια κα? χρη?σις.

Cp. the more complete statement of the Nic. Eth. i. 7. §§ 14-16, ψυχη?ς ῥνέργεια κατ? ῥρετ?ν ῥρίστην ῥν βί? τελεί?.

ῥπισκεπτέον δ? κα? πόσα ταν?τ? ῥστ?ν ω??ν ῥνευ πόλις ο?κ ῥν ε?η.

‘Besides considering the highest good of the state or the idea of the state in its highest terms (gathered from the previous section) we must also consider the indispensable conditions of it, and among them we shall find its parts.’ All the parts are conditions of a state, not all the conditions are parts; e.g. the θη?τες are a condition but not a part; τ? βουλευόμενον both a condition and a part.

πέμπτον δ? κα? πρω?τον.

‘First,’ i. e. in honour, not in necessity, for that place he assigns to the sixth class.

Spengel would omit κα? πρω?τον. But how could the insertion of such a clause ever be explained, unless it had been put in by the piety of a Greek monk?

ἢν καλονοσιν ἑρατεῖαν, ‘which they call ritual.’ The formula ἢν καλονοσιν seems to imply some technical or uncommon use of the word, which occurs nowhere else in classical Greek, cp. ἢν καλονοσί τινες ἡλιγαρχίαν, vi. 1. § 6.

ἕκτον δὲ τῶν ἑριθμῶν.

The last words are pleonastic, ‘sixth in numerical succession.’

The conjecture of Lambinus τῶν δικαίων taken from τῶν συμπερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων above, § 7, has been adopted in the text. But the reading of the MSS. τῶν ἑναγκαίων, ‘of necessary matters of life,’ is really defensible and is confirmed by the word ἑναγκαϊότατον in § 7. ἑναγκαίων may also refer to punishments: see infra c. 13. § 6.

οὐκ ἢν πάσῃ δὲ τῶν πολιτείῃ.

‘This question, however, does not arise in every state, for it is already decided. In democracies all share in all, while in oligarchies only some share in some employments or functions. But we are speaking of the ideal state in which the question remains to be considered.’

καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπομεν.

This passage can hardly refer to ii. 1. § 2, for there Aristotle is speaking of the distribution of property: here of the distribution of functions in the state. The reference is rather to iv. c. 4 and c. 14; see supra c. 4. § 1.

ἢπερ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοπονοντες περὶ τῆς ἑρίστης πολιτείας . . . ἐρηται πρότερον.

The connexion is as follows: ‘But in the best state, with which we are now concerned, all cannot participate in all, for the trader, the artisan and the husbandman have no leisure for education, neither are they capable of political functions.’

ἐρηται πρότερον in c. 8. § 5 supra. It is noticeable that Aristotle in describing the perfect state no longer, as in a democracy (cp. vi. c. 4.), regards the husbandmen as the best material out of which to form citizens.

τοῖς μέλλοντας ἑσεσθαι,

sc. πολίτας, (ἢν τῆς κάλλιστα πολιτευομένη πόλει § 3), ‘citizens of the best state.’

πότερον ἑτερα καὶ ταντα θετέον.

Bekker in his second edition inserts ἑτέροις after ἑτερα unnecessarily. Without it we may translate: ‘Are these also to be distinct, or are both to be given to the same persons?’

Compare Book ii. 5. § 26.

ἄλλο μὲν καὶ τῶν κτήσεις δεῖν εἶναι περὶ τούτους.

The use of περὶ is singular: the force of the preposition may be paraphrased as follows: 'they too should have a near interest in property,' an indirect way of expressing what is more distinctly said infra § 8 τῶν κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων.

εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ γεωργοῦ δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους.

The necessity seems to arise from the impossibility of the husbandman having the leisure which a citizen requires for mental cultivation and the fulfilment of political duties, cp. § 4.

καὶ κεχώρισται δὲ τούτων ἡκαστον, τὸ μὲν αἰ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

τούτων, i. e. not merely the πολιτικὸν and βουλευτικόν; to these must be added the γεωργοί, τεχνῶται, and τὸ θητικόν, in all five. The two first interchange with each other, but never with the three last.

The division between the mere conditions of the state (viz. the γεωργοί, τεχνῶται and τὸ θητικόν) and the parts of it (τὸ πολιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν) is permanent. The division between τὸ πολιτικόν, τὸ τῶν ἐρέων γένος and τὸ βουλευτικὸν is transitory or κατὰ μέρος, i. e. the same persons may belong in turn, or at different stages of life, to all three classes.

οἴκε δ' οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὸν τὸ εἶναι γνώριμον τοῦ περὶ πολιτείας ἡλοσοῦντων, ἦτι δεῖ διῆρησθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν.

This chapter has been regarded, and perhaps with reason, as a criticism of Plato, Aristotle being desirous of disproving by historical facts the claim of Plato to originality in instituting the system of caste and of common meals.

τὸ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα κ.τ.λ.

In apposition with τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις, 'the custom in Crete going back to the reign of Minos.'

'The name Italy was originally confined to the district between the Lametic and Scylletic Gulfs' (Golfo di Eufemia and Golfo di Squillace), 'and was derived from Italus, an ancient king of the Oenotrians' (called by Thucydides vi. 2 a Sicel king) 'who inhabited these regions. The people to the north-west towards Tyrrhenia were called Ausones and those to the north-east in the district called Siritis' (on the shore of the Tarentine gulf) 'Chones.'

The mention of Italy (taken in this narrower sense) leads the writer to particularise its different regions; but nothing is said about how far the custom of common meals may have extended.

ἡση τετύχηκεν ἡντὶς ὀψῶσα, viz. that part of Italy which is bounded or enclosed at its narrowest point by the two gulfs. The reason (ἡπέχει γὰρ τανῶτα) is imperfectly

expressed: ‘You may call this the boundary because the distance is so small between the two gulfs.’ It is in fact about 20 miles.

It has been asked, ‘What does Aristotle purpose in this digression?’ There is a fallacy in requiring that every part of an ancient work should have a distinct purpose. Aristotle, like Aeschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, ‘breaks out’ into the favourite subject of geography, and his conceptions of it, as might be expected in the beginning of such studies, are not perfectly accurate or distinct.

It is evident that common meals played a great part in the political organisation of Hellas and the south of Italy. But, according to Susemihl, no other writer mentions their existence in Italy.

Σύρτιν is the reading of most MSS., σύρτην of two only. The MSS. of the old translator appear all to give *syrtem*. Σ??ρτιν is conjectured by Heyne, who compares Arist. Fragm. Πολιτε??αι 542, κα? ο? τ?ν Σ??ρτιν δ? κατοικον?ντες . . . ?ς ?ησι Τίμαιος κα? ?ριστοτέλης, ε?ς τρυ??ν ?ξώκειλαν ο?χ ??σσον Συβαριτω?ν, Athen. xii. 523 C. Hence Goëttling’s conjecture Σιρ??τις the district of Siris. Of any district of Italy called Syrtis or Syrtis there is no mention elsewhere.

? μ?ν ον??ν τω?ν συσσιτίων τάξις ?ντεν?θεν γέγονε πρω?τον, ? δ? χωρισμ?ς ? κατ? γένος τον? πολιτικον? πλήθους ?ξ Α?γύπτου· πολ? γ?ρ ?περτείνει το??ς χρόνοις τ?ν Μίνω βασιλείαν ? Σεσώστριος,

is translated in the English text: ‘From this part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into castes [which was much older] from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos.’

It is also possible to supply the ellipse differently: ‘The separation into castes came [not from Italy or Crete, but] from Egypt.’

The sentence is then parallel with the other statements. Common tables existed in Crete and in Italy: the latter were the older, and therefore are called ‘the origin of the institution’ (§§ 2, 4); similarly, caste existed in Crete and in Egypt; in the latter country its origin dates further back than in the former, for Sesostris is older than Minos, and therefore it is said to have originated there.

σχεδ?ν μ?ν ον??ν κα? τ? ?λλα δε?? νομίζειν ε?ρη?σθαι πολλάκις ?ν τ?? πολλ?? χρόν?.

A favourite reflection of Aristotle’s. See note on text for parallel passages.

?τι δ? πάντα ?ρχα??α.

‘All political institutions are ancient; for they are found in Egypt which is the most ancient of all countries.’ Cp. Plat. Laws ii. 657. ‘Their (i. e. the Egyptian) works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago; this is literally true, and no exaggeration.’ For further references see note on text. That this sameness was the weakness of Egypt, and that the life of Hellas was progress, seems not to have occurred either to Aristotle or Plato.

τοῖς μὲν ἐρημένοις

is the reading of the MSS., altered in the text after Lambinus into ἐρημένοις, a change which seems to be required by the want of a suitable antecedent and by the parallelism of παραλελειμμένα. Cp. supra, σχεδὸν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλα δεῖν νομίζειν ἐρηθῆσθαι πολλάκις, and ii. 5. § 16.

ἄσπερον ἔρονμεν.

This promise is not fulfilled. In c. 12. § 1 the common meals are only mentioned in passing; no reason is given in support of the institution.

τὸ πρὸς τοῖς στυγαίτονας πολέμους ἰμονοητικώτερον.

A lesson learned from the experience of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. The Acharnians whose lands lay on the borders, seeing them ravaged, wished to attack the invaders rashly (Thuc. ii. 21), and afterwards when they had lost their possessions as Archidamus thought likely (Thuc. ii. 20 ἄσπερον τῶν σπέρων οὐκ ἔμοιως προθύμους ἔσεσθαι ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων κινδυνεύειν, στάσιν δὲ ἔσεσθαι), and as Aristophanes in his 'Acharnians' seems to imply, were wanting to make peace.

For reference to Plato and criticism on him see note on text.

δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους.

Compare above c. 9. § 8, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῖς γεωργοῖς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους ἢ περιοίκους, a comparison which has led to the insertion of ἢ before περιοίκους in this passage, or to the omission of it in c. 9. The text of the MSS. is probably right in both passages. 'If we could have the very best thing, the husbandmen should be slaves; or if slaves cannot be had, then perioeci of alien stock.'

ἀπὸ τῆς δὲ πρὸς ἀπὸ τῶν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν ἐχέσθαι δεῖν κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα βλέποντας.

The order of the words is as follows—δεῖν ἐχέσθαι κατατυγχάνειν [τον] τὴν θέσιν εἶναι.

The four points to be attended to appear to be as follows: 1) healthy and airy situation, open to the winds (cp. § 4, infra): 2) good water: 3) convenience for administration (πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις): 4) adaptation to military requirements (πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις).

Cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, καὶ σύμπασαν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν ἠπέδειξα ἀπὸ τῆς, ἢ τι πρὸς μεσημβρίαν ἠναπέπταται, ἢ στε εὐδηλον εἶναι, ἢ τι χειμῶνος μὲν ἐρήλιός ἐστι, τον δὲ θέρους ἐσκίος.

Vitruvius i. 6 tells us how the inhabitants of Mitylene suffered from the situation of their town: 'Oppidum magnificentiter est aedificatum et eleganter; sed positum non prudenter. In quâ civitate auster cum flat homines aegrotant, cum eurus, tussiant, cum

septentrio, restituuntur in sanitatem, sed in angiportis et plateis non possunt consistere propter vehementiam frigoris.’ (Quoted by Eaton.)

δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν.

κατὰ βορέαν = ‘facing the same way that the North wind does,’ (cp. κατὰ ῥόον) i. e. sheltered from the North wind. Cp. Plat. Crit. 118 A, B, ἢ δὲ τόπος οὐκ ἔστι τῆς νήσου πρὸς νότον ἑτέτραπτο, ἢ πρὸ τῶν ῥοκτῶν κατάβορος.

δεύτερον may either be taken as *an alternative, or as introducing a second condition of healthfulness, so that a South Eastern aspect is what is recommended; i. e. a situation which is open to the healthy East winds and affords shelter from the North wind.

τοντό γ’ ἐρηται

is the reading of all the MSS. The conjecture of Lambinus, ἐρηθσαι, adopted by Bekker in his second edition, is unnecessary.

τοντό γ’ ἐρηται = ‘a remedy has been found for this,’ i. e. ‘a remedy may be found.’ The language is not quite symmetrical, but this is no reason for altering it.

ῥοδοχοὺς ῥμβρίους ῥδασιν.

Five MSS. read ῥμβρίους, a possible reading, ‘rain cisterns for water’ instead of ‘cisterns for rain water.’

ἢν τε τοιούτῃ κατὰ πρὸς τοιοντόν.

‘In the situation described, and looking to the quarter described.’

τοιούτων ναμάτων.

The reading of the best MSS. and the old translator, ‘such streams as I have spoken of above,’ that is to say, ‘good streams’ (ῥγεινωῖν § 4).

ῥκρόπολις ῥλιγαρχικὴν κατὰ μοναρχικόν, ῥριστοκρατικὴν . . . ῥσχυροὺς τόποι πλείους.

It may be asked: ‘Why should a single fortress be adapted to a monarchy, or oligarchy, several strongholds to an aristocracy?’ Probably because in the former case the government is more concentrated. A small governing class, if they are to maintain their power against the people, must draw together. An aristocracy has only to defend itself against foreign enemies, and is therefore better dispersed.

ἢν τις οὕτω κατασκευάζῃ, καθάπερ ἢν τοῖς γεωργοῖς ῥς καλονόσι τινες τῶν ῥμπέλων συστάδας.

The last word is explained by Hesychius (under ξυστάδες) as ἀπὸ πυκνῶν ῥμπελοι, ῥμεινον δὲ τῶν ἐρκεῖ κατὰ μὲν κατὰ στομάχον περὶ τετευμένας ῥκούειν, i. e. 1) *vines

planted thickly or in clumps, or 2) vines planted irregularly. If we adopt the first of these interpretations and take the image literally, Aristotle is suggesting that the city should be built partly in regular streets, but here and there in blocks which would have the character of strong places. If we take the second, he would seem to mean that the city should be built in part irregularly, with a view to confusing or perplexing an enemy after he had entered it.

ο? μ? ?άσκοντες δε??ν ?χειν (τείχη).

Cp. Laws vi. 778 D ff, περ? δ? τειχω?ν, ω?? Μέγилле, ?γωγ? ?ν τη?? Σπάρτ? ξυμ?εροίμην τ? καθεύδειν ?α?ν ?ν τη?? γη?? κατακείμενα τ? τείχη.

The absence of walls in Sparta suggested to Plato the poetical fancy that the walls of cities should be left to slumber in the ground: it may reasonably be conjectured that the position of Sparta and the military character of her citizens rendered artificial defences unnecessary.

?λεγχομένας ?ργ? τ?ς ?κείνως καλλωπισαμένας.

The disasters of Leuctra (b.c. 371) and of Mantinea (b.c. 362) had done a great deal to diminish the admiration for Sparta. (Cp. ii. 9. § 10 and infra c. 14. § 16). Yet the allusion is hardly to the point, for Sparta was never taken by an enemy: Epaminondas after the battle of Leuctra refrained from attacking it, Xen. Hell. vi. 5.

?στι δ? πρ?ς μ?ν το?ς ?μοίους κα? μ? πολ? τ?? πλήθει δια?έροντας ο? καλ?ν τ? πειρα?σθαι σώζεσθαι δι? τη?ς τω?ν τειχω?ν ?ρυσμότητος.

A somewhat romantic notion with which may be compared the further refinement of § 11, infra; also the saying of Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, when he saw catapults brought from Sicily, which in other words and under other circumstances has no doubt often been ejaculated by the African or New Zealand savage, ?πόλωλεν ?νδρ?ς ?[Editor: illegible character]ετά. (Plut. Apophth. Lac. 219 A.)

πολεμικωτάτην.

Either 'the most truly warlike in character' or *'the best defence of the warrior.' Both meanings may be included.

?μοίως δ? κα? τα??ς ο?κήσεσι τα??ς ?δίαις μ? περιβάλλειν τοίχους.

Private houses as well as cities, especially in the country, might in many cases need the protection of walls.

?μοίως δέ, sc. ?χει.

α?τά,

sc. τ? τείχη, i. e. the position of the walls; or more generally, 'the consideration of these circumstances.'

ῥαγείων.

The MSS. vary between ῥαγων, ῥαγίων, ῥαγείων.

εἴη δ' ἔν τῷ τοιοῦτος ἡ τόπος ἡστίς ἡπιάνειάν τε ἡχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ῥετῆς θέσιν ἡκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γειτνωῦντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ῥυμνοτέρως.

Lit. 'This place should be of a sort which has conspicuousness, suitable to the position of virtue, and towering aloft over the neighbouring parts of the city.'

Thomas Aquinas, who wrote a Commentary on the Politics, if we may judge from his Latin 'bene se habentem ad apparentiam virtutis,' seems to have read θέσιν τε ἡχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ῥετῆς ἡπιάνειαν. (Susemihl.) But the words are better as they are found in the Greek MSS.

The habitation of virtue is to be like that of the Gods who have their temples in the Acropolis. Cp. Vitruv. 1. 7 'Aedibus vero sacris quorum deorum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, unde moenium maxima pars conspiciatur areae distribuuntur' (quoted by Schneider); and Burke, French Revolution, p. 107, 'The temple of honour ought to be seated on an eminence.'

εἴη δ' ἔν εἰχαρίς ἡ τόπος, εἴ καὶ τὴν γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡχοι τὴν τάξιν ἡντανῶθα. πρέπει γὰρ διῆρησθαι κατὰ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ τῶν τῶν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῦ νεωτέρους ῥχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοῦ δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῦ ῥχουσιν· γὰρ ἔν ἡθαλμοῦ τῶν ῥχόντων παρουσία μάλιστα ἡμποιεῖ τὴν ἡληθινὴν ἀδῶ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἡλευθέρων ἡόβον.

The opposition of μὲν and δὲ before νεωτέρους and πρεσβυτέρους seems to imply that the youth are to perform under the eye of certain magistrates, and the elders under the eye of the magistrates as a body. The distinction appears to be in the one case, that some of the magistrates are to go to the gymnasium, in the other the exercises are to take place in or near the public buildings appropriated to the magistrates. Everywhere the presence of the authorities is required. *'Some of the rulers are to be present (διατρίβειν) at the exercises of the younger men, but the elders are to perform their exercises with the rulers.' Here either another verb has to be supplied with παρὰ τοῦ ῥχουσιν or the word διατρίβειν is to be taken in a slightly different sense. Or 2) we may translate, 'and the elders shall be placed at the side of the magistrates.' This, however, disregards μὲν and δὲ and seems not to cohere with the words διῆρησθαι κατὰ τῆς ἡλικίας: for thus no mention is made of the gymnastics of the elders. 3) The most natural way of taking the Greek words (τοῦ δὲ . . . ῥχουσιν) that 'the magistrates shall perform their gymnastic exercises before the elders,' (St. Hilaire) gives a very poor sense. The clause ἡ γὰρ ἔν ἡθαλμοῦ κ.τ.λ., shows clearly that the principal point is the requirement of the presence of the magistrates at all gymnastic exercises.

The word κόσμον is difficult. It may be taken in the sense of 'institution,' which is in some degree supported by the use of κόσμος τῆς πολιτείας for 'the order or constitution of the state,' (Περὶ Κόσμου 6. 399 b. 18). Or* τῶν τῶν κόσμον may

be the accusative after δι?ρη?σθαι and may be taken with Adolph Stahr in the sense of ‘this embellishment of the state:’ [dieser Schmuck der Stadt]. In this case it is better to make δι?ρη?σθαι impersonal, κόσμον being the indirect accusative following it. κα? τον?τον, this institution too, i. e. as well as the offices of state which in c. 9 are divided between old and young.

τ?ν δ? τω?ν ?νίων κ.τ.λ.

Cp. supra, c. 5. § 4.

?πε? δ? τ? πλη?θος διαιρε??ται της πόλεως ε?ς ?ερε??ς, ε?ς ?ρχοντας.

The enumeration is incomplete, because Aristotle has only occasion to speak of priests and magistrates. The places assigned to their common tables, like those of the soldiers and the guardians of the country, are to be situated conveniently for their employments. The baldness of the expression suggests the possibility that something may have dropped out. The first words ?πε? δ? τ? πλη?θος appear to be a repetition of ?πε? δ? δε?? τ? μ?ν πλη?θος τω?ν πολιτω?ν at the beginning of the Chapter. πλη?θος is used for the citizens generally, not as opposed to the upper classes.

περ? τ?ν τω?ν ?ερω?ν ο?κοδομημάτων ?χειν τ?ν τάξιν.

‘To have their proper place.’ Cp. § 8, τ?ν ε?ρημένην τάξιν. τ?ν . . . ο?κοδομημάτων, sc. τάξιν, is to be supplied.

τ?ν καλουμένην ?στυνομίαν.

The qualifying καλουμένην, if not a mere pleonasm, seems to indicate the more uncommon or technical expression. Cp. note on c. 8. § 7 supra, and on vi. 1. § 6.

The MSS. vary between νενεμη?σθαι and μεμιμη?σθαι. P⁴ has compounded them into νενεμιμη?σθαι. Bekker in his second edition has adopted μεμιμη?σθαι. Cp. vi. 2. § 7, where certain magistrates are required by law to take their meals together.

περ? πολιτείας α?τη?ς.

Hitherto Aristotle has been speaking only of the conditions of the best state, which are its ?λη (supra c. 4. §§ 1-3). Now he is going on to speak of the πολιτεία itself, which is the ε??δος of a πόλις (cp. iii. 3. §§ 7-9).

Chapters 13, 14, 15 form a transition to the subject of education, which is begun in c. 16, and is continued in Book viii. But it cannot be said that Aristotle fulfils the promise of discussing the ‘constitution’ of the best state. He describes the life of his citizens from birth to boyhood, but says nothing about their judicial or political duties.

?κκειται καλω?ς.

‘Stands out well,’ or ‘distinctly.’ For the thought, cp. Eud. Eth. ii. 11, 1227 b. 20, ?στι γ?ρ τ?ν μ?ν σκοπ?ν ?ρθ?ν ε??ναι, ?ν δ? το??ς πρ?ς τ?ν σκοπ?ν διαμαρτάνειν.

In this passage, of which the connexion is obscure, Aristotle seems to say that the good man is superior to the ordinary conditions of existence, and so to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only (*ἡλάττονος τοῦ μείνον διακεκμημένοις*), the legislator may make his citizens superior to external conditions. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. cc. 9-12.

ἢ περὶ δὲ τὸ προκειμένον ἔστι τὴν ἄριστην πολιτείαν δεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ ἕκαστου καθ' ἑνὸς ἄριστον ἢ πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἢ ῥιστα δ' ἢ πολιτεύοιτο καθ' ἑνὸς εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἢ νδέχεται τὴν πόλιν, δηλοῦν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖν, τί ἔστι, μὴ λανθάνειν.

The connexion is as follows: 'In various ways men mistake the nature of happiness, but we recognise it to be the great object of a state, and therefore we should ascertain its nature.'

ἢ ἀμὲν δὲ καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἠκείνων ἔελος.

It is difficult to say why Aristotle should speak thus doubtfully or depreciatingly of a principle which lies at the basis both of his ethical and political philosophy. Is the expression to be attributed only to the Greek love of qualifying language?

καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἔξ ἠποθέσεως ἢ πλῶς.

These words are not found in the Nicomachean Ethics (see references in note on text), and therefore may be supposed to be added by Aristotle as an explanation.

λέγω δὲ ἔξ ἠποθέσεως.

'Happiness is an absolute good, whereas punishments are only good under certain conditions;' they are evils which prevent greater evils. The negative and the positive senses of the word 'just,'—just punishments, just actions,—needed to be distinguished in the beginning of philosophy.

οἷον τὸ περὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεις ἀδικαίαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις π' ἄρετης μὲν εἰσιν, ἢ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἢ ἀναγκαῖως ἢ χουσιν (ἄρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηθενὲς δεῖν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τὴν ἄδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), ἀπὸ δὲ π' τῆς τιμῆς καὶ τῆς εἰσπορίας ἢ πλῶς εἰσὶ κάλλιστα πράξεις.

'They have their rightness, not as ends, but as means or conditions of something else which is an end.' For the use of *ἢ ἀναγκαῖον*, cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 2, τῶν δ' ἢ νεργειῶν ἀπὸ μὲν εἰσιν ἢ ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἄτερα ἀρεταί, ἀπὸ δὲ καθ' ἀτάς.

Under the common notion of *ἢ ἀναγκαῖα* and *ἠποθέσεως*, by a play of words, Aristotle appears to comprehend not only the external goods which are the conditions of individual life, but the penalties imposed by law, which are the conditions of the existence of states.

ἀπὸ δὲ π' τῆς τιμῆς πράξεις, sc. ἔρρουσαι, τείνουσαι ἢ γινόμεναι.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄτερον κακὸν τινὲς ἀρεσίς ἔστιν.

‘The one is a voluntary choice of an evil,’ i.e. for the sake of removing some other evil. For example, punishment puts an end to crime.

The conjecture ῥαίρεσις, which is adopted by Schneider, Coraes, Bekker (2nd edition), and Susemihl, is unnecessary.

χρήσαιο δ' ῥν ῥ σπουδαῖος ῥνρ κα? πενί? κα? νόσ? κα? ταῖς ῥλλαις τύχαις ταῖς ἀύλαις καλωῖς ῥλλ? τ? μακάριον ῥν τοῖς ῥναντίοις ῥστίν.

Compare Nic. Eth. i. 10, especially the noble words in § 12, ῥμωσ δ? κα? ῥν τούτοις διαλάμπει τ? καλόν, ῥπειδαν ῥέρ? τις ε?κόλωσ πολλῖς κα? μεγάλας ῥτυχίας μ? δι? ῥναλγησίαν ῥλλ? γεννάδας ῥν κα? μεγαλόψυχος.

δηλόν δ' ῥτι κα? τῖς χρήσεις ῥναγκαῖον σπουδαίας κα? καλῖς εῖναι ταύτας ῥπλωῖς. δι? κα? νομίζουσιν ῥνθρωποι τῖς ε?δαιμονίας αῖτια τ? ῥκτῖς εῖναι τῶν ῥγαθῶν, ῥσπερ ε? τον? καθαρίζειν λαμπρῶν κα? καλωῖς αῖτιῶτο τῶν λύραν μαῖλλον τῖς τέχνης.

‘The good man will make a use of external goods which is absolutely good. And because (δι?) this use of external goods is good in him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, which is just as if we were to attribute the melody to the lyre and not to the player.’

αῖτιῶτο, sc. τις, gathered from ῥνθρωποι. τις occurs in one MS. (P⁵) and is inserted by Bekker in his 2nd edition.

δι? κατ' εῖχῶν εῖχόμεθα τῶν τῖς πόλεωσ σύστασιν ὡῖν ῥ τυχῶ κυρία.

1) ‘Since therefore some things must be presupposed (δι?), our prayer and desire is that our city may be so constituted as to have the goods of fortune,’ sc. εῖναι ῥξ ῥκείων ὡῖν, etc.; or 2) ‘we desire that her constitution in respect of the goods of fortune may answer to our prayer,’ making κατ' εῖχῶν, sc. εῖναι, the predicate, ὡῖν, sc. ῥν ῥκείνοισ ὡῖν; or 3) ‘we ask if we could only have our prayer,’ or ‘though it be only an ideal,’ as above, κατ' εῖχῶν, iv. 11. § 1, πολιτείαν τῶν κατ' εῖχῶν γινομένην.

κα? γρ ε? πάντας ῥνδέχεται σπουδαίους εῖναι, μ? καθ' ῥκαστον δ? τῶν πολιτῶν, ὡῖν αῖρετώτερον, ῥκολουθεῖ? γρ τῶ καθ' ῥκαστον κα? τ? πάντας.

He seems to mean that although there might be some common idea of virtue which the citizens attained collectively, such as patriotism, yet it would be better that each individual should be virtuous, for each implies all. Compare, ii. 3. § 2, τ? γρ πάντες διττόν, κ.τ.λ., where he distinguishes ‘each’ from ‘all.’

ῥνία τε ὁθῶν ῥῥελοσ ῥνῥναι· τ? γρ ῥθη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ, κ.τ.λ.

Lit. ‘Some qualities there is no use in having by nature; for habit alters them; and through nature,’ or ‘such is their nature that, they are swayed by habit both towards good and towards evil.’ To us the reasoning of this passage appears singular. Yet probably what Aristotle means to say is, that moral qualities, if given by nature,

would cease to be moral, and in so far as they are moral would cease to be natural. Nature in this passage is used for 'instinct,' or 'natural impulse.' From another point of view (Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 2) he shows, using the term ὕσις in a somewhat different sense, that things which are purely natural cannot be altered by habit; but that nature supplies the conditions under which habits may be cultivated. Cp. also infra, c. 15. § 7.

ἑτέρους . . . ἢ τοῦ αἰτοῦ διὰ βίου.

'Are rulers and subjects to differ at different times, or to be the same always?'

τοῦ ἡγεμονίας.

1) *Dative of reference: 'In relation to their subjects,' or, 2) with a more obvious construction, but with a feebler sense, τοῦ ἡγεμονίας may be taken after ἀνεράν, 'so that the superiority of the governors is manifest to their subjects.'

Σκύλαξ.

The same who is mentioned in Herodotus (iv. 44) as sailing down the Indus by order of Darius Hystaspes. Whether the writings passing under his name with which Aristotle was acquainted were genuine or not we cannot say. The short summary of the geography of the habitable world which has come down to us under the name of Scylax contains allusions to events later than the time of Herodotus, and is therefore certainly either spurious or interpolated.

πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν.

Not country as opposed to town—'the country people combine with the malcontents of the town;' but, 'all the inhabitants *minus* the rulers,' i.e. the perioeci, metics, or any others, who, though personally free, had no political rights, make common cause with the subject classes and desire revolution.

ἢ γὰρ ὕσις δέδωκε τὴν ἀρεσιν, ποιήσασα αἰτῶν τῶν γένει τὰ τὴν τῶν μὲν νεώτερον τῶν δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὡς τὸν μὲν ἡγεσθαι πρέπει, τοῦ δ' ἡγεῖν.

Lit. 'For nature herself has given the principle of choice when she created in the very race the same element, i. e. the same human beings, partly young and partly old, of whom the one are fitted to obey, the others to command.'

αἰτῶν τῶν γένει τὰ τὸν. The word αἰτῶν has less MS. authority than αἰτό, and is omitted altogether in one MS. and in Aretino's translation. Αἰτῶν may be translated: 'In the human race nature has created the very same thing, making a distinction of old and young, corresponding to that of rulers and subjects.' The correction τῶν αἰτῶν for αἰτῶν is unnecessary.

ἢ περὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἡγεμονίας τὴν αἰτῶν ἡρετῶν ἐπιναί ἡμὲν καὶ τὸν ἡρίστου ἡνδρός.

i. e. in the best state which he is here discussing.

Ἐσαύτως οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνγκη διῆρησθαι καὶ τὸν τοῦ τῆς μέρους δηλονότι, καὶ τῆς πράξεις δὲ ἄλογον ἔρον μὲν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῦρ' αὖ τῆς τῶν ὑψέτι βελτίονος ἀρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῦ δὲ δυναμένους τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῦν δυοῦν.

Ἐσαύτως . . . ἔχειν. 'And as there must be a division of the soul, in like manner there must be a division of the actions of the soul;' Ἐσαύτως answers to ἄλογον ἔχειν, and is to be taken closely with καὶ τῆς πράξεις.

τὸν τοῦ τῆς μέρους, sc. τῆς λόγον ἔχον.

ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῦν δυοῦν, sc. τῶν πράξεων. 'The simple action of the highest principle is better than the mixed action of all or of two, that is the union of the higher with the lower, or the practical and speculative reason combined (τοῦν δυοῦν).' Aristotle is here speaking of that life of mind which in the Ethics he conceives to have a separate existence (ἢ δὲ τὸν νοῦν [sc. ἐξαιμονία] κεχωρισμένη Nic. Eth. x. 8. § 3). But we are unable to understand how this pure mind condescends to take a part in human things—the analogous difficulty in Aristotle to the relation of τῶν νοούμενα and τῶν αἰνόμενα in Plato. We know that within the sphere of practice thought and reflection must always be reappearing if the legislator is endowed with them. But Aristotle nowhere explains how the speculative, either in private or public life, is related to the practical, or what is the higher training which fits the citizen for either.

Ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἔγανται τὸν νομοθέτου τὴν σκοπόν, ἢ τι πάντα πρὸς τὴν κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον νομοθέτησεν· ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὴν λόγον ἔστιν ἐλέγκτα καὶ τοῦ δὲ ἔργοις ἔξελέγκται νῦν.

Cp. Thuc. ii. 39, καὶ ἢ ταῦς παιδείαις οὐ μὲν ἔπιπόν' ἔσκησει (sc. οὐ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) ἐθὺς νέοι ἔντες τῶν ἔνδρε' ἔον μετέρχονται, ἢ με' δὲ ἔνειμένως δαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἔσσον ἢ τὸς ἔσοπαλε' ἔς κινδύνους χωρονόμεν.

καὶ τοῦ δὲ ἔργοις ἔξελέγκται νῦν. Alluding to Leuctra and Mantinea. Cp. c. 11. § 8, about walls, and ii. 9. § 10, about the women.

οὐτὼ καὶ Θίβρων.

Who Thibron was is unknown. But we have an example of a treatise such as he might have written in the 'de Republica Lacedemoniorum,' attributed to Xenophon. Was he more likely to have been a Spartan, or only an admirer of Sparta, like the Philolacon in other states of Hellas? The name is Lacedaemonian. The words τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστος τῶν γραφόντων περὶ πολιτείας αὐτῶν remind us how large a literature of political philosophy must have existed in the time of Aristotle, although we are apt to imagine him the first writer on such subjects. Cp. ii. 1. § 1; c. 7. § 1; c. 12. § 1.

ἢ τι δὲ τὸν τοῦ γελοῦν, ἐπὶ μένοντες ἢ τοῦ δὲ νόμοις ἀτον', καὶ μηδενὲς ἢ μπουδίζοντος πρὸς τὴν χρησθαι τοῦ δὲ νόμοις, ἢ ποβεβλήκασι τὴν ζῆν καλω'.

‘If their greatness depended on their laws, it is ridiculous to suppose that they can have retained their laws and lost their happiness.’

ἴτι κρατεῖν ἴσκησεν ἴπῃ τῷ πέλαις ἴρχειν.

‘If states are trained in virtue only that they may rule over their neighbours, the same principle will impel individuals to usurp the government in their own states.’

Παυσανίῃ τῇ βασιλειῇ.

See note on v. 1. § 10.

ταῦτῃ γὰρ ἴριστα καὶ ἴδίῃ καὶ κοινηῇ τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἴμποιεῖν δεῖ τὰ ταῦτῃς ψυχαῖς τῷ ἴνθρώπῳ.

There is a slight flaw in the text, which may be corrected (with Susemihl) by adding τε after τόν.

τῷ γὰρ βαῖν ἴλιασιν, ἴσπερ ἴ σίδηρος, εἴρηνην ἴγοντες.

Cp. Soph. Aj. 650 (Dindorf):—

κῆγῃ γάρ, ἴς τῃ δεινῃ ἴκαρτέρουν τότε,
βαῖνῃ σίδηρος ἴς, ἴθελύνθην στόμα
πρῃς τῃσδε τῃς γυναικός.

In the Nic. Eth. x. 7, Aristotle dwells at length on the thesis that the true happiness of man is to be sought in leisure and contemplation. But we have a difficulty in realizing his meaning. For we naturally ask how is the leisure to be employed? and on what is contemplation to feed? To these questions his writings supply no answer. We have no difficulty in understanding that by a philosopher the mind and the use of the mind is deemed higher than the body and its functions, or that the intellectual is to be preferred to the moral, or that the life of a gentleman is to be passed in liberal occupations, not in trade or servile toil. But when we attempt to go further we can only discern a negative idealism; we are put off with words such as θεωρία, οἴσια, and the like, which absorbed the minds of that generation, but which to us appear to have no context or meaning.

But if in the sphere of the individual the idea of contemplative leisure is feeble and uncertain, much more shadowy is the meaning of the word when applied to the state. We can see that peace is to be preferred to war; that the Athenians ‘provided for their weary spirits many relaxations from toil’ (Thuc. ii. 38); that ‘they could fix their minds upon the greatness of Athens until they became filled with the love of her’ (ib. 43); that into education an element of philosophy should enter; that sleep is sweet to weary mortals; that to the Greek leisure was a necessity of the higher life. But we fail to perceive how the leisure of a state, the interest of a spectacle, the tranquillity of wealth is better than some great struggle for freedom; or how the sons of those who fought at Thermopylae and Salamis were more fortunate than their fathers. Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge that greater virtues of some kind would be required in

‘the islands of the blest’ than in the ordinary life of man. The contemplative end which he imagines is not suited to the human character and is nearly unmeaning. To us there appears to be more truth in the sentiment, which has been repeated in many forms, that ‘the search after knowledge is a greater blessing to man than the attainment of it.’

δε?? γ?ρ πολλ? τω?ν ?ναγκαίων ?πάρχειν, ?πως ?ξη?? σχολάζειν.

‘The virtues of leisure imply the virtues of business, for business supplies the means of leisure.’

? μ?ν γ?ρ πόλεμος ?ναγκάζει δικαίους ε??ναι κα? σω?ρονε??ν.

Cp. Tennyson’s Maud I. vi.-xiii.:—

‘Why do they prate of the blessings of peace?

Peace in her vineyard—yes!—but a company forges the wine.’

Yet there is corruption in war as well as in peace, now as of old, in furnishing the commissariat of an army, in making appointments, in conferring distinctions, sometimes followed by a fearful retribution.

?κε??νοι μ?ν γ?ρ ο? ταύτ? δια?έρουσι τω?ν ?λλων, τ?? μ? νομίζειν τα?τ? το??ς ?λλοις μέγιστα τω?ν ?γαθω?ν, ?λλ? τ?? γενέσθαι ταν?τα μα?λλον διά τινος ?ρετη?ς.

‘The Lacedaemonians agree with the rest of mankind that the good life is the end, but they differ in supposing the end to be obtained by military virtue alone.’

Cp. (though a different point of view from that which is here taken) ii. 9. §§ 34, 35: ‘Although the Lacedaemonians truly think that the goods for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.’

?πε? δ? μείζω τε ?γαθ? ταν?τα, κα? τ?ν ?πόλαυσιν τ?ν τούτων ? τ?ν τω?ν ?ρετω?ν, κα? ?τι δι’ α?τήν, ?ανερ?ν ?κ τούτων, πω?ς δ? κα? δι? τίνων ?σται, τον?το δ? θεωρητέον.

The construction of the sentence is as follows: ?πε? δ? ?ανερ?ν ?κ τούτων μείζω [ε??ναι] τ? ?γαθ? ταν?τα κα? τ?ν ?πόλαυσιν τ?ν τούτων ? τ?ν τω?ν ?ρετω?ν [sc. ?θικω?ν ? πολεμικω?ν χρη?σιν understood from ?πόλαυσιν] κα? ?τι [α? ?ρετα?] ε?σ? δι’ α?τ?ν [sc. τ?ν τούτων ?πόλαυσιν].

πω?ς δ? introduces the apodosis which is resumed in τον?το δ? θεωρητέον.

?ρετω?ν goes back to διά τινος ?ρετη?ς in the previous sentence.

?νδέχεται γ?ρ διημαρτηκέναι κα? τ?ν λόγον τη?ς βελτίστης ?ποθέσεως, κα? δι? τω?ν ?θω?ν ?μοίως ??χθαι.

The meaning of ἡχθῆναι is simply ‘trained;’ whether for good or evil depends on the sense given to ἡμοίως. Either 1)* ‘in the same i. e. a mistaken way’; or 2) ‘all the same’ = ‘nevertheless.’ The first is most in accordance with the context διημαρτηκῆναι καὶ τὴν λόγον. The καὶ is needlessly bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. ‘For even reason (which we might least expect to err) is not infallible.’

ἄνεργον δὲ τὸν τό γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἔν τοις ἄλλοις, ἃ ἡ γένεσις ἔπ’ ἄρχητος ἔστ’ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἡπό τινος ἄρχητος ἄλλου τέλους· ἃ δὲ λόγος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ νοητικὴ τῆς ὑσεως τέλος.

1) *The connexion is as follows: ‘We have to consider whether men are to be trained by reason or by habit: Thus much is clear—that there is a succession of means and ends: every birth having a beginning and every end having a beginning in some other end; and the end of nature being reason and intelligence.’ That is to say: ‘In every birth there are previous elements and in like manner in the end or intellectual perfection of human nature other antecedents, such as education, are implied, which from other points of view are themselves ends.’

2) According to Susemihl the words are to be taken as follows: ‘It is clear that generation implies some antecedent principle and the end which springs from an antecedent principle is in turn relative to a further end.’ According to this way of taking the passage γένεσις in the 1st clause is equivalent to τέλος in the 2nd. Generation has an antecedent principle of which it is the end. The end which thus springs from an antecedent principle has a further end, namely, intelligence and reason. But two objections may be offered to this way of translating the words. *a)* τινός has no meaning. *b)* The less natural construction is adopted instead of the more natural. For ἄλλου τέλους would naturally depend upon the words which immediately precede, ἡπό τινος ἄρχητος.

3) Once more, Mr. Postgate proposes to take the passage as follows: ‘So much then is evident—first here, as in other cases, coming into existence is the beginning of all, and what is the end, viewed from a certain beginning, is itself directed towards a further end.’ To this interpretation it may be objected that ἔπ’ ἄρχητος is taken in a different sense from ἡπό τινος ἄρχητος and that τὸν τέλους, as in the preceding explanation, is construed unnaturally.

See *infra* note on § 9.

τὴν χρησμόν.

The oracle ‘μὲν τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα’ which is found in the margin of two MSS. is probably made up from the context. Out of these words Göttling has constructed a hexameter ἄλλ’ νέας, Τροίζην, ἄλοκας μὲν τέμνε βαθείας. The equivocation may either consist in the double meaning of νεαῖς ‘fallow ground’ (in Attic used for νειαῖς) and νέας ‘the young maiden:’ or the disputed point may have been only whether the oracle was to be taken literally or metaphorically.

δι? τ?ς μ?ν ?ρμόττει περ? τ?ν τω?ν ?κτωκαίδεκα ?τω?ν ?λικίαν συζευγνύναι, το?ς δ? ?πτ? κα? τριάκοντα, ? μικρόν.

The words ? μικρ?ν probably mean ‘thereabouts’ or ‘nearly,’ like μικρον?; or some word such as πλε??ον may have dropped out.

The disparity of age between the man and woman appears to be great; but as Aristotle extends the term for the women from 18 to 50, and for the men from 35 to 70 years, the time allowed for cohabitation in either would nearly coincide, i.e. 35 and 32 years. There is therefore no reason for doubting the reading.

The relative ages to us appear singular. Malthus, On Population vol. i. p. 237, remarks that this regulation ‘must of course condemn a great number of women to celibacy, as there never can be so many men of thirty-seven as there are women of eighteen.’ But the real and great disparity is between the total number of women after eighteen and the total number of men after thirty-five.

Plato in the Republic (v. 460) makes the interval less. He assigns twenty to forty as the marriageable age for women: for men, from the time ‘when they have passed the greatest speed of life’ (twenty-five?) to fifty-five. In the Laws (iv. 721) the citizens are required to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; but in another passage (772 D, E) between twenty-five and thirty-five.

In the History of Animals (Aristotle?) the age proper for marriage in men is limited to sixty, or at the utmost seventy; in women to forty, or at the utmost fifty.

?τι δ? ? διαδοχ? τω?ν τέκνων το??ς μ?ν ?ρχομένης ?σται τη?ς ?κμη?ς, ??ν γίγνηται κατ? λόγον ε?θ?ς ? γένεσις, το??ς δ? ?δη καταλελυμένης τη?ς ?λικίας πρ?ς τ?ν τω?ν ?βδομήκοντα ?τω?ν ?ριθμόν.

According to this way of reckoning Aristotle seems to consider the prime of life to be thirty-five. The father having begun to keep house at thirty-five years of age would at seventy give up to the son, who might be expected to begin family life over again at thirty-five.

In speaking of the succession of children to their parents Aristotle takes account only of the fathers.

το??ς δ? περ? τ?ν ?ραν χρόνοις, ?ς ο? πολλο? χρω?νται καλω?ς κα? νν?ν, ?ρίσαντες χειμω?νος τ?ν συναυλίαν ποιε??σθαι ταύτην.

Sc. δε?? ο?τως ποιε??ν, taking δε?? from the previous sentence. The better MSS. read δε?? χρη?σθαι after χρόνοις, but this is unnecessary, and the repetition of χρω?νται after χρη?σθαι is unpleasant.

συναυλίαν, ‘cohabitation’ probably from α?λ? not from α?λός.

κα? α?το?ς ?δη.

i. e. ‘themselves when they come to be parents as well as the writers on these subjects.’

Like Plato, Aristotle prescribes gymnastics for women as well as men. Cp. Plat. Laws vii. 789; Rep. v. 457.

δι? δ? πλη?θος τέκνων, ??ν ? τάξις τω?ν ?θω?ν κωλύ?, μηδ?ν ?ποτίθεσθαι τω?ν γιγνομένων· ?ρισται γ?ρ δ? τη?ς τεκνοποιίας τ? πλη?θος. ??ν δέ τισι γίγνηται παρ? ταν?τα συνδυασθέντων, πρ?ν α?σθησιν ?γγενέσθαι κα? ζώην, ?μποιε??σθαι δε?? τ?ν ?μβλωσιν.

‘But when there are too many children (for we have settled that there is to be a limit of population), they must not be exposed merely for this reason. If, however, it should happen that a couple exceed the number allowed by law, then abortion must be practised before sense and life have begun.’

?ρισται γ?ρ δ? . . . τ? πλη?θος gives the reason for introducing the previous remark. ‘I speak of this because population has been limited.’ Cp. ii. 7. § 5, where Aristotle says that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the limit of population; and ii. 6. § 10, where he censures Plato for supposing that population will be kept down even if nothing is done to secure this object: and Rep. v. 461, where abortion and exposure are allowed, or in certain cases enforced; also a curious and interesting passage quoted from Musonius a Stoic philosopher (about 60 a.d.), by Stobaeus § 15. p. 450, in which he denounces abortion and similar practices as offences against Zeus the god of kindred.

Respecting the seven ages, see *infra*, note on c. 17. § 15; and for the regulations of Aristotle respecting marriage, the time after marriage, procreation and nursing of children and their early education, cp. Laws vii. 788-794.

ο?εσθαι.

sc. δε??. To be gathered from the previous paragraph.

τ?ς δ? διατάσεις τω?ν παίδων κα? κλαυθμο?ς ο?κ ?ρθω?ς ?παγορεύουσιν ο? κωλύοντες ?ν το??ς νόμοις· συμ?έρουσι γ?ρ πρ?ς α?ξησιν.

This is another misrepresentation of Plato, who only says that when children are silent they are pleased, and that they ought to have as little pain as possible in early childhood lest they grow up morose in character. (‘When anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate.’ Laws vii. 792 A). Yet the words ?ν το??ς νόμοις sufficiently show that Plato is the writer to whom Aristotle is referring.

τ?ς διατάσεις, ‘the passions or struggles,’ a neutral word to be interpreted by κλαυθμο? which follows.

ε?λογον ον??ν ?πελαύνειν ?π? τω?ν ?κουσμάτων κα? τω?ν ?ραμάτων ?νελευθερίαν κα? τηλικούτους ?ντας.

A thought enlarged upon by Plato Rep. ii. 377 ff.

Bekker in his 1st edition has unnecessarily altered ?νελευθερίαν, the reading of the majority of the MSS., into ?νελευθερίας. In his 2nd edition he has substituted ?νελευθέρων, which has some MS. authority. Neither alteration is necessary; τηλικούτους ?ντας may be taken as an accusative of the remoter object. ?πελαύνειν has been altered by Susemihl into ?πολαβε??ν, a change which is partly grounded on a various reading ?πολαύειν, and partly on the ‘absumere’ of the old translator.

κα? τηλικούτους ?ντας. 1)* ‘Even when they are at this early age,’ i. e. although they are so young, care must be taken about what they see and hear; or 2) κα? may be emphatic, ‘especially at this early age when they cannot take care of themselves.’

?πιμελ?ς μ?ν ον??ν ?στω το??ς ?ρχουσι μηθ?ν μήτε ?γαλμα μήτε γρα??ν ε??ναι τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν, ε? μ? παρά τισι θεο??ς τοιούτοις ο??ς κα? τ?ν τωθασμ?ν ?ποδίδωσιν ? νόμος· πρ?ς δ? τούτοις ??ήσιν ? νόμος το?ς ?χοντας ?λικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν κα? ?π?ρ α?τω?ν κα? τέκνων κα? γυναικω?ν τιμαλ?ε??ν το?ς θεούς.

ο??ς κα? τ?ν τωθασμ?ν ?ποδίδωσιν ? νόμος. Such as the Phallic improvisation at the Dionysiac festival of which Aristophanes furnishes an imitation in the Acharnians 263 ff.

The words πρ?ς δ? τούτοις introduce a second exception: ‘indecent may be allowed in the temples of certain Gods;’ πρ?ς δ? τούτοις, ‘and also to persons of full age whom the law allows to worship in such temples.’ Cp. once more Plat. Rep. ii. 378: ‘The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which his son in turn inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and simple persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and in order to reduce the number of hearers they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim.’

Θεόδωρος.

A great Athenian actor and performer of Sophocles who took the part of Antigone: Aeschines was his tritagonist who played Creon. Dem. Fal. Leg. 418. He is mentioned in the Rhetoric of Aristotle ii. 23. 1400 b. 16, iii. 13. 1414 b. 13.

ο? γ?ρ τα??ς ?βδομάσι διαιρον?ντες τ?ς ?λικίας ?ς ?π? τ? πολ? λέγουσιν ο? καλω?ς, δε?? δ? τη?? διαιρέσει τη?ς ?ύσεως ?πακολουθε??ν.

It is uncertain whether we should read *ο? καλω?ς or ο? κακω?ς in this passage. The authority of the MSS. and the immediate context confirm the former. On the other hand ο? κακω?ς is the more idiomatic expression, and is not irreconcilable with the context:—‘Those who divide the ages of men by seven are not far wrong, and yet we should rather observe the divisions made by nature;’ or, ‘and we should observe the

divisions made by nature, i. e. the divisions into sevens' (Bergk 25). This is also confirmed by the passage in c. 16. § 17, α?τη [sc. ? τη?ς διανοίας ?κμ?] δ' ?στ?ν ?ν το??ς πλείστοις ?νπερ τω?ν ποιητω?ν τιν?ς ε?ρήκασιν ο? μετρον?ντες τα??ς ?βδομάσι τ?ν ?λικίαν, περ? τ?ν χρόνον τ?ν τω?ν πεντήκοντα ?τω?ν.

It may be observed too that Aristotle himself in this passage divides ages by sevens—seven, fourteen (puberty), twenty-one.

The 'sevens' of Aristotle agree with the 'sevens' of Solon (?) in the years which he assigns to marriage (35) and to the highest development of the mind (49 or 50):—

Πα??ς μ?ν ?νηβος ??ν ?τι νήπιος ?ρκος ?δόντων
 ?ύσας ?κβάλλει πρω?τον ?ν ?πτ' ?τεσιν·
 το?ς δ' ?τέρους ?τε δ? τελέσ? θε?ς ?πτ' ?νιαυτούς,
 ?βης ?κ?αίνει σήματα γεινομένης·
 τη?? τριτάτ? δ? γένειον ?εξομένων ?τι γυίων
 λαχνον?ται, χροιη?ς ?νθος ?μειβομένης·
 τη?? δ? τετάρτ? πα?ς τις ?ν ?βδομάδι μέγ' ?ριστος
 ?σχύν, ?ν τ' ?νδρες σήματ' ?χουσ' ?ρετη?ς·
 πέμπτ? δ' ?ρίου, ?νδρα γάμου μεμνημένον ε??ναι
 κα? παίδων ζητε??ν ε?σοπίσω γενεήν·
 τη?? δ' ?κτ? περ? πάντα καταρτύεται νόος ?νδρός,
 ο?δ' ?ρδειν ?θ' ?μω?ς ?ργ' ?πάλαμνα θέλει·
 ?πτ? δ? νον?ν κα? γλω?σσαν ?ν ?βδομάσιν μέγ' ?ριστος
 ?κτώ τ'· ?μ?οτέρων τέσσαρα κα? δέκ' ?τη·
 τη?? δ' ?νάτ? ?τι μ?ν δύναται, μαλακώτερα δ' α?τον?
 πρ?ς μεγάλην ?ρετ?ν γλω?σσά τε κα? σο?ίη· 1
 τη?? δεκάτ? δ' ?τε δ? τελέσ? θε?ς ?πτ' ?νιαυτούς,
 ο?κ ?ν ?ωρος ??ν μο??ραν ?χοι θανάτου.

Compare an interesting note of Mr. Cope's in his edition of Aristotle's Rhetoric, vol. ii. p. 160.

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BOOK VIII.

δε?? γ?ρ πρ?ς ?κάστην πολιτεύεσθαι.

Here Susemihl has adopted παιδεύεσθαι after Aretino's translation. But πολιτεύεσθαι the reading of the Greek MSS. is also confirmed by William de Moerbek, 'politizare,' and is more in accordance with the context: 'For the life of the citizen should conform to the state, because the state is of one character, and this unity in the end of the state necessitates unity in the education of the citizens.'

?ανερ?ν ?τι κα? τ?ν παιδείαν μίαν κα? τ?ν α?τ?ν ?ναγκα??ον ε??ναι πάντων κα? ταύτης τ?ν ?πιμέλειαν ε??ναι κοιν?ν κα? μ? κατ' ?δίαν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 14, κράτιστον μ?ν ον??ν τ? γίγνεσθαι κοιν?ν ?πιμέλειαν κα? ?ρθήν, where he goes on to show that public education can be best enforced, but that, since it is generally neglected, we must have recourse to private education, which moreover will take into account the peculiarities of the individual case; also that the education of individuals must be based upon general principles, and these are to be gathered from the science or art of legislation.

?παινέσειε δ' ?ν τις κα? τον?το Λακεδαιμονίους: κα? γ?ρ πλείστην ποιον?νται σπουδ?ν περ? το?ς πα??δας κα? κοινή?? ταύτην.

Aristotle appears to praise the Lacedaemonians, not for the quality of their education (cp. infra c. 4), but for the circumstance that it was established by law. According to Isocrates Panath. 276 d, the Spartans fell so far below the general standard of education in Hellas, that they did not even know their letters, τοςον?τον ?πολελειμμένοι της κοινή?ς παιδείας κα? ?ιλοσοφίας ε?σ?ν ?στ' ο?δ? γράμματα μανθάνουσιν: and according to Plato, or rather according to the author of the Platonic Hippias Major (285 C), 'not many of them could count.'

κα? τον?το. κα? is found in all the MSS., and was the reading of Moerbek. There is no difficulty in explaining it: 'One may praise the Lacedaemonians for this also,' as he has already praised their common use of property in ii. 5. § 7. Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 13, ?ν μόν? δ? τη?? Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει μετ' ?λίγων ? νομοθέτης ?πιμέλειαν δοκε?? πεποι?σθαι τρο?η?ς τε κα? ?πιτηδευμάτων.

ων?ν γ?ρ ?μισβητε??ται περ? τω?ν ?ργων.

'We are agreed about the necessity of a state education, but we differ about the subjects of education' or 'about the things to be done in education;' cp. infra § 3, τω?ν ?λευθέρων ?ργων κα? τω?ν ?νελευθέρων.

?κ δ? της ?μποδ?ν παιδείας.

‘The customary education’ or ‘the education which meets us in life’—without any idea of obstruction.

ταραχώδης ἢ σκέψις.

‘It is impossible to consider the theory of education apart from the prevalent custom; and it would be equally impossible even if we could frame a perfect theory to carry it out in practice.’

τῶ περιττά.

Lit. ‘things in excess,’ i. e. not included in the ordinary training either for life or virtue, in modern language ‘the higher knowledge.’ For the use of the word cp. ii. 6. § 6; Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 4.

κριτάς τινας.

Cp. for the use of the word De Anima i. 405 b. 8, πάντα τῶ στοιχεῖα κριτῶν ἐληθεύοντων τῆς γῆρας, ‘All these views have found approvers.’

καταβεβλημένοι,

‘laid down and so established.’ cp. c. 3. § 11, καταβεβλημένα παιδεύματα. Cp. supra, ἢ ἢμποδῶν παιδεία.

ἢπαμῶστερίζουσιν,

‘are of a double character,’ partly liberal, partly illiberal.

ἢστι δῶ τέτταρα κ.τ.λ.

μουσικῶ is here separated from γράμματα, which in Plato’s Republic are included under it.

We may remark the form of sentence: ‘There are four;’ but the fourth is introduced with a qualification, τέταρτον ἢνιοι.

ἀῶτη γῶρ ἢρχῶ πάντων.

Not ἢύσις but ἢ σχολή, as is shown by the clause which follows, ἢνα καῶ πάλιν ἐῶπωμεν περῶ ἀῶτης referring to vii. 15. §§ 1, 2, and perhaps to Nic. Eth. x. 6.

ἢλως.

Either, 1) ‘the general question must be asked;’ or 2) *taking ἢλως in an emphatic sense, ‘the question must be surely’ or ‘absolutely asked.’ In what follows §§ 3-6, Aristotle passes on to discuss the more general subjects of refreshments or relaxations, and returns to music in § 7.

But ἄλλως is only a conjecture of Victorious. All the MSS. read τέλος, except one (P⁵), which reads τελευταῖον. (Cp. the old trans. ‘finaliter.’) The reading τέλος gives a sufficient but not a very good sense (‘lastly’), nor can any objection be made to it on the ground that the word occurs in the following line with a different meaning. For such false echoes are not uncommon. Cp. συναγειν, used in two senses, iv. 15. § 8, note.

τὸν ἢ τῆς διαγωγῆς σχολήν.

Cp. infra § 8, τὸν ἢ τῆς σχολῆς διαγωγῆν. The two expressions are nearly equivalent: 1) ‘the leisure occupied in διαγωγῆ.’ 2) ‘the διαγωγῆ of leisure.’ It is hard to find any satisfactory phrase in English to express what Aristotle throughout this book terms διαγωγῆ. The first sense of the word is that employment of leisure which becomes a gentleman (cp. πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδίον διαγωγῆν. ἐλλόγως δ’ ἐς πάντα τάττεται καὶ αἰνεται μετέχειν. ἢ τε γὰρ παιδίον χάριν ἢ ναπαύσεως ἔστι, τὸν δ’ ἢ ναπαυσιν ἢ ναγκαῖον ἢ δεῖν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἢ ατρεία τίς ἔστιν)· καὶ τὸν διαγωγῆν ἢ μολογουμένως δεῖν μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὴν καλὴν ἢ ἄλλο καὶ τὸν ἢ δονῆν infra c. 5. §§ 9, 10). Further it is joined with ἢ ρόνησις (c. 5. § 4. init. πρὸς διαγωγῆν συμβάλλεται τι καὶ ἢ ρόνησιν) and therefore seems to mean the rational or intellectual employment and enjoyment of leisure. It is always distinguished from παιδίον and ἢ ναπαυσις ‘amusement’ and ‘relaxation,’ which are properly, not ends, but only means to renewed exertion (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6); and so means to means, whereas διαγωγῆ and σχολῆ are ends in themselves. The idea of ‘culture,’ implying a use of the intellect, not for the sake of any further end, but for itself, would so far correspond to διαγωγῆ.

ἢ γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγῆν εἶναι τῶν ἢ λευθέρων, ἢ ταύτην τάττουσιν.

ἢ ταύτην, sc. τῆς ἢ τῆς σχολῆς διαγωγῆς.

τάττουσιν, sc. αἰτῆν or music. ‘They reckon music in that class of intellectual enjoyments which they suppose to be peculiar to freemen.’

ἢ ἄλλ’ οἴονται μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἢ πρὸς δαῖτα θαλείην.

The line is not found in our Homer. There is no doubt that in the original θαλείην is to be taken with δαῖτα; but it is probably quoted by Aristotle in reference to the Muse Thalia: and καλεῖν Θαλίην is said in the same way as καλέουσιν οἰδῆν in the following quotation.

ἢ γὰρ μουσικὸν τὸ ποιεῖν δῆλον.

i. e. ‘the fact that the ancients included music in education proves thus much, that they considered it a noble part of education’;—they would not have included what was purely utilitarian.

οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οἶον ἢ μαρτον τὸν ἢ μαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ’ ἢ περγάζονται τὸν ἢ πόνους, ἢ τὸν ἢ πρὸς ἢ νδρίαν μάλιστα συμμέρον.

‘The Lacedaemonians do not run into the error of spoiling the frames of their children, but they spoil their characters.’

ε? τε κα? πρ?ς ταύτην, ο?δ? τον?το ?ξευρίσκουσιν· ο?τε γ?ρ ?ν το??ς ?λλοις ζ?οις ο?τ’ ?π? τω?ν ?θνω?ν ?ρω?μεν τ?ν ?νδρίαν ?κολουθον?σαν το??ς ?γριωτάτοις, ?λλ? μα?λλον το??ς ?μερωτέροις κα? λεοντώδεσιν ?θεσιν.

‘And even if they train with a view to courage they do not attain to it; for courage is not to be found in brutal but in mild and lionlike natures, whether (the comparison is made) of animals or of barbarians.’ Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 375 and Aristotle’s Criticism on this passage in the Politics vii. 7. §§ 5-8.

τω?ν ?πειρωτικω?ν ?θνω?ν.

Not ‘of Epirus,’ which would be wholly disconnected from the Pontus and could hardly have been described as in this state of savagery, nor as in the translation ‘there are other inland tribes,’ for the Achaeans are not inland tribes (unless indeed the tribes ‘about the Pontus’ are called continental with reference to the Mediterranean), but more accurately ‘other tribes on the mainland.’ For another mention of these cannibals in Aristotle, cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 5. § 2.

μ? πρ?ς ?σκειν?ντας.

Said for πρ?ς μ? ?σκειν?ντας. But the fall of Sparta was not really due to the improvements of the other Hellenes in gymnastics; though the equal or superior military discipline of Macedon at last overpowered them.

The fall and decay of Sparta is a political lesson which greatly impresses Aristotle, cp. notes on vii. 11. § 8 and c. 14. § 16 ff.

So in modern times the superiority of nations has often been due to their superior organization. Those who organize first will be first victorious until others become in their turn better trained and prepared. By organization Frederick the Great crushed Austria, as she was afterwards crushed once more in 1866; again the military organization both of Prussia and Austria crumbled before Napoleon at Jena, as the French organization was in turn overpowered by the new military development of Germany in 1870. The Germans have still to prove, ε?τε τ?? το?ς νέους γυμνάζειν τ?ν τρόπον τον?τον διέ?ερον, ε?τε τ?? μόνον μ? πρ?ς ?σκειν?ντας ?σκε??ν.

?ς ?ησ?ν ? λόγος.

Cp. Plato (e. g. Phaedo 87 A, Soph. 238 B) for a similar personification of the argument.

A warning against overstraining of the faculties in youth which may be applied to the young student of modern times as well as to the young Olympic victor.

καταλαμβάνειν τ?ν ?λικίαν.

‘To occupy,’ ‘engage,’ ‘employ.’

ἵνα ὅσπερ ἡνδρόσιμον γένηται τοῖς λόγοις.

A musical term and therefore appropriately used in speaking of music = ‘the keynote,’ ‘that what we have to say may be a sort of keynote to any future discussion of the subject.’ Cp. Arist. Rhet. iii. 14. § 1, 1414 b. 22, καὶ γὰρ οὐ ἀλληταί, ἢ τι ἦν ἐν ἡμῶν ἡχοῦσιν ἀλληλοῦσαι τὸν ἄτοκον προαυλήσαντες συνηψῶσαν τῶν ἡνδρόσιμον, καὶ ἦν τοῖς παιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖν οὕτω γράφειν.

Aristotle suggests three reasons which might be given for the cultivation of music:

- 1) παιδία καὶ ἡναπαύσεως ἕνεκα, like sleep, wine, dancing (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6), amusement and relaxation being the means to renewed exertion.
- 2) Because of its influence on character. Hence its value in education (παιδεία).
- 3) πρὸς διαγωγὴν καὶ ἡρόνησιν, as an end.

In c. 7. § 3 he speaks of music as being used for a) παιδεία, b) κάθαρσις, c) διαγωγὴ; a) corresponds to 2) of c. 5 (πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν), c) to 3).

This leaves b) κάθαρσις to correspond to the use of music as a relaxation, and would seem to show that Aristotle gave the lower meaning to κάθαρσις (i. e. ‘purgation’ rather than ‘purification’). Cp. c. 3. § 4, ἡαρμακείας χάριν, and c. 7. § 4, ὅσπερ ἡατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. See note on c. 7. § 3.

καὶ ἡμα παύει μέριμναν, ἢ ἡησῶν Εἡριπίδης.

Goettling and Bekker (in his second edition), against the authority of the MSS. of the Politics, have altered ἡμα παύει into ἡναπαύει, an unnecessary change, and unsupported by the MSS. of Euripides, which cannot be quoted on either side; for the citation, like many others in Aristotle, is inaccurate. The words referred to occur in Eur. Bacch. 380:—

ἢς [Βρόμιος] τάδ’ ἡχει,
θιασεύειν τε χοροῖς
μετά τ’ ἡλλον ἡγέλασαι,
ἡποπανῶσαι τε μερίμνας.

τάττουσιν ἡτήν.

Sc. εἰς παιδίον καὶ ἡνάπαυσιν understood from the words preceding.

Reading ἡπνὸν for οἶνον, gathered from ἡπνου καὶ μέθης supra, with Bekker’s 2nd edition, but against the authority of all the MSS. and of William de Moerbek.

ἢλλ’ ἡμὸν οἶνον διαγωγὴν τε παισῶν ἡρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἡποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις.

The particle τε is not easily explained. It may be suggested either that 1) it should be omitted, or 2) should be changed into τι or το??ς, or 3) that κα? ?ρόνησιν should be added after it from the corresponding words in § 4, ? προς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται κα? ?ρόνησιν.

ο?δεν? γ?ρ ?τελε?? προσήκει τέλος.

A singular and almost verbal fancy. 'The imperfect is opposed to the perfect, and therefore the immature youth is not intended for reason and contemplation.' Yet the meaning of τέλος is obscure, cp. infra §§ 12, 13, ?πε? δ' ?ν μ?ν τ?? τέλει συμβαίνει το??ς ?νθρώποις ?λιγάκις γίγνεσθαι.

§§ 5-8 are a series of ?πορίαι which take the form of a suppressed dialogue. 1) But a child may learn music with a view to a time when he will be grown up; 2) But why should he learn himself? 3) He will not appreciate unless he does; 4) Then why should he not learn cookery? 5) And how will his morals be improved by playing himself rather than by hearing others perform? Yet infra c. 6 these cobwebs are dashed aside; and it is acknowledged that the truer and deeper effect of music can only be produced on the mind by actual practice.

?σπερ ο? Λάκωνες· ?κε??νοι γ?ρ ο? μανθάνοντες ?μωσ δύνανται κρίνειν ?ρθω?ς, ?ς ?ασί, τ? χρηστ? κα? τ? μ? χρηστ? τω?ν μελω?ν.

Cp. what Plato says of the 'timocratic man,' in Rep. viii. 548 E, α?θαδέστερόν τε δε?? α?τόν, ??ν δ' ?γώ, ε??ναι κα? ?ποαμουσότερον, ?ιλόμευσον δέ· κα? ?ιλήκοον μέν, ?ητορικ?ν δ' ο?δαμω?ς.

ο? γ?ρ ? Ζε?ς α?τ?ς ?δει κα? κιθαρίζει το??ς ποιητα??ς, ?λλ? κα? βαναύσους καλον?μεν το?ς τοιούτους.

In II. i. 603 it is Apollo, not Zeus, who plays to the assembly of the gods.

?χει γ?ρ ?σως ?δονήν τινα κα? τ? τέλος, ?λλ' ο? τ?ν τυχον?σαν· ζητον?ντες δ? ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ?ς ταύτην ?κείνην, δι? τ? τ?? τέλει τω?ν πράξεων ?χειν ?μοιώμά τι.

There is a finality about pleasure, which leads to a confusion with happiness. Like the greater end of life it comes after toil; it is sensible to the eye or feeling; it is the anticipation of we know not what: no account can be given of it. ταύτην, sc. ο? τ?ν τυχον?σαν, 'the higher pleasure;' ?κείνην, 'the lower pleasure.'

δι? ?ν μ?ν ον??ν α?τίαν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 13. § 6, ?λλ' ?πε? ο?χ? α?τ? ο?τε ?ύσις ο?θ' ?ξις ? ?ρίστη ο?τ' ?στιν ο?τε δοκε??, ο?δ' ?δον?ν διώκουσι τ?ν α?τ?ν πάντες, ?δον?ν μέντοι πάντες. ?σως δ? κα? διώκουσιν ο?χ? ?ν ο?ονται ο?δ' ?ν ?ν ?α??εν, ?λλ? τ?ν α?τήν· πάντα γ?ρ ?ύσει ?χει τι θε??ον· ?λλ' ε?λή?ασι τ?ν τον? ?νόματος κληρονομίαν α? σωματικά? ?δονα? δι? τ? πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν ε?ς α?τ?ς κα? πάντας μετέχειν α?τω?ν· δι? τ? μόνως ον??ν γνωρίμους ε??ναι ταύτας μόνως ο?ονται ε??ναι.

ο? δι? ταύτην μόνην,

sc. ζητον?σιν.

?τι δ? ?κροώμενοι τω?ν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθε??ς, κα? χωρ?ς τω?ν ?υθμω?ν κα? τω?ν μελω?ν α?τω?ν.

i.e. ‘any imitation, whether accompanied by rhythm or song or not, creates sympathetic feeling.’

παρ? τ?ς ?ληθιν?ς ?ύσεις.

‘Near to or not far removed from their true natures.’

συμβέβηκε δ? τω?ν α?σθητω?ν ?ν μ?ν το??ς ?λλοις μηδ?ν ?πάρχειν ὁμοίωμα το??ς ?θεσιν, ο??ον ?ν το??ς ?πτο??ς κα? το??ς γευστο??ς, ?λλ’ ?ν το??ς ?ρατο??ς ?ρέμα· σχήματα γάρ ?στι τοιαν?τα, ?λλ’ ?π? μικρόν, κα? πάντες τη?ς τοιαύτης α?σθήσεως κοινωνον?σιν.

‘As to the senses [other than the sense of hearing], objects of sight alone furnish representations of ethical character; (for figures are 1) objects of sight, or 2*) are of an ethical character); but to a certain extent only, and this intellectual element (though feeble) is common to all.’

The obscurity of the passage has led to the insertion of ο? before πάντες: but the construction is then abrupt and the meaning thus obtained, ‘all do not participate in the sense of figure,’ would be a strange statement.

?τι δ’ ο?κ ?στι ταν?τα ?μοιώματα τω?ν ?θω?ν, ?λλ’ σημε??α μα?λλον.

‘Yet such figures and colours (which have been previously called representations) are not really representations but more truly signs and indications.’

ο? μ?ν ?λλ’ ?σον δια?έρει κα? περ? τ?ν τούτων θεωρίαν, δε?? μ? τ? Παύσωνος θεωρε??ν το?ς νέους, ?λλ’ τ? Πολυγνώτου κ?ν ε? τις ?λλος τω?ν γρα?έων ? τω?ν ?γαλματοποιω?ν ?στ?ν ?θικός.

Cp. Poetics 2. 1448 a. 5, Πολύγνωτος μ?ν γ?ρ κρείττους, Παύσων δ? χείρους, Διονύσιος δ? ?μοίους ε?καζεν.

?ν δ? το??ς μέλεσιν α?το??ς.

‘But though hardly discernible in painting we have the very expression of the feeling in music.’

κα? το??ς ?υθμο??ς ε??ναι.

Bekker in his 2nd edition has inserted πρ?ς τ?ν ψύχην before ε??ναι. Cp. a reading which is confirmed by one MS. of the old translator, ‘cognatio *ad animam*.’ Aretino’s

translation suggests ἡμῶν, but the same sense can be got out of the Greek as it stands, ἡμῶν (or πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν) being supplied from τὴν ὕσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην or οὗ νεοί in the previous sentence.

For the doctrine that the soul is a harmony, cp. Plat. Phaedo 86, 92-95; Timaeus 35, 36.

ἡπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν,

sc. τὸ ποιῆσθαι βαναύσους.

πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἴδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ἴσπερον.

Though there is no variation in the MSS., or in the old translator, there seems to be a corruption in this passage. Susemihl transposes χρήσεις and μαθήσεις. Goettling omits both. If retained in their present order, they must be translated as in the text, and may be supposed to mean that practice precedes theory. In the Republic practical life precedes philosophical leisure, and at the end of the Ethics (x. 9. § 20) Aristotle says that the sophist having no experience of politics cannot teach them (cp. Plat. Tim. 19 D).

But a fatal objection to this way of interpreting the passage is the word μάθησις, which elsewhere in this chapter, and even in the next sentence, means 'early education,' not 'mature philosophical speculation.'

Compare Plat. Rep. ii. 411. In the Laws vii. 810 he limits the time allowed for the study of music to three years.

τὸ λόγῳ.

'Speech,' as in bk. i. 2. § 10.

The singular outburst of intellectual life at Athens, which we may well believe to have arisen after the Persian War, belongs to a period of Greek history known to us only from the very short summary of Athenian history contained in a few pages of Thucydides. It was the age of Pindar and Simonides and Phrynichus and Aeschylus, of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Protagoras and Gorgias.

ἡκῆαντίδῳ.

A very ancient comic poet who flourished in the generation before Aristophanes.

ἡπερ δὲ τῶν τε ἡργάνων κ.τ.λ.

This, like many other sentences beginning with ἡπερ, is an anacoluthon, of which the real apodosis is to be found in the words διόπερ οὗ τῶν ἡλευθέρων κρίνομεν ἡῖναι τὴν ἡργασίαν ἡλλῶ θητικωτέραν.

ἡ τρίτον δεῖν τινῶν ἡτερον.

Three alternatives are given: 1) Shall we use all the harmonies and rhythms in education? 2) Shall we make the same distinctions about them in education which are made in other uses of them? Or 3) Shall we make some other distinction?

τρίτον δε?? has been suspected. τρίτον is certainly not symmetrical because it introduces not a third case but a subdivision of the second case. Yet other divisions in Aristotle are unsymmetrical (cp. supra c. 3. § 1 and vii. 11. §§ 1-4).

νομικῶς.

‘After the manner of a law,’ i. e. ἢ τύπῃ explained by the words which follow.

τῆ μὲν ἠθικῆ τῆ δὲ πρακτικῆ τῆ δ’ ἠθουσιαστικῆ τιθέντες.

These distinctions are but feebly represented by modern styles; the first is in some degree analogous to sacred music, the second to military music, and the third to the music of the dance.

πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος,

sc. τῆς ψυχῆς or *τῶν μελῶν.

τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἠπλωῶς, πάλιν δ’ ἢ τοῦ περὶ ποιητικῆς ἡρονῶμεν σαφέστερον.

This promise is very imperfectly fulfilled in the short allusion to κάθαρσις in Poet. c. 6.

διὲ ταῦτα μὲν τοιαύταις ἡρμονίαις καὶ τοῦτοις τοιούτοις μέλεσι θετέον τοῦ τῆν θεατρικῆν μουσικῆν μεταχειριζομένους ἡγωνιστάς.

‘Therefore it is for such harmonies and for such melodies that we must establish the competitions of musical performers,’ i. e. we must leave such strains of art to regular performers.

παρακεχρωσμένα.

παραχρώσεις are explained to mean ‘deviations from the received scale in music.’

ἢ δ’ ἢ τῆς πολιτείας Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τῆν ἡρυσιστῆ μόνην καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ τὰ ἡποδοκιμάσας τῶν ἡργάνων τῆν ἀλόν.

This criticism of Plato appears to be just.

καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἡχειρήσας ἢ τῆς δωριστῆ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοῦ μύθους.

The emendation Μύσους (adopted by Bekker in his 2nd edition) is unnecessary. The words may also mean ‘to compose a dithyramb called the “Fables.”’ Whether fables could be written in a dithyrambic form or not, the difficulty which Philoxenus

experienced was of another kind: what he found hopeless was the attempt to compose dithyrambic poetry adapted to the severe Dorian music.

δηλον ὅτι τούτους ῥους τρεῖς

is abruptly expressed and possibly something may be omitted. The general meaning is 'that if there be a harmony suited to the young it must be tested by the three principles of education; the mean, the possible, the becoming.'

Without assuming that Aristotle wrote a complete treatise on the subject of education, in which he includes gymnastic, music, drawing, and literature (cp. c. 3. § 1), it is hard to imagine that, if the work had received from his hands its present form, he would have broken off in this abrupt manner.

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[*] δεισόζου = stinking; cp. Suidas, s. v. δεισαλέος:—δεισαλέος, κοπρώδης. δε??σα γ?ρ ? κόπρος.

[1] al. lect. σω?μά τε κα? δύναμις.